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Preface
1 INTRODUCTION
The central topic of this book is application-level fault-tolerance, that is the methods,
architectures, and tools that allow to express a fault-tolerant system in the application
software of our computers. Application-level fault-tolerance is a sub-class of software
fault-tolerance that focuses on the problems of expressing the problems and solutions
of fault-tolerance in the top layer of the hierarchy of virtual machines that constitutes
our computers. This book shows that application-level fault-tolerance is a key
ingredient to craft truly dependable computer systems—other approaches, such as
hardware fault-tolerance, operating system fault-tolerance, or fault-tolerant
middleware, are also important ingredients to achieve resiliency, but they are not
enough. Failing to address the application layer means leaving a backdoor open to
problems such as design faults, interaction faults, or malicious attacks, whose
consequences on the quality of service could be as unfortunate as, e.g., a physical
fault affecting the system platform. In other words, in most cases it is simply not
possible to achieve complete coverage against a given set of faults or erroneous
conditions without embedding fault-tolerance provisions also in the application layer.
In what follows the provisions for application-level fault-tolerance are called
application-level fault-tolerance protocols.
As a lecturer in this area, I wrote this book as my ideal textbook for a possible course
on resilient computing and for my doctoral students in software dependability at the
University of Antwerp. Despite this, the main goal of this book is
not—only—education. The main mission of this book is first of all spreading the
awareness of the necessity of application-level fault-tolerance. Another critical goal is
highlighting the role of several important concepts that are often neglected or
misunderstood: The fault and the system models, i.e., the assumptions on top of
which our computer services are designed and constructed. Last but not the least of
our goals, this book aims to provide a clear view to the state-of-the-art of
application-level fault-tolerance, also highlighting in the process a number of lessons
learned through hands-on experiences gathered in more than 10 years of work in the
area of resilient computing.
It is our belief that any person who wants to include dependability among the design
goals of their intended software services should have a clear understanding of
concepts such as dependability, system models, failure semantics, and fault models
and of their influence on their final product’s quality of experience. Such information
is often scattered among research papers while it is presented here in a unitary
Application-level fault-tolerance is defined in what follows as the sub-class of software
fault-tolerance that focuses on how to express the problems and solutions of
fault-tolerance in the top layer of the hierarchy of virtual machines that constitutes our
computers. Traditionally research in this sub-class was initiated by Brian Randell with his
now classical article on which system structure to give our programs in order to be
tolerant to faults (Randell, 1975). The key problem expressed in that paper was that of a
cost-effective solution to embed fault-tolerance in the application software. Recovery
blocks (treated in Chapter 4) was the proposed solution. Randell was also the first to state
the insufficiency of fault-tolerance solutions based exclusively on hardware designs and
the need of appropriate structuring techniques such that the incorporation of a set of
fault-tolerance provisions in the application software could be performed in a simple,
coherent, and well structured way. A first proposal for the embedding recovery blocks in a
programming language was proposed shortly afterwards (Shrivastava, 1978). Leaving the
safe path of hardware fault-tolerance brought about new problems and challenges:
Hardware redundancy guarantees random component failures, while software replication
does not guarantee statistical independence of failures. In other words, a single cause may
produce many (undesirable) effects. This means that “in software the redundancy required
is not simple replication of programs but redundancy of design” (Randell, 1975). An
answer to this problem and another important milestone was the conception of N -version
programming by Algirdas Aviz˘ienis (Aviz˘ienis, 1985), which combines hardware and
information redundancy in the attempt to reduce the chance of correlated failures in the
software components. At the same time, the very meaning of computing and
programming was evolving, again bringing new possibilities but also opening up new
problems and challenges: The spread of distributed systems meant also the end of the
purely synchronous model for computing and communication (see for instance (Jalote,
1994) and (Lamport, Shostak, & Pease, 1982) and Chapter 2); object orientation made it
possible to easily reuse third-party software components, but turned our applications into
a chain of links of unknown strength and trustworthiness (Green, 1997). The logics for
assembling the links together is in our applications, hence it is clear that the logics to
prevent the break of those links to lead to disaster must also involve the application
layer (Saltzer, Reed, & Clark, 1984). Luckily from the object model there began to stem
several variants, such as composition filters, distributed objects, or fragmented objects,
that would provide the programmer with powerful tools for fault-tolerance programming
in the application layer (see Chapter 6 for a few examples). Other approaches are also
being devised, e.g. aspect-oriented programming—though their potential as
fault-tolerance language is yet to be confirmed (see Chapter 8 for a brief introduction).
Still other approaches are also discussed in this book. A special accent is given to those
approaches where the author had first-hand experience with. In one case—the Ariel
recovery language—the reader is provided with enough details to even understand how
the approach has been crafted. We are now at the verge of yet another change, with
ubiquitous computing, service orientation and the novel Web technology promising to
serve us as even more powerful solutions to accompany us in the transition towards the
Information Society of tomorrow. Such topics would require a book on their own and have
not been treated here. Still the problems of application-level fault-tolerance are with us,
while to date no ultimate and general-purpose solution has been found out. This book is
about this possibly unique case in computer science and engineering of a problem yet
unsolved though being formulated more than 30 years ago.
Table 1: A short introduction to application-level fault-tolerance
framework and from the viewpoint of the application-level dependable software
engineer.
Another aspect that makes this book unique from all others in the field is the fact that
concepts are described with examples that, in some cases, reach a deep level of detail.
This is not the case in all chapters, as it reflects the spectrum of working experiences
that the author had during more than a decade of research in this area. Any such
spectrum is inherently not uniformly distributed. As a consequence some chapters
provide the reader with in-depth knowledge, down to the level of source code
examples, while others just introduce the reader into the subject, explain the main
concepts, and place the topic in the wider context of methods treated in this book. To
increase readability, we isolated some of the most technical texts into quoted sections
typed in blue.
Furthermore, this book has a privileged viewpoint, which is the one of real-time,
concurrent, and embedded system design. This book does not focuses in particular on
the design of fault-tolerance provisions for service-oriented applications, such as web
services, and does not cover fault-tolerance in the middleware layer.
In what follows the background top-level information and the structure of this book
are introduced.
2 BACKGROUND AND STRUCTURE
No man conceived tool in human history has ever permeated so many aspects of
human life as the computer has been doing for the last 60 years. An outstanding
aspect of this success story is certainly given by an overwhelming increase in
computer performance. Another one, also very evident, is the continuous decrease of
costs of computer devices—A 1000$ PC today provides its user with more
performance, memory, and disk space of a million dollar mainframe of the Sixties.
Clearly performance and costs are “foreground figures”—society at large is well
aware of their evolution and of the societal consequences of the corresponding spread
of computers. On the other hand this process is also characterized by “background
figures”, that is, properties that are often overlooked despite their great relevance.
Among such properties it is worth mentioning the growth in complexity and the
crucial character of the roles nowadays assigned to computers: Human society more
and more expects and relies on good quality of complex services supplied by
computers. More and more these services become vital, in the sense that lack of
timely delivery ever more often can have immediate consequences on capitals, the
environment, and even human lives. Strangely though it may appear, the common
man is well aware that computers get ever more powerful and less expensive, but
doesn’t seem to be aware or even care about computers being safe and up to their ever
more challenging tasks. The turn of the century brought about this problem for the
first time—the Millennium Bug, also known as Y2K, reached the masses with striking
force, as a tsunami of sudden awareness that “yes, computers are powerful, but even
computers can fail.”
Y2K ultimately did not show up, and the dreaded scenarios of a society
simultaneously stripped by its computer services ended up in a few minor accidents.
Figure 1: Perception of dependability in the Sixties (TM& c© 2008 Marvel Characters,
Inc. All Rights Reserved.)
But society had had a glimpse to some of the problems that are central to this book:
Why do we trust computer services? Are there modeling, design, development
practices, conceptual tools, and concrete methods, to convince me that when I take a
computer service, that service will be reliable, safe, secure, available? In other words,
is there a science of computer dependability, such that reliance of computer systems
can be measured, hence quantitatively justified? And, is there an engineering of
computer dependability, such that trustworthy computer services can be effectively
achieved? Dependability—the discipline that studies those problems—is introduced
in Chapter 1.
This book in particular focuses on fault-tolerance, which is described in Chapter 1
as one of the “means” for dependability: Fault-tolerance is one of the four classes of
methods and techniques enabling one to provide the ability to deliver a service on
which reliance can be placed, and to reach confidence in this ability (together with
fault prevention, fault removal, and fault forecasting). Its core objective is “preserving
the delivery of expected services despite the presence of fault-caused errors within the
system itself” (Aviz˘ienis, 1985). The exact meaning of faults and errors is also given
in the cited chapter, together with an introduction to fault-tolerance mainly derived
from the works of Jean-Claude Laprie (Laprie, 1992, 1995, 1998, 1985). What is
important to remark here is that fault-tolerance acts after faults have manifested
themselves in the system: Its main assumption is that faults are inevitable, but they
must be tolerated, which is fundamentally different from other approaches where, e.g.,
faults are sought to be avoided in the first place. Why focusing on fault-tolerance, why
is it so important? For the same reason referred above as a background figure in the
history of the relationship between human society and computers: The growth in
complexity. Systems get more and more complex, and there are no effective methods
that can provide us with a zero-fault guarantee. The bulk of the research of computer
scientists and engineers concentrated on methods to pack conveniently ever more
complexity in computer systems. Software in particular has become a point of
accumulation of complexity, and the main focus so far has been on how to express and
compose complex software modules so as to tackle ever new challenging problems
rather than dealing with the inevitable faults introduced by that complexity. Layered
design is a classical method to deal with complexity.
Software, software fault-tolerance, and application-level software fault-tolerance, are
the topics of Chapter 2. It is explained what does it mean that a program is
fault-tolerant and what are the properties expected from a fault-tolerant program. The
main objective of Chapter 2 is introducing two sets of design assumptions that shape
the way people structure their fault-tolerant software—the system and the fault
models. Often misunderstood or underestimated, those models describe
• what is expected from the execution environment in order to let our software
system function correctly,
• and what are the faults that our system is going to consider. Note that a
fault-tolerant program shall (try to) tolerate only those faults stated in the fault
model, and will be as defenseless against all other faults as any non
fault-tolerant program.
Together with the system specification, the fault and system models represent the
foundation on top of which our computer services are built. Not surprisingly enough,
weak foundations often result in fragile constructions. To provide evidence to this, the
chapter introduces three well-known accidents—the Ariane 5 flight 501 and
Mariner-1 disasters and the Therac-25 accidents (Leveson, 1995). In each case it has
been stressed out what went wrong, what were the biggest mistakes, and how a careful
understanding of fault models and system models would have helped highlighting the
path to avoid catastrophic failures that cost considerable amounts of money and even
the lives of innocent people.
After this, the chapter focuses on the core topic of this book, application-level
software fault-tolerance. Main questions addressed here are: How to express and
achieve fault-tolerance in the mission layer? And, why is application-level software
fault-tolerance so important? The main reason for this is that a computer service is the
result of the concurrent execution of several “virtual” and physical machines (see
Fig. 2). Some of these machines run a predefined, special-purpose service, meant to
serve—unmodified—many different applications. The hardware, the operating
system, the network layers, the middleware, a programming language’s run-time
executive, and so forth, are common names of those machines. A key message in this
book is that tolerating the faults in one machine does not protect from faults
originating in another one. This includes the application layer. Now, while the
machines “below” the application provide architectural (special-purpose) complexity,
the mission layer contributes to computer services with general-purpose complexity,
Figure 2: Computer Services are the result of layered designs. The higher you go, the
more specialized is the layer.
which is intrinsically less reliable. This and other reasons justifying the need for
application-level software fault-tolerance are given in that chapter. The main
references here are (Randell, 1975; Lyu, 1998a, 1998b).
Chapter 2 also introduces what the author considers to be the three main properties of
application-level software fault-tolerance: Separation of design concerns, adaptability,
and syntactical adequacy (De Florio & Blondia, 2008b). In this context the key
questions are: Given a certain fault-tolerance provision, is it able to guarantee an
adequate separation of the functional and non-functional design concerns? Does it
tolerate a fixed, predefined set of faulty scenarios, or does it dynamically change that
set? And, is it flexible enough as to host a large number of different strategies, or is it
a “hardwired” solution tackling a limited set of strategies?
Finally, this chapter defines a few fundamental fault-tolerance services, namely
watchdog timers, exception handling, transactions, and checkpointing-and-rollback.
After having described the context and the “rules of the game”, this book discusses
the state of the art in application-level fault-tolerance protocols. First, in Chapter 3,
the focus is on so-called single-version and multiple-version software
fault-tolerance (Aviz˘ienis, 1985).
• Single-version protocols are methods that use a non-distributed, single task
provision, running side by side with the functional software, often available in
the form of a library and a run-time executive.
• Multiple-version protocols are methods that use actively a form of redundancy,
as explained in what follows. In particular the chapter discusses recovery blocks
and N-version programming.
Chapter 3 also features several in-depth case studies deriving from the author’s
research experiences in the field of resilient computing. In particular the EFTOS
fault-tolerance library (Deconinck, De Florio, Lauwereins, & Varvarigou, 1997;
Deconinck, Varvarigou, et al., 1997) is introduced as an example of application-level
single-version software fault-tolerance approach. In that general framework, the
EFTOS tools for exception handling, distributed voting, watchdog timers,
fault-tolerant communication, atomic transactions, and data stabilization, are
discussed. The reader is also given a detailed description of RAFTNET (Raftnet,
n.d.), a fault-tolerance library for data parallel applications.
A second large class of application-level fault-tolerance protocols is the focus of
Chapter 4, namely the one that works “around” the programming language, that is to
say either embedded in the compiler or via language transformations driven by
translators. In that chapter it is also discussed the design of a translator supporting
language-independent extensions called reflective and refractive variables and
linguistic support for adaptively redundant data structures.
• Reflective and refractive variables (De Florio & Blondia, 2007a) are syntactical
structures to express adaptive feedback loops in the application layer. This is
useful to resilient computing because a feedback loop can attach error recovery
strategies to error detection events.
• Redundant variables (De Florio & Blondia, 2008a) are a tool that allows
designers to make use of adaptively redundant data structures with commodity
programming languages such as C or Java. Designers using such tool can define
redundant data structures in which the degree of redundancy is not fixed once
and for all at design time, but rather it changes dynamically with respect to the
disturbances experienced during the run time.
The chapter shows that by a simple translation approach it is possible to provide
sophisticated features such as adaptive fault-tolerance to programs written in any
programming language.
In Chapter 5 te reader gets in touch with methods that work at the level of the
language itself: Custom fault-tolerance programming languages. In this approach
fault-tolerance is not embedded in the program, nor around the programming
language, but provided through the syntactical structures and the run-time executives
of fault-tolerance programming languages. Also in this case application-level
complexity is enucleated from the source code and shifted to the architecture, where it
is much easier and cost-effective to tame. Three classes of approaches are
treated—object-oriented languages, functional languages, and hybrid languages. In
the latter class special emphasys is given to Oz (Mu¨ller, Mu¨ller, & Van Roy, 1995), a
multi-paradigm programming language that achieves both transparent distribution and
translucent failure handling.
A separate chapter is devoted to a large case study in fault-tolerant languages: The
so-called recovery language approach (De Florio, 2000; De Florio, Deconinck, &
Lauwereins, 2001). In Chapter 6 the concept of recovery language is first introduced
in general terms and then proposed through an implementation: the Ariel recovery
language and a supporting architecture. That architecture is an evolution of the
EFTOS system described in Chapter 3, and targets distributed applications with
non-strict real-time requirements, written in a procedural language such as C, to be
executed on distributed or parallel computers consisting of a predefined set of
processing nodes. Ariel and its run-time system provide the user with a fault-tolerance
linguistic structure that appears to the user as a sort of second application-level
especially conceived and devoted to address the error recovery concerns. This
separation is very useful at design time, as it allows to bound design complexity. In
Ariel this separation holds also at run-time, because even the executable code for error
recovery is separated from the functional code. This means that, in principle, the error
recovery code could change dynamically so as to match a different set of internal and
environmental conditions. This can be used to avoid “hardwiring” a fault model into
the application—an important property especially when, e.g., the service is embedded
in a mobile terminal (De Florio & Blondia, 2005).
Chapter 7 discusses fault-tolerance protocols based on aspect-oriented
programming (Kiczales et al., 1997), a relatively novel structuring technique with the
ambition to become the reference solution for system development, the way
object-orientation did starting with the Eighties. We must remark how aspects and
their currently available implementations have not yet reached a maturity comparable
with that of the other techniques discussed in this book. For instance, the chapter
remarks how no aspect-oriented fault-tolerance language has been proposed to date
and, at least in same cases, the adequacy of aspects as a syntactical structure to host
fault-tolerance provisions has been questioned. On the other hand, aspects allow
regarding the source code as a flexible web of syntactic fragments that the designer
can rearrange with great ease, deriving modified source codes matching particular
goals, e.g. performance and, hopefully in the near future, dependability. The chapter
explains how aspects allow to separate design concerns, which bounds complexity and
enhances maintainability, and presents three programming languages:
AspectJ (Kiczales, 2000), AspectC++ (Spinczyk, Lohmann, & Urban, 2005) and
GluonJ (GluonJ, n.d.).
The following chapter, Chapter 8, deals with failure detection protocols in the
application layer. First the concept of failure detection (Chandra & Toueg, 1996), a
fundamental building block to develop fault-tolerant distributed systems, is
introduced. Then the relationship between failure detection and system models is
highlighted—the key assumptions on which our dependable services are built, which
were introduced in Chapter 2. Then it is introduced a tool for the expression of this
class of protocols (De Florio & Blondia, 2007b), based on a library of objects called
time-outs (V. De Florio, 2006). Finally a case study is described in detail: The failure
detection protocol employed by the so-called EFTOS DIR net (De Florio, Deconinck,
& Lauwereins, 2000), a distributed “backbone” for fault-tolerance management which
was introduced in Chapter 3 and that later evolved into the so-called Backbone
discussed in Chapter 6.
Hybrid approaches are the focus of Chapter 9, that is, fault-tolerance protocols that
blend two or more methods among those reported in previous chapters. In more detail
RεLinda is introduced—a system coupling the recovery language approach of
Chapter 6 and generative communication, one of the models introduced in
Chapter 4 (De Florio & Deconinck, 2001). After this the recovery
language-empowered extensions of two single-version mechanisms previously
introduced in Chapter 3 are described, namely a distributed voting mechanism and a
watchdog timer (De Florio, Donatelli, & Dondossola, 2002). The main lessons
learned in this case are that the recovery language approach allows to fast-prototype
complex strategies by composing a set of building blocks together and by building
system-wide, recovery-time coordination strategies with the Ariel language. This
allows set up sophisticated fault-tolerance systems while keeping the management of
their complexity outside of the user application. Other useful properties achieved in
this way are transparency of replication and transparency of location.
Chapter 10 provides three examples of approaches used to assess the dependability
of application-level provisions. In the first case reliability analysis is used to quantify
the benefits of coupling an approach such as recovery languages to a distributed
voting mechanism (De Florio, Deconinck, & Lauwereins, 1998). Then a tool is used
to systematically inject faults onto the adaptively redundant data structure discussed in
Chapter 4 (De Florio & Blondia, 2008a). Monitoring and fault-injection are the topic
of the third case, where a hypermedia application to watch and control a dependable
service is introduced (De Florio, Deconinck, Truyens, Rosseel, & Lauwereins, 1998).
Chapter 11 concludes the book by summarizing the main lessons learned. It also
offers a view to the internals of the application-level fault-tolerance provision
described in Chapter 6—the Ariel recovery language.
3 SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS
Application software development is not an easy task; writing truly dependable
fault-tolerant applications is even more difficult, not only in itself for the additional
complexity required by fault-tolerance but often also because of the lack of awareness
which is necessary in order to master the complexity of this tricky task.
The first and foremost contribution of this book is increasing the awareness of the role
and significance of application-level fault-tolerance. This has been reached by
highlighting important concepts that are often neglected or misunderstood, as well as
introducing the available tools and approaches that can be used to craft high-quality
dependable services by working also in the application layer.
Secondly, this book summarizes the most widely known approaches to
application-level software fault-tolerance. A base of properties in which those
approaches can be compared and assessed is defined.
Finally, this book features a collection of several research experiences the author had
in the field of resilient computing through his participation to several research projects
funded by the European Community. This large first-hand experience is reflected into
the deep level of detail that is reached in some cases.
We hope that the above contributions will prove useful to the readers and intrigue
them into entering the interesting arena of resilient computing research and
development. Also, too many times the lack of awareness and know-how in resilient
computing has brought the designers to supposedly robust systems whose failures had
in some cases dreadful consequences on capitals, the environment, and even human
lives—as a joke we call them sometimes “endangeneers”. We hope that this book may
contribute to the spread of that awareness and know-how that should always be part of
the education of dependable software engineers. This important requirement is
witnessed by several organizations such as the European Workshop on Industrial
Computer Systems Reliability, Safety and Security, technical committee 7), whose
mission is “To promote the economical and efficient realization of programmable
industrial systems through education, information exchange, and the elaboration of
standards and guidelines” (EWICS, n.d.), and the ReSIST network of
excellence (ReSIST, n.d.), which is developing a resilient computing curriculum
recommended to all people involved in teaching dependability-related subjects.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The general objective of this chapter is to introduce the basic concepts and the
terminology of the domain of dependability. Concepts such as reliability,
safety, or security, have been used inconsistently by different communities of
researchers: The real-time system community, the secure computing
1
community, and so forth, each had its own “lingo” and was referring to
concepts such faults, errors and failures without the required formal
foundation. This changed in the early Nineties, when Jean-Claude Laprie
finally introduced a tentative model for dependable computing. To date, the
Laprie model of dependability is the most widespread and accepted formal
definition for the terms that play a key role in this book. As a consequence,
the rest of this chapter introduces that model.
2 DEPENDABILITY, RESILIENT
COMPUTING, AND FAULT-TOLERANCE
As just mentioned the central topic of this chapter is dependability, defined
in (Laprie, 1985) as the trustworthiness of a computer system such that
reliance can justifiably be placed on the service it delivers. In this context,
service means the manifestations of a set of external events perceived by the
user as the behavior of the system (Aviz˘ienis, Laprie, & Randell, 2004)
user means another system, e.g., a human being, or a physical device, or a
computer application, interacting with the former one.
The concept of dependability as described herein was first introduced by
Jean-Claude Laprie (Laprie, 1985) as a contribution to an effort by IFIP
Working Group 10.4 (Dependability and Fault-Tolerance) aiming at the
establishment of a standard framework and terminology for discussing reliable
and fault-tolerant systems. The cited paper and other works by Laprie are the
main sources for this chapter—in particular (Laprie, 1992), later revised
as (Laprie, 1995) and (Laprie, 1998). A more recent work in this framework
is (Aviz˘ienis, Laprie, Randell, & Landwehr, 2004). Professor Laprie is
continuously revising his model, also with the contributions of various teams of
researchers in Europe and abroad—let me just cite here the EWICS TC7
(European Workshop on Industrial Computer Systems Reliability, Safety and
Security, technical committee 7), whose mission is “To promote the economical
and efficient realization of programmable industrial systems through
education, information exchange, and the elaboration of standards and
guidelines” (EWICS, n.d.), and the ReSIST network of excellence (ReSIST,
n.d.), boasting a 50-million items resilience knowledge base (Anderson,
Andrews, & Fitzgerald, 2007), which developed a resilient computing
curriculum recommended to all involved in teaching dependability-related
subjects.
Laprie’s is the most famous and accepted definition of dependability, but it is
certainly not the only one. Not surprisingly, due to the societal relevance of
such a topic, dependability has also slightly different definitions (Motet &
Geffroy, 2003). According to Sommervilla (Sommervilla, 2006), for instance,
dependability is “The extent to which a critical system is trusted by its users”.
This is clearly a definition that focuses more on how the user perceives the
system than on how the system actually is trustworthy. It reflects the extent
of the user’s confidence that the system will operate as users expect and in
particular without failures.
In other words, dependability is considered by Sommervilla and others as a
measure of the quality of experience of a given user and a given service. From
this descends that the objective of dependability engineers is not to make
services failure-proof, but to let its users believe so! Paraphrasing Patterson
and Hennessy (Patterson & Hennessy, 1996), if a particular hazard does not
occur very frequently, it may not be worth the cost to avoid it. This means
that residual faults are not only inevitable, but sometimes even expected. It’s
the notion of “dependability economics”: Because of the very high costs of
dependability achievement, in some cases it may be more cost effective to
accept untrustworthy systems and pay for failure costs. This is especially
relevant when time-to-market is critical to a product’s commercial success.
Reaching the market sooner with a sub-optimal product may bring more
revenues than doing so with a perfectly reliable product surrounded by early
bird competitors that have already captured the interest and trust of the
public.
In what follows the book shall stick to Laprie’s model of dependability.
Following such model, a precise and complete characterization of dependability
is given
1. by enumerating its basic properties or attributes,
2. by explaining which phenomena constitute potential impairments to it,
and
3. by reviewing the scientific disciplines and the techniques that can be
adopted as means for improving dependability.
Attributes, impairments, and means can be globally represented into one
picture as a tree, traditionally called the dependability tree (Laprie, 1995) (see
Fig. 1).
2.1 The Attributes of Dependability
As just mentioned, dependability is a general concept that embraces a number
of different properties (Walkerdine, Melville, & Sommerville, 2002). These
properties correspond to different viewpoints from which the user perceives the
quality of the offered service—in other words, for different users there will be
in general different key properties corresponding to a positive assessment of
the service:
• Availability is the name of the property that addresses the readiness
for usage.
• Reliability is the property that measures the continuity of service
delivery.
Figure 1: The dependability tree
• The property expressing the reliance on the non-occurrence of events
with catastrophic consequences on the environment is known as safety.
• The property that measures the reliance on the non-occurrence of
unauthorized disclosure of information has been called confidentiality.
• The property that measures the reliance on the non-occurrence of
improper alterations of information has been called integrity.
• The property that expresses the ability to undergo repairs and upgrades
has been called maintainability.
These properties qualify dependability, and therefore are known as its
attributes (Laprie, 1995). Certain combinations of these attributes received a
special name—security (Jonsson, 1998; Bodeaum, 1992), for instance, is
defined as the conjoint requirement for integrity, availability, and
confidentiality.
This section defines a number of important measures of a system’s quality of
service, including some of the attributes presented in Sect. 2.1 that are most
relevant in what follows.
2.1.1 Reliability
When we take a plane, or even just a lift, the key property we expect from the
computer system behind the service is that it proceed without flaws for the
entire duration of the service. Any disruption of the service in the middle of
the run would be disastrous. Reliability is the property that measures the
continuity of service delivery. In other words, one expects—and hopes!—that
airborne systems be reliable throughout their flights!
More formally, reliability is defined as the conditional probability
that the system will perform correctly throughout interval [t0, t],
given that the system was performing correctly at time
t0 (Johnson, 1989). Time t0 is usually omitted and taken as the
current time. The general notation for reliability is therefore R(t).
The negative counterpart of reliability, unreliability, is defined as
Q(t) = 1−R(t), and represents the conditional probability that the system
will perform incorrectly during the interval [t0, t], given that the system was
performing correctly at time t0. Unreliability is also known as the probability
of failure.
2.1.2 Mean Time To Failure, Mean Time To Repair, and Mean
Time Between Failures
If a system is known to fail, it makes sense to ask how long the system can be
expected to run without problems. Such figure is called Mean Time to Failure
(MTTF). MTTF is defined as the expected time that a system will operate
before the occurrence of its first failure.
Another important property is Mean Time to Repair (MTTR). MTTR is
defined as the average time required for repairing a system. It is often
specified by means of a repair rate µ, namely the average number of repairs
that occur per time unit.
Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) is the average time between any two
consecutive failures of a system. This is slightly different from MTTF which
regards on a system’s very first failure. The following relation holds:
MTBF = MTTF +MTTR.
As it is usually true that MTTR is a small fraction of MTTF, it is usually
allowed to assume that MTBF ≈ MTTF.
2.1.3 Availability
When we need to perform a banking transaction, or when we press the brake
pedal while driving our car, or when we take an elevator and press the key
corresponding to the floor we need to reach, the key property we expect from
the system is that it serve us—it allow us to complete our transaction, or to
slow down our car, or simply that the elevator works. What really matters is
not how long the system worked so far, but that it works the moment we need
it. This property is called availability.
Availability is defined as a function of time representing the probability that a
service is operating correctly and is available to perform its functions at the
instant of time t (Johnson, 1989). It is usually represented as function A(t).
Availability represents a property at a given point in time, whereas reliability
concerns time intervals. These two properties are not to be mistaken with
each other—a system might exhibit a good degree of availability and yet be
rather unreliable, e.g., when inoperability is pointwise or rather short.
Availability can be approximated as the total time that a system
has been capable of supplying its intended service divided by the
elapsed time that system has been in operation, i.e., the percentage
of time that the system is available to perform its expected
functions. The steady-state availability can be proven (Johnson,
1989) to be
Ass =
MTTF
MTTF +MTTR
·
2.1.4 Safety
Safety is the attribute of dependability that measures a system’s ability to
operate, normally or not, without damaging that system’s
environment (Sommervilla, 2006). So though it might seem a little strange at
first, safety does not take into account the correctness of the system. In other
words, while e.g. reliability is a functional attribute, this is not the case for
safety. With reliability, quality is related to conformance to the functional
specifications. With safety, quality is non-functional. A crashed system would
exhibit minimal reliability and maximal safety. As remarked by Sommervilla,
because of the increasing number of software-based control systems, software
safety is being recognized as an important aspect of overall system safety.
Systems where the issue of safety is particularly important, to the point that
failures may lead to loss of lives or severe environmental damages are called
life-critical or mission-critical systems (Storey, 1996). An example architecture
for safety-critical systems is Cardamon (Corsaro, 2005).
2.1.5 Maintainability
Maintainability is a function of time representing the probability that a failed
system will be repaired in a time less than or equal to t.
Maintainability can be estimated as
M(t) = 1− exp−µt,
µ being the repair rate, assumed to be constant (see Sect. 2.1.2).
2.2 Impairments to Dependability
Hardware and software systems must conform to certain specifications, i.e.,
agreed upon descriptions of the expected system response corresponding to
any initial system state and input, as well as the time interval within which
the response should occur. This includes a description of the functional
behavior of the system—basically, what the system is supposed to do, or in
other words, a description of its service—and possibly a description of other,
non-functional requirements. Some of these requirements may concern the
dependability of the service.
In real life, any system is subject to internal or external events that can affect
in different ways the quality of its service. These events have been partitioned
into three classes by their cause-effect relationship: depending on this, an
impairment can be classified as a fault, an error, or a failure. When the
delivered service of a system deviates from its specification, the user of the
system experiences a failure. Such failure is due to a deviation from the
correct state of the system, known as an error. That deviation is due to a
given cause, for instance related to the physical state of the system, or to bad
system design. This cause is called a fault. A failure of a system could give
rise to an event that is perceived as a fault by the user of that system,
bringing to a concatenation of cause-and-effects events known as the
“fundamental chain” (Laprie, 1985):
. . . fault ⇒ error ⇒ failure ⇒ fault ⇒ error ⇒ failure ⇒ . . .
(symbol “⇒” can be read as “brings to”). Attributes defined in Sect. 2.1 can
be negatively affected by faults, errors, and failures. For this reason, failures,
errors, and faults have been collectively termed as the “impairments” of
dependability. They are characterized in the following three paragraphs.
2.2.1 Failures
Failures System failures occur when the system does not behave as agreed in
the system specifications or when the system specification did not properly
describe its function. This can happen in many different ways (Cristian, 1991):
omission failures occur when an agreed reply to a well defined request is
missing. The request appears to be ignored;
timing failures occur when the service is supplied, though outside the
real-time interval agreed upon in the specifications. This may occur
when the service is supplied too soon (early timing failure), or too late
(late timing failure, also known as performance failure);
response failures happen either when the system supplies an incorrect output
(in which case the failure is said to be a value failure), or when the
system executes an incorrect state transition (state transition failure);
crash failure is when a system continuously exhibits omission failures until
that system is restarted. In particular, a pause-crash failure occurs
when the system restarts in the state it had right before its crash, while
a halting-crash occurs when the system simply never restarts. When a
restarted system re-initialises itself wiping out the state it had before its
crash, that system is said to have experienced an amnesia crash. It
may also be possible that some part of a system’s state is re-initialized
while the rest is restored to its value before the occurrence of the
crash—this is called a partial-amnesia crash.
Defining the above failure classes allows extending a system’s
specification—that is, the set of its failure-free behaviors—with failure
semantics, i.e., with the failure behavior that system is likely to exhibit upon
failures. This is important when programming strategies for recovery after
failure (Cristian, 1991). For instance, if the service supplied by a
communication system may delay transmitted messages but never lose or
corrupt them, then that system is said to have performance failure semantics.
If that system can delay and also lose them, then it is said to have
omission/performance failure semantics.
In general, if the failure semantics of a system s allows it to exhibit a behavior
in the union of two failure classes F and G, then s is said to have F/G failure
semantics. In other words, the “slash” symbol can be read as the union
operator among sets. For any given s it is possible to count the possible failure
behaviors in a failure class. Let us call b this function from the set of failure
classes to integers. Then, given failure classes F and G,
b(F/G) = b(FUG) = b(F ) + b(G).
Failure semantics can be partially ordered by means of function b:
Given any two failure semantics F and G, then F is said to exhibit
a weaker (less restrictive) failure semantics than G:
F < G ≡ b(F ) > b(G).
In particular, it is true that F/G < F . Therefore, the union of all
possible failure classes represents the weakest failure semantics
possible. If system s exhibits such semantics, s is said to have
arbitrary failure semantics, i.e., s can exhibit any failure
behavior, without any restriction. By its definition, arbitrary
failure semantics is also weaker than arbitrary value failure
semantics. This latter is also known as Byzantine failure
semantics (Lamport, Shostak, & Pease, 1982).
In the case of stateless systems, pause-crash and halting-crash behaviors are
subsets of omission failure behaviors (Cristian, 1991), so omission failure
semantics is in this case weaker than pause-crash and halting-crash failure
semantics.
As clearly stated in (Cristian, 1991), it is the responsibility of a system
designer to ensure that it properly implements a specified failure semantics.
For instance, in order to implement a processing service with crash failure
semantics, one can use duplication with comparison: Two physically
independent processors executing in parallel the same sequence of instructions
and comparing their results after the execution of each instruction. As soon as
a disagreement occurs, the system is shut down (Powell, 1997). Another
possibility is to use self-checking capabilities. Anyway, given any failure
semantics F , it is up to the system designer to decide how to implement it,
also depending on the designer’s other requirements, e.g., those concerning
Figure 2: Failure classes.
costs and expected performance. In general, the weaker the failure semantics,
the more expensive and complex it is its implementation. Moreover, a weak
failure semantics imply higher costs in terms of redundancy exhaustion (see
Sect. 3) and, often, higher performance penalties. For this reason, the designer
may leave the ultimate choice to the user—for instance, the designer of the
Motorola C compiler for the PowerPC allows the user to choose between two
different modes of compilation—the fastest mode does not guarantee that the
state of the system pipeline be restored on return from interrupts (Sun, 1996).
This translates into behaviors belonging to the partial-amnesia crash
semantics. The other mode guarantees the non-occurrence of these behaviors
at the price of a lower performance for the service supplied by that
system—programs compiled with this mode run slower.
Failures can also be characterized according to the classification in
Fig. 2 (Laprie, 1995), corresponding to the different viewpoints of
• failure domain (i.e., whether the failure manifests itself in the time or
value domain),
• failure perception (i.e., whether any two users perceive the failure in
the same way, in which case the failure is said to be consistent, or
differently, in which the failure is said to be inconsistent),
• and consequences on the environment. In particular a failure is said
to be benign when consequences are of the same order as the benefits
provided by normal system operation, while it is said catastrophic when
consequences are incommensurably more relevant than the benefits of
normal operation (Laprie, 1995).
Systems that provide a given failure semantics are often said to exhibit a
“failure mode”. For instance, systems having arbitrary failure semantics (in
both time and value domains) are called fail-uncontrolled systems, while
those only affected by benign failures are said to be fail-safe systems; likewise,
systems with halt-failure semantics are referred to as fail-halt systems. These
terms are also used to express the behavior a system should have when dealing
with multiple failures—for instance, a “fail-op, fail-op, fail-safe” system is one
such that is able to withstand two failures and then behaves as a fail-safe
system (Rushby, 1994) (fail-op stands for “after failure, the system goes back
to operational state”). Finally, it is worth mentioning the fail-time-bounded
failure mode, introduced in (Cuyvers, 1995), which assumes that all errors are
detected within a pre-defined, bounded period after the fault has occurred.
2.2.2 Errors
An error is the manifestation of a fault (Johnson, 1989) in terms of a deviation
from accuracy or correctness of the system state. An error can be either
latent, i.e., when its presence in the system has not been yet perceived, or
detected, otherwise. Error latency is the length of time between the
occurrence of an error and the appearance of the corresponding failure or its
detection.
2.2.3 Faults
A fault (I. Lee & Iyer, 1993) is a defect, or an imperfection, or a lack in a
system’s hardware or software component. It is generically defined as the
adjudged or hypothesised cause of an error. Faults can have their origin within
the system boundaries (internal faults) or outside, i.e., in the environment
(external faults). In particular, an internal fault is said to be active when it
produces an error, and dormant (or latent) when it does not. A dormant fault
becomes an active fault when it is activated by the computation process or the
environment. Fault latency is defined as either the length of time between the
occurrence of a fault and the appearance of the corresponding error, or the
length of time between the occurrence of a fault and its removal.
Faults can be classified according to five viewpoints (Laprie, 1992, 1995,
1998)—phenomenological cause, nature, phase of creation or occurrence,
situation with respect to system boundaries, persistence. Not all combinations
can give rise to a fault class—this process only defines 17 fault classes,
summarized in Fig. 3. These classes have been further partitioned into three
“groups”, known as combined fault classes.
The combined fault classes that are more relevant in the rest of the book are
now briefly characterized:
Physical faults:
• Permanent, internal, physical faults. This class concerns those
faults that have their origin within hardware components and are
continuously active. A typical example is given by the fault
corresponding to a worn out component.
• Temporary, internal, physical faults (also known as intermittent
faults) (Bondavalli, Chiaradonna, Di Giandomenico, & Grandoni,
1997). These are typically internal, physical defects that become
active depending on a particular pointwise condition.
• Permanent, external, physical faults. These are faults induced on
the system by the physical environment.
Figure 3: Laprie’s fault classification scheme.
• Temporary, external, physical faults (also known as transient
faults) (Bondavalli et al., 1997). These are faults induced by
environmental phenomena, e.g., EMI.
Design faults:
• Intentional, though not malicious, permanent / temporary design
faults. These are basically trade-offs introduced at design time. A
typical example is insufficient dimensioning (underestimations of
the size of a given field in a communication protocol1, and so forth).
• Accidental, permanent, design faults (also called systematic faults,
or Bohrbugs): flawed algorithms that systematically turn into the
same errors in the presence of the same input conditions and initial
states—for instance, an unchecked divisor that can result in a
division-by-zero error.
• Accidental, temporary design faults (known as Heisenbugs, for
“bugs of Heisenberg”, after their elusive character): while
systematic faults have an evident, deterministic behavior, these
bugs depend on subtle combinations of the system state and
environment.
Interaction faults:
• Temporary, external, operational, human-made, accidental faults.
These include operator faults, in which an operator does not
correctly perform his or her role in system operation.
• Temporary, external, operational, human-made, non-malicious
faults: “neglect, interaction, or incorrect use problems” (Sibley,
1998). Examples include poorly chosen passwords and bad system
parameter setting.
• Temporary, external, operational, human-made, malicious faults.
This class includes the so-called malicious replication faults, i.e.,
faults that occur when replicated information in a system becomes
inconsistent, either because replicates that are supposed to provide
identical results no longer do so, or because the aggregate of the
data from the various replicates is no longer consistent with system
specifications.
2.3 Means for Dependability
Developing a dependable service, i.e., a service on which reliance can be placed
justifiably, calls for the combined utilisation of a set of methods and techniques
globally referred to as the “means for dependability” (Laprie, 1998):
fault prevention aims at preventing the occurrence or introduction of faults.
Techniques in this category include, e.g., quality assurance and design
methodologies;
fault-tolerance groups methods and techniques to set up services capable of
fulfilling their function in spite of faults;
fault removal aims at reducing the number, incidence, and consequences of
faults. Fault removal is composed of three steps: verification, diagnosis
and correction. Verification checks whether the system adheres to certain
properties—the verification conditions—during the design, development,
production or operation phase; if it does not, the fault(s) preventing
these conditions to be fulfilled must be diagnosed, and the necessary
corrections (corrective maintenance) must be made;
fault forecasting investigates how to estimate the present number, the
future incidence and the consequences of faults. Fault forecasting is
conducted by evaluating the system behavior with respect to fault
occurrence or activation. Qualitatively, it aims at identifying, classifying
and ordering failure modes or at identifying event combinations leading
to undesired effects. Quantitatively, it aims at evaluating (in terms of
probabilities) some of the attributes of dependability.
Of the above mentioned methods, fault-tolerance represents the core tool for
the techniques and tools presented in this book. Because of this, it is discussed
in more detail in Sect. 2.3.1.
2.3.1 Fault-Tolerance
Fault-tolerance methods come into play the moment a fault enters the system
boundaries. Its core objective is “preserving the delivery of expected services
despite the presence of fault-caused errors within the system itself” (Aviz˘ienis,
1985). Fault-tolerance has its roots in hardware systems, where the
assumption of random component failures is substantiated by the physical
characteristics of the adopted devices (Rushby, 1994).
According to (Anderson & Lee, 1981), fault-tolerance can be decomposed into
two sub-techniques—error processing and fault treatment.
Error processing aims at removing errors from the computational state (if
possible, before failure occurrence). It can be based on the following
primitives (Laprie, 1995):
Error detection , which focuses on detecting the presence in the
system of latent errors before they are activated. This can be done,
e.g., by means of built-in self-tests or by comparison with
redundant computations (Rushby, 1994).
Error diagnosis i.e., assessing the damages caused by the detected
errors or by errors propagated before detection.
Error recovery consists of methods to replace an erroneous state with
an error-free state. This replacement takes one of the following
forms:
1. Compensation, which means reverting the erroneous state into
an error-free one exploiting information redundancy available in
the erroneous state, predisposed, e.g., through the adoption of
error correcting codes (Johnson, 1989).
2. Forward recovery, which finds a new state from which the
system can operate (frequently in degraded mode). This
method only allows recovering from errors of which the damage
can be anticipated2—therefore, this method is system
dependent (P. Lee & Anderson, 1990). The main tool for
forward error recovery, according to (Cristian, 1995), is
exception handling.
3. Backward recovery, which substitutes an erroneous state by an
error-free state prior to the error occurrence. As a consequence,
the method requires that, at different points in time (known as
recovery points), the current state of the system be saved in
some stable storage means. If a system state saved in a
recovery point is error-free, it can be used to restore the system
to that state, thus wiping out the effects of transient faults. For
the same reason, this technique allows also to recover from
errors of which the damage cannot or has not been anticipated.
The need for backward error recovery tools and techniques
stems from their ability to prevent the occurrence of failures
originated by transient faults, which are many times more
frequent than permanent faults (Rushby, 1994). The main tools
for backward error recovery are based on
checkpoint-and-rollback (Deconinck, 1996) and recovery
blocks (Randell, 1975) (see Chapter 3).
According to (Rushby, 1994), an alternative technique with respect to
error recovery is fault masking, classically achieved by modular
redundancy (Johnson, 1989): a redundant set of components perform
independently on the same input value. Results are voted upon. The
basic assumption of this method is again that of random component
failures—in other words, to be effective, modular redundancy requires
statistical independence, because correlated failures translate in
contemporary exhaustion of the available redundancy. Unfortunately a
number of experiments (Eckhardt et al., 1991) and theoretical
studies (Eckhardt & Lee, 1985) have shown that often this assumption is
incorrect, to the point that even independent faults are able to produce
correlated failures. In this context, the concept of design diversity (or
N -version programming) came up (Aviz˘ienis, 1985). It is discussed in
Chapter 3.
Fault treatment aims at preventing faults from being re-activated. It can be
based on the following primitives (Laprie, 1995):
Fault diagnosis i.e., identifying the cause(s) of the error(s), in location
and nature, i.e. determining the fault classes to which the faults
belong. This is different from error diagnosis; besides, different
faults can lead to the same error.
Fault passivation i.e., preventing the re-activation of the fault. This
step is not necessary if the error recovery step removes the fault, or
if the likelihood of re-activation of the fault is low enough.
Reconfiguration updates the structure of the system so that non-failed
components fulfill the system function, possibly at a degraded level,
even though some other components have failed.
3 FAULT-TOLERANCE, REDUNDANCY,
AND COMPLEXITY
A well-known result by Shannon (Shannon, Winer, & Sloane, 1993) tells us
that, from any unreliable channel, it is possible to set up a more reliable
channel by increasing the degree of information redundancy. This means that
it is possible to trade off reliability and redundancy of a channel. The author of
this book observes that the same can be said for a fault-tolerant system,
because fault-tolerance is in general the result of some strategy effectively
exploiting some form of redundancy—time, information, and/or hardware
redundancy (Johnson, 1989). This redundancy has a cost penalty attached,
though. Addressing a weak failure semantics, able to span many failure
behaviors, effectively translates in higher reliability—nevertheless,
1. it requires large amounts of extra resources, and therefore implies a
high cost penalty, and
2. it consumes large amounts of extra resources, which translates into the
rapid exhaustion of the extra resources.
For instance, a well-known result by Lamport et al. (Lamport et al., 1982) sets
the minimum level of redundancy required for tolerating Byzantine failures to
a value that is greater than the one required for tolerating, e.g., value failures.
Using the simplest of the algorithms described in the cited paper, a
4-modular-redundant (4-MR) system can only withstand any single Byzantine
failure, while the same system may exploit its redundancy to withstand up to
three crash faults—though no other kind of fault (Powell, 1997). In other
words:
After the occurrence of a crash fault, a 4-MR system with strict
Byzantine failure semantics has exhausted its redundancy and is no
more dependable than a non-redundant system supplying the same
service, while the crash failure semantics system is able to survive
to the occurrence of that and two other crash faults. On the other
hand, the latter system, subject to just one Byzantine fault, would
fail regardless its redundancy.
Therefore, for any given level of redundancy, trading complexity of failure
mode against number and type of faults tolerated may be considered as an
important capability for an effective fault-tolerant structure. Dynamic
adaptability to different environmental conditions3 may provide a satisfactory
answer to this need, especially when the additional complexity does not
burden (and jeopardize) the application. Ideally, such complexity should be
part of a custom architecture and not of the application. On the contrary, the
embedding in the application of complex failure semantics, covering many
failure modes, implicitly promotes complexity, as it may require the
implementation of many recovery mechanisms. This complexity is detrimental
to the dependability of the system, as it is in itself a significant source of
design faults. Furthermore, the isolation of that complexity outside the user
application may allow cost-effective verification, validation and testing. These
processes may be unfeasible at application level.
The author of this book conjectures that a satisfactory solution to the design
problem of the management of the fault-tolerance code (presented in
Chapter 2) may translate in an optimal management of the failure semantics
(with respect to the involved penalties). The fault-tolerance linguistic
structure proposed in Chapter 6 allows solving the above problems by means
of its adaptability.
4 CONCLUSION
This chapter has introduced the reader to Laprie’s model of dependability
describing its attributes, impairments, and means. The central topic of this
book, fault-tolerance, has also been briefly discussed. The complex relation
between the management of fault-tolerance, of redundancy, and of complexity,
has been pointed out. In particular, a link has been conjectured between
attribute adaptability and the dynamic ability to trade off the complexity of
failure mode against number and type of faults being tolerated.
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Notes
1A noteworthy example is given by the bad dimensioning of IP addresses. Currently, an IP
address consists of four sections separated by periods. Each section contains an 8-bit value,
for a total of 32 bits per address. Normally this would allow for more than 4 billion possible
IP addresses—a rather acceptable value. Unfortunately, due to a lavish method for assigning
IP address space, IP addresses are rapidly running out. A new protocol, IPv6 (Hinden &
Deering, 1995), is going to fix this problem through larger data fields (128-bit addresses) and
a more flexible allocation algorithm.
2In general, program specifications are not complete: there exist input states for which
the behavior of the corresponding program P has been left unspecified. No forward recovery
technique can be applied to deal with errors resulting from executing P on these input states.
On the contrary, if a given specification is complete, that is, if each input state is covered in
the set G of all the standard and exceptional specifications for P , and if P is totally correct ,
i.e. fully consistent with what prescribed in G, then P is said to be robust (Cristian, 1995).
In this case forward recovery can be used as an effective tool for error recovery.
3The following quote by J. Horning (Horning, 1998) captures very well how relevant may be
the role of the environment with respect to achieving the required quality of service: “What
is the most often overlooked risk in software engineering? That the environment will do
something the designer never anticipated”.
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1 INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES
After having described the main characteristics of dependability and
fault-tolerance, it is analyzed here in more detail what does it mean that a
program is fault-tolerant and what are the properties expected from a
fault-tolerant program. The main objective of this chapter is introducing two
sets of design assumptions that shape the way our fault-tolerant software is
structured—the system and the fault models. Often misunderstood or
underestimated, those models describe
• what is expected from the execution environment in order to let our
software system function correctly,
• and what are the faults that our system is going to consider. Note that a
fault-tolerant program shall (try to) tolerate only those faults stated in
the fault model, and will be as defenseless against all other faults as any
non fault-tolerant program.
Together with the system specification, the fault and system models represent
the foundation on top of which our computer services are built. It is not
surprising that weak foundations often result in falling constructions. What is
really surprising is that in so many cases little or no attention had been given
to those important factors in fault-tolerant software engineering. To give an
idea of this, three well-known accidents are described—the Ariane 5 flight 501
and Mariner-1 disasters and the Therac-25 accidents. In each case it is
stressed what went wrong, what were the biggest mistakes, and how a careful
understanding of fault models and system models would have helped
highlighting the path to avoid catastrophic failures that cost considerable
amounts of money and even the lives of innocent people.
The other important objective of this chapter is introducing the core subject
of this book: Software fault-tolerance situated at the level of the application
layer. First of all, it is explained why targeting (also) the application layer is
not an open option but a mandatory design choice for effective fault-tolerant
software engineering. Secondly, given the peculiarities of the application layer,
three properties to measure the quality of the methods to achieve
fault-tolerant application software are introduced:
1. Separation of design concerns, that is, how good the method is in
keeping the functional aspects and the fault-tolerance aspects separated
from each other.
2. Syntactical adequacy, namely how versatile the employed method is in
including the wider spectrum of fault-tolerance strategies.
3. Adaptability: How good the employed fault-tolerance method is in
dealing with the inevitable changes characterizing the system and its
run-time environment, including the dynamics of faults that manifest
themselves at service time.
Finally, this chapter also defines a few fundamental fault-tolerance services,
namely watchdog timers, exception handling, transactions, and
checkpointing-and-rollback.
2 WHAT IS A FAULT-TOLERANT
PROGRAM?
So what makes a program fault-tolerant? In order to answer this key question,
let us further detail what a service is: In the following a service is considered
as a set of manifestations of external events that, if compliant to what agreed
upon in a formal specification, can be considered by a watcher as being
“correct”. This said, a program can be defined as a physical entity, stored for
instance as voltage values in a set of memory cells, which is supposed to drive
the production of a service. One of the main goals of software engineering is
being able to set up of a robust link (in mathematical terms, a
emphhomomorphism/) between a service’s high-level specification and a
low-level computer design (the program).
More formally, for some functions f and g it is true that
Service = f(program),program = g(specification).
A first (obvious) conclusion is the hard link between the service
and its specification:
Service = g · f(specification).
Building robust versions of f and g is well known as being a
difficult, non trivial job.
Now let us concentrate on the range of g (the software set).
For any two systems a and b, if a relies on b to provide its service, then the
expression “a depends on b” will be used. We shall represent this through the
following notation:
a ⇒ b.
This relation is called the “dependence” among the two systems. Clearly it is
true that, for instance, Service ⇒ program, program ⇒ CPU, and CPU ⇒
memory. Trying to develop an exhaustive list of dependent systems may be a
long-lasting exercise, and most likely it would end up with an incomplete
categorization. Figure 1 provides an arbitrary incomplete expansion of the
dependence relation.
As evident from that picture, dependences call for Dependability, i.e., the
fundamental property to achieve Dependable services which has been
characterized in Chapter 1. A dependable service is then one that persists
even when, for instance, its corresponding program experiences faults—to
some agreed upon extent.
When designing a fault-tolerant program, two important steps are:
Figure 1: An expansion of the dependence relation.
1. Defining the System model, which declares the characteristics we
expect from the run-time environment—the main system features our
program will depend upon at run-time.
2. Defining the Fault model, which enumerates the erroneous cases that
one considers and aims to tolerate.
Summarizing, the main three variables that the designer of a fault-tolerant
service needs to take into account in order to preserve its functions are: The
specification, the system model, and the fault model:
Fault-tolerant Service⇒ (specification, system model, fault model).
In the following two sections the system and fault models are characterized.
2.1 Dependable Services: The System Model
System Model The system model characterizes the properties of the system
components our program depends upon. It could be represented as a tree like
the one in Fig. 1 whose leaves are computation, communication and clock
sub-systems. These leaves are annotated with statements representing some
expected properties of the corresponding sub-systems.
2.1.1 Synchronous System Model.
A well-known system model is the synchronous model: In such a system the
service depends on “perfect” (ideal) computation, communication and clock
sub-systems. In particular, that model dictates that it is possible to know
precisely how long will it take for any task to be fully executed by the
available CPUs and for any message to be sent and eventually received
through the available communication networks. Moreover, the hardware clocks
available on different nodes are perfect—no drift is possible.
The main benefit of such a model is that it facilitates considerably the task of
the designer and the developer: The system is assumed to be perfectly stable,
which means that no disruptions are deemed as likely to occur. This paves the
way to the adoption of simple software structures, such as connection-oriented
communication: Any two tasks willing to communicate with each other first
establish a connection and then synchronously exchange messages through it.
This structure is very simple and much more effective than, e.g.,
datagram-based communication—where messages are sent asynchronously, and
each of them must be routed separately to destination.
Clearly opting for the synchronous system model is an optimistic approach,
though not always a very realistic one. Writing a program with these
assumptions means basically shifting problems to deployment time. This is
because whatever violation of the system assumptions becomes a fault.
Possible events, such as a late message arrival or a missed deadline, violate the
model assumptions and can lead to a failure. Even momentary disruptions e.g.
a node becoming unavailable for a small fraction of a second and then back
on-line are not compatible with the synchronous system assumption—for
instance, they break all the connections between the tasks on that node and
those residing elsewhere in the system. This single event becomes a fault that
triggers potentially many errors. Tolerating that single fault requires a non
trivial error treatment, e.g. re-establishing all the broken connections through
some distributed protocol. Of course in some cases it can be possible to build
up a system that strictly obeys the synchronous system model. But such a
system would require custom, non-standard hardware/software components:
For instance, synchronous Ethernet could be used for communication instead
of the inherently non-deterministic CSMA/CD Ethernet. These choices clearly
have the consequence to strengthen the dependence between service and target
platform. Embedded systems are exactly this—a combination of custom
hardware and software assembled so as to produce a well defined, special
purpose service. In some other cases—for instance, hard real-time
systems—the synchronous system model is the only option, as the service
specification dictates strict deterministic execution for all processing and
communication tasks.
2.1.2 Asynchronous System Model.
At the other extreme in the spectrum of possible system models is the
asynchronous system model. Its main assumptions are:
• No bounds on the relative speed of process execution.
• No bounds on message transmission delays.
• No hardware clocks are available or otherwise there are no bounds to
clock drift.
As can be clearly understood this model is quite simple, does not impose
special constraint on the hardware platform and (in a sense) is more close to
reality: It recognizes that non-determinism and asynchrony are common and
does not try to deny or fight this matter of fact. This matches many common
life execution environments such as the Internet. Unfortunately as Einstein
would say this system model is too simple: It was proven that given these
assumptions one cannot come up with effective solutions to services such as
time-based coordination and failure detection (Fischer, Lynch, & Paterson,
1985).
2.1.3 Partially Synchronous System Model.
Given the disadvantages of these two main system models, designers have been
trying to devise new models combining the best of both aspects. Partial
synchrony models belong to this category. Such models consider that for some
systems and some environments there are long period of times where the
system is obeying the synchronous hypotheses and physical time bounds are
respected. Such periods are followed by brief periods where delays are
experienced on processing and communication tasks. One such model is the
so-called timed asynchronous system model (Cristian & Fetzer, 1999), which is
characterized by the following assumptions: Timed asynchronous system model
• All tasks communicate through the network via a datagram service with
omission/performance failure semantics (see Chapter 1).
• All services are timed: specifications prescribe not only the outputs and
state transitions that should occur in response to inputs, but also the
time intervals within which a client task can expect these outputs and
transitions to occur.
• All tasks (including those related to the OS and the network) have
crash/performance failure semantics (again, see Chapter 1).
• All tasks have access to a local hardware clock. If more than one node is
present, clocks on different nodes have a bounded drift rate.
• A “time-out” service is available at application-level: Tasks can schedule
the execution of events so that they occur at a given future point in
time, as measured by their local clock1.
In particular, this model allows a straightforward modeling of system
partitioning: As a result of sufficiently many omission or performance
communication failures, correct nodes may be temporarily disconnected from
the rest of the system during so-called periods of instability (Cristian &
Fetzer, 1999). Moreover it is assumed that, at reset, tasks or nodes restart
from a well-defined, initial state—partial-amnesia crashes (defined in
Chapter 1) are not considered.
As clearly explained in the cited paper, the above hypotheses match well
current distributed systems based on networked workstations—as such, they
represent an effective model on which to build our fault-tolerant services.
2.2 Dependable Services: The Fault Model
Another important step when designing a fault-tolerant system is the choice of
which erroneous conditions one wants to tackle so as to prevent them to lead
to system failures. This set of conditions that our fault-tolerant system is to
tolerate is the fault model, F .
What is F exactly? It is a set of events that
• may hinder the service distribution, and that
• are considered as likely to occur, and that
• one aims to tolerate (that is, prevent them from turning into failures).
Clearly F is a very important property for any fault-tolerant program, because
even the most sophisticated fault-tolerant program p will be defenseless when
any other condition than the ones in its fault model takes place. To highlight
this fact, programs shall be referred to as functions of F , e.g. one shall write
p(F ). A special case is given by non fault-tolerant programs, that is, programs
with an empty fault model. In this case one shall write p(∅). The same applies
for the service produced by program p(F ). In what follows such a service will
be referred to as an F -dependable service. In other words an F -dependable
service is one that persists despite the occurrence of faults as described in its
fault model F .
An important property of F is that, in turn, it is a function of an environment
E where the service (or better, its corresponding program) is operating.
Clearly an F -dependable service may tolerate faults in E′ and may not do so
for those in E′′: An airborne service may well experience different events than,
e.g., one meant in an electrical energy primary substation2 (Unipede, 1995).
Obviously the choice of F is an important aspect towards a successful
development of a dependable service. Imagine for instance what may happen if
our fault model F matches the wrong environment, or if the target
environment changes its characteristics (e.g. a rising of temperature due to a
firing). One may argue that all the above cases are exceptional, and that most
of the time they do not take place. This was maybe the case in the past, when
services were stable. Our services now run in a very fluid environment, where
the occurrence of changes is the rule, not the exception. As a consequence,
software engineering for fault-tolerant systems should allow to consider the
nature of faults as a dynamic system, i.e., a system evolving in time, and by
modeling faults as a function F (t). The author is convinced that any current
fault-tolerance provision should adopt such structure for its fault model.
Failing to do so leaves the designer with two choices:
1. Overshooting, i.e., over-dimensioning the fault-tolerance provisions with
respect to the actual threats being experienced, or
2. undershooting, namely underestimating the threat in view of an
economy of resources.
Note how those two risks turn into a crucial dilemma to the designer: Wrong
choices here can lead to either unpractical, too costly designs, or to cheap but
vulnerable provisions: Fault-tolerant codes that are not dependable enough to
face successfully the threats actually experienced.
In Chapter 4 it is introduced and discussed an example of fault-tolerant
software whose fault model dynamically changes tracking the environment.
Next section focuses on a few cases where static fault models and wrong
system models led to catastrophic consequences.
3 (IN)FAMOUS ACCIDENTS
3.1 Faulty Fault Models: The Ariane 5 Flight 501
On June 4, 1996, the maiden flight of the unmanned Ariane 5 rocket ended in
a failure just forty seconds after its lift-off from Kourou, French Guiana. At an
altitude of about 3700 meters, the launcher veered off its flight path, broke up
and exploded. The rocket was on its first voyage, and it took the European
Space Agency (ESA) more than a decade of intense development costing $7
billion.
Designed as a successor to the successful Ariane 4 series, the Ariane 5 was
designed to be capable of hurling a cargo of several tons—four identical
scientific satellites that were designed to establish precisely how the Earth’s
magnetic field interacts with solar winds—into orbit each launch, and was
intended to give Europe a leading edge in the commercial space business.
After the failure, the ESA set up an independent Inquiry Board to identify the
causes of the failure. It was their task to determine the causes of the launch
failure, investigate whether the qualification tests and acceptance tests were
appropriate in relation to the problem encountered and recommend corrective
actions. The recommendations of the Board concern mainly around software
engineering practices like testing, reviewing and the construction of
specifications and requirements. The case of the Ariane 5 is particularly
meaningful to what discussed so far, because it provides us with an example of
a fault-tolerant design that did not consider the right fault model. This was
the ultimate cause of its failure. In the following we discuss what happened
and which have been the main mistakes with respect to the discussion so far.
The Flight Control System of the Ariane 5 was of a standard design. The
attitude of the launcher and its movements in space were measured by an
Inertial Reference System (SRI). The SRI had its own internal computer, in
which angles and velocities were calculated on the basis of information from a
strap-down inertial platform, with laser gyros and accelerometers. The data
from the SRI were transmitted through the data-bus to an On-Board
Computer (OBC), which executed the flight program and controlled the
nozzles of the solid boosters and the so-called Vulcain cryogenic engine, via
servovalves and hydraulic actuators. As already mentioned, this system was
fault-tolerant: In order to improve its reliability two SRI’s were operating in
parallel, with identical hardware and software. For the time being the
consequences of this particular design choice will not be
considered—Chapter 3 will go back to this issue.
One SRI was active and one was in hot stand-by—as soon as the OBC
detected that the active SRI had failed it immediately switched to the other
one, provided that this unit was functioning properly. Likewise the system was
equipped with two OBC’s, and a number of other units in the Flight Control
System were also duplicated.
The software used in the Ariane 5 SRI was mostly reused from that of the
Ariane 4 SRI. The launcher started to disintegrate about 39 seconds after
take-off because of high aerodynamic loads due to an angle of attack of more
than 20 degrees that led to separation of the boosters from the main stage, in
turn triggering the self-destruct system of the launcher. This angle of attack
was caused by full nozzle deflections of the solid boosters and the so-called
Vulcain main engine. These nozzle deflections were commanded by the OBC
software on the basis of data transmitted by the active Inertial Reference
System (SRI 2). Part of these data at that time did not contain proper flight
data, but showed a diagnostic bit pattern of the computer of the SRI 2, which
was interpreted as flight data. The reason why the active SRI 2 did not send
correct attitude data was that the unit had declared a failure due to a software
exception. The OBC could not switch to the backup SRI 1 because that unit
had already ceased to function during the previous data cycle (72 millisecond
period) for the same reason as SRI 2. The internal SRI software exception was
caused during execution of a data conversion from 64-bit floating point to
16-bit signed integer value. The floating point number which was converted
had a value greater than what could be represented by a 16-bit signed integer.
This resulted in an Operand Error. The data conversion instructions (in Ada
code) were not protected from causing an Operand Error, although other
conversions of comparable variables in the same place in the code were
protected.
No reference to justification of this decision was found directly in the source
code. Given the large amount of documentation associated with any industrial
application, the assumption, although agreed, was essentially obscured, though
not deliberately, from any external review. The reason for the three remaining
variables, including BH, the one denoting horizontal bias, being unprotected
was that further reasoning indicated that they were either physically limited
or that there was a large margin of safety, a reasoning which in the case of the
variable BH turned out to be faulty.
The main reason behind the failure was a software reuse error in the Inertial
Reference System (ISR). Specifically, the conversion from horizontal velocity of
the rocket (represented as a 64-bit floating-point number) with respect to the
platform to a 16-bit signed integer resulted in an overflow, as the number was
larger than the largest integer storable in a 16-bit unsigned integer, resulting
in an overflow exception being thrown. This failure caused complete loss of
guidance and attitude information approximately 37 seconds after the start of
the main engine ignition sequence. Ariane 5 had been deprived of its basic
faculties: Its perception of where it was in the sky and which direction it had
to proceed. This loss of information was due to specification and design errors
in the ISR, upon which depends the Flight Control Computer (FCC). This
software was originally developed and successfully used in the Ariane 4 but
was not altered to support the new flight trajectory and increase in horizontal
acceleration resulting from the new Vulcain engines. Because of this, the ISR
memory banks were quickly overloaded with information that could not be
processed and fed to the onboard computers fast enough. The FCC could thus
no longer ensure the correct guidance and control and from that instant the
launcher was lost.
Several are the reasons behind the Ariane 5 failure—in what follows the focus
shall go on the one more pertaining to this chapter: Several faults resulting in
Operand Errors were included in the Ariane 4 fault model, F . Treating these
faults introduced some run-time overhead. To minimize this overhead, some of
these faults were not included in the fault model, reduced to a smaller F ′. One
of the faults in F but not in F ′ triggered the chain of events that ultimately
led to the Ariane failure.
3.2 Faulty Specifications: The Mariner 1.
The Mariner Program, a series of ten spacecrafts, was started by NASA on
July 22, 1962 with the launch of Mariner 1 and ended on November 3, 1973,
with the launch of Mariner 10. Other spacecraft, based on these, were
continued with different names, like Voyager and Viking.
Mariner 1, a 202.8 kg unmanned spacecraft, was sent to Venus for a flyby with
several scientific instruments on board, such as a microwave radiometer, an
infrared radiometer and a cosmic dust detector. These should investigate
Venus and its orbits.
The Mariner was made by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) and to be
used by NASA. The total costs for this spacecraft were close to $ 14 million.
For getting into space, the Mariner 1 was attached to an Atlas-Agena rocket.
Such type of rocket had been already used for launching missiles. It used
different antennas to be controllable by a ground control unit, but it had its
own on-board control system in case of a failing communication.
The launch was rescheduled to July 20, 1962. That day at Cape Canaveral
launch platform the first countdown started, after which a fey delays occurred
because of problems in the range safety command system. The countdown was
stopped and restarted once before being canceled because of a blown fuse in
the range safety circuits. At 23:08 local time on July 21, the countdown began
again. Another three holds gave the technicians time to fix minor issues such
as power fluctuations in the radio guidance system. At 09:21:23 UTC, the
countdown ended and the spaceship started its launch. Let us call this time as
time X. A few minutes later, the range safety officer noticed that the
spacecraft was going out of course, and at X + 4 minutes, it was clear that
manual correction was necessary. However, the spacecraft did not react as
hoped and went more and more off course. A strict deadline at this stage was
Figure 2: The Mariner 1
time X + 300, corresponding to the separation of the Atlas/Agena rocket.
After this time destroying the Mariner1 would not be possible anymore. To
prevent serious damage, the range safety officer decided to enforce
destroyment at X + 293 seconds. The Mariner 1 radio transponder kept
sending signals until X + 357 seconds.
The investigation on what went wrong includes many factors. A brief overview
is given in what follows.
It is sometimes stated that a misspelling in a Fortran program was responsible
for the crash of the Mariner 1. However, this is not true—such bug existed in
another system in the Mercury project, which was fixed before being able to
do any harm. In fact, the faulty software was used in several missions, but
corrected before the resulting inaccurate data resulted in a flight failure. The
bug was caused by two main factors: Fortran, which ignores spaces, and a
design fault—a small typo, a period instead of a comma, resulting in a line like
“DO 5 K = 1, 3” (an iterative loop) being interpreted as “DO5K = 1.3” (an
assignment).
The actual cause of the crash started with a hardware malfunction of the
Atlas antennas. The beacon for measuring the rate of the spacecraft failed to
pass signals for four periods ranging from 1.5 to 61 seconds. During the
absence of correct data, a smoothed function should guide the spacecraft into
the right direction. However, the smooth function had not been implemented,
resulting in fast changes in the course direction. To counteract these drastic
changes, the course was changed over and over again, with the vehicle going
more and more off its intended course.
For each flight, a Range Safety Officer made sure that, should the spacecraft
go out of a safety zone, it would be destructed before being able to do any
harm to people or the environment. After the Range Safety Officer saw that
the flight was uncontrollable before being out of reach he ordered to let the
Mariner 1 explode, to prevent further damage. This happened only 7 seconds
before the separation of the Mariner 1 and the Atlas-Agena rocket, which held
the explosives.
Why the smooth function had not been implemented? The error had occurred
when an equation was being transcribed by hand in the specification for the
guidance program. The writer missed the superscript bar in r˙n (the n-th
smoothed value of the time derivative of a radius). Without the smoothing
function indicated by the bar, the program treated normal minor variations of
velocity as if they were serious, causing spurious corrections that sent the
rocket off course. Because of that the Range Safety Officer had to shut it down.
As the method would be used only in case of communication failure, and such
failure had not been injected during testing experiments, the simulation did
not verify the consequences of the hardware failure and did neither notice the
slight but catastrophic difference between the expected and the real function
values.
It is possible to conclude that the Mariner 1 is a classic example of the
consequences of a faulty or misinterpreted specification: As mentioned before,
Service = f(program),program = g(specification),
and a flawed specification fatally translates in a failed service.
3.3 Faulty Models: The Therac-25 Accidents
The Therac-25 accidents have been recognized as “the most serious
computer-related accidents to date” (Leveson, 1995). Herein they are briefly
discussed to give an idea of the consequences of faulty system and fault models.
The Therac-25 was a linac, that is, a medical linear accelerator that uses
accelerated electrons to create high-energy beams able to destroy tumors with
minimal impact on the surrounding healthy tissue. It was the latest member
of a successful family of linacs, including e.g. the Therac-6 and the Therac-20,
built by Atomic Energy Commission Limited (AECL), a Canadian company.
Compared to its ancestors, the Therac-25 had a revolutionary design: it was
smaller, cheaper and more powerful.
In the past AECL had built several successful medical linear accelerators,
including the Therac-6 and the Therac-20. Compared to its ancestors, the
Therac-25 had three advantages: It was more compact, cheaper and had more
features. The compactness was due to the so-called “double-pass” concept
used for the Therac-25. This double-pass design of the accelerator meant that
the accelerator itself was much more compact, rendering the total size of the
machine much smaller. This was achieved by folding the mechanism that
accelerates the electrons (a little like it is for the French horn among wind
instruments).
The cheaper cost of the Therac-25 came from several factors—it was a
dual-mode linacs, that is, it was able to produce both electron and photon
beams, which required normally two machines; also, the Therac-6 and the
Therac-20 both had hardware interlocks to ensure safe operation. With the
development of the Therac-25 however, AECL decided that such interlocks
were an unnecessary burden for the customer, raising the costs without
bringing extra benefits. Most of the extra complexity of the Therac-25,
including safety issues, was managed in software. This is a key difference
between the new model and its ancestors—in the latter, software played a very
limited role and “merely added convenience to the existing hardware, which
was capable of standing alone” (Leveson, 1995). Such software was custom
built but reused routines of the original Therac-6 and Therac-20 code. The
Therac-25 software was developed over a period of several years by a single
programmer using the PDP 11 assembly language. Even the system software
was not standard but custom built. One could argue that when used to
compose a life-critical service such as this, software should come with
guarantees about its quality and its fault-tolerant features; unfortunately this
was not the case at the time3. Not only no fault model or system model
document had been produced—the safety analysis carried out by AECL was a
fault tree where only hardware faults had been considered! AECL apparently
considered their software as error-free. It is interesting to note the
assumptions AECL drew on software, as they could be considered as the three
main mistakes in fault-tolerant software development:
1. Programming errors have been significantly reduced by extensive testing
on a simulator. Any residual software error is not included in the
analysis.
2. Program software does not wear out or degrade.
3. Possible faults belong to the following two classes: Hardware physical
faults and transient physical faults induced by alpha particles and
electromagnetic noise.
The Therac-25 software was very complex. It consisted of four major
components: Stored data, a scheduler, a set of critical and non-critical tasks,
and interrupt services. It used the interrupt-driven software model, and
inter-process communication among concurrent tasks was managed through
shared memory access. Analysis revealed that no proper synchronization was
put into place to secure accesses to shared memory. This introduced race
conditions that would cause some of the later accidents.
One of the tasks of the software was to monitor the machine status. In
particular the treatment unit had an interlock system designed to remove
power in case of a hardware malfunction. The software monitored this
interlock system and, when faults got detected, either prevented a treatment
from being started or, if the treatment was in progress, it suspended or put in
hold the treatment. The software had been developed relying on the
availability of said interlock system—in other words, it had to be part of the
system model document. Changing the system and reusing the software led to
disaster. Indeed hardware interlocks had been the only reason that prevented
deadly overdoses to be delivered while using the old members of the Therac
family of devices. A proof of this was found later with the Therac-20. At the
University of Chicago, students could exercise radiation therapy with the
Therac-20. In the beginning of each academic year, there were a lot of
defected machines. Most of the time, the main problem was blown fuses. After
about three weeks, these failures would typically go away. After carefully
studying this behavior, it was concluded that due to the random faulty
configurations entered by students who did not know the machine, overdose
charges took place. Fortunately fuses were in place to prevent any overdose
damage. Would these fuses also have been in place in the Therac-25, many of
the accidents could have been avoided4.
4 SOFTWARE FAULT-TOLERANCE
Research in fault-tolerance concentrated for many years on hardware
fault-tolerance, i.e., on devising a number of effective and ingenious hardware
structures to cope with faults (Johnson, 1989). For some time this approach
was considered as the only one needed in order to reach the requirements of
availability and data integrity demanded by nowadays complex computer
services. Probably the first researcher who realized that this was far from
being true was B. Randell who in 1975 (Randell, 1975) questioned hardware
fault-tolerance as the only approach to employ—in the cited paper he states:
“Hardware component failures are only one source of unreliability
in computing systems, decreasing in significance as component
reliability improves, while software faults have become increasingly
prevalent with the steadily increasing size and complexity of
software systems.”
Indeed most of the complexity supplied by modern computing services lies in
their software rather than in the hardware layer (Lyu, 1998a, 1998b; Huang &
Kintala, 1995; Wiener, 1993; Randell, 1975). This state of things could only be
reached by exploiting a powerful conceptual tool for managing complexity in a
flexible and effective way, i.e., devising hierarchies of sophisticated abstract
machines (Tanenbaum, 1990). This translates in implementing software with
high-level computer languages lying on top of other software
strata—middleware, the device drivers layers, the basic services kernel, the
operating system, the run-time support of the involved programming
languages, and so forth.
Partitioning the complexity into stacks of software layers allowed the
implementor to focus exclusively on the high-level aspects of their problems,
and hence it allowed managing a larger and larger degree of complexity. But
though made transparent, still this complexity is part of the overall system
being developed. A number of complex algorithms are concurrently executed
by the hardware, resulting in the simultaneous progress of many system
states—under the hypothesis that no involved abstract machine, nor the actual
hardware, be affected by faults. Unfortunately, as in real life faults do occur,
the corresponding deviations are likely to jeopardize the system’s function,
also propagating from one layer to the other, unless appropriate means are
taken to avoid in the first place, or to remove, or to tolerate these faults.
In particular, faults may also occur in the application layer, that is, in the
abstract machine on top of the software hierarchy5. These faults, possibly
having their origin at design time, or during operation, or while interacting
with the environment, are not different in the extent of their consequences
from those faults originating, e.g., in the hardware or the operating system.
An efficacious argument to bring evidence to the above statement is the case
of the so-called “millennium bug”, i.e., the most popular class of design faults
that ever emerged in the history of computing technologies, also known as “the
year 2000 problem”, or as “Y2K”. The source of this problem is simple: Most
of the software still in use today was developed using a standard where dates
are coded in a 6-digit format. According to this standard, two digits were
considered as enough to represent the year. Unfortunately this translates into
the impossibility to distinguish, e.g., year 2000 from year 1900, which by the
en of last century was recognized as the possible cause of an unpredictably
large number of failures when calculating time elapsed between two calendar
dates, as for instance year 1900 was not a leap year while year 2000 is.
Choosing the above mentioned standard to represent dates resulted in a
hidden, almost forgotten design fault, never considered nor tested by
application programmers. As society got closer and closer to the year 2000, the
possible presence of this design fault in our software became a nightmare that
seemed to jeopardize all those crucial functions of our society today appointed
to programs manipulating calendar dates, such us utilities, transportation,
health care, communication, public administration, and so forth. Luckily the
expected many and possibly crucial system failures due to this one
application-level fault (Hansen, LaSala, Keene, & Coppola, 1999) were not so
many and not that crucial, though probably for the first time the whole society
became aware of the extent of the relevance of dependability in software.
These facts and the above reasoning suggest that, the higher the level of
abstraction, the higher the complexity of the algorithms into play and the
consequent error proneness of the involved (real or abstract) machines.
As a conclusion, full tolerance of faults and the complete fulfillment of the
dependability design goals of a complex software application call for the
adoption of protocols to avoid, remove, or tolerate faults working at all levels,
including the application layer.
5 SOFTWARE FAULT-TOLERANCE IN
THE APPLICATION LAYER
The need of software fault-tolerance provisions located in the application layer
is supported by studies that showed that the majority of failures experienced
by nowadays computer systems are due to software faults, including those
located in the application layer (Lyu, 1998a, 1998b; Laprie, 1998); for
instance, NRC reported that 81% of the total number of outages of US
switching systems in 1992 were due to software faults (NRC, 1993). Moreover,
nowadays application software systems are increasingly networked and
distributed. Such systems, e.g., client-server applications, are often
characterized by a loosely coupled architecture whose global structure is in
general more prone to failures6. Due to the complex and temporal nature of
interleaving of messages and computations in distributed software systems, no
amount of verification, validation and testing can eliminate all faults in an
application and give complete confidence in the availability and data
consistency of applications of this kind (Huang & Kintala, 1995). Under these
assumptions, the only alternative (and effective) means for increasing software
reliability is that of incorporating in the application software provisions of
software fault-tolerance (Randell, 1975).
Another argument that justifies the addition of software fault-tolerance means
in the application layer is given by the widespread adoption of object
orientation, components and service orientation. Structuring one’s software
into a web of objects, components and services is a wonderful conceptual tool
which allows to quickly compose a service out of reusable components. This
has wonderful relapses on many aspects including development and
maintenance times and costs, but has also a little drawback: it promotes the
composition of software systems from third-party objects the sources of which
are unknown to the application developers.
In other words, the object, component and service abstractions fostered the
capability to deal with higher and higher levels of complexity in software and
at the same time eased and therefore encouraged software reuse. As just
mentioned, this has very positive impacts though it translates the application
in a sort of collection of reused, pre-existing components or objects made by
third parties. The reliability of these software entities and hence their impact
on the overall reliability of the user application is often unknown, to the point
that Grey refers as an “art” to the ability to create reliable applications using
off-the-shelf software components (Green, 1997). The case of the Ariane 501
flight and that of the Therac-25 linear accelerator (see Chapter 2) are
well-known examples that show how improper reuse of software may produce
severe consequences (Inquiry, 1996).
But probably the most convincing reasoning for not excluding the application
layer from a fault-tolerance strategy is the so-called “end-to-end argument”—a
system design principle introduced in (Saltzer, Reed, & Clark, 1984). Such
principle states that, rather often, functions such as reliable file transfer, can
be completely and correctly implemented only with the knowledge and help of
the application standing at the endpoints of the underlying system (for
instance, the communication network).
This does not mean that everything should be done at the application
level—fault-tolerance strategies in the underlying hardware and operating
system can have a strong impact on the system’s performance. However, an
extraordinarily reliable communication system that guarantees that no packet
is mistreated (lost, duplicated, or corrupted, or delivered to the wrong
addressee) does not reduce the burden of the application programmer to
ensure reliability: For instance, for reliable file transfer, the application
programs that perform the transfer must still supply a file-transfer-specific,
end-to-end reliability guarantee.
The main message of this chapter can be summarized as follows:
Pure hardware-based or operating system-based solutions to
fault-tolerance, though often characterized by a higher degree of
transparency, are not fully capable of providing complete
end-to-end tolerance to faults in the user application. Relying
solely on the hardware, the middleware, or the operating system is
a mistake:
• It develops only partially satisfying solutions.
• It requires a large amount of extra resources and costs.
• And often it is characterized by poor service
portability (Saltzer et al., 1984; Siewiorek & Swarz, 1992).
6 STRATEGIES, PROBLEMS, AND KEY
PROPERTIES
The above conclusions justify the strong need for application-level
fault-tolerance. As a consequence of this need, several approaches to
application-level fault-tolerance have been devised during the last three
decades (see chapters 5–8 for an extensive survey). Such a long research
period hints at the complexity of the design problems underlying
Application-level fault-tolerance engineering, which include:
1. How to incorporate fault-tolerance in the application layer of a computer
program.
2. Which fault-tolerance provisions to support.
3. How to manage the fault-tolerance code.
Problem 1 is also known as the problem of the system structure to
software fault-tolerance, which was first proposed by B. Randell in
1975 (Randell, 1975). It states the need of appropriate structuring techniques
such that the incorporation of a set of fault-tolerance provisions in the
application software might be performed in a simple, coherent, and well
structured way. Indeed, poor solutions to this problem result in a huge degree
of code intrusion: in such cases, the application code that addresses the
functional requirements and the application code that addresses the
fault-tolerance requirements are mixed up into one large and complex
application software.
• This greatly complicates the task of the developer and demands expertise
in both the application and the fault-tolerance domains. Negative
repercussions on the development times and costs are to be expected.
• The maintenance of the resulting code, both for the functional part and
for the fault-tolerance provisions, is more complex, costly, and error
prone.
• Furthermore, the overall complexity of the software product is
increased—which, as mentioned in Chapter 1, is in itself a source of
faults.
One can conclude that, with respect to the first problem, an ideal system
structure should guarantee an adequate Separation between the
functional and the fault-tolerance Concerns (in what follows this
property will be referred to as “sc”).
Moreover, the design choice of which fault-tolerance provisions to support can
be conditioned by the adequacy of the syntactical structure at “hosting” the
various provisions. The well-known quotation by B. L. Whorf efficaciously
captures this concept:
“Language shapes the way we think, and determines what we can
think about”:
Indeed, as explained in Chapter 1, a non-optimal answer to Problem 2 may
• require a high degree of redundancy, and
• rapidly consume large amounts of the available redundancy,
which at the same time would increase the costs and reduce the reliability.
One can conclude that, devising a syntactical structure offering straightforward
support to a large set of fault-tolerance provisions, can be an important aspect
of an ideal system structure for application-level fault-tolerance. In the
following this property will be called Syntactical Adequacy (or more briefly
“sa”).
Finally, one can observe that another important aspect of any application-level
fault-tolerance architecture is the way the fault-tolerance code is managed, at
compile time as well as at execution time. If one wants to realize
F -dependable systems where the fault model F can change over time, as
mentioned in Chapter 2, then our architecture must allow the fault-tolerance
code to be changed as well so as to track the changing fault model.
A possible way to do so is for instance to have an architectural component to
monitor the observed faults and check whether the current fault model is still
valid or not. When this is not the case, the component should extend the fault
model and change the fault-tolerance code accordingly, either loading some
pre-existing code or synthesizing a new one matching the current threat. In
both cases, the architecture must allow disabling the old code and enabling the
new one.
Adaptability (or a for brevity) is defined herein as the ability of an
application-level fault-tolerant architecture such that it allows on-line
(dynamic) or at least off-line management of the fault-tolerance provisions and
of their parameters. This would allow letting the fault-tolerance code adapt
itself to the current environment or at least allow service portability. Clearly
an important requirement for any such solution is that it does not overly
increase the complexity of the resulting application—which would be
detrimental to dependability.
The three properties sc, sa and a will be referred to in what follows as the
structural attributes of application-level fault-tolerance.
7 SOME WIDELY USED SOFTWARE
FAULT-TOLERANCE PROVISIONS
In this section the key ideas behind some widely used software fault-tolerance
building blocks will be introduced: the watchdog timer, exception handling,
transactions, and checkpointing and rollback. Such building blocks will be
studied in depth in the rest of the book.
7.1 Watchdog Timers
Clov: Wait! Yes Yes! I have it! I set the alarm.
Hamm: This is perhaps not one of my bright days, but frankly
Clov: You whistle me. I don’t come. The alarm rings. I’m gone.
It doesn’t ring. I’m dead. [Pause.]
Hamm: Is it working? [Pause. Impatiently.] The alarm, is it working?
Clov: Why would’nt it be working?
Hamm: Because it’s worked too much.
Clov: But it’s hardly worked at all.
Hamm: [Angrily.] Then because it’s worked too little!
(Samuel Beckett, Endgame.)
Watchdogs are versatile and effective tools in detecting processing errors. The
idea is very simple: Let us suppose there is a process p that needs to perform
cyclically a critical operation and then releases the locks that keep in a waiting
state several concurrent processes. Clearly the pending processes are
dependant on p: A single fault affecting p and preventing it to continue would
result in blocking indefinitely all the pending processes. Obviously it is very
important to make sure that a fault stopping p be timely detected. (Such first
service would then lead to proper error recovery steps, e.g. releasing the locks).
A watchdog timer is an additional process w that monitors the execution of p
by requiring the latter to send w periodically a “sign of life”—clearing a shared
memory flag or sending a heartbeat message to w. By checking whether the
flag has been cleared or the heartbeat has arrived, process w can assess that p,
at least in the last period, had been at least able to timely send the sign of life.
In more formal terms, using the vocabulary of Chapter 2, one
could say that watchdog timers protect p against
crash/performance failures.
If w does not receive the expected sign of life, then it is said to “fire.”
Despite its simplicity, the watchdog calls for important choices at design and
configuration time. In particular,
• How often should p send the sign of life implies a trade off of
performance and failure detection latency. Moreover, quite often the
dependency chain between p and w is not simple: For instance, p may
rely on a communication system C to deliver a heartbeat message, which
complicates the matter at hand considerably (p ⇒ C, so is it C or p that
failed when w fired?) Of course also dependency chains such as these are
an arbitrary simplification, and C could be more precisely identified as a
long cascade of dependent sub-services, whose emergent behavior is that
of a communication system, each component of which could be the
actual source of a problem ultimately resulting in the firing of w.
• How often should w check for the arrival of a sign of life from p implies
the adherence to a system model, explicitly defined or otherwise. A
synchronous system model corresponds to a hard real-time system
assumptions, which would allow for a very “tight” watchdog cycle. The
farther one goes from that assumption (the more asynchronous the
system model, so to say), the larger the chance to introduce unexpected
latencies in the execution of both p and w. A consequence of this is that,
if one wants to reduce the probability that w erroneously declares p as
faulty, then he shall need to compensate for late processing and late
messages by widening the watchdog cycle. Of course this implies a larger
failure detection latency. Bringing this to the limit, in a fully
asynchronous system, the compensation time grows without bound, at
the cost of not being able to accomplish any sensible task anymore! This
result was proven in the famous article (Fischer et al., 1985), which I
usually refer to as “the FLoP paper” (a little kidding with the names of
its authors). Scientists have found a way to deal with this ostensible
conundrum, and the idea is based on using a web of “extended
watchdogs”—so called failure detectors (see Chapter 8 .)
• What to do if the watchdog timer fails. Everything has a coverage, and
this includes watchdogs, so it is unwise assuming that a watchdog cannot
fail. Furthermore, the failure can be as simple to deal with as a crash, or
as tricky as a Byzantine (arbitrary) failure. Failures could be for
instance the result of either
– a design fault in the algorithm of the watchdog, or
– a physical fault, e.g. causing the processing node of the watchdog to
get disconnected from the network, or
– an attack, e.g. a man-in-the-middle attack or an identity spoofing
attack (Harshini, Sridhar, & Sridhar, 2004).
Watchdog timers are often used in software fault-tolerance designs. The
problem this book focuses on, as mentioned already, is how to express
watchdog timers and their configuration. And again, an important factor in
measuring the effectiveness of the available solutions is for us how such
solutions perform with respect to the three structural properties of
application-level software fault-tolerance, and to sc in particular. The less
code intrusion an approach requires, the higher our assessment. This book
presents two examples: The EFTOS watchdog timer (a library and run-time
executive requiring full code intrusion, see Chapter 3) and the Ariel watchdog
timer (an evolution of the EFTOS watchdog timer that makes use of the Ariel
language to enucleate the configuration statements from the source code—thus
reducing code intrusion; see Chapter 6 and Appendix “The Ariel Internals.”)
7.2 Exceptions and Exception Handlers
An exception is an event that is triggered at run time due to the interaction
with the environment and results in a (temporary or permanent) suspension of
the current application so to manage the event. Let us consider the following
C fragment:
void main(void) {
int a, b, c;
a = function1();
b = function2();
c = a / b; /* danger here */
}
Clearly instruction a / b is unprotected against a division-by-zero exception:
When b is zero the division is undefined and—unless the division instruction is
faulty—the CPU does not know how to deal with it.
Other examples of exceptions are:
• An overflow or underflow condition.
• A not-a-number (NaN) floating point constant.
• Misalignments.
• A breakpoint is encountered.
• Access to protected or non existing memory areas.
• Power failures.
• A sub-system failure, e.g. a disk crash while accessing a file.
As the CPU has no clue about how to recover from the condition, either the
program stops or it tries to deal with it with some code supplied by the
programmer precisely for that, that is, to catch the exception and deal with it.
The following version of the above code fragment does prevent the exception
to occur:
void main(void) {
int a, b, c;
a = function1();
b = function2();
if (b != 0)
c = a / b; /* no more danger here */
else {
fprintf(stderr, "An exception has been avoided: division-by-zero\n");
}
}
As can be seen from the above mentioned examples, not all the exceptions can
be avoided. Hence it is very important that a programming language hosts
some mechanisms that allow the user to catch exceptions and properly deal
with them. One such language is Java. Java is particularly interesting for not
only it allows, but mandates (with some exception, if you excuse me for the
pun) that the programmer supplies proper code to deal with all the exceptions
that can be raised by the sub-services the application depends
upon (Pelliccione, Guelfi, & Muccini, 2007). For example, if one tries to
compile an instruction such as this:
ImageFile input = new OpenImageFile("edges.png");
whose purpose is to open an image file and associate its descriptor with a local
variable, the Java compiler would report an error complaining the lack of
proper instructions to deal with the case that the OpenImageFile method fails
due to a java.io.FileNotFoundException. In more detail, the Java compiler
would emit a message like “unreported exception i; must be caught or declared
to be thrown s”, where i is the exception and s is the lacking statement, and
report an unrecoverable error. The only way to compile successfully the above
Java fragment is through the following syntax:
try {
ImageFile input = new OpenImageFile("edges.png");
}
catch (FileNotFoundException exception) {
System.out.println("Exception: Couldn’t open file edges.png");
exception.printStackTrace();
}
whose semantics is: First try to execute the statements in the try block; if
everything goes well, skip the catch statement and go on; otherwise if the
catch block refers the raised exception, execute it. In this case the handling of
the exception is a simple printed message and a dump of the program
execution stack though method printStackTrace, which reports on where in
the control flow graph the execution took place and how it propagated
through the system and application modules. Note how a Try-Catch block is a
nice syntactical construct to build mechanisms such as Recovery Blocks
(discussed in Chapter 3)—that is, the Syntactical Adequacy (sa) of Java to
host mechanisms such as Recovery Blocks is very high.
The general syntax for exception handling in Java is
try {
...Instructions possibly raising exceptions...
}
catch (ExceptionType1 exception1) {
...Instructions to deal with exception Exception1...
}
catch (ExceptionType2 exception2) {
...Instructions to deal with exception Exception2...
}
...
finally {
...Instructions to be executed in any case at the end of the try block...
}
An example follows:
try {
x = new BufferedReader(new
FileReader(argv[0])); // this instruction
// throws FileNotFoundException
String s = x.readLine(); // this one throws IOException
while(s != null) {
System.out.println(s);
s = x.readLine(); // this one throws IOException
}
}
catch(FileNotFoundException e1) {
System.out.println("I can’t open a file.");
e1.printStackTrace();
}
catch(IOException e2) {
System.out.println("I can’t read from a file");
ioe.printStackTrace();
}
finally {
x.close(); // this one throws IOException
// and NullPointerException
}
Java defines a large number of exceptions, divided into two classes: Checked
and unchecked exceptions. Checked exceptions are basically recoverable
exceptions, which include e.g. those due to input/output failures or network
failures. Checked exceptions mandatorily call for a corresponding try...catch
block. Unchecked exceptions are unrecoverable conditions corresponding to
the exhaustion of the system assets (e.g. an out of memory error or a segment
violation).
Java also offers a mechanism to propagate an exception from an invoked
module to the invoking one—this is known as “throwing” an exception.
Java and other systems offer so-called Automated Exception Handling or
Error Interception tools, which continuously monitor the execution of
programs recording debugging information about exceptions and other
conditions. Such tools allow tracking the cause of exceptions taking place in
Java programs that run in production, testing or development environments.
An example of an exception handling mechanism is given in Chapter 3.
7.3 Checkpointing and Rollback
Checkpointing and Rollback (CR) is a widely used fault-tolerance mechanism.
The idea is simple: Someone (the user, or the system, or the programmer)
takes a periodic snapshot of the system state and, if the system fails
afterwards, the snapshot is reloaded so as to restore the system to a working
and (hopefully) correct situation. The fault model of most of the available CR
tools is transient (design and physical) faults, i.e., faults that might not show
up again when the system re-executes. Checkpointing is also a basic building
blocks for more complex fault-tolerance mechanisms, such as Recovery Blocks
(described in Chapter 3), where after rollback a new software version is tried
out, or task migration (supported by language Ariel, see Chapter 6), where the
snapshot is loaded on a different processing node of the system. Clearly in the
latter case the fault model may be somewhat extended so as to consider
permanent faults having their origin in the originating machine (for instance
in its local run-time executives, or compilers, or shared libraries, and so forth).
CR is also a key requirement to achieve atomic actions (see Sect. 7.4).
CR packages can be divided into three categories:
• application-level libraries, such as psncLibCkpt (Meyer, 2003),
• user commands, e.g. Dynamite (Iskra et al., 2000) or ckpt (Zandy, n.d.),
• operating system mechanisms and patches, e.g. psncC/R (Meyer, 2003).
Another classification is given by the logics for initiating checkpointing, which
can be:
• Time-based (“every t time units do checkpointing”). This is supported
e.g. by ckpt and libckpt (Plank, Beck, Kingsley, & Li, 1995). The latter
in particular supports incremental checkpointing (only the data that
changed from last checkpointing needs to be stored.)
• Event based (e.g., when the user generates a signal, e.g. with UNIX
command “kill”). An example of this is psncLibCkpt. A special case
is (Shankar, 2005), where the signal can actually terminate the process
and create a dump file that can be “revived” afterwards).
• Algorithmic (that is, when the algorithm enters a given phase, e.g., the
top of a loop; obviously application-level libraries allow this).
Also in the case of checkpointing there are several important design and
configuration issues: In particular,
• How often should the checkpointing occur? Suppose one has executed a
series of checkpointings, c1, c2, . . . cn, and after the last one and before
the next one the system experiences a failure. The normal practice in
CR is to reload cn and retry. Are we sure that the corresponding fault
occurred between cn−1 and cn? In other words, are we sure that the
period of checkpointing is large enough to compensate for fault latency
and error latency (see Chapter 1 for their definitions)?
• Are we sure that the checkpointed state includes the whole of the system
state? The state of the system may include e.g. descriptors of open TCP
connections, the state of low-level system variables, the contents of files
distributed throughout the network, and so forth. Failing to restore the
whole system state may well result in a system failure.
• Are we sure the the checkpointed state resides in a safe part of the
system? Are we sure that we will be able to access it, unmodified, when
rollback is needed? In other words, are we making use of a reliable stable
storage for checkpointed states? Recall that everything has a coverage,
and this includes stable storage; so how stable is our stable storage? See
further on for a section on stable storage.
CR has been specialized in several different contexts, such as distributed
systems, parallel computers, clusters and grid systems (Schneider, Kohmann,
& Bugge, n.d.)
Our focus is on how to express checkpointing and rollback, so mainly in CR
libraries and their configuration. As usual the less code intrusion an approach
requires, the better its sc.
Chapter 3 briefly discusses two CR libraries, PsncLibCkpt and Libckpt.
7.4 Transactions
An important building block to fault-tolerance is transactions. A transaction
bundles an arbitrary number of instructions of a common programming
language together and makes them “atomic”, that is indivisible: It is not
possible to execute one such bundle partially, it either executes completely or
not at all. More formally a transaction must obey the so-called ACID
properties:
Atomicity: In a transaction involving two or more blocks of instructions,
either all of the blocks are committed or none are.
Consistency: A transaction either brings the system into a new valid
processing state, or, if any failure occurs, returns it to exact state the
system was before the transaction was started.
Isolation: Running, not yet completed transactions must remain isolated
from any other transaction.
Durability: Data produced by completed transactions is saved in a stable
storage that can survive a system failure or a system restart.
A common protocol to guarantee the ACID properties is so-called two-phase
commit, described e.g. in (Moss, 1985). Two important services required by
transactions are stable storage and checkpointing and rollback.
As mentioned in (Kienzle & Guerraou, 2002), transactions act like a sort of
firewall for failures and may be considered as effective building blocks for the
design of dependable distributed services. Another important feature of
transactions is that they mask concurrency, which makes transaction-based
systems eligible for being executed on a parallel machine.
As it is always the case in fault-tolerant computing, the hypotheses behind
transaction processing are characterized by their coverage, that is, a
probability of being effectively achieved. A so-called transaction monitor is a
sort of Watchdog controlling and checking the execution of transactions.
Transactions are common in database management systems, where operations
such as database updating must be either fully completed or not at all in order
to avoid inconsistencies possibly leading to financial disasters. This explains
why transactions are supported by SQL, the Structured Query Language that
is the standard database user and programming interface.
Transactions require considerable run-time support. One system supporting
transactions is OPTIMA (Kienzle & Guerraou, 2002), a highly configurable,
object-oriented framework that offers support for open multithreaded
transactions and guarantees the ACID properties for transactional objects.
Written in Java, it provides its users with a procedural interface that allows an
application programmer to start, join, commit, and abort transactions.
Argus and Arjuna (discussed in Chapter 5) are examples of transactional
languages. The C programming language does not provide any support for
transactions in its standard library; for this reason, a custom tool was
developed for that within the EFTOS project. Such tool is described in
Chapter 3.
8 CONCLUSION
Together with system specifications, two important ingredients to craft correct
fault-tolerant systems are the system model and the fault model. After
describing those models, it has been shown how relevant their choice can be on
the dependability of important services. Configurable communication
protocols and services are collections of modules that can be combined into
different configurations. This allows designing system that can be customized
with respect to the requirements of the system and fault models. This allows
to put those models in the foreground and to fine-tune the system towards the
application requirements (Hiltunen, Ta¨ıani, & Schlichting, 2006). As a side
effect of this, one would obtain a system characterized by less overhead and
higher performance.
This chapter also reviewed a few famous accidents. What is surprising is that,
quite often, the reports summarizing the “things that went wrong” all lead to
the same conclusions, which have been nicely summarized in (Torres-Pomales,
2000):
”In a system with relaxed control over allowable capabilities, a
damaged capability can result in the execution of undesirable
actions and unexpected interference between components.”
The various approaches to application-level fault-tolerance surveyed in this
book provide different system structures to solve the above mentioned
problems. Three “structural attributes” are used in the next chapters in order
to provide a qualitative assessment of those approaches with respect to various
application requirements. The structural attributes constitute, in a sense, a
base with which to perform this assessment. One of the outcomes of this
assessment is that regrettably none of the approaches surveyed in this book is
capable to provide the best combination of values of the three structural
attributes in every application domain. For specific domains, such as
object-oriented distributed applications, satisfactory solutions have been
devised at least for sc and sa, while only partial solutions exist, for instance,
when dealing with the class of distributed or parallel applications not based on
the object model.
The above matter of facts has been efficaciously captured by Lyu, who calls
this situation “the software bottleneck” of system development (Lyu, 1998b):
in other words, there is evidence of an urgent need for systematic approaches
to assure software reliability within a system (Lyu, 1998b) while effectively
addressing the above problems. In the cited paper, Lyu remarks how
“developing the required techniques for software reliability engineering is a
major challenge to computer engineers, software engineers and engineers of
related disciplines”.
This chapter concludes our preliminary discussion on dependability,
fault-tolerance and the general properties of application-level provisions for
fault-tolerance. From next chapter onward various families of methods for the
inclusion of fault-tolerance in our programs will be discussed.
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Notes
1In Chapter 8 we describe in detail a time-out service.
2See Chapter 3 for a characterization of the faults typical of a primary substation, as well
as for a case study of a fault-tolerant service for primary substations.
3Quoting Frank Houston of the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), “A significant
amount of software for life-critical systems comes from small firms, especially in the medical
device industry; firms that fit the profile of those resistant to or uninformed of the principles
of either system safety or software engineering.”
4A full report about the Therac-25 accidents is out of the scope of this book; the reader
may refer e.g. to (Leveson, 1995) for that.
5In what follows, the application layer is to be intended as the programming and execution
context in which a complete, self-contained program that performs a specific function directly
for the user is expressed or is running.
6As Leslie Lamport efficaciously synthesised in his quotation, “a distributed system is one
in which I cannot get something done because a machine I’ve never heard of is down”.
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FAULT-TOLERANT PROTOCOLS USING
SINGLE- AND MULTIPLE-VERSION
SOFTWARE FAULT-TOLERANCE
1 INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES
This chapter discusses two large classes of fault-tolerance protocols:
• Single-version protocols, that is, methods that use a non-distributed,
single task provision, running side by side with the functional software,
often available in the form of a library and a run-time executive.
• Multiple-version protocols, which are methods that use actively a form of
redundancy, as explained in what follows. In particular recovery blocks
and N-version programming will be discussed.
The two families have been grouped together in this chapter because of the
several similarities they share.
The chapter also introduces two important structures for software
fault-tolerance, namely exception handling and transactions, and proposes
several examples of single-version and multiple version tools.
2 FAULT-TOLERANT PROTOCOLS USING
SINGLE- AND MULTIPLE-VERSION
SOFTWARE FAULT-TOLERANCE
A key requirement for the development of fault-tolerant systems is the
availability of replicated resources, in hardware or software. A fundamental
method employed to attain fault-tolerance is multiple computation, i.e.,
N -fold (N > 1) replications in three domains:
Time That is, repetition of computations.
Space I.e., the adoption of multiple hardware channels (also called “lanes”).
Information That is, the adoption of multiple versions of software.
Following Aviz˘ienis (Aviz˘ienis, 1985), it is possible to characterize
at least some of the approaches towards fault-tolerance by means
of a notation resembling the one used to classify queuing systems
models (Kleinrock, 1975):
nT/mH/pS,
the meaning of which is “n executions, on m hardware channels, of
p programs”. The non-fault-tolerant system, or 1T/1H/1S, is
called simplex in the cited paper.
2.1 Single-version Software Fault-Tolerance: Libraries of
Tools
Single-version software fault-tolerance (SV) is basically the embedding into the
user application of a simplex system of error detection or recovery features,
e.g., atomic actions (Jalote & Campbell, 1985),
checkpoint-and-rollback (Deconinck, 1996), or exception handling (Cristian,
1995). The adoption of SV in the application layer requires the designer to
concentrate in one physical location, namely, the source code of the
application, both the specification of what to do in order to carry on some user
computation and the strategy such that faults are tolerated when they occur.
As a result, the size of the problem addressed is increased. A fortiori, this
translates into increasing the size of the user application. This induces loss of
transparency, maintainability, and portability while increasing development
times and costs.
A partial solution to this loss in portability and these higher costs is given by
the development of libraries and frameworks created under strict software
engineering processes. In the following, three examples of this approach are
presented—the EFTOS library and the SwIFT system. Special emphasis is
reserved in particular to the first system, for which the author of this book
designed a number of contributions.
2.1.1 The EFTOS library.
EFTOS (Deconinck, De Florio, Lauwereins, & Varvarigou, 1997; Deconinck,
Varvarigou, et al., 1997) (the acronym stands for “embedded, fault-tolerant
supercomputing”) is the name of ESPRIT-IV project 21012. The aims of this
project were to integrate fault-tolerance into embedded distributed
high-performance applications in a flexible and effective way. The EFTOS
library has been first implemented on a Parsytec CC system (Parsytec, 1996b),
a distributed-memory MIMD supercomputer consisting of processing nodes
based on PowerPC 604 microprocessors at 133MHz, dedicated high-speed
links, I/O modules, and routers. As part of the project, this library has been
then ported to a Microsoft Windows NT / Intel PentiumPro platform and to a
TEX / DEC Alpha platform (TXT, 1997; DEC, 1997) in order to fulfill the
requirements of the EFTOS application partners. The main characteristics of
the CC system are the adoption of the thread processing model and of the
message passing communication model: communicating threads exchange
messages through a proprietary message passing library called EPX (Parsytec,
1996a). The porting of the EFTOS library was achieved by porting EPX on
the various target platforms and developing suitable adaptation layers.
Through the adoption of the EFTOS library, the target embedded parallel
application is plugged into a hierarchical, layered system whose structure and
basic components (depicted in Fig. 1) are:
• At the base level, a distributed net of “servers” whose main task is
mimicking possibly missing (with respect to the POSIX standards)
operating system functionalities, such as remote thread creation;
• One level upward (detection tool layer), a set of parameterizable
functions managing error detection, referred to as “Dtools”. These basic
components are plugged into the embedded application to make it more
dependable. EFTOS supplies a number of these Dtools, including:
– A watchdog timer thread (see Sect. 4);
– a trap-handling mechanism (described in Sect. 5);
– in Sect. 6, a tool to manage transactions.
and an API for incorporating user-defined EFTOS-compliant tools;
• At the third level (control layer), a distributed application called “DIR
net” (its name stands for “detection, isolation, and recovery network”) is
used to coherently combine the Dtools, to ensure consistent
fault-tolerance strategies throughout the system, and to play the role of
a backbone handling information to and from the fault-tolerance
elements (Deconinck et al., 1999). The DIR net can be regarded as a
fault-tolerant network of crash-failure detectors, connected to other
peripheral error detectors. Each node of the DIR net is “guarded” by an
<I’m Alive> thread that requires the local component to send
periodically “heartbeats” (signs of life). For this reason the algorithm of
the DIR net shall be described (in Chapter 8, devoted to failure
detection protocols.)
A special component of the DIR net, called RINT, manages error
recovery by interpreting a custom language called RL—the latter being a
sort of ancestor of the programming language described in this book in
Chapter 6;
• At the fourth level (application layer), the Dtools and the components of
the DIR net are combined into dependable mechanisms, among which
will be described:
– In Sect. 3, a distributed voting mechanism called “voting
farm” (De Florio, 1997; De Florio, Deconinck, & Lauwereins, 1998a,
1998c).
– In Sect. 7, a so-called data stabilizing tool.
Other tools not described in what follows include e.g. a virtual Stable
Memory (Deconinck, Botti, Cassinari, De Florio, & Lauwereins, 1998).
• The highest level (presentation layer) is given by a hypermedia
distributed application based on standard World-Wide Web technology,
which monitors the structure and the state of the user
application (De Florio, Deconinck, Truyens, Rosseel, & Lauwereins,
1998). This application is based on a special CGI script (E. Kim, 1996),
called DIR Daemon, which continuously takes its inputs from the DIR
net, translates them into HTML (Berners-Lee & Connolly, 1995), and
remotely controls a WWW browser (Zawinski, 1994) so that it renders
these HTML data. A description of this application is in Chapter 10.
A system of communication daemons, called Server network in the EFTOS
lingo, manages communication among the processing nodes in a way
somewhat similar to that used in the Parallel Virtual Machine (see (Geist et
al., 1994) for more details on this).
The author of this book contributed to this project designing and developing a
number of basic tools, e.g., its distributed voting system (described in detail in
Sect. 3), the EFTOS monitoring tool (see Chapter 10), the RL language and
its run-time system (that is, the task responsible for the management of error
recovery (De Florio, Deconinck, & Lauwereins, 1998b, 1998c), which will
evolve into the ariel language discussed in Chapter 6). Furthermore, he took
part in the design and development of various versions of the DIR
net (De Florio, 1998).
2.1.2 The SwIFT System.
SwIFT (Huang, Kintala, Bernstein, & Wang, 1996), whose name stands for
Software Implemented Fault-Tolerance, is a system including a set of reusable
software components (watchd, a general-purpose UNIX daemon watchdog
timer; libft, a library of fault-tolerance methods, including single-version
implementation of recovery blocks and N -version programming (see Sect. 2.3);
libckp, i.e., a user-transparent checkpoint-and-rollback library; a file
replication mechanism called REPL; and addrejuv, a special “reactive” feature
of watchd (Huang, Kintala, Kolettis, & Fulton, 1995) that allows for software
rejuvenation1. The system derives from the HATS system (Huang & Kintala,
1995) developed at AT&T. Both have been successfully used and proved to be
efficient and economical means to increase the level of fault-tolerance in a
software system where residual faults are present and their toleration is less
costly than their full elimination (Lyu, 1998). A relatively small overhead is
introduced in most cases (Huang & Kintala, 1995).
Figure 1: The structure of the EFTOS library. Light gray has been used for
the operating system and the user application, while dark gray layers pertain
EFTOS.
2.1.3 Two libraries for Checkpointing and Rollback
As mentioned in Chapter 2, checkpointing and rollback (CR) is an important
mechanism to achieving software fault-tolerance. The focus here goes on two
packages working in the application layer.
Library psncLibCkpt. PsncLibCkpt (Meyer, 2003) is a library for
applications written in C. psncLibCkpt has been designed for simplicity—very
few changes in the application software allow to add the CR functionality.
Such changes are so simple that could be applied automatically, e.g. through
the C preprocessor “#define” statement. In practice, only the main function
needs to be renamed as ckpt target, with no modification on its parameters.
Once this is done, the application is ready to catch signals of type
“SIGFREEZE” and to save a checkpoint as a response. Restarting the
application on the last saved checkpoint is quite easy: calling the program
with argument “=recovery” makes psncLibCkpt load the checkpoint.
Configuration is also quite simple and can be done through a configuration file
or by editing a header file. The latter case requires compiling the application.
Library libckpt. Libckpt (Plank, Beck, Kingsley, & Li, 1995) is another CR
library for C applications. It performs several optimizations such as “main
memory checkpointing” (a 2-stage pipeline overlapping application execution
and flushing of the checkpointed state onto disk) and state compression. The
main reason for our interest in libckpt is its support for so-called
“user-directed checkpointing”, which means that libckpt makes intense use of
the application layer to optimize processing.
One of these optimizations is user-driven exclusion of memory blocks from the
state to be checkpointed. This allows not to include, e.g., clean data (memory
yet to be initialized or used). Two function calls are available,
exclude_bytes(address, size, usage);
include_bytes(address, size);
which allow to adapt the checkpointed state dynamically at run-time.
Another application-level mechanism is so-called “synchronous checkpointing”:
The user can specify, in the application program, points where checkpointing
the state would have more sense from an algorithmic point of view. Function
checkpoint_here does exactly this. There are also parameters allowing the
express a minimum and a maximum amount of time between checkpointings.
In the cited articles the authors of libckpt show how the adoption of
user-directed checkpointing on the average brought to halving the checkpoint
size.
Conclusions. Two libraries for checkpointing and rollback, both of them
targeting the same class of applications,have been discussed. The first case
only manages user commands while the second one allows more control in the
Figure 2: A fault-tolerant program according to a SV system.
application layer. Apart from performance issues, one can observe that the
second case allows greater control but exhibits lower sc. Such control may be
used to achieve adaptive resizing of the checkpointed state, so a slightly better
a.
2.2 Conclusions.
Figure 2 synthesizes the main characteristics of the SV approach: the
functional and the fault-tolerant code are intertwined and the developer has to
deal with the two concerns at the same time, even with the help of libraries of
fault-tolerance provisions. In other words, SV requires the application
developer to be an expert in fault-tolerance as well, because he (she) has to
integrate in the application a number of fault-tolerance provisions among
those available in a set of ready-made basic tools. His (hers) is the
responsibility for doing it in a coherent, effective, and efficient way. As it has
been observed in Chapter 2, the resulting code is a mixture of functional code
and of custom error-management code that does not always offer an
acceptable degree of portability and maintainability. The functional and
non-functional design concerns are not kept apart with SV, hence one can
conclude that (qualitatively) SV exhibits poor separation of concerns (sc).
This in general has a bad impact on design and maintenance costs.
As to syntactical adequacy (sa), one can easily observe how following SV the
fault-tolerance provisions are offered to the user through an interface based on
a general-purpose language such as C or C++. As a consequence, very limited
sa can be achieved by SV as a system structure for application-level software
fault-tolerance.
Furthermore, little or no support is provided for off-line and on-line
configuration and reconfiguration of the fault-tolerance provisions.
Consequently the adaptability (a) of this approach is deemed as insufficient.
On the other hand, tools in SV libraries and systems give the user the ability
to deal with fault-tolerance “atoms” without having to worry about their
actual implementation and with a good ratio of costs over improvements of the
dependability attributes, sometimes introducing a relatively small overhead.
Using these toolsets the designer can re-use existing, long tested, sophisticated
pieces of software without having each time to “re-invent the wheel”.
It is also important to remark that, in principle, SV poses no restrictions on
the class of applications that may be tackled with it.
As a final remark, it is interesting to note how, at least judging from the
following recent work (Liu, Meng, Zhou, & Wu, 2006), it appears that the
concept of a reusable “library” of fault-tolerance services is re-emerging in the
context of service-oriented architectures.
2.3 Multiple-version Software Fault-Tolerance:
Structures for Design Diversity
This section describes multiple-version software fault-tolerance (MV), an
approach that requires N (N > 1) independently designed versions of
software. MV systems are therefore xT/yH/NS systems. In MV, a same
service or functionality is supplied by N pieces of code that have been
designed and developed by different, independent software teams2. The aim of
this approach is to reduce the effects of design faults due to human mistakes
committed at design time. The most used configurations are NT/1H/NS, i.e.,
N sequentially applicable alternate programs using the same hardware
channel, and 1T/NH/NS, based on the parallel execution of the alternate
programs on N , possibly diverse, hardware channels.
Two major approaches exist: the first one is known as recovery block (Randell,
1975; Randell & Xu, 1995), and is dealt with in Sect. 2.3. The second
approach is the so-called N -version programming (Aviz˘ienis, 1985, 1995). It is
described in Sect. 2.3.
The Recovery Block Technique. Recovery Blocks are usually
implemented as NT/1H/NS systems. The technique addresses residual
software design faults. It aims at providing fault-tolerant functional
components which may be nested within a sequential program. Other versions
of the approach, implemented as 1T/NH/NS systems, are suited for parallel or
distributed programs (Scott, Gault, & McAllister, 1985; Randell & Xu, 1995).
The recovery blocks technique is similar to the hardware fault-tolerance
approach known as “stand-by sparing”, which is described, e.g., in (Johnson,
1989). The approach is summarized in Fig. 3: on entry to a recovery block, the
current state of the system is checkpointed. A primary alternate is executed.
When it ends, an acceptance test checks whether the primary alternate
successfully accomplished its objectives. If not, a backward recovery step
reverts the system state back to its original value and a secondary alternate
takes over the task of the primary alternate. When the secondary alternate
Figure 3: The recovery block model with two alternates. The execution environ-
ment is charged with the management of the recovery cache and the execution
support functions (used to restore the state of the application when the ac-
ceptance test is not passed), while the user is responsible for supplying both
alternates and the acceptance test.
ends, the acceptance test is executed again. The strategy goes on until either
an alternate fulfills its tasks or all alternates are executed without success. In
such a case, an error routine is executed. Recovery blocks can be nested—in
this case the error routine invokes recovery in the enclosing block (Randell &
Xu, 1995). An exception triggered within an alternate is managed as a failed
acceptance test. A possible syntax for recovery blocks is as follows:
ensure acceptance test
by primary alternate
else by alternate 2
.
.
else by alternate N
else error
Note how this syntax does not explicitly show the recovery step that should be
carried out transparently by a run-time executive.
The effectiveness of recovery blocks rests to a great extent on the coverage of
the error detection mechanisms adopted, the most crucial component of which
is the acceptance test. A failure of the acceptance test is a failure of the whole
recovery blocks strategy. For this reason, the acceptance test must be simple,
must not introduce huge run-time overheads, must not retain data locally, and
so forth. It must be regarded as the ultimate means for detecting errors,
though not the exclusive one. Assertions and run-time checks, possibly
supported by underlying layers, need to buttress the strategy and reduce the
probability of an acceptance test failure. Another possible failure condition for
the recovery blocks approach is given by an alternate failing to terminate.
This may be detected by a time-out mechanism that could be added to
recovery blocks. This addition, obviously, further increases the complexity.
The SwIFT library that has been described in Sect. 2.1 implements recovery
blocks in the C language as follows:
#include <ftmacros.h>
...
ENSURE(acceptance-test) {
primary alternate;
} ELSEBY {
alternate 2;
} ELSEBY {
alternate 3;
}
...
ENSURE;
Unfortunately this approach does not cover any of the above mentioned
requirements for enhancing the error detection coverage of the acceptance test.
This would clearly require a run-time executive that is not part of this
strategy. Other solutions, based on enhancing the grammar of pre-existing
programming languages such as Pascal (Shrivastava, 1978) and
Coral (Anderson, Barrett, Halliwell, & Moulding, 1985), have some impact on
portability. In both cases, code intrusion is not avoided. This translates into
difficulties when trying to modify or maintain the application program without
interfering “much” with the recovery structure, and vice-versa, when trying to
modify or maintain the recovery structure without interfering “much” with the
application program. Hence one can conclude that recovery blocks are
characterized by unsatisfactory values of the structural attribute sc.
Furthermore, a system structure for application-level software fault-tolerance
based exclusively on recovery blocks does not satisfy attribute sa3. Finally,
regarding attribute a, one can observe that recovery blocks are a rigid strategy
that does not allow off-line configuration nor (a fortiori) code adaptability.
On the other hand, recovery blocks have been successfully adopted throughout
30 years in many different application fields. It has been successfully validated
by a number of statistical experiments and through mathematical
modeling (Randell & Xu, 1995). Its adoption as the sole fault-tolerance
means, while developing complex applications, resulted in some
cases (Anderson et al., 1985) in a failure coverage of over 70%, with acceptable
overheads in memory space and CPU time.
A negative aspect in MV system is given by development and maintenance
costs, that grow as a monotonic function of x, y, z in any xT/yH/zS system.
Development costs may be alleviated by using an approach such as diversity
for off-the-shelf products (Gashi & Popov, 2007; Gashi, Popov, & Strigini,
2006). Other researchers have sought cost-effective diversity through the use of
different computer architectures, different compilers, or different programming
languages (Meulen & Revilla, 2005). A recent approach is using diversity for
security concerns (Cox et al., 2006).
N-Version Programming. N -Version Programming (NVP) systems are
built from generic architectures based on redundancy and consensus. Such
Figure 4: The N -Version Software model when N = 3. The execution envi-
ronment is charged with the management of the decision algorithm and with
the execution support functions. The user is responsible for supplying the N
versions. Note how the Decision Algorithm box takes care also of multiplexing
its output onto the three hardware channels—also called “lanes”.
systems usually belong to class 1T/NH/NS, less often to class NT/1H/NS.
NVP is defined by its author (Aviz˘ienis, 1985) as “the independent generation
of N > 1 functionally equivalent programs from the same initial specification.”
These N programs, called versions, are developed for being executed in
parallel. This system constitutes a fault-tolerant software unit that depends
on a generic decision algorithm to determine a consensus or majority result
from the individual outputs of two or more versions of the unit.
Such a strategy (depicted in Fig. 4) has been developed under the fundamental
conjecture that independent designs translate into random component
failures—i.e., statistical independence. Such a result would guarantee that
correlated failures do not translate into immediate exhaustion of the available
redundancy, as it would happen, e.g., using N copies of the same version.
Replicating software would also mean replicating any dormant software fault
in the source version—see, e.g., the accidents with the Therac-25 linear
accelerator (Leveson, 1995) or the Ariane 5 flight 501 (Inquiry, 1996).
According to Aviz˘ienis, independent generation of the versions significantly
reduces the probability of correlated failures. A number of
experiments (Eckhardt et al., 1991) and theoretical studies (Eckhardt & Lee,
1985) questioned the correctness of this assumption, though a more recent
study involving a large number of independently developed multiple software
versions claims otherwise (Lyu, Huang, Sze, & Cai, 2003).
The main differences between recovery blocks and NVP are:
• Recovery blocks (in its original form) is a sequential strategy whereas
NVP allows concurrent execution;
• Recovery blocks require the user to provide a fault-free,
application-specific, effective acceptance test, while NVP adopts a
generic consensus or majority voting algorithm that can be provided by
the execution environment (EE);
• Recovery blocks allow different correct outputs from the alternates, while
the general-purpose character of the consensus algorithm of NVP calls
for a single correct output4.
The two models collapse when the acceptance test of recovery blocks is done
as in NVP, i.e., when the acceptance test is a consensus on the basis of the
outputs of the different alternates.
A few hybrid designs derived by coupling the basic ideas of recover blocks and
NVP are now briefly discussed.
Variations on the Main Theme. N Self-Checking Programming (Laprie,
Arlat, Beounes, & Kanoun, 1995) couples recovery blocks with N -version
programming: as in N -version programming, N independently produced
versions are executed, sequentially or in parallel. Each version is associated to
a separate acceptance test, possibly different from the others, which tells
whether the version passed the test and also produces a “rank”. A selection
module then chooses as overall output the one produced by the version with
the highest rank. A variant of this technique organized versions in couples and
performs comparison between the outputs of their versions as a
general-purpose acceptance test. To the best of our knowledge, no
application-level support for N Self-Checking Programming has been proposed
to date.
Consensus recovery blocks (Vouk, McAllister, Eckhardt, & Kim, 1993) targets
the chance that the N -version programming scheme fail because it is not
possible to find a majority vote among the output of the replicas. When this is
the case, instead of declaring failure the outputs are assessed by acceptance
tests (as in recovery blocks), which then have the last word in choosing the
overall system output or declaring failure. Reliability analysis proves this
approach to be better than N -version programming and recovery blocks,
though the added complexity may well translate in higher chances of
introducing faults in the architecture (Torres-Pomales, 2000).
Distributed recovery blocks (K. Kim & Welch, 1989) (DRB) may
be considered as a parallel computing extension of recovery blocks.
In DRB there is not a single couple of primary and alternate
versions. Instead, several couples are running concurrently on
different interconnected processing nodes. Each couple executes
the recovery block scheme in parallel. Nodes and couples are
organized hierarchically. When the execution of the top-level
couple finishes, one queries the result of the acceptance test. If the
test is passed by either primary or alternate, then the system
declares success. If the test is not passed, instead of declaring
failure as in plain recovery blocks, DRB goes on checking the
acceptance test at the top-minus-one node. Global failure is only
declared if no successful acceptance test can be found when orderly
scanning the nodes. A time acceptance test is also used to handle
performance failure of the acceptance tests.
Again on the Ariane 5. Chapter 2 briefly reported on the case of the
Ariane 5 disaster. As it was mentioned there, the chain of events that brought
to the Ariane 5 failure started within the Inertial Reference System (SRI), a
component responsible for the measurement of the attitude of the launcher
and its movements in space. To enhance the dependability of the system, the
SRI was equipped two computers. Such computers were operating in parallel,
with identical hardware and software. As described in the mentioned chapter,
the SRI software had a number of data conversion instructions. Some of these
instructions were “protected” (proper exception handling code had been
associated to them), while some others were considered “safe enough” and
were not protected so as to reduce the overhead on performance. One of the
unprotected variables experienced an Operand Error. If the Ariane 5 designers
had divided the SRI variables into two blocks, and had protected one block on
the primary SRI and the other block on the backup SRI, they would have had
no increased performance penalty and the failure would not have occurred.
2.3.1 A hybrid case: Data Diversity
A special, hybrid case is given by data diversity (Ammann & Knight, 1988). A
data diversity system is a 1T/NH/1S (less often a NT/1H/1S). It can be
concisely described as an NVP system in which N equal replicas are used as
versions, but each replica receives a different minor perturbation of the input
data. Under the hypothesis that the function computed by the replicas is non
chaotic, that is, it does not produce very different output values when fed with
slightly different inputs, data diversity may be a cost-effective way to
fault-tolerance. Clearly in this case the voting mechanism does not run a
simple majority voting but some vote fusion algorithm (Lorczak, Caglayan, &
Eckhardt, 1989). A typical application of data diversity is that of real time
control programs, where sensor re-sampling or a minor perturbation in the
sampled sensor value may be able to prevent a failure. Being substantially an
NVP system, data diversity reaches the same values for the structural
attributes. The greatest advantage of this technique is that of drastically
decreasing design and maintenance costs, because design diversity is avoided.
Conclusions. As in recovery blocks, also NVP has been successfully
adopted for many years in various application fields, including safety-critical
airborne and spaceborne applications. The generic NVP architecture, based on
redundancy and consensus, addresses parallel and distributed applications
written in any programming paradigm. A generic, parameterizable
architecture for real-time systems that supports the NVP strategy
straightforwardly is GUARDS (Powell et al., 1999).
It is noteworthy to remark that the EE (also known as N -Version Executive)
is a complex component that needs to manage a number of basic functions, for
instance the execution of the decision algorithm, the assurance of input
consistency for all versions, the inter-version communication, the version
synchronization and the enforcement of timing constraints (Aviz˘ienis, 1995).
On the other hand, this complexity is not part of the application
software—the N versions—and it does not need to be aware of the
fault-tolerance strategy. An excellent degree of transparency can be reached,
thus guaranteeing a good value for attribute sc. Furthermore, as mentioned in
Chapter 2, costs and times required by a thorough verification, validation, and
testing of this architectural complexity may be acceptable, while charging
them to each application component is certainly not a cost-effective option.
Regarding attribute sa, the same considerations provided when describing
recovery blocks hold for NVP: also in this case a single fault-tolerance strategy
is followed. For this reason NVP is assessed here as unsatisfactory regarding
attribute sa.
Off-line adaptability to “bad” environments may be reached by increasing the
value of N—though this requires developing new versions—a costly activity
for both times and costs. Furthermore, the architecture does not allow any
dynamic management of the fault-tolerance provisions. One concludes that
attribute a is poorly addressed by NVP. In other words, the choices of the
designer about the fault model are very difficult to maintain and change.
Portability is restricted by the portability of the EE and of each of the N
versions. Maintainability actions may also be problematic, as they need to be
replicated and validated N times—as well as performed according to the NVP
paradigm, so not to impact negatively on statistical independence of failures.
Clearly the same considerations apply to recovery blocks as well. In other
words, the adoption of multiple-version software fault-tolerance provisions
always implies a penalty on maintainability and portability.
Limited NVP support has been developed for “conventional” programming
languages such as C. For instance, libft (see Sect. 2.1) implements NVP as
follows:
#include <ftmacros.h>
...
NVP
Figure 5: A fault-tolerant program according to a MV system.
VERSION{
block 1;
SENDVOTE(v_pointer, v_size);
}
VERSION{
block 2;
SENDVOTE(v_pointer, v_size);
}
...
ENDVERSION(timeout, v_size);
if (!agreeon(v_pointer)) error_handler;
ENDNVP;
Note that this particular implementation extinguishes the potential
transparency that in general characterizes NVP, as it requires some
non-functional code to be included. This translates into an unsatisfactory
value for attribute sc. Note also that the execution of each block is in this
case carried out sequentially.
It is important to remark how the adoption of NVP as a system structure for
application-level software fault-tolerance requires a substantial increase in
development and maintenance costs: both 1T/NH/NS and NT/1H/NS
systems have a cost function growing with the square of N . The author of the
NVP strategy remarks how such costs are paid back by the gain in
trustworthiness. This is certainly true when dealing with systems possibly
subjected to catastrophic failures—let us recall once more the case of the
Ariane 5 flight 501 (Inquiry, 1996). Nevertheless, the risks related to the
chances of rapid exhaustion of redundancy due to a burst of correlated failures
caused by a single or few design faults (Motet & Geffroy, 2003) justify and call
for the adoption of other fault-tolerance provisions within and around the
NVP unit in order to deal with the case of a failed NVP unit.
Figure 5 synthesizes the main characteristics of the MV approach: several
replicas of (portions of) the functional code are produced and managed by a
control component. In recovery blocks this component is often coded side by
side with the functional code while in NVP this is usually a custom hardware
box.
3 The EFTOS Tools: The EFTOS Voting Farm
In this section the EFTOS voting farm— a library of functions written in the
C programming language and implementing a distributed software voting
mechanism—is described: This tool could be used to implement NVP systems
in the application software. It has developed in the framework of project
EFTOS, which was introduced in Sect. 2.1.1.
The Voting Farm was designed to be used either as a stand-alone tool for fault
masking or as a basic block in a more complex fault tolerance structure set up
within the EFTOS fault tolerance framework. In what follows the design and
structure of the stand-alone voting farm are described as a means to
orchestrate redundant resources with fault transparency as primary goal. It is
also described how the user can exploit said tool to straightforwardly set up
systems consisting of redundant modules and based on voters. An example of
such system is given by so-called “restoring organs.”
3.1 Basic Structure and Features of the EFTOS Voting
Farm
A well-known approach to achieve fault masking and therefore to hide the
occurrence of faults is the so-called N-modular redundancy technique (NMR),
valid both on hardware and at software level. To overcome the shortcoming of
having one voter, whose failure leads to the failure of the whole system even
when each and every other module is still running correctly, it is possible to
use N replicas of the voter and to provide N copies of the inputs to each
replica, as described in Fig. 6. This approach exhibits among others the
following properties:
1. Depending on the voting technique adopted in the voter, the occurrence
of a limited number of faults in the inputs to the voters may be masked
to the subsequent modules (Lorczak et al., 1989); for instance, by using
majority voting, up to ceil(N/2)− 1 faults can be made transparent.
2. If one considers a pipeline of such systems, then a failing voter in one
stage of the pipeline can be simply regarded as a corrupted input for the
next stage, where it will be restored.
The resulting system is easily recognizable to be more robust than plain NMR,
as it exhibits no single-point-of-failure. Dependability analysis confirms
intuition. Property 2. in particular explains why such systems are also known
as “restoring organs” (Johnson, 1989).
Figure 6: A restoring organ, i.e., anN-modular redundant system withN voters,
when N = 3.
From the point of view of software engineering, this system though has two
major drawbacks:
• Each module in the NMR must be aware of and responsible for
interacting with the whole set of voters;
• The complexity of these interactions, which is a function increasing with
the square of N , the cardinality of the voting farm, burdens each module
in the NMR.
Within EFTOS the two above flaws were recognized as serious impairments to
our design goals, which included replication transparency, ease of use, and
flexibility (De Florio, Deconinck, & Lauwereins, 1998a).
In order to reach the full set of our requirements, the design of the system was
slightly modified as described in Fig. 7: In this new picture each module only
has to interact with and be aware of one voter, regardless the value of N .
Moreover, the complexity of such a task is fully shifted to the voter, i.e., it is
transparent to the user.
The basic component of our tool is therefore the voter (see Fig.8) which is
defined as follows:
A voter is a local software module connected to one user module
and to a farm of fully interconnected fellows. Attribute “local”
Figure 7: Structure of the EFTOS voting farm mechanism for a NMR system
with N = 3 (the well-known triple modular redundancy system, or TMR).
Figure 8: A user module and its voter. The latter is the only member of the
farm of which the user module should be aware of: from the user point of view,
messages will only flow between these two ends. This has been designed so
as to minimize the burden of the user module and to keep it free to continue
undisturbed as much as possible.
means that both user module and voter run on the same processing
node.
As a consequence of the above definition, the user module has no other
interlocutor than its voter, whose tasks are completely transparent to the user
module. It is therefore possible to model the whole system as a simple
client-server application: On each user module the same client protocol applies
(see Sect. 3.1.1) while the same server protocol is executed on every instance
of the voter (see Sect. 3.1.3).
3.1.1 Client-Side of the Voting Farm: the User Module
Table 3 gives an example of the client-side protocol to be executed on each
processing node of the system in which a user module runs: a well-defined,
ordered list of actions has to take place so that the voting farm be coherently
declared and defined, described, activated, controlled, and queried: In
particular, describing a farm stands for creating a static map of the allocation
of its components; activating a farm substantially means spawning the local
voter (Sect. 3.1.3 will shed more light on this); controlling a farm means
requesting its service by means of control and data messages; finally, a voting
farm can also be queried about its state, the current voted value, etc.
As already mentioned, the above steps have to be carried out in the same way
on each user module: this coherency is transparently supported in
Single-Process, Multiple-Data (SPMD) architectures. This is the case, for
instance, of Parsytec EPX (Embedded Parallel eXtensions to UNIX , see, e.g.,
(Parsytec, 1996a, 1996b)) whose “initial load mechanism” transparently runs
the same executable image of the user application on each processing node of
the user partition.
This protocol is available to the user as a class-like fault-tolerant library of
functions dealing with opaque objects referenced through pointers. A tight
resemblance with the FILE set of functions of the standard C programming
language library (Kernighan & Ritchie, 1988) has been sought so to shorten as
much as possible the user’s learning time—the API and usage of Voting Farm
closely resemble those of FILE (see Table 1).
phase FILE class VotingFarm t class
declaration FILE* f; VotingFarm t* vf;
opening f = fopen(. . . ); vf = VF open(. . . );
control fwrite(f, . . . ); VF control(vf, . . . );
closings fclose(f); VF close(vf);
Table 1: The C language standard class for managing file is compared with the
VF class. The tight resemblance has been sought in order to shorten as much
as possible the user’s learning time.
The Voting Farm has been developed using the CWEB system of structured
documentation (De Florio, 1997)—an invaluable tool both at design and at
development time (Knuth, 1984).
3.1.2 System and Fault Models
A fault and system model document allows to bring to the foreground all the
assumptions and dependencies that were used while designing a service. This
is done so that when porting that service to a new platform all those
underlying dependencies and assumptions do not slip the attention of the
designer—see Chapter 2 for possible consequences of such a mistake.
The EFTOS target platform was a dedicated system with a custom, dedicated
communication network. Accordingly, the adopted system model was that of
partially synchronous systems. This assumption is in this case a realistic one,
at least for parallel environments like that of the Parsytec EPX, which was
equipped with a fast and dedicated communication subsystem, such that
processors did not have to compete “too much” for the network. Such
subsytem also offered a reliable communication means and allowed to
transparently tolerate faults like, e.g., the break of a link, or a router’s failure.
The internal algorithms of the Voting Farm are assumed to have fail/stop
behavior. Upper bounds are known for communication delays. A means to
send and to receive messages across communication links is assumed to be
available. Let us call these functions Send and Receive. Furthermore, the
following semantics is assumed for those functions: Send blocks the caller until
the communication system has fully delivered the specified message to the
specified (single) recipient, while Receive blocks the caller until the
communication system has fully transported a message directed to the caller,
or until a user-specified timeout has expired.
The Voting Farm can deal with the following classes of faults (Laprie, 1995):
• physical as well as human-made,
• accidental as well as intentional,
• development as well as operational,
• internal and external faults,
• permanent and temporary,
as long as the corresponding failure domain consists only of value failures.
Timing errors are also considered, though the delay must not be larger than
some bounded value (which is assumed to be the case in the system model).
The tool is only capable of dealing with one fault at a time—the tool is ready
to deal with other new faults only after having recovered from the present one.
Consistent value errors are tolerated. Under this assumption, arbitrary in-code
value errors may occur.
As a final remark, let us recall what mentioned in Chapter 2: software
engineering for fault-tolerant systems should allow considering the nature of
faults as a dynamic system, i.e., a system evolving in time, and by modeling
faults as a function F (t). The EFTOS Voting Farm allows to do so: If a
service using the voting farm is moved to a new environment, for instance one
characterized by a higher frequency of faults affecting the voters, the designer
has just to choose a new value for N , the number of voters. Nothing changes
in the application layer except that value. Of course this is an example of
off-line adaptation, as it requires recompiling the service programs. In
Chapter 4 an example of a tool will be described, which tracks the
environment adjusting its fault model accordingly.
3.1.3 Server-Side of the Voting Farm: the Voter
The local voter thread represents the server-side of the voting farm. After the
set up of the static description of the farm (Table 3, Step 3) in the form of an
ordered list of processing node identifiers (positive integer numbers), the
server-side of our application is launched by the user by means of the VF run
function. This turns the static representation of a farm into an “alive”
(running) object, the voter thread.
This latter connects to its user module via inter-process communication
provisions (so called “local links”) and to the rest of the farm via synchronous,
blocking channels (“virtual links”).
Once the connection is established, and in the absence of faults, the voter
reacts to the arrival of the user messages as a finite-state automaton: In
particular, the arrival of input messages triggers a number of broadcasts
among the voters—as shown in Fig.9—which are managed through the
distributed algorithm described in Table 2.
When faults occur and affect up to M < N voters, no arrival for more than ∆t
time units is interpreted as an error. As a consequence, variable input messages
is incremented as if a message had arrived, and its faulty state is recorded. By
doing so one can tolerate up to M < N errors at the cost of M∆t time units.
Note that even though this algorithm tolerates up to N − 1 faults, the voting
algorithm may be intrinsically able to cope with much less than that: for
instance, majority voting fails in the presence of faults affecting ceil(N/2) or
more voters. As another example, algorithms computing a weighted average of
the input values consider all items whose “faulty bit” is set as zero-weight
values, automatically discarding them from the average. This of course may
also lead to imprecise results as the number of faults gets larger.
Besides the input value, which represents a request for voting, the
user module may send to its voter a number of other
requests—some of these are used in Table 3, Step 5. In particular,
the user can choose to adopt a voting algorithm among the
following ones:
• Formalized majority voting technique,
• Generalized median voting technique,
Figure 9: The “local” input value has to be broadcast to N − 1 fellows, and
N − 1 “remote” input values have to be collected from each of the fellows. The
voting algorithm takes place as soon as a complete set of values is available.
1 /* each voter gets a unique voter id in {1, . . . , N} */
voter id = who-am-i;
2 /* all messages are first supposed to be valid */
For all i : validi = TRUE;
3 /* keep track of the number of received input messages */
i = input messages = 0;
4 do {
5 /* wait for an incoming message or a timeout */
Wait Msg With Timeout(∆t);
6 /* u points to the user module’s input */
if ( Sender == USER ) u = i;
7 /* read it */
if ( ¬ Timeout ) msgi = Receive;
8 /* or invalidate its entry */
else validi = FALSE;
9 /* count it */
i = input messages = input messages + 1;
10 if (voter id == input messages) Broadcast(msgu);
11 } while (input messages ¬ = N);
Table 2: The distributed algorithm needed to regulate the right to broadcast
among the N voters. Each voter waits for a message for a time which is at most
∆t, then it assumes a fault affected either a user module or its voter. Function
Broadcast sends its argument to all voters whose id is different from voter id. It
is managed via a special sending thread so to circumvent the case of a possibly
deadlock-prone Send.
• Formalized plurality voting technique,
• Weighted averaging technique,
• Consensus,
the first four items being the voting techniques that were
generalized in (Lorczak et al., 1989) to “arbitrary N-version
systems with arbitrary output types using a metric space
framework.” To use these algorithms, a metric function can be
supplied by the user when he or she “opens” the farm (Table 3,
Step 2, function objcmp): this is exactly the same approach used in
opaque C functions like e.g., bsearch or qsort (Kernighan & Ritchie,
1988). A default metric function is also available.
Note how the fault model assumption: “arbitrary in-code value
errors may occur” is due to the fact that the adopted metric
approach is not able to deal with non-code values.
The choice of the algorithm, as well as other control choices are managed via
function VF control, which takes as argument a voting farm pointer plus a
variable number of control argument—in Table 3, Step 5, these arguments are
an input message, a virtual link for the output vote, an algorithm identifier,
plus an argument for that algorithm.
Other requests include the setting of some algorithmic parameters and the
removal of the voting farm (function VF close).
The voters’ replies to the incoming requests are straightforward. In particular,
a VF DONE message is sent to the user module when a broadcast has been
performed; for the sake of avoiding deadlocks, one can only close a farm after
the VF DONE message has been sent. Any failed attempt causes the voter to
send a VF REFUSED message. The same refusing message is sent when the
user tries to initiate a new voting session sooner than the conclusion of the
previous session.
Note how function VF get (Table 3, Step 6) simply sets the caller in a waiting
state from which it exits either on a message arrival or on the expiration of a
time-out.
1 /* declaration */
VotingFarm t *vf;
2 /* definition */
vf = VF open(objcmp);
3 /* description */
For all i in {1, . . . , N} : VF add(vf, nodei, identi);
4 /* activation */
VF run(vf);
5 /* control */
VF control(vf, VF input(obj, sizeof(VFobj t)),
VF output(link),
VF algorithm (VFA WEIGHTED AVERAGE),
VF scaling factor(1.0) );
6 /* query */
do {} while (VF error==VF NONE and VF get(vf)==VF REFUSED);
7 /* deactivation */
VF close(vf);
Table 3: An example of usage of the voting farm.
3.1.4 Voting Farm: An Example
This section introduces and discusses a program simulating a NMR (N
modular redundant) restoring organ which makes use of the Voting Farm
class. N is set to the cardinality of that list of values to vote on.
// An example of usage of the EFTOS voting farm
// We exploit the SPMD mode to launch the same executable on all target nodes
// First the necessary header files are loaded
#include <vf.h>
#include "tmr.h"
void main(int argc, char *argv[ ])
{
VotingFarm t *vf; // vf is the pointer to the Voting Farm descriptor 10
VF msg t *m; // m is a Voting Farm message object
double metrics(void*,void*); // metrics is the opaque function to compare votes
double sf = 0.5; // sf is the scaling factor for voting algorithm
double d; // d is an input value to vote upon, read from the command line
int this; // this is the processor id (the node on which the code runs)
int i;
// this is the id of the processor I’m running on
this= GET_ROOT()->ProcRoot->MyProcID; 20
// up to argc processors are to be used
if (this >= argc-1) return;
// declare a voting farm, with metrics() as metric function
vf = VF_open(metrics);
// add version i @ node i
for (i=0; i<argc-1 && i<NPROCS; i++)
VF_add(vf, i, i); 30
// spawn the farm
VF_run(vf);
// read the value to be voted
sscanf(argv[this+1], "%lf", &d);
// send vf three parameters: scaling factor. . .
VF_send(vf, 3, VFO_Set_Scaling_Factor(&sf)
// . . .voting algorithm. . . 40
, VFO_Set_Algorithm(VFA_MAJORITY)
// . . .an input value
, VFO_Set_Input_Message(&d,sizeof(d))
);
// wait for a message from the farm
do {
m = VF_get(vf);
// keep on waiting while there’s no error and return
// code is VF REFUSED ("refused attempt to close VF") 50
} while ( VF error == 0 && m−>code == VF REFUSED);
// when there an error or a different message, let’s check: done?
if (m->code == VF_DONE)
{
// was it possible to find a majority vote?
if (m->msglen == VF_FAILURE)
printf("<user %d> : no output vote is available\n", this);
else
printf("<user %d> : output vote is %lf\n", this, DOUBLE(m->msg)); 60
// anyway, close the farm
VF_close(vf);
// wait for an acknowledgment or error
do {
m = VF_get(vf);
} while ( VF_error == 0 && m->code != VF_QUIT );
return; 70
}
return;
}
// metrics reveals the nature of the two opaque input values:
// they are double precision floating point numbers, and their
// distance is abs(a-b)
double metrics(void *a,void *b) {
double *d1, *d2; 80
d1 = (double*)a, d2 = (double*)b;
if (*d1 > *d2) { return *d1 - *d2; }
return *d2 - *d1;
}
3.1.5 Voting Farm: Some Conclusions
The EFTOS Voting Farm is currently available for a number of message
passing environments, including Parsytec EPX, Windows, and TXT TEX. A
special version has been developed for the latter, which adopts the mailbox
paradigm as opposed to message passing via virtual links. In this latter
version, the tool has been used in a software fault tolerance implementation of
a stable memory system for the high-voltage substation controller of ENEL,
the main Italian electricity supplier (Deconinck et al., 1998). This stable
memory system is based on a combination of temporal and spatial redundancy
to tolerate both transient and permanent faults, and uses two voting farms,
one with consensus and the other with majority voting.
Figure 10: The interaction between Watchdog Timer, DIR net and the appli-
cation. The dotted line represents control flow, the full line stands for data
flow.
The Voting Farm can be used as a stand-alone tool, as seen so far; but it can
also be used as a tool to compose more complex dependable mechanisms
within a wider framework. Chapter 9 shall describe how to use our tool with
the so-called “recovery language approach”, a linguistic framework and an
architecture for dependable automation services.
As a conclusion the Voting Farm is characterized by limited support for sc
and bad sa (as it only targets a single provision). As for aone may observe
how, despite that tool exhibits no support for adaptability in the form
described in this section, this aspect could be enhanced by using an hybrid
approach such as the one described in Chapter 9.
4 The EFTOS Tools: The Watchdog Timer
This section describes the EFTOS watchdog timer. It consists of a single
thread. This thread does the timing and checking of user-driven timestamps,
and informs a DIR Agent thread if a performance failure is detected. This
concept is depicted in Fig. 10.
The whole set up of Fig. 10 is built by executing the single StartWD function
when the two major system component for EFTOS, the so-called DIR net and
Server net, are both used and when the Watchdog thread was pre-configured
through the server net (details on how to do this have been omitted). Note
that after this step any future interaction with the WatchDog Timer, done via
watchdap, is characterized by a satisfactory level of transparency: The user
needs not to concern about low level details such as protocols and interface; he
or she has just to control the process through a high-level application-program
interface.
This user-transparency can no longer be sustained if neither DIR net nor
Server net are used. In this case it is the responsibility of the user to deploy
the watchdog through function StartWDnd and to let it start watching by
issuing function WDStart. In both cases the user interfaces its watchdog
through the same function, the already mentioned watchdap.
As can be seen from Fig. 10, an active watchdog connects to a so-called DIR
agent and notifies it of all performance failures experienced by its watched
task. When no DIR net is used, this message must nevertheless be sent to
some other task.
The following short source code illustrates the usage of the EFTOS watchdog:
// A worker performs some work receiving input and sending output
// through a communication link called ioLink
//
// To protect the worker, a watchdog timer is started (in this case
// by the worker itself). Within the processing loop, the watcher
// sends n heartbeat signal to the watchdog through function watchdapp
//
int worker (LinkCB˙t *ioLink)
{
// declare the communication link with the watchdog 10
LinkCB˙t *AWDLink;
// declare the communication link with the EFTOS server net
LinkCB˙t *mylink2server;
// input and output buffers
char input[1024], output[1024];
int size, error;
20
// Connects (or spawns) the EFTOS Server net
mylink2server = ConnectServer();
if ((AWDLink = StartWD(link2server, . . .various parameters. . .,
. . .cycle times. . ., &error)) == NULL)
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to initialise the WD, error:%d ", error);
// main processing loop: get input data. . . 30
while ((size = RecvLink(ioLink, (byte *)input, sizeof(input))) != 0)
{
// . . .process data. . .
process(input, output);
// . . .forward output. . .
SendLink(ioLink, (byte *)output, strlen(output)+1);
// . . .and say "I’m OK"
if (watchdap(AWDLink,TIMESTAMP,0)!= 0) 40
fprintf(stderr, "Error re-initialising the watchdog");
}
}
For more details on programming and configuring the EFTOS watchdog timer
the reader may refer to (Team, 1998).
The system model of the EFTOS Watchdog Timer is the same specified for
the whole EFTOS framework: A fully synchronous system—an assumption
allowed by the embedded character of the EFTOS target services and
platforms. The fault model includes accidental, permanent or temporary
design faults, and temporary, external, physical faults.
As a final statement let us remark how, as for the structural properties, what
has been said for the Voting Farm also applies to the EFTOS watchdog timer:
limited support for sc, bad sa due to the single design concern, and no
adaptability unless coupled with other approaches and tools. One such hybrid
approach is described in Chapter 9.
The EFTOS watchdog timer was developed by Wim Rosseel at the University
of Leuven.
5 The EFTOS Tools: The EFTOS Trap
Handler
Programming languages such as C constitute powerful tools to craft efficient
system services, but are streamlined “by construction” for run-time efficiency.
As a consequence, their run-time executive is very simple: They lack
mechanisms for bound checking in arrays, are very permissive with data type
conversions, and allow all type of “dirty tricks” with pointers. A fortiori, the
C language does not provide any support for exception handling. Within
project EFTOS a so-called Trap Handler was designed and developed. This
tool is basically a library and a run-time executive to manage exceptions
taking place in programs written in the C programming language on Parsytec
supercomputers based on PowerPC processors. The library was developed
Stephan Graeber at DLR (the Deutsche Zentrum fu¨r Luft- und Raumfahrt)
with the Parsytec EPX message passing library. In the following this tool is
described.
5.1 The EFTOS Trap Handling Tool
As mentioned in Chapter 2, exception (or trap) handling is an important
feature to design software fault-tolerant systems. When the processor e.g. tries
to access memory that is not allocated or executes illegal instructions then a
trap is generated, which causes the processor to jump to a specialized routine
called trap handler. As other operating systems, also EPX provides a standard
trap handling function which simply stops processing and writes a core dump
file.
The EFTOS framework provides two ways to alter this behavior:
1. The Trap Handling Tool connects to a third party (by default, the
EFTOS DIR net) and creates a “fault notification stream”: Caught
exceptions are forwarded to a remote handler. A generalization of this
strategy is used in Oz (see Chapter 5) and Ariel (in Chapter 6) and, in
service-oriented architectures, in the system reported in (Ardissono,
Furnari, Goy, Petrone, & Segnan, 2006).
2. The programmer defines which exception to catch and how to handle
them with the functions of the Trap Handling library. This is
semantically equivalent to, e.g., Java exceptions, but very different from
the syntactical point of view. This is because the handling is done with
the programming language, as opposed to in.
5.2 Algorithm of the Trap Handling Tool.
The first action of StartTrapTool is to give the server network the command to
create remotely a thread on a specified node with the code of the TrapTool.
After that, it connects to the newly spawn trap tool and exchanges some
additional information with it. After this state has been set up properly, it
installs a new trap handler for the current thread. The Trap handling Tool
itself first gets the connection to the StartTrapTool function and receives the
additional information from there. After that it connects to the appropriate
DIR agent, and waits for incoming messages for the rest of its execution time.
If a trap message arises from the trap handler, the DIR net is informed and
the necessary information about the trap that occurred is passed to the
responsible DIR agent. The DIR net is also able to send messages to the Trap
Handling Tool to enact user-defined exception handling procedures. The trap
handler itself is only responsible for passing the message of a fault to the Trap
Tool and to set the processor in a sleeping mode. The processor will resume
only when proper actions to handle the exception are scheduled for execution.
5.2.1 Structure of user trap handling
The concept of user-defined trap handlers is based on a stack of functions.
The first element in the stack is the default EPX trap handler. New
user-defined handlers are orderly pushed onto the stack. When an exception is
caught, the stack is visited from top to bottom calling each visited function.
When a function successfully handles the exception the Trap Handler stops
this procedure, otherwise the stack reaches its bottom and EPX performs
termination and memory dump.
A user defined trap handler can handle either one or more classes of traps.
Traps are processor-dependent, e.g. the PowerPC defines among others the
following classes:
1. DSI exception: A data memory access cannot be performed because of a
memory protection violation, or because the instruction is not supported
for the type of memory addressed.
2. ISI exception: An instruction fetch cannot be performed. Reasons may
be that an attempt is made to fetch an instruction from a non-execute
segment, or that a page fault occurred when translating the effective
address, or that the fetch access violates memory protection.
3. Alignment exception: processor cannot perform a memory access
because of an incorrect alignment of the requested address.
4. Program exception: This may have several reasons. E.g. the execution of
an instruction is attempted with an illegal opcode.
The user-defined trap handler should be defined as a function with the
following prototype:
int MyTrapHandler (int TrapNo)
With TrapNo this function gets the trap number, that is the exception code
corresponding to the exception that was actually caught by the system. This
corresponds to the exception code returned by Java in the catch statements.
The user defined trap handler function should return 1 if the trap was handled
and the system has to be recovered, otherwise the function should return 0. If
a trap occurs, in some cases the whole node has to be rebooted. In such cases
a user defined trap handler can be used for instance to store state information
on another node, so as to restart execution from there or on the same node
after reboot. Obviously this procedure only covers transient faults. In other
cases the fault shall represent itself and cause the occurrence of the same
failure again.
With the function NewTrapHandler the user can push a trap handling
function on top of the handling functions stack. When the function is called
for the first time, a stack manager is installed as internal trap handler and the
stack of functions is initialized.
With function ReleaseTrapHandler the user can remove the function at the
top of the stack. To remove all functions and bring the stack to its
initialization state with just the original EPX trap handler, the user can
invoke function SetDefaultTrapHandler.
As can be clearly seen, the EFTOS Trap Handler is not as easy and intuitive
as e.g. the exception handling mechanism used in Java: As mentioned already,
syntactical adequacy (sa, defined in Chapter 2) has a strong link with
complexity. The other side of the coin is given by efficiency: The EFTOS trap
handling tool is characterized by a very limited overhead and consumes quite
few system resources.
The following short source code illustrates the usage of user defined trap
handlers:
// Function MyTraphandler returns 1 if an exception
// is caught and processed, and 0 otherwise.
//
int MyTrapHandler (int TrapNo)
{
switch (TrapNo) {
// this is the equivalent of the Java catch statement.
// NK TRA DFETCH means in EPX ‘‘data access exception’’
case NK TRAP DFETCH:
10
// what follows is the handling of the data access exception
. . .
return 1;
// other cases may follow here. . . */
default:
return 0;
}
} 20
void main(void)
{
// some work is done here
. . .
// right before an operation that may result in a data exception
NewTrapHandler(&MyTrapHandler);
30
// here there is an operation that may result in a data exception
. . .
// the default handler is finally restored
ReleaseTrapHandler();
}
5.2.2 System and Fault Models of the EFTOS Trap Handling Tool
The system model of the EFTOS Trap Handling Tool is the same specified for
the whole EFTOS framework: A fully synchronous system—an assumption
allowed by the embedded character of the EFTOS target services and
platforms. Target faults are clearly exceptions and system errors such as the
one presented in Chapter 2. The fault model includes temporary design faults,
and temporary external physical faults.
5.2.3 Conclusions
A single-version software fault-tolerance tool has been introduced, addressing
exception handling and fault information forward. Developed in the
framework of the EFTOS project, the tool is characterized by limited support
for sc, bad sa due to its single design concern, and no adaptability.
6 The EFTOS Tools: Atomic Actions
The main goal of the functions described in what follows is to provide a
mechanism for atomic transactions: The actions checked by these functions
either end properly or are not executed at all. A description of transactions
can be found in Chapter 2.
6.1 The EFTOS Atomic Action Tool
As explained in Chapter 2, an atomic action or transaction may be defined as
the activity of a set of components where no information flows between that
set and the rest of the system during that activity, and the activity is either
fully completed or not at all (Anderson & Lee, 1981). To guarantee this
property an atomic action needs to be able to checkpoint its state before the
beginning of the action and roll back in case of failure.
In literature several protocols for atomic commitment have been
proposed (Babaoglu, Toueg, & Mullender, 1993; Jalote & Campbell, 1985). As
mentioned already, probably the best known and the simplest protocol is the
two phase commit protocol (2PC) (Lampson, 1981). The 2PC protocol
although very simple has as the big drawback that it may block. For example,
if the coordinator fails while all the cohorts are waiting to receive a decision
message, then none of these processes will be able to terminate. The cohorts
need to wait until the coordinator is recovered before being able to decide on
the outcome of the action. It is clear that such behavior is unacceptable. Next
to the blocking aspect of several protocols, often the assumption is made that
no faults can occur in the communication layer. Clearly this assumption has a
coverage, which means one needs accomodate for the cases where it proves to
be not valid. The tool described herein takes these aspects into account.
Let us begin by introducing our assumptions:
Atomic Action Algorithm:
(save the status)
(Synchronize)
Check an assertion
Set the timer t_i,
Broadcast the result of the assertion to the other partners
{
while the deadline has not passed
for all partners
send result within time
if sending timed out change state to abort
and inform everyone hereof
}
Receive the result from all partners
{
while not received all results and deadline t_i has not passed
receive
if deadline t_i passed
abort and inform everyone
}
If at least one result was abort then abort
Wait (t_2) for potential stray messages
if result is abort
do recovery
Table 4: A pseudo code sketch of the algorithm of the Atomic Action tools.
6.1.1 System Model
Assumptions. As already remarked, any algorithm is valid under specific
assumptions. In the case of the EFTOS Atomic Action Tool a partially
synchronous model of computation is assumed: although not limited as in the
synchronous model, an upper bound on message delays is assumed to be
known.
At any time a process may be either operational or non-operational. A process
is considered to be operational when it follows exactly the actions specified by
the program it is executing. Any operational process may end up in a
non-operational state due to a failure. In a non-operational state any
information related to that process is considered to be lost, unless it was stored
into some stable storage. A non-operational process may be returned to an
operational state after executing some recovery protocol. During this recovery
protocol the information saved in stable memory is used to restore the process.
Each processor has its local clock, which does not run synchronous with the
neighboring processors. Each local clock however is only used to measure time
intervals, so a global time is not a necessary assumption (Lamport, 1978). The
target design platforms require a bounded termination time and a low amount
of communication, as communication negatively affect the communication vs.
processing ratio. Therefore a reasonably simple and lightweight algorithm has
been designed. It has as main constraint that all tasks should be loosely
synchronized before making use of the algorithm.
The Algorithm.
Figure 4 provides the reader with a pseudo code overview of the
algorithm. The algorithm has a fairly simple structure as can be
seen at first glance. Some pre-processing steps like saving state
information and loosely synchronizing should be considered.
Hereafter the algorithm will start by checking an assertion which
decides on the local status. After the local status has been decided
a timer t1, conditional for the successful completion of the action,
is set. As a next step the local status information is propagated to
the other partners in the action and the algorithm starts waiting
for the status information to be received from the other partners.
All expected messages should be received within the time-out t1 to
be able to result in a successful action. Once all status messages
are received, a decision is made on success or failure of the action.
The decision propagation however is delayed for some more time
t2, so that possible failure messages can be received. This will be
further elaborated in the next section where some failure cases are
discussed. By means of these multiple time-outs (t1, t2) the
algorithm can guarantee successful functioning under the specified
restrictions.
Failure Mode. Both process and communication failures are considered.
For process failures, it may be clear that the time-out (t1) will trigger a
transition to the ABORT state (see Fig. 11). For communication, due to the
synchronous nature hereof on the design platforms, failures can be compared
to process failures. This is clear in case of blocking. In such a case either one
partner never joined in the communication or both partners tried to send or
receive over the same communication link. Otherwise the link communication
might also truly fail. This case can be considered as a failure of the two
partners in communication. This assumption is valid because the only thing
the processes are aware of is the fact that their communication with another
process failed. In Fig. 12 some failure cases are illustrated. In the first case it
is considered a process failure. The failure of this process will lead to a
condition in which insufficient inputs have been received for a successful
decision phase. This will lead to a time-out that will automatically trigger the
ABORT behavior of the action. In the second case it is assumed that some
communication fails. This will lead to the situation where some partners will
decide to ABORT as they have not received sufficient inputs, while others will
Figure 11: The behavior in case of a not responding partner. C? stands for
potential commit. A? stands for potential abort, A! is an agreed abort. T? is
a potential time-out in communication. t1 is the primary time-out the action
should respect, t2 is the secondary timeout used to receive stray messages.
decide to COMMIT in the first step. The transition to ABORT however, due
to insufficient input, will trigger the propagation of the ABORT message to all
other partners. Upon receipt of this message all partners will still change their
status to ABORT.
6.1.2 The Implementation
The status of the action is decided upon by assertions provided by the user.
The implementation has two working modes. In one mode only the local
status is changed, unless there is a transition from COMMIT to ABORT at
which point this new state is propagated to all partners in the action. In the
second mode the distributed state decision is made. This is the mode
illustrated in Fig. 13. Notice that the communication time-out is realized by
means of a return message that should be received within time T. In Fig. 14
the state graph of the used algorithm is shown. AA End in this graph is the
intermediate state complying with the first mode of the algorithm. From this
graph it is clear that any error will result in a transition to the ABORT state.
6.1.3 Functionality
The whole mechanism basically is based on two levels of control (see Fig. 15.
The first level embraces the local state. This is achieved by direct interaction
with a local Atomic Action thread. The second level embraces a global state.
This global state is maintained by the Atomic Action threads themselves,
using the knowledge of the requirements to limit the communications. The
communication limitation is achieved for in-block checks, where the global
state will only be adapted if a request comes to change to local state to
Figure 12: The behavior in case of a communication fails (time-out).
“abort”. A final check always leads to a proprietary decision among all local
states and the current global state. This leads to communication from every
partner to every other partner, thus having a quadratic complexity.
More details about the EFTOS Atomic Action tool is available in (Team,
1998) and (Rosseel, De Florio, Deconinck, Truyens, & Lauwereins, 1998).
6.2 Conclusion
A single-version software fault-tolerance provisions for managing atomic
actions has been briefly sketched. As most of the EFTOS tools, it is
characterized by limited support for SC, bad SA and no adaptability.
7 The TIRAN Data Stabilizing Software Tool
An application-level tool is described, which implements a software system for
stabilizing data values, capable of tolerating both permanent faults in memory
and transient faults affecting computation, input and memory devices by
means of a strategy coupling temporal and spatial redundancy. The tool
maximizes data integrity allowing a new value to enter the system only after a
user-parameterizable stabilization procedure has been successfully passed.
Designed and developed in the framework of the ESPRIT project TIRAN (the
follow-up of project EFTOS, described in more detail in Chapter 6), the tool
can be used in stand-alone mode but can also be coupled with other
dependable mechanisms developed within that project. Its use had been
suggested by ENEL, the main Italian electricity supplier, in order to replace a
hardware stable storage device adopted in their highvoltage sub-stations.
Figure 13: The message passing scheme in fault free case for the EFTOS im-
plementation. The application starts the AA thread which will spawn a sender
thread on its own. This is illustrated in the beginning of the time-scale. At this
point node I also will save some status information to a stable storage entity.
Once a distributed decision is to be achieved messages are exchanged accord-
ing to the algorithm. Upon the agreed decision of ABORT, the first node will
restore its saved status. The central zone between node 0 and node i illus-
trates execution locked time, the black rectangle illustrates the beginning of the
user-function the unfilled rectangle illustrates the returning of the user-function.
Figure 14: This is a state-graph of the implementation. AACommit is the
intermediate COMMIT state, AA END is an intermediate ABORT state and
AA Abort is the ABORT state. AA Commit is the start state for the algorithm.
Figure 15: The Atomic Action embraces two levels of control, local within the
Atomic Action thread and global in agreement with the other Atomic Action
threads.
7.1 Introduction
In this text the design and the implementation of a data stabilizing software
system are introduced. Such system is a fault-tolerant software component
that allows validating input and output data by means of a stabilization
procedure. Such data stabilizing system has been developed with the explicit
goal of taking over a pre-existing stable storage hardware device used at ENEL
S.p.A.—the main Italian electricity supplier, the third largest
world-wide—-within a program for substation automation of their high voltage
sub-stations. The mentioned hardware device is able to tolerate the typical
faults of a highly disturbed environment subject to electro-magnetic
interference: transient faults affecting memory modules and the processing
devices, often resulting in bit flips or even in system crashes. This hardware
component was mainly used within control applications with a cyclic behavior
only dependent on their state (that is, Moore automata). Typically these
applications:
• Read their current state from stable storage,
• produce with it an output that, once validated, is propagated to the field,
• then they read their input from the field and compute a tentative future
state and future output.
The whole cycle is repeated a number of times in order to validate the future
state. When this temporal redundancy scheme succeeds, the tentative state is
declared as a valid next state and the stable storage is updated accordingly.
The cyclic execution is paced by an external periodic signal which resets the
CPU and re-fetches the application code from an EPROM. External memory
is not affected by this step. This policy and the nature of faults (frequency,
duration and so forth) allow confining possible impairment affecting the
internal state of the application within one cycle.
Developed in the framework of the ESPRIT project TIRAN, a prototypic
version of this data stabilizing tool has been successfully integrated in a
test-bed control application at ENEL, whose cyclic behavior is regulated by a
periodic restart device—the only custom, dedicated component of that
architecture. Initially developed on a Parsytec CC system equipped with 4
processing nodes, the tool has been then ported to a number of runtime
systems; at ENEL, the tool is currently running under the TEX
nanokernel (DEC, 1997; TXT, 1997) and VxWorks on several hardware
boards, each based on the DEC Alpha processor. Preliminary results on these
systems show that the tool is capable to fulfill its dependability and data
integrity requirements, adapting itself to a number of different simulated
disturbed environments thanks to its flexibility.
In what follows an analysis of the requirements to the Data Stabilizing System
tool is carried out. Basic functionalities of the tool are then summarized. The
two “basic blocks” of our tool, namely a manager of redundant memories and
a data stabilizer, are then introduced. Finally some conclusions are drawn,
summarizing the lessons learned while developing our Data Stabilizing
Software Tool.
7.2 Requirements for the Data Stabilizer
In an electrical power network, automation is a fundamental requirement for
the subsystems concerning production, transport and distribution of energy.
In many sites of such a network, remotely controlled automation systems play
an important role towards reaching a more efficient and cost-effective
management of the networks. While considering the option to install high
performance computing nodes as controllers into such environments, the
question of a software solution for a data stabilizer arose. The goal of a data
stabilizer is to protect data in memory from permanent faults affecting
memory devices and from transient faults affecting data of systems running in
disturbed environments, as they typically arise by electro-magnetic
interference, and to validate these data by means of a stabilization procedure
based on the joint exploitation of temporal and spatial redundancy. When
controlling high voltage, an important source of faults is electricity
itself—because all switching actions in the field cause electrical disturbances,
which enter the control computers via their I/O devices, often overcoming the
filtering barriers. Furthermore, electro-magnetic interference causes disturbs in
the controllers. Clearly, due to the very nature of this class of environments,
such faults cannot be avoided ; on the other hand, they should not impair the
expected behavior of the computing systems that control the automation
system. In order to overcome the effects of transient faults, temporal
redundancy is employed. This means that all computation is repeated several
times (a concept also known as “redoing” and introduced in Chapter 5),
assuming that due to the nature (frequency, amplitude, and duration) of the
disturbances, not all of the cyclic replications are affected. As in other
redundancy schemes, a final decision is taken via a voting between the
different redundant results. Clearly this calls for a memory component that be
more resilient to transient faults with respect to conventional memory devices.
In traditional applications often a special hardware device, called stable
storage device, is used for this. The idea was to replace this special hardware
with a software solution, which offers on the one hand more flexibility, while
on the other hand it provides the same fault tolerance functionality. The
following requirements were deduced from this:
1. The data stabilizer has to be implemented in conventional memory
available on the hardware platform running the control application.
Typical control applications show a cyclic behavior, which is represented
in the following steps:
(a) Read sensor data,
(b) calculate control laws based on new sensor data and status
variables,
(c) update status variables,
(d) and output actuator data.
The data stabilizer has to interface with such kind of applications.
2. The Data Stabilizing System has to tolerate any transient faults affecting
the elaboration or the inputs. Furthermore, it has to tolerate permanent
and transient faults affecting the memory itself.
3. The Data Stabilizing System has to store and to stabilize status data,
i.e. if input data to the Data Stabilizing System have been confirmed a
number of times, they should be considered as stable.
4. Because of this stabilization the Data Stabilizing System has to provide
a high data integrity, i.e. only correct output should be released.
A few further requirements were added, namely:
1. The Data Stabilizing System has to minimize the number of custom,
dedicated, hardware components in the system: In particular, the system
has to work with conventional memory chips.
2. The system has to make use of the inherently available redundancy of a
parallel or distributed system.
3. Its design goal must include maximizing flexibility and re-usability, so as
to favor the adoption of the system in a wide application field, which, in
the case of ENEL, ranges from energy production and transport to
energy distribution.
4. The Data Stabilizing System has to eliminate the use of mechanisms
possibly affecting the deterministic behavior, for instance by not using
dynamic memory allocation during the critical phases of real-time
applications.
5. A major focus of the system is on service portability (see Chapter 2) in
order to have minimal dependencies with specific hardware platforms or
specific operating systems.
6. The system has to be scalable, at least from 1 to 8 processors.
In the following the functionality of the Data Stabilizing System is deduced
from the requirements stated in the last paragraph.
First one needs to clarify the concept of data stabilization. Let us assume one
wants to develop a controller with a short cycle time with respect to the
dynamics of the input and the output data. Disturbances from temporal faults
can influence either the input or the output data. These temporal effects, in
particular on the output data, must be eliminated. For this reason, the
controller is run several times with the same input data. Let us furthermore
assume that, in the absence of faults, the same output data are produced.
This allows the output of the controller from several runs to be compared. If
the output does not change in a number of consecutive cycles, the output is
staid to be stable. The described process of repeated runs of the controller and
comparison of the results is called stabilization.
The described procedure of cyclic repetition of a process is the basis of
temporal redundancy (that is, redoing). In order to detect and overcome
transient faults, even if their characteristics such as distribution of frequency
and duration are not known, temporal redundancy can be applied. If the
computation time for a process is outspoken longer than the expected duration
of a transient fault, and the frequency of the disturbances is low enough, it is
assumed that in several repetitive computations of the same data only one
fault may show up. So if the algorithm performs the same computation several
times, there will be a period of some consecutive, not impaired results.
The number Ntime of consecutive equal data inputs to the Data
Stabilizing System is the level of temporal redundancy. It is the
minimum number of cycles the Data Stabilizing System has to
execute until a new input can be assumed to be stable.
Another strong requirement of our design is that of maximizing data integrity.
To reach this goal, the Data Stabilizing System tool adopts a strategy, to be
described later on, aiming at ensuring that data are only allowed to be stored
in the Data Stabilizing System the moment they have been certified as being
“stable”. On a read request from a given memory location, the Data
Stabilizing System will then return the last stabilized data, while a write into
Data Stabilizing System will actually take place only when the strategy
guarantees that data that are going to be written are stable. Another
important requirement is that permanent faults affecting the system should
not destroy the data. A standard method for increasing the reliability of
memory is replication of data in redundant memories: a “write” is then
translated into writing into each of a set of redundant memories, with voting
of the data when reading out. An approach like the one described in
Chapter 4, that is, redundant variables, was not available yet and therefore it
was not used in this case. No additional hardware is required for this, as the
writings are done in the memories of the processing nodes of the target,
distributed memory platform.
Using the principles of spatial redundancy, the same data are
replicated in different memory areas—let us call them banks. The
spatial redundancy factor Nspat is the number of replicas stored in
the Data Stabilizing System. Changing this parameter the user is
allowed to trade off dependability with performance and resource
consumption.
In order to fulfill the above mentioned requirements the Data Stabilizing
System implements a strategy based on two buffers, one for reading the last
stabilized data, and the other for receiving the new data. These two buffers
are called the memory banks.
• The bank used for the output of the stabilized data is called the current
bank.
• The other bank, called future bank, receives the Ntime input data for the
Data Stabilizing System one after the other and checks whether the
results are stable.
If the results are stable the role of the banks is switched, so that the future
bank becomes the new current bank and the output data are fetched from
there.
During the design and implementation phases of the Data Stabilizing System
tool, the idea arose to isolate the spatial redundancy from the tool to build a
custom tool especially devoted to the distributed memory approach—the
Distributed Memory Tool. It showed that this approach simplifies the design
and the implementation of the Data Stabilizing System tool.
7.2.1 The Distributed Memory Tool
The Distributed Memory Tool is the sub-system responsible for the
management of the spatial redundancy scheme for the Data Stabilizing
System.
Let us call a local user context either a thread or a process, which the user
application sees as one task with its own local environment.
Assume that the user application consists of several such local user contexts,
which are distributed among several nodes of a multiprocessor system. The
basic component of the distributed memory tool is the local handler, which is
defined as follows:
A local memory handler is a local software module connected to
one local user context and to a set of fully interconnected fellows.
The attribute “local” means that both user context and memory
handler run on the same processing node and they represent the
whole tool from the viewpoint of the processing node.
As a consequence of this definition, the local user context regards the local
memory handler as the only interface to the distributed memory tool. The
local memory handler and the attached user module are connected via an IPC
mechanism based on shared memory, referred to in the following as a “local
link” and borrowed from the EPX terminology5. Commands to the distributed
memory or messages from the memory will only flow between local user
context and local memory handler. The tasks of the local memory handler are
completely transparent to the user module. The same design concepts used for
the EFTOS Voting Farm and described in Sect. 3 have been used here.
Figure 16: The local memory handler with its memory banks. The associated
partitions are represented in a hatched way.
7.2.2 The Local Memory Handler and Its Tasks
As mentioned in the previous section, the local memory handler (see Fig. 16)
is responsible for the management of two banks of memory, i.e., the current
bank, that is, the bank where all read access take place, and the future bank,
which is the bank for all writing actions. Each bank is cut into Nspat
partitions, where each handler is responsible for exactly one partition. This
partition can be seen as the part of the redundant memory attached to the
local user context, which is assigned to the local handler. This partition is
referred to as the one associated to the user module. If a user module (i.e. a
local user context) initiates to write data into its partition, this is done via a
command to the local memory handler, which is sent via the connecting local
link. The local handler then stores the data into the associated partition, and
distributes them to the other local memory handlers residing on the other
nodes. With this method the data are distributed as soon as they are received
from the application.
For reading from the local memory handler there are several concurrent
commands available. The common way is to request voted data from the local
memory handler. In this case, one local handler receives a request for voted
data from the attached user module. It then informs all other handlers and
requests a voting service to vote among the replicas of the partition associated
to the requesting user module. The result of the voting is provided to the
calling user module as result of the read action. The kind of voting is user
definable among those treated in (Lorczak et al., 1989). If a voting task fails, a
time-out system allows regarding such an event as the delivery of a dummy
vote. If the user application has a cyclic behavior, such that the user modules
on the different nodes all execute the same cycle, and under the hypothesis of
each node serving exclusively the same set of tasks, then under the hypothesis
Figure 17: Structure of the Distributed Memory Tool. The associated partitions
are represented hatched.
State Flag A Flag B Current Future
1 0 0 A B
2 0 1 B A
3 1 0 B A
4 1 1 A B
Table 5: Coding of the current and future bank flags
of a synchronous system model it is possible to assume that the requests for
reading may be processed more or less simultaneously on all nodes. In this
case, this information can be used to synchronize the nodes via the set of local
memory handlers and some data transfer between the nodes can be run in an
optimized way.
Clearly the Distributed Memory Tool is not aware of the logics pertaining to
the stabilization mechanism, hence it is a task of the user application to
inform the local memory handler about when to switch the banks (in the next
section it is shown how the temporal redundancy tasks take care of this).
Normally this can be done once per cycle. The switching can also be
connected with a checking phase, testing whether the current banks are equal
on all nodes by means of an equality voting.
Clearly, both determining the role of each bank and switching these roles are
crucial points for the whole strategy. In particular, these actions need to be
atomic. A fast and effective way to reach this property is the use of two binary
flags—one per bank—whose contents concurrently determines the roles of the
banks. These flags have been protected by storing them in the bank
themselves. Table 5 shows how the coding of the flags in both banks is done.
The idea is that, for changing from one state to another, just one write action
is needed in the future bank. The current bank can therefore be regarded as
being a readonly memory bank. As an example if the actual state is state 2,
and one wants to switch the banks, then it suffices to change the flag in the
future bank, which is bank A. Changing Flag A from 0 to 1 brings the system
to state 4.
7.2.3 Application-program Interface and Client side
Using function calls the user module is able to initialize the tool, to setup the
net of local handlers, and to activate the tool. This process is done in several
steps:
1. Each instance of a DMT is built up by declaring a pointer to a
corresponding data structure:
dmt_t *dmt;
This data structure is the place to hold all information for one instance
of the Distributed Memory Tool on each node. So each user module that
wants to use the Distributed Memory Tool needs to declare a variable of
this type.
Figure 18: Structure of the Data Stabilizing System Tool.
2. In the next step, the Distributed Memory Tool is defined and described.
This creates a static map which holds all necessary information to drive
the tool on each node. The following code fragment:
dmt = DMT_open (id, VotingAlgorithm);
for (i = 0; i < NumHandlers; i++)
DMT_add (dmt, i, PartitionSize,
(i == MyNodeId));
when executed on every node where the Distributed Memory Tool is
intended to run, sets up a local memory handler to be used by the tool.
The voting algorithm can be selected by the user via a kind of call-back
function.
3. After the definition and description of the Distributed Memory Tool, the
latter has to be started to set up data structures and threads. This
activation is done via function
int DMT_run (dmt_t *dmt);
This function simply spawns the local memory handler thread after
having checked the consistency of the structures defined in the
description phase. All allocation of memory is done in the handler itself.
7.3 The Data Stabilizing System Tool
As already mentioned, the Data Stabilizing System tool builds on top of the
Distributed Memory Tool. The latter is used for the management of the
spatial redundancy (see Fig. 18), while the Data Stabilizing System takes care
of the management of the temporal redundancy strategy. On each node the
writing requests to the Data Stabilizing System are done into a temporal
redundancy buffer, which holds a user definable number Ntime of copies of the
last inputs. As the temporal buffers are only handled locally, this fits well to
the concept of local memory handler. The Data Stabilizing System module
performs a voting on the contents of the temporal buffers and, if this voting is
successful, the result is fed into the Distributed Memory Tool. The Data
Stabilizing System handles all accesses as well as the temporal voting
transparently of the local user context.
7.3.1 Algorithms
The Data Stabilizing System Module as a whole gives each local user context a
combination of temporal and spatial redundant memory buffers, which are
able to keep the local state variables. The set of all local user contexts that
store data in an instance of a Data Stabilizing System is called the context
family associated to that tool. The Data Stabilizing System completely hides
the memory handling and the handling of the Distributed Memory Tool, so
that the user only needs to write to and read from the memory—all other
handling is done transparently. This guarantees an acceptable separation of
design concerns (sc), which could be further improved by using some
translator as in Chapter 4.
The following steps are executed automatically:
1. The new data is written into the temporal buffer.
2. Using internal flag values the current and the future banks are
determined. This is done within the Distributed Memory Tool, therefore
only the flag values of the spatial redundancy buffers are used.
3. A voting on the temporal buffer takes place. If the temporal buffer is
stabilized, i.e. the voting is positive, the content of the temporal buffer is
stored into the spatial redundancy buffers, i.e. the respective calls to the
DMT are done.
4. If the evaluation of the internal flags allows it, the Distributed Memory
Tool switches the memory banks.
5. A voting is applied to evaluate the output of the current bank in the
distributed memory. Such output is returned to the calling local user
context.
7.3.2 Application-Program Interface
The Data Stabilizing System is identified via a control block structure. It must
be seen in connection with the Distributed Memory Tool—in fact it is a kind
of front end to that tool, which provides additional functionality. The steps to
be performed to set up the Data Stabilizing System are similar to those
elaborated for the Distributed Memory Tool:
1. Each instance of a Data Stabilizing System Tool is built up by declaring
a pointer to a corresponding data structure:
smCB_t * sm;
Each local user context that is member of the associated context family
needs to declare a pointer to a variable of type smCB t. Similarly to the
Distributed Memory Tool, the Data Stabilizing System Tool has to be
defined and described. With the SM open statement a local instance of
the system is created. In addition to the parameters of the DMT open
statement some parameters regarding the temporal redundancy are
passed to this statement.
sm = SM_open (id, N_time,
TemporalVotingAlgorithm, SpatialVotingAlgorithm);
for (i = 0; i< N_spat; i++)
SM_add(sm, i, PartitionSize, (i == MyNodeId) ) ;
The above code sets up an instance of the Data Stabilizing System tool,
provided it is called in every local user context that needs to take part in
the processing of the tool.
2. Up to this point the Data Stabilizing System Tool is defined and
described, that is its structure is set up, but no instance has been
installed, no memory has been allocated and no handler for the spatial
redundant memory has been started yet. To do this the tool must be
activated. This is done via the function SM run. This function allocates
the temporal redundancy buffers, initializes the variables, and activates
the attached Distributed Memory Tool using the function DMT run.
The Data Stabilizing System can only be started up if all local user
contexts belonging to its context family call SM run at the same point in
their start-up phase.
At run-time, the Data Stabilizing System Tool is controlled via two functions,
which read the data from the application or provide stabilized and voted data
to the application:
int SM_write (smCB_t *MyCB, void *SM_in);
int SM_read (smCB_t*MyCB, void *SM_out);
The user provides data to the Data Stabilizing System via function SM write,
which is then responsible for the handling of these values. This function is
used to input the local data of a local user context to the Data Stabilizing
System. The parameters submitted to the function describe the Data
Stabilizing System control block structure (MyCB) and the address of the
data to be copied into the Data Stabilizing System (SM in). When the
function is returned, all data provided to the function using the SM in pointer
are copied out of this memory location into the temporary buffer of the Data
Stabilizing System. The SM read function writes the local data of the calling
local user context back to the address submitted through the pointer SM out.
The Data Stabilizing System control block structure MyCB is used to identify
the Data Stabilizing System.
Switching from the current to the future bank is achieved by means of the
following procedure:
• Determine the current meaning of the banks from their internal flags.
• Write data into the specified partition(s) of the future bank of the
memory.
• Output data via a voting between the distributed copies of the current
bank.
• If the contents of the future banks of all nodes are equal, switch the role
of the memory banks.
7.3.3 System and Fault Models
As already mentioned, the embedded and hard real-time character of the
application makes it reasonable to assume a synchronous system model. The
overall strategy implemented in the Data Stabilizing System allows to mask a
number of transient faults resulting in:
• An erroneous input value.
• Errors affecting the circular buffer.
• Errors affecting the temporal redundancy modules.
• Errors affecting the flag values,
occurring during the execution cycle, or caused by an external disturbance, or
a wrong flag value, and so forth. These are tolerated either through the voting
sessions (temporal redundancy) or are masked via the periodic restarts which
invalidate the current cycle. In this latter case this is therefore perceived as a
delay of the stabilized output. The same applies when a fault affects the phase
of determining the current bank, or faults occurring during the voting among
temporal redundancy modules, or faults affecting the spatial redundancy
modules. More details on this can be found in [4]. Tolerance of permanent
faults resulting in node crashes is achieved by using the Data Stabilizing
System as a dependable mechanism compliant to the recovery language
approach described in Chapter 6. As explained in that chapter, this approach
exploits a high level distributed application (the TIRAN backbone) and a
library of error detection tools in order to detect events such as node and task
crashes. User defined error recovery actions can then be attached to the error
detection events so as to trigger corrective actions such as a reconfiguration of
the Data Stabilizing System tasks.
7.4 Conclusion
In the text above a software system implementing a data stabilizing tool has
been described. Such tool is to be placed in highly disturbed environments
such as those typical of sub-station automation. Due to its design, based on a
combination of spatial and temporal redundancy and on a cyclic restart policy,
the tool proved to be capable of tolerating transient and permanent faults and
to guarantee data stabilization. Initially developed on a Parsytec CC system,
the tool has been then ported to several runtime systems. The most important
lessons learned while developing this tool are those that brought the author of
this book to the concept of service portability introduced in Chapter 2: A
software code such as the one of the system described so far can be ported to a
different environment with a moderated effort; but porting the service is
indeed something else. In this case, a thorough evaluation of the new working
environment is due in order to come up with proper new values for parameters
such as Ntime and Nspat. A system like the Data Stabilizing tool puts this
requirement in the foreground and makes it possible to perform an off-line
adaptability of its service. As a consequence a is assessed as “moderate”.
Augmenting the approach towards acceptable degrees of a would call for the
adoption of a strategy such as the one used in redundant variables (see
Chapter 4). As a final remark, its single-purpose design intrinsically translates
in bad sa.
8 An Approach to Express Recovery Blocks:
The Recovery Meta-Program
The Recovery Meta-Program (RMP) (Ancona, Dodero, Giannuzzi, Clematis,
& Fernandez, 1990) is a mechanism that alternates the execution of two
cooperating processing contexts. The concept behind its architecture can be
captured by means of the idea of a debugger, or a monitor, which:
• is scheduled when the application is stopped at some breakpoints,
• executes some sort of a program, written in a specific language,
Figure 19: Control flow between the application program and RMP while exe-
cuting a fault-tolerance strategy based on recovery blocks.
• and finally returns the control to the application context, until the next
breakpoint is encountered.
Breakpoints outline portions of code relevant to specific fault-tolerance
strategies—for instance, breakpoints can be used to specify alternate blocks or
acceptance tests of recovery blocks (see Sect. 2.3)—while programs are
implementations of those strategies, e.g., of recovery blocks or N -version
programming. The main benefit of RMP is in the fact that, while breakpoints
require a (minimal) intervention of the functional-concerned programmer,
RMP scripts can be designed and implemented without the intervention and
even the awareness of the developer. In other words, RMP guarantees a good
separation of design concerns. As an example, recovery blocks are
implemented, from the point of view of the functionally concerned designer,
specifying alternates and acceptance tests, while the execution goes like in
Fig. 19:
• When the system encounters a breakpoint corresponding to the entrance
of a recovery block, control flows to the RMP, which saves the
application program environment and starts the first alternate.
• The execution of the first alternate goes on until its end, marked by
another breakpoint. The latter returns the control to RMP, this time in
order to execute the acceptance test.
• Should the test succeed, the recovery block is exited, otherwise control
goes to the second alternate, and so forth.
In RMP, the language to express the meta-programs is Hoare’s
Communicating Sequential Processes language (Hoare, 1978) (CSP).
Conclusions. In the RMP approach, all the technicalities related to the
management of the fault-tolerance provisions are coded in a separate
programming context. Even the language to code the provisions may be
different from the one used to express the functional aspects of the
application. One can conclude that RMP is characterised by optimal sc.
The design choice of using CSP to code the meta-programs influences
negatively attribute sa. Choosing a pre-existent formalism clearly presents
many practical advantages, though it means adopting a fixed, immutable
syntactical structure to express the fault-tolerance strategies. The choice of a
pre-existing general-purpose distributed programming language as CSP is
therefore questionable, as it appears to be rather difficult or at least
cumbersome to use it to express at least some of the fault-tolerance provisions.
For instance, RMP proves to be an effective linguistic structure to express
strategies such as recovery blocks and N -version programming (Yeung &
Schneider, 2003), where the main components are coarse grain processes to be
arranged into complex fault-tolerance structures. Because of the choice of a
pre-existing language like CSP, RMP appears not to be the best choice for
representing provisions such as, e.g., atomic actions (Jalote & Campbell,
1985). This translates in very limited sa. No a was foreseen among the design
choices of RMP.
Our conjecture is that the coexistence of two separate layers for the functional
and the non-functional aspects could have been better exploited to reach the
best of the two approaches: Using a widespread programming language such
as Java for expressing the functional aspect, while devising a custom language
for dealing with non-functional requirements, e.g., a language especially
designed to express error recovery strategies. This design choice has been
taken in the approach described in Chapter 6, the recovery language approach.
9 A Hybrid Case: The RAFTNET Library for
Dependable Farmer-Worker Parallel
Applications
RAFTNET is a tool to compose dependable parallel applications obeying the
farmer-worker data parallel paradigm. It is described here as a hybrid example
of a system that appears to its users as a library, hence a single-version
software fault-tolerance provision, though at run-time manages a potentially
large degree of redundant components—a typical characteristics of
multiple-version software fault-tolerance.
9.1 Introducing RAFTNET
The RAFTNET Library is another example of a library to build fault-tolerant
services. The main difference between RAFTNET and a system such as the
Voting Farm is that it does not provide the application programmer with a
dependable mechanism (in this case, distributed voting), but rather it provides
a dependable structure for a class of target applications. In more detail,
RAFTNET is a library for data parallel, farmer-worker applications: Any such
applications using RAFTNET makes uses of the available redundancy not only
to reach higher performance but also to tolerate certain faults and disruptions
that would normally jeopardize its progress. In the following the structure of
RAFTNET, its models, properties, and features are described.
9.2 Why Dependable Parallel Applications?
Parallel computing is nowadays the only technique that can be used in order
to achieve the impressive computing power needed to solve a number of
challenging problems; as such, it is being employed by an ever growing
community of users in spite of what are known as two main disadvantages,
namely:
1. harder-to-use programming models, programming techniques and
development tools—if any,—which sometimes translate into programs
that don’t match as efficiently as expected with the underlying parallel
hardware, and
2. the inherently lower level of dependability that characterizes any such
parallel hardware i.e., a higher probability for events like a node’s
permanent or temporary failure.
A real, effective exploitation of any given parallel computer asks for solutions
which take into a deep account the above outlined problems.
Let us consider for example the synchronous farmer-worker algorithm i.e., a
well-known model for structuring data-parallel applications: a master process,
namely the farmer, feeds a pool of slave processes, called workers, with some
units of work; then polls them until they return their partial results which are
eventually recollected and saved. Though quite simple, this scheme may give
good results, especially in homogeneous, dedicated environments.
But how does this model react to events like a failure of a worker, or more
simply to a worker’s performance degradation due e.g., to the exhaustion of
any vital resource? Without substantial modifications, this scheme is not able
to cope with these events—they would seriously affect the whole application or
its overall performances, regardless the high degree of hardware redundancy
implicitly available in any parallel system. The same inflexibility prevents a
failed worker to re-enter the computing farm once it has regained the proper
operational state.
As opposed to this synchronous structuring, it is possible for example to
implement the farmer-worker model by de-coupling the farmer from the
workers by means of an intermediate module, a dispatcher which
asynchronously feeds these latter and supplies them with new units of work on
an on-demand basis. This strategy guarantees some sort of a dynamic
balancing of the workload even in heterogeneous, distributed environments,
thus exhibiting a higher matching to the parallel hardware. The Live Data
Structure computational paradigm, known from the LINDA context, makes
this particularly easy to set up (see for example (Carriero & Gelernter, 1989a,
1989b; De Florio, Murgolo, & Spinelli, 1994)).
With this approach it is also possible to add a new worker at run-time without
any notification to both the farmer and the intermediate module—the
newcomer will simply generate additional, non-distinguishable requests for
work. But again, if a worker fails or its performances degrade, the whole
application may fail or its overall outcome be affected or seriously delayed.
This is particularly important when one considers the inherent loss in
dependability of any parallel (i.e., replicated) hardware.
Next sections introduce and discuss a modification to the above sketched
asynchronous scheme, which inherits the advantages of its parent and offers
new ones, namely:
• it allows a non-solitary, temporarily slowed down worker to be left out of
the processing farm as long as its performance degradation exists, and
• it allows a non-solitary worker which has been permanently affected by
some fault to be definitively removed from the farm,
both of them without affecting the overall outcome of the computation, and
dynamically spreading the workload among the active processors in a way that
results in an excellent match to various different MIMD architectures.
9.3 The Technique
For the purpose of describing the technique the following scenario is described:
a MIMD machine consists of n+ 2 identical “nodes” (n > 0), or processing
entities, connected by some communication line. On each node a number of
independent sequential processes are executed on a time-sharing basis. A
message passing library is available for sending and receiving messages across
the communication line. A synchronous communication approach is used: a
sender blocks until the intended receiver gets the message. A receiver blocks
waiting for a message from a specific sender, or for a message from a number
of senders. When a message arrives, the receiver is awaken and is able to
receive that message and to know the identity of the sender. Nodes are
numbered from 0 to n+ 1. Node 0 is connected to an input line and node
n+ 1 is connected to an output line.
• Node 0 runs:
– a Farmer process, connected by the input line to an external
producer device. From now on a camera is assumed to be the
producer device. A control line wires again the Farmer to the
camera, so that this latter can be commanded to produce new data
and eventually send this data across the input line;
– a Dispatcher process, yet to be described.
Figure 20: Summary of the interactions among the processes.
• Node n+ 1 runs a Collector process, to be described later on, connected
by the output line to an external storage device e.g., a disk;
• Each of the nodes from 1 to n is purely devoted to the execution of one
instance of the Worker process. Each Worker is connected to the
Dispatcher and to the Collector processes.
9.4 Interactions Between the Farmer and the Dispatcher
On demand of the Farmer process, the camera sends it an input image. Once
it has received an image, the Farmer performs a predefined, static data
decomposition, creating m equally sized sub-images, or blocks. Blocks are
numbered from 1 to m, and are represented by variables bi, 0 < i < m+ 1.
The Farmer process interacts exclusively with the camera and with the
Dispatcher process.
• Three classes of messages can be sent from the Farmer process to the
Dispatcher (see Fig. 20):
1. a NEW RUN message, which means: “a new bunch of data is
available”;
2. a STOP message, which means that no more input is available so the
whole process has to be terminated;
3. a couple (k, bk), k in {1, . . .m} i.e., an integer which identifies a
particular block (it will be referred from now on as a “block-id”),
followed by the block itself.
• The only type of message that the Dispatcher process sends to the
Farmer process is a block-id i.e., a single integer in the range {1, . . . ,m}
which expresses the information that a certain block has been fully
processed by a Worker and recollected by the Collector (see Sect. 9.4.2.)
At the other end of the communication line, the Dispatcher is ready to process
a number of events triggered by message arrivals. For example, when a class-3
message is received, the block is stored into a work buffer as follows:
receive (k, bk)
sk = DISABLED
wk = bk
(Here, receive is the function for receiving an incoming message, ~s is a vector
of m integers pre-initialized to DISABLED, which represents some status
information that will be described later on, and ~w is a vector of “work
buffers”, i.e., bunches of memory able to store any block. DISABLED is an
integer which is not in the set {1, . . . ,m}.)
As the Farmer process sends a class-1 message, that is, a NEW RUN signal, the
Dispatcher processes that event as follows:
~s = 0
broadcast RESUME
that is, it zeroes each element of ~s and then broadcasts the RESUME message to
the whole farm.
When the first image arrives to the Farmer process, it produces a series
(bi)0<i<m+1, and then a sequence of messages (i, bi)0<i<m+1. Finally, the
Farmer sends a NEW RUN message.
Starting from the second image, and while there are images to process from
the camera, the Farmer performs the image decomposition in advance, thus
creating a complete set of (k, bk) couples. These couples are then sent to the
Dispatcher on an on-demand basis: as soon as block-id i is received, couple
(i, bi) is sent out. This is done for anticipating the transmission of the couples
belonging to the next run of the computation. When eventually the last
block-id of a certain run has been received, a complete set of “brand-new”
blocks is already in the hands of the Dispatcher; at that point, sending the one
NEW RUN message will simultaneously enable all blocks.
9.4.1 Interactions Between the Dispatcher and the Workers
The Dispatcher interacts with every instance of the Worker process.
• Four classes of messages can be sent from the Dispatcher to the Workers
(see Fig. 20):
1. a SLEEP message, which sets the receiver into a wait condition;
2. a RESUME message, to get the receiver out of the waiting state;
3. a STOP message, which makes the Worker terminate;
4. a (k,w) couple, where w represents the input data to be elaborated.
• Worker j, 0 < j < n+ 1, interacts with the Dispatcher by sending it its
worker-id message, i.e., the j integer. This happens when Worker j has
finished dealing with a previously sent w working buffer and is available
for a new (k,w) couple to work with.
In substance, Worker j continuously repeats the following loop:
send j to Dispatcher
receive message from Dispatcher
process message
Clearly, send transmits a message. The last instruction, in dependence with
the class of the incoming message, results in a number of different operations:
• if the message is a SLEEP, the Worker waits until the arrival of a RESUME
message, which makes it resume the loop, or the arrival of any other
message, which means that an error has occurred;
• if it is a STOP message, the Worker breaks the loop and exits the farm;
• if it is a (k,w) couple, the Worker starts computing the value f(w),
where f is some user-defined function e.g., an edge detector. If a RESUME
event is raised during the computation of f , that computation is
immediately abandoned and the Worker restarts the loop. Contrariwise,
the output couple (k, f(w)) is sent to the Collector process.
When the Dispatcher gets a j integer from Worker j, its expected response is a
new (k,w) couple, or a SLEEP. What rules in this context is the ~s vector—if all
entries of ~s are DISABLED, then a SLEEP message is sent to Worker j.
Otherwise, an entry is selected among those with the minimum non-negative
value, say entry l, and a (l, bl) message is then sent as a response. Then sl is
incremented by 1.
More formally, considered set S = {s in ~s | s¬ = DISABLED}, if S is non-empty
it is possible to partition S according to the equivalence relation R defined as
follows:
For all (a, b) in S × S : aR b if and only if sa = sb.
So the blocks of the partition are the equivalence classes:
[x]
def
= {s in S | Exists y in {1 . . .m} such that (s = sy) and (sy = x)}.
Now, first let us consider
a = min{b | Exists b >= 0 such that [b] in S/R};
then l is chosen in [a] in some way, e.g. pseudo-randomly; finally, message
(l, bl) is sent to Worker j, sl is incremented, and the partition is reconfigured
accordingly. If S is the empty set, a SLEEP message is generated.
In other words, entry si when greater than or equal to 0 represents some sort
of a priority identifier (the lower the value, the higher the priority for block
bi). The block to be sent to a requesting Worker process is always selected
among those with the highest priority; after the selection, si is updated
incrementing its value by 1. In this way, the content of si represents the
degree of “freshness” of block bi: it substantially counts the number of times it
has been picked up by a Worker process; fresher blocks are always preferred.
As long as there are “brand-new” blocks i.e., blocks with a freshness attribute
of 0, these are the blocks which are selected and distributed. Note that this
means that as long as the above condition is true, each Worker deals with a
different unit of work; on the contrary, as soon as the last brand-new block is
distributed, the model admits that a same block may be assigned to more than
one Worker.
This is tolerated up to a certain threshold value; if any si becomes greater
than that value, an alarm event is raised—too many workers are dealing with
the same input data, which might mean that they are all affected by the same
problem e.g., a software bug resulting in an error when bi is being processed.
This special case shall not be considered. Another possibility is that two or
more Workers had finished their work almost at the same time thus bringing
rapidly a flag to the threshold. Waiting for the processing time of one block
may supply the answer.
A value of DISABLED for any si means that its corresponding block is not
available to be computed. It is simply not considered during the selection
procedure.
9.4.2 Interactions Between the Workers and the Collector
Any Worker may send one class of messages to the Collector; no message is
sent from this latter to any Worker (see Fig. 20).
The only allowed message is the couple (k, o) in which o is the fully processed
output of the Worker’s activity on the kth block.
The Collector’s task is to fill a number of “slots”, namely pi, i = 1, . . . ,m, with
the outputs coming from the Workers. As two or more Workers are allowed to
process a same block thus producing two or more (k, o) couples, the Collector
runs a vector of status bits which records the status of each slot: if fi is FREE
then pi is “empty” i.e., it has never been filled in by any output before; if it is
BUSY, it already holds an output. ~f is firstly initialized to FREE.
For each incoming message from the Worker, the Collector repeats the
following sequence of operations:
receive (k, o) from Worker
if fk is equal to FREE
then
send k to Dispatcher
pk = o
fk = BUSY
check-if-full
else
detect
endif
where:
check-if-full checks if, due to the last arrival, all entries of ~f have become
BUSY. In that case, a complete set of partial outputs has been recollected
and, after some user-defined post-processing (for example, a polygonal
approximation of the chains of edges produced by the Workers), a global
output can be saved, and the flag vector re-initialized:
if ~f is equal to BUSY
then
post-process ~p
save ~p
~f = FREE
endif
detect is a user-defined functionality—he or she may choose to compare the
two o’s so to be able to detect any inconsistency and start some recovery
action, or may simply ignore the whole message.
Note also that an acknowledgment message (the block-id) is sent from the
Collector to the Dispatcher, to inform it that an output slot has been occupied
i.e., a partial output has been gathered. This also means that the Farmer can
anticipate the transmission of a block which belongs to the next run, if any.
9.4.3 Interactions Between the Collector and the Dispatcher
As just stated, upon acceptance of an output, the collector sends a block-id,
say integer k, to the Dispatcher—it is the only message that goes from the
Collector to the Dispatcher.
The Dispatcher then simply acts as follows:
sk = DISABLED
send k to Farmer
that is, the Dispatcher “disables” the kth unit of work—set S as defined in
Sect. 9.4.1 is reduced by one element and consequently partition S/R changes
its shape; then the block-id is propagated to the Farmer (see Fig. 20).
On the opposite direction, there is only one message that may travel from the
Dispatcher to the Collector: the STOP message that means that no more input
is available and so processing is over. Upon reception of this message, the
Collector stops itself, like it does any other receiver in the farm.
9.5 Discussion
The just proposed technique uses asynchronicity in order to efficiently match
to a huge class of parallel architectures. It also uses the redundancy which is
inherent to parallelism to make an application able to cope with events like
e.g., a failure of a node, or a node being slowed down, temporarily or not.
• If a node fails while it is processing block k, then no output block will be
transferred to the Collector. When no more “brand-new” blocks are
available, block k will be assigned to one or more Worker processes, up
to a certain limit. During this phase the replicated processing modules of
the parallel machine may be thought of as part of a hardware
redundancy fault tolerant mechanism. This phase is over when any
Worker module delivers its output to the Collector and consequently all
others are possibly explicitly forced to resume their processing loop or, if
too late, their output is discarded.
• If a node has been for some reason drastically slowed down, then its
block will be probably assigned to other possibly non-slowed Workers.
Again, the first who succeeds, its output is collected; the others are
stopped or ignored.
In any case, from the point of view of the Farmer process, all these events are
completely masked. The mechanism may be provided to a user in the form of
some set of basic functions, making all technicalities concerning both parallel
programming and fault tolerance transparent to the programmer.
Of course, nothing prevents the concurrent use of other fault tolerance
mechanisms in any of the involved processes e.g., using Watchdog timers to
understand that a Worker has failed and consequently reset the proper entry
of vector ~f . The ability to re-enter the farm may also be exploited committing
a reboot of a failed node and restarting the Worker process on that node.
9.5.1 Reliability Analysis
In order to compare the original, synchronous farmer-worker model
with the one described in this paper, a first step is given by
observing that the synchronous model depicts a series system
(Johnson, 1989) i.e., a system in which each element is required not
to have failed for the whole system to operate. This is not the case
of the model described in this paper, in which a subset of the
elements, namely the Worker farm, is a parallel system (Johnson,
1989): if at least one Worker has not failed, so it is for the whole
farm subsystem. Note how Fig. 20 may be also thought of as the
reliability block diagram of this system.
Considering the sole farm subsystem, if Ci(t), 0 < i < n+ 1 is the
event that Worker on node i has not failed at time t, and R(t) is
the reliability of any Worker at time t then, under the assumption
of mutual independency between the events, one can conclude that:
(1)
being Rs(t) the reliability of the farm as a series system, and
(2)
where Rp(t) represents the reliability of the farm as a parallel
system. Of course failures must be independent, so again
data-induced errors are not considered. Figure 21 shows the
reliability of the farm in a series and in a parallel system as a
Worker’s reliability goes from 0 to 1.
An Augmented LINDA Model. The whole idea pictured in this paper
may be implemented in a LINDA tuple space manager (see for example
(Carriero & Gelernter, 1989b, 1989a)). Apart from the standard functions to
access “common” tuples, a new set of functions may be supplied which deal
with “book-kept tuples” i.e., tuples that are distributed to requestors by
means of the algorithm sketched in Sect. 9.4.1. As an example:
fout (for fault tolerant out) may create a book-kept tuple i.e., a
content-addressable object with book-kept accesses;
frd (fault tolerant rd) may get a copy of a matching book-kept tuple, chosen
according to the algorithm in Sect. 9.4.1;
fin (fault tolerant in) may read-and-erase a matching book-kept tuple,
chosen according to the algorithm in Sect. 9.4.1,
and so on. The ensuing augmented LINDA model results in an abstract,
elegant, efficient, dependable, and transparent mechanism to exploit a parallel
hardware. Chapter 9 describes another example of a dependable LINDA
model.
9.6 Implementation Issues
The RAFTNET system has been developed for network of workstations using
a subset of the MPICH routines (MPICH (MPICH, n.d.) is a portable
implementation of the MPI message passing library (Gropp, Lusk, & Skjellum,
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Figure 21: For a fixed value ~t, a number of graphs of Rp(~t) (the reliability of the
parallel system) and Rs(~t) (the reliability of the series system) are portrayed
as functions of R(~t), the reliability of a Worker at time t, and n, the number
of the components. Each graph is labeled with its value of n; those above the
diagonal portray reliabilities of parallel systems, while those below the diagonal
pertain to series systems. Note that for n = 1 the models coincide, while for any
n > 1 Rp(~t) is always above Rs(~t) except when R(~t) = 0 (no reliable Worker)
and when R(~t) = 1 (totally reliable, failure-free Worker).
Figure 22: Data structures and data structure conversions in the masterworker
library.
1999)). The code of this system has been also ported to a “pure” TCP/IP
environment by porting the MPICH subset (Raftnet, n.d.).
The implemented master-worker system acts as black box. Firstly, knowledge
about the algorithm details is not required by the user application
programmer. This allows a fast integration of the master-worker library in
existing serial applications. Secondly, in RAFTNET data structures in the
user application can take any form. They need not to be known beforehand by
the master-worker algorithm. Both aspects contribute to the flexibility of the
system. The resulting master-worker library can be integrated in a wide
variety of programs, on the condition that a limited set of user application
functions are written. Both ideas are explained in this section. The modified
master-worker algorithm is implemented in the master-worker library. The
application that is to be parallelized, resides in the user application library. A
main process calls the master-worker library with a restricted set of
arguments. Most of these arguments are pointers to functions in the user
library for splitting, merging, post-processing the output data or for handling
data structures. Communication between the master-worker and the user
application library is solely via these functions. Writing these functions forms
the main effort of the programmer for integrating the master-worker library
with his/her user application library. This setup ensures that the
master-worker algorithm can be used for a wide variety of programs.
Furthermore, the detailed implementation of the master-worker algorithm
remains a black box for the user.
The concept of the user application acting as a black box for the
master-worker library, is mainly a matter of handling data structures and
requires a more elaborated explanation. Often, the program flow can be
regarded as a series of data structure conversions. To support a variety of
applications, the master-worker library keeps track of various data structures
(Fig. 22). DW STRUCT, WC STRUCT and CM STRUCT denote the input
blocks, the processed blocks and the post-processed output data respectively.
The prefixes are the first letters of source and destination. Conversion between
these structures is performed in the user functions for processing and merging.
MC MERGED STRUCT is a structure containing supporting information for
merging the data. Fields in data structures are sent one at a time. Details
Figure 23: Process for sending and receiving one field of a data structure.
about these structures are beforehand only known by the user library. On the
other hand, the master-worker library needs to know these details for sending
and receiving the data. Two functions written by the user application
programmer, that are passed on via the master-worker interface, serve as a
communication channel between user application library and master-worker
library for these structure details (Fig. 23.)
• The first function (describe) receives as input from the master-worker
library, information such as the index of the structure (which is one of
the structures in Fig. 22) and the field index. The describe function in
the user library returns information such as the number of entries in that
field (in case it is an array) and the data type. For the receiving process,
the returned information allows allocating memory for the receive buffer
by the master-worker library. For the sending process, also the data
itself is returned to the master-worker library, which is transmitted
immediately.
• After actually receiving this data, the receive process fills in the users
data structure with this received field. The user function fillstruct
receives via its arguments the structure and field index, the structure
itself and the data. It returns the structure with the data field filled in.
Via this schedule, the master-worker library does not need to be aware of the
data structure details—these are returned and filled in by the user
application’s describe and fillstruct functions. The user programmer is
completely in control of the data structures that are used.
9.6.1 Failure semantics
Due to the characteristics of the underlying algorithm, our system
compensates omission/performance and state-transition failures of its workers.
• Omission failures occur when an agreed reply to a request is missing.
The request appears to be ignored. This is compensated by
redistributing a request when its “freshness” allows it.
• Performance failures occur when the service is supplied, though too late
with respect to some real-time interval possibly agreed upon in the
specifications. This class of failures can be compensated by adopting a
number of workers large enough to mask, e.g., crashing or late processing
workers.
• State transition failures are also covered, as the state of the system is
never lost because of a failing worker: Indeed, by construction, each
state transition is atomic: A block is marked as processed only when its
completion is explicitly acknowledged. Half finished blocks are simply
discarded.
Memory Allocation Delays and Failures. A memory allocation failure
can be due to either not enough available memory on that node possibly
resulting from memory leaks or due to another memory-greedy program
running. In the former case, memory allocation fails permanently and
contribution to the system eventually ends. In the latter, the worker might be
able to continue after the other program is finished or when it is in a further
stage of processing.
When receiving data, the receiving process can fail to allocate memory for the
receive buffer. In this case, the process sleeps a certain time slice, polling for
available memory regularly. In case the failure is temporary (e.g. another
memory-greedy program running on the same node), this will allow the
process to continue its program cycle. For permanent failures, the process
stops contribution after trying to allocate memory for a certain number times.
Processes Sending to Failed Workers. The algorithm handles failures of
workers if error codes are returned to the master-worker library. These can fail
to contribute or be delayed for quite some time. However, processes that send
towards these workers are not aware of these kinds of events. Therefore, such
events are handled by using appropriate send operations.
When using synchronous messages for sending a bunch of data, a sort of
“handshake” is required between the sender and the receiver. When the send
operation is a blocking one and the receiving process is a worker that failed
meanwhile, the whole system will block. For this reason, using synchronous
blocking messages for sending towards workers is avoided.
In the MPI-1 standard, no explicit asynchronous send operation is available.
The standard send operation can be asynchronous, but this depends typically
on the MPI implementation and—in case of MPICH—also on the length of the
message that is to be transmitted. Therefore, non-blocking send operations are
invoked. This is combined with standard messages, in order to exploit
optimizations of buffering in the MPI implementation.
9.6.2 Initialization and Finalization
The master-worker library and the MPI environment are initialized and
finalized with two separate calls to the master-worker library,
masterworker_init and masterworker_final. The masterworker interface
itself can be invoked one or more times in between. One master-worker run
can e.g. use the output of a former master-worker run as input. Also, other
process functions or other user functions can be used in these separate
masterworker runs.
All nodes can be initialized and finalized via user application functions that
are passed on to the master-worker library via the masterworker interface.
These functions can be used for setting up or freeing global variables in these
processes once. These global variables can be used during the program flow of
that node, avoiding re-initialization and re-finalization after each process cycle
of that node. If such initialization is not necessary, empty functions can be
used.
Not all variables that are needed for processing are available at all nodes. If a
set of variables is needed by the collector for merging the data, these can be
transmitted in the MC_MERGED_STRUCT structure. Variables needed for
processing a block, but changing according to the blockid (k), should be sent
to the workers via the DW_STRUCT. Variables that do not change according to
the blockid, should however not be transmitted with each block. These can be
initialized as global variables before calling the masterworker_init function.
All processes will possess these variables in this case.
9.6.3 Speeding up
Possible time-consuming operations, such as saving results, splitting input
units or merging and post-processing the output, are performed in RAFTNET
by separate threads. In this way, temporary delays are smoothed out over one
cycle of the master-worker system for splitting, processing and postprocessing
a data unit.
The same reasoning has been applied to the master and the dispatcher. These
consist of separate threads on the same node. Sending a certain set of input
blocks from the master to the dispatcher results in this case in only exchanging
pointers. This avoids the communication cost of sending input blocks from the
master to the dispatcher or output units from the dispatcher to the master.
9.7 Application and System Description
9.7.1 Parallelization Choice
Not all algorithms are good candidates to apply the master-worker on.
Parallelising an application over different processors offers a real added value
when code optimizations have been done on the algorithm. As such, these two
approaches are complementary. The following rules of thumb were used in the
decision of applying the raftnet library on the algorithms described in the rest
of this section:
Algorithm locality: Splitting up the input data for parallel execution is most
efficient when operations have no or little data dependency or when
these operations are very local if there is a positional data dependency
(e.g. pixels in an image grid).
Input and output: When data is split up, this can affect the final result.
Either the result is erroneous (mostly because of the absence of locality
in the algorithm), the output has noise added to it or the merged output
is correct (identical to serial execution). This example is often because
parallel execution only used a similar split policy that was already
inherently used in the serial execution (e.g. audio MP3 encoding). In the
second case, the evaluation has to be made if the noise is significant for
the final outcome and if it is, can the noise be filtered out in an efficient
way.
In the following, a case study is briefly described: Feature selection via corner
detection and Delaunay triangulation on the reconstructed points. The testing
environment consisted of a PA RISC 85000 processor with a 400 MHz clock
and 1.5 MB cache, running the HP-UX 11.0 operating system. MPICH 1.2.2
has been used, which implements the MPI 1.2 standard.
9.7.2 Corner Detection
The corner detection algorithm (Harris & Stephens, 1988) forms the basis of,
e.g., a 3D reconstruction algorithm. The features selected in this phase are
matched (i.e. the corresponding corners in several images) and used for
reconstruction of the 3rd dimension, which was lost in the projection to 2D
while capturing. During the tests, the setup in Fig. 24 was used.
Machine A captures, via a Conexant Bt878 based card, the data onto a local
disk (NVREC, n.d.). In turn, this disk is shared via NFS with the rest of the
network, in particular the parallel master-worker cluster. The images are
captured in PAL VideoCD format, 352× 288, 25 fps (frames per second), to
pgm frames.
The initial version in C, based on the C++ development code was not even
close to be able to process the images in soft real time and only 7 fps were
processed. In a following step, the algorithm was optimized by including faster
Figure 24: Capture and processing setup.
Figure 25: Image processing parallelization schemes.
and more memory aware data types and by reducing intermediate buffers and
loop transformations (Leeman et al., 2005).
Due to these changes, this algorithm got a speedup of 30%, which still put it
about two times slower than the minimal soft real time requirement (10–12
fps).
Since conventional code optimization techniques were exhausted, assigning a
larger cycle budget to the task within the available environment was done by
adding a parallelization layer. Figure 25 shows two possible parallelization
schemes. One possibility is to split up the figure. In doing this, edge effects
have to be accounted for, so about 7% of the pixel values need to be
replicated. In the test setup, the second option was preferred: The frames are
handled in a FIFO by the master and are sent as a whole to the workers. This
has also the advantage that no splitting is needed at the dispatcher side, nor is
there need for merging of the results (coordinate data) on the collector’s side.
For the integration of the master-worker algorithm, only 125 extra lines of
code had to be written to use the required functionality of raftnet. Tests on
the implemented system show that soft real time feature detection in the
absence of faults is possible with 4 to 5 workers (depending on the network
and worker load). Adding more workers improves further performance and, at
the same time, enhances the dependability of the service.
Voting Farm Broadcast algorithm Sect. 3.1.3 Table 2
Trap Handler General algorithm Sect. 5.2 -
Atomic Actions General algorithm Sect. 6.1.1 Table 4
Table 6: The algorithms of the EFTOS tools.
10 CONCLUSION
In this chapter single-version and multiple-version software fault-tolerance
have been described. Also the main features of a few systems based on these
approaches have been discussed. After this a number of examples have been
treated in more detail—a flexible and easy to use mechanism for software
voting; a software watchdog timer; a tool providing exception handling for the
C programming language; a tool to manage transactions in C; and a system
combining spatial and temporal redundancy to achieve data stabilization.
Some of their algorithms have been introduced—Table 6 locates them in the
chapter.
A so-called recovery meta-program—a syntactical structure for the expressions
of provisions such as recovery blocks—has been also introduced. Finally a
hybrid system, RAFTNET, combining aspects of both approaches, has been
discussed.
Main aspect of the SV approach is the inherent mixture of the functional and
the fault-tolerant code, which requires the developer to deal with the two
corresponding concerns at the same time. MVSFT do not suffer from such
flaw. On the other hand, as already mentioned, MVSFT have been designed
expressly in order to address residual design faults. Such fault model though is
intrinsically static, as the approach requires an off-line definition of the
variants. This means that any service adopting the MVSFT provision assumes
a static, stable environment, the typical faults of which are known as well as
the extent of their consequences. Any time this is not valid anymore, the risk
is higher of a coverage failure for the assumption of statistical independence
becomes greater.
Despite their relatively long life, the approaches reviewed in this chapter are
still being used and debated upon. This is especially true for MVSFT based on
design diversity, whose effectiveness with respect to the problem of correlated
failures appears to be a constant field of debate (Meulen & Revilla, 2005),
while its applicability is being enlarged to domains such as security (Cox et
al., 2006) and to non custom-made versions (Gashi et al., 2006).
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Notes
1Software rejuvenation (Huang et al., 1995) offers tools for periodical and graceful termi-
nation of an application with immediate restart, so that possible erroneous internal states,
due to transient faults, be wiped out before they turn into a failure.
2This requirement is explained very clearly by Randell (Randell, 1975): “All fault-tolerance
must be based on the provision of useful redundancy, both for error detection and error
recovery. In software the redundancy required is not simple replication of programs but
redundancy of design.” Chapter 2 reported the consequences of a well known case where
redundancy of design would have prevented a catastrophic failure—the Ariane 5 flight 501.
3Randell himself states that, given the ever increasing complexity of modern computing,
there is still an urgent need for “richer forms of structuring for error recovery and for design
diversity” (Randell & Xu, 1995).
4This weakness of NVP can be narrowed, if not solved, adopting the approach used in the
so-called “voting farm” (De Florio, Deconinck, & Lauwereins, 1998c, 1998a; De Florio, 1997),
a generic voting tool designed by author of this book in the framework of his participation to
project “EFTOS” (see Sect. 2.1.1): such a tool works with opaque objects that are compared
by means of a user-defined function. This function returns an integer value representing a
“distance” between any two objects to be voted. The user may choose between a set of
predefined distance functions or may develop an application-specific distance function. Doing
the latter, a distance may be endowed with the ability to assess that bitwise different objects
are semanticly equivalent. Of course, the user is still responsible for supplying a bug-free
distance function—though is assisted in this simpler task by a number of template functions
supplied with that tool.
5We recall that EPX, or Embedded Parix, was the operating system and message passing
library of EFTOS’ target platforms.
page
Contents
1 INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES 49
2 FAULT-TOLERANT PROTOCOLS USING SINGLE- ANDMULTIPLE-
VERSION SOFTWARE FAULT-TOLERANCE 49
2.1 Single-version Software Fault-Tolerance: Libraries of Tools . . . . 50
2.1.1 The EFTOS library. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.1.2 The SwIFT System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.1.3 Two libraries for Checkpointing and Rollback . . . . . . . 54
2.2 Conclusions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.3 Multiple-version Software Fault-Tolerance: Structures for Design
Diversity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.3.1 A hybrid case: Data Diversity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3 The EFTOS Tools: The EFTOS Voting Farm 64
3.1 Basic Structure and Features of the EFTOS Voting Farm . . . . 64
3.1.1 Client-Side of the Voting Farm: the User Module . . . . . 67
3.1.2 System and Fault Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.1.3 Server-Side of the Voting Farm: the Voter . . . . . . . . . 69
3.1.4 Voting Farm: An Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.1.5 Voting Farm: Some Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4 The EFTOS Tools: The Watchdog Timer 75
5 The EFTOS Tools: The EFTOS Trap Handler 77
5.1 The EFTOS Trap Handling Tool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.2 Algorithm of the Trap Handling Tool. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.2.1 Structure of user trap handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.2.2 System and Fault Models of the EFTOS Trap Handling
Tool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.2.3 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
6 The EFTOS Tools: Atomic Actions 81
6.1 The EFTOS Atomic Action Tool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
6.1.1 System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
6.1.2 The Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
6.1.3 Functionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
6.2 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
7 The TIRAN Data Stabilizing Software Tool 85
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
7.2 Requirements for the Data Stabilizer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
7.2.1 The Distributed Memory Tool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
7.2.2 The Local Memory Handler and Its Tasks . . . . . . . . . 93
7.2.3 Application-program Interface and Client side . . . . . . . 95
7.3 The Data Stabilizing System Tool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
7.3.1 Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
7.3.2 Application-Program Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
7.3.3 System and Fault Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
7.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
8 An Approach to Express Recovery Blocks: The Recovery Meta-
Program 100
9 A Hybrid Case: The RAFTNET Library for Dependable Farmer-
Worker Parallel Applications 102
9.1 Introducing RAFTNET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
9.2 Why Dependable Parallel Applications? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
9.3 The Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
9.4 Interactions Between the Farmer and the Dispatcher . . . . . . . 105
9.4.1 Interactions Between the Dispatcher and the Workers . . 106
9.4.2 Interactions Between the Workers and the Collector . . . 108
9.4.3 Interactions Between the Collector and the Dispatcher . . 109
9.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
9.5.1 Reliability Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
9.6 Implementation Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
9.6.1 Failure semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
9.6.2 Initialization and Finalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
9.6.3 Speeding up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
9.7 Application and System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
9.7.1 Parallelization Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
9.7.2 Corner Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
10 CONCLUSION 119
References 119
FAULT-TOLERANT PROTOCOLS USING
COMPILERS AND TRANSLATORS
1 INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES
In this chapter our survey of methods and structures for application-level
fault-tolerance continues getting closer to the programming language: Indeed,
tools such as compilers and translators work at the level of the language—they
parse, interpret, compile or transform our programs, so they are interesting
candidates for managing dependability aspects in the application layer. An
important property of this family of methods is the fact that fault-tolerance
complexity is extracted from the program and turned into architectural
complexity in the compiler or the translator.
Apart from continuing with our survey, this chapter also aims at providing the
reader with two practical examples:
• Reflective and refractive variables, i.e. a syntactical structure to express
adaptive feedback loops in the application layer. This is useful to
resilient computing because a feedback loop can attach error recovery
strategies to error detection events.
• Redundant variables, that is a tool that allows designers to make use of
adaptively redundant data structures with commodity programming
languages such as C or Java. Designers using such tool can define
redundant data structures in which the degree of redundancy is not fixed
once and for all at design time, but rather it changes dynamically with
respect to the disturbances experienced during the run time.
Both tools are new research activities that are currently being carried out by
the author of this book at the PATS research group of the University of
Antwerp. It is shown how through a simple translation approach it is possible
to provide sophisticated features such as adaptive fault-tolerance to programs
written in any language, even plain old C.
2 FAULT-TOLERANT PROTOCOLS USING
COMPILERS AND TRANSLATORS
Our first subject is tools that work “within” the compiler: Meta-object
protocols. Most of such tools are based on the concept of reflection: The
ability to mirror the feature of a system by creating a causal connection
between sub-systems and internal objects. In other words, events experienced
by a reflected sub-system trigger events on the object representing that
sub-system, and vice-versa.
2.1 Compiler-level Tools: Meta-object Protocols,
Reflection, and Introspection
Some of the negative aspects pointed out while describing single and multiple
version software approaches can be in some cases weakened, if not solved, by
means of a generic structuring technique that allows to reach in some cases an
adequate degree of flexibility, transparency, and separation of design concerns:
the adoption of meta-object protocols (Kiczales, Rivie`res, & Bobrow, 1991).
The idea is to “open” the implementation of the run-time executive of an
object-oriented language like C++ or Java so that the developer can adopt
and program different, custom semantics, adjusting the language to the needs
of the user and to the requirements of the environment. Using meta-object
protocols, the programmer can modify the behavior of a programming
language’s features such as methods invocation, object creation and
destruction, and member access. The transparent management of spatial and
temporal redundancy (Taylor, Morgan, & Black, 1980) is a context where
meta-object protocols appear to be particularly adequate.
The key concept behind meta-object protocols is that of computational
reflection, or the causal connection between a system and a meta-level
description representing structural and computational aspects of that
system (Maes, 1987). The protocols offer the meta-level programmer a
representation of a system as a set of meta-objects, i.e., objects that represent
and reflect properties of “real” objects, i.e., those objects that constitute the
functional part of the user application. Meta-objects can for instance represent
the structure of a class, or object interaction, or the code of an operation.
This mapping process is called reification (Robben, 1999).
The causality relation of meta-object protocols could also be extended to allow
for a dynamical reorganisation of the structure and the operation of a system,
e.g., to perform reconfiguration and error recovery. The basic object-oriented
feature of inheritance can be used to enhance the reusability of the
fault-tolerance mechanisms developed with this approach.
A related concept is introspection, a technique that hacks the compiler to
unravel and reason upon the hidden structure of our programs.
2.1.1 OpenC++ and Project FRIENDS
OpenC++ has been defined as a “code analysis library” (Karpov, 2008): A
tool to parse and analyze C++ source code. Such tool makes use of a
meta-object protocol to provide services for language extensions. In
OpenC++, classes are objects as in Smalltalk, and called class metaobjects.
A class metaobject translates—at compile time—expressions involving a class.
In a sense, it works like a filter parsing all the expressions that mention its
class. The default filter leaves the expressions unmodified, but the
programmer can choose otherwise. This simple idea translates in a powerful
tool for the programmer: For instance (Shigeru, 1996), shows how easy it is to
perform some accounting on all methods invocations of a given class (doing
this in a standard programming language such as C++ would require
considerable programming effort (Leeman et al., 2005)).
As one can easily understand, such features may translate in a useful
syntactical structure for the tolerance of faults. An architecture supporting
this approach is the one developed in the framework of project
FRIENDS (Fabre & Pe´rennou, 1996, 1998). Name FRIENDS is the acronym
of “Flexible and Reusable Implementation Environment for your Next
Dependable system”. This project aims at implementing a number of
fault-tolerance provisions (e.g., replication, group-based communication,
synchronization, voting) at meta-level. In FRIENDS a distributed application
is a set of objects interacting via the proxy model, a proxy being a local
intermediary between each object and any other (possibly replicated) object.
2.1.2 Javassist
Javassist (Java Programming Assistant) (Javassist, n.d.) is a Java
meta-library: It allows the programmer to access and manipulate the bytecode
of an application, that is, the Java pseudo-code that is interpreted by the Java
Virtual Machine to execute that application. This powerful feature allows to
change the implementation of a class at run-time, which is known as structural
reflection. Javassist can edit the bytecode either in the high-level form of the
corresponding Java source level or directly as bytecodes. It is even possible to
compile bytecode strings on the fly. Working with the standard Java compiler
and virtual machine, Javassist offers a meta-object interface to control method
invocations on base-level objects. All these features makes it a powerful tool
for program transformation. One of the possible uses of Javassist is to
augment Java for aspect-oriented programming1, e.g. inserting before, after,
and around advices. This gave raise to the GluonJ system, “a light-weight but
powerful AOP framework on top of Javassist” (GluonJ, n.d.). Another
interesting application would be to make use of Javassist to monitor and
protect objects, for instance taking periodic “snapshots” of their state. This is
but one possible way to achieve higher dependability through an approach like
the one offered by Javassist, though to the best of our knowledge no research
is being carried out on this topic yet.
2.1.3 MetaC++
MetaC++ (Strasser, 2005) is a tool that reads a C++ program and produces
a tree with a representation of language constructs. The tree is exported to
clients through an API or in the form of an XML file. The gathered meta-data
can be used to rewrite a modified version of the original program, including all
types of patches, filters, and improvements—which makes it interesting as a
fault-tolerance provision. It was designed by its author primarily as a
source-to-source code translator, but also to be used by source code analysis
tools, stub generators, and source-to-UML converters. According to its author,
future releases of MetaC++ will provide mechanisms to mark elements of the
language with attributes, as in
persistent class MyDatabaseObject;
This will facilitate the set up of systems such as redundant variables, the
dynamically redundant data structures described in Chapter 10.
2.1.4 Introspection
Data hiding and encapsulation are powerful tools to master the complexity of
complex computer services, but they also represent a process that inhibits the
access to complexity that is still there, and therefore can potentially jeopardize
those services. The idea of introspection is to gain access into this complexity,
to inspect the hidden structure of programs, and to interpret their meaning
through semantic processing, the same way the Semantic Web promises to
achieve with the data scattered in the Internet. Quoting its author,
“introspection is a means that, when applied correctly, can help crack the code
of a software and intercept the hidden and encapsulated meaning of the
internals of a program”. The way to achieve introspection is by instrumenting
the software with data collectors producing information available in a form
allowing semantic processing, such as RDF. This idea is being used in the
Introspector project, which aims at instrumenting the GNU programming
tool-chain so as to create a sort of semantic web of all software derived from
those tools. The ultimate goal is very ambitious: “To create a super large and
extremely dense web of information about the outside world extracted
automatically from computer language programs” (DuPont, n.d.). Should this
become possible, we would be given a tool to reason (and to let computers
reason on our behalf!) about the dependability characteristics of the
application software—imagine what could mean for instance being able to
check for the presence of a hidden design goal and have the problem solved
without human intervention. Some years ago this would have sounded like
science fiction, now it appears that many researchers are focussing on tools
that go in this direction: GASTA (Gcc Abstract Syntax Tree
Analysis) (Thouvenin, 2004) for instance uses introspection to automatically
annotate C code to analyze the presence of null pointer design faults).
GCC-XML (King, 2004) has similar goals. A more advanced example appears
to be XOGASTAN (XML-Oriented Gcc Abstract Syntax Tree
ANalyzer) (Antoniol, Di Penta, Masone, & Villano, 2004), which uses the
abstract syntax tree produced by the GNU compiler while processing a C file
and translates it into XML. Another of their tools then can read the XML file
and analyze it.
So let us hope this may become part of our future.
Conclusions. Meta-object protocols and reflection are indeed a promising
system structure for embedding different non-functional concerns in the
application-level of a computer program. They work at language level,
providing means to modify the semantics of basic object-oriented language
building blocks like object creation and deletion, calling and termination of
class methods, and so forth. This appears to match perfectly to a proper
subset of the possible fault-tolerance provisions, especially those such as
transparent object redundancy, which can be straightforwardly managed with
the meta-object approach. When dealing with these fault-tolerance provisions,
meta-object protocols and reflection provide a perfect separation of the design
concerns, i.e., optimal sc. Some other techniques, specifically those who might
be described as “the most coarse-grained ones”, such as distributed recovery
blocks (Kim & Welch, 1989), appear to be less suited for being efficiently
implemented via meta-object protocols. These techniques work at distributed,
i.e., macroscopic, level.
The above situation reminds the author of this book of another one, regarding
the “quest” for a novel computational paradigm for parallel processing able of
dealing effectively with the widest class of problems, the same way the Von
Neumann paradigm does for sequential processing, though with the highest
degree of efficiency and the least amount of changes in the original (sequential)
user code. In that context, the concept of computational grain came up: Some
techniques were inherently looking at the problem “with coarse-grained
glasses,” i.e., at macroscopic level, while others were considering the problem
exclusively at microscopic level. Meta-object protocols are an example of the
latter approaches: They provide a small grain access to a program’s atomic
structures and provide means to modify their behavior.
Meta-object protocols look at the problem from a microscopic point of view.
Some of the hitherto developed fault-tolerance techniques fit perfectly with
this approach—for instance, object redundancy can be easily managed with
the meta-object approach, and, for instance, Robben (Robben, 1999) describes
meta-programs for checkpointing, active replication, and transaction
processing.
It is still unclear whether this set is general enough to host, efficaciously ,
many forms of fault-tolerance, as it is remarked for instance in (Randell & Xu,
1995; Lippert & Videira Lopes, 2000) (“what reflective capabilities are needed
for what form of fault-tolerance, and to what extent these capabilities can be
provided in more-or-less conventional programming languages, and allied to
other structuring techniques [like RB and NVP] remain to be determined”). It
is therefore difficult to establish a qualitative assessment of attribute sa for
meta-object protocols and reflection. Judging from the evidence acquired to
date one can cautiously assess their sa as “≥ average” (average or more.)
The run-time management of libraries of meta-object protocols may be used to
reach satisfactory values for attribute a. To the best of our knowledge this
feature has not been exploited for reaching higher dependability in any system
supporting meta-object protocols and reflection .
As evident, the target application domain is mostly the one of object-oriented
applications written with languages extended with a meta-object protocol,
such as Open C++.
One can conclude that meta-object protocols and reflection offer an elegant
system structure to embed a certain set of non-functional services (including
some fault-tolerance provisions) in an object-oriented program.
Computational reflection is a relatively old concept, though still actively
investigated in various forms, especially because it is one of the possible ways
to realize aspect-orientation, which is being given an even larger attention by
researchers these days. OpenC++ is still referenced and investigated (Karpov,
2008). MetaC++ does not appear to have received wide attention. On the
contrary, introspection appears to be spreading with projects such as GASTA,
XOGASTAN and GCC-XML.
Both computational reflection and introspection are conceptual ingredients
that can be used to craft fault-tolerance systems, though cannot provide an
answer of their own but must be coupled with other approaches. No
fault-tolerance provisions based on introspection surfaced to date, so it is
difficult to assess the value of the structural attributes for introspection for the
time being.
2.2 Enhancing Programs through Translations
2.2.1 LINDA Systems
The Linda (Carriero & Gelernter, 1989b, 1989a) approach adopts a special
model of communication, known as generative communication (Gelernter,
1985). According to this model, communication is still carried out through
messages, though messages are not sent to one or more addressees for them to
be retrieved from local mailboxes—on the contrary, messages are included in a
distributed (virtual) shared memory, called tuple space, where every Linda
process has equal read/write access rights. In generative communication, the
sender of a message cannot know who will read any sent message—if any
eventually will. This means that traditional terms such as client-server or
peer-to-peer, which are normally used to describe relationships between
communicating entities, do not apply to generative communication. A tuple
space is some sort of a shared relational database for storing and withdrawing
special data objects called tuples, sent by the Linda processes. Tuples are
basically lists of objects identified by their contents, cardinality and type. Two
tuples match if (1) they have the same number of objects, (2) if the objects are
pairwise compatible for what concerns their types, and (3) if the memory cells
associated to the objects are bitwise equal. A Linda process inserts, reads, and
withdraws tuples via blocking or non-blocking primitives. Read operations can
be performed by supplying a template tuple—that is, a prototype tuple
consisting of constant fields and of fields that can assume any value. A process
trying to access a missing tuple via a blocking primitive enters a wait state
that continues until any tuple matching its template tuple is added to the
tuple space. This allows processes to synchronize. When more than one tuple
matches a template, the choice of which actual tuple to address is done in a
non-deterministic way. Concurrent execution of processes is supported through
the concept of “live data structures”: Tuples requiring the execution of one or
more functions can be evaluated on different processors—in a sense, they
become active, or “alive”. Once the evaluation has finished, a (no more active,
or passive) output tuple is entered in the tuple space.
Parallelism is implicit in Linda—there is no explicit notion of network, number
and location of the system processors, though Linda has been successfully
employed in many different hardware architectures and many applicative
domains, resulting in a powerful programming tool that sometimes achieves
excellent speedups without affecting portability issues. Unfortunately the
model does not cover the possibility of failures—for instance, the semantics of
its primitives are not well defined in the case of a processor crash, and no
fault-tolerance means are part of the model. Moreover, in its original form,
Linda only offers single-op atomicity (Bakken & Schlichting, 1995), i.e., atomic
execution for only a single tuple space operation. With single-op atomicity it
is not possible to solve problems arising in two common Linda programming
paradigms when faults occur: Both the distributed variable and the
replicated-worker paradigms can fail (Bakken & Schlichting, 1995). As a
consequence, a number of possible improvements have been investigated to
support fault-tolerant parallel programming in Linda. Apart from design
choices and development issues, many of them implement stability of the tuple
space (via replicated state machines (Schneider, 1990) kept consistent via
ordered atomic multicast (Birman, Schiper, & Stephenson, 1991)) (Bakken &
Schlichting, 1995; Xu & Liskov, 1989; Patterson, Turner, Hyatt, & Reilly,
1993), while others aim at combining multiple tuple-space operations into
atomic transactions (Bakken & Schlichting, 1995; Anderson & Shasha, 1991;
Cannon & Dunn, 1992). Other techniques have also been used, e.g., tuple
space checkpoint-and-rollback (Kambhatla, 1991). The author of this book
also proposed an augmented Linda model for solving inconsistencies related to
failures occurring in a replicated-worker environment (see Chapter 9) and an
algorithm for implementing a resilient replicated worker scheme for
message-passing farmer-worker applications. As seen in Chapter 3, this
algorithm can mask failures affecting a proper subset of the set of
workers (De Florio, Deconinck, & Lauwereins, 1999).
Linda can be described as a parallel processing extension that can be added to
any existing programming language. The greater part of these extensions
requires a preprocessor translating the extension in the host language. This is
the case, e.g., for FT-Linda (Bakken & Schlichting, 1995),
PvmLinda (De Florio, Murgolo, & Spinelli, 1994), C-Linda (Berndt, 1989),
and MOM (Anderson & Shasha, 1991). A counterexample is, e.g., the
POSYBL system (Schoinas, 1991), which implements Linda primitives with
remote procedure calls, and requires the user to supply the ancillary
information for distinguishing tuples.
Linda systems allow dealing with redundant data and redundant processes in a
transparent way, so they are in general characterized by good sc. Though
available in many flavours, typically Linda systems focus on a few
fault-tolerance solutions, hence sa is assessed as “average/potentially good”.
Adaptivity is not supported in the available Linda systems, so their a is
deemed as insufficient. The Linda approach, on the other hand, may make use
of its high transparency to achieve fault-tolerance applications whose
redundancy changes with the experienced or forecast faults—which would
bring to good a.
Very popular some years ago, Linda appears not to be an emergent
fault-tolerance the solution these days.
2.2.2 The Porch Translator
Porch (Strumpen, 1998) is a source-to-source translator that converts a
sequential C program into an equivalent one that supports the saving and
reloading of “portable checkpoints”. This means that Porch allows to dump a
checkpoint on machine m and restart it on machine n, even though m and n
have different computer architecture. Clearly this can be used to achieve task
migration and reconfiguration. Porch allows to execute checkpoints
periodically, or by sending signals e.g. through the UNIX “kill” command.
Porch suffers from several limitations: Rolling back a checkpoint does not
preserve open file descriptors and sockets; only initialized pointers are stored
in the checkpoints, hence uninitialized pointers may change their value.
Porch is functionally not dissimilar from other checkpoint and rollback
systems such as psncLibCkpt (Meyer, 2003), ckpt (Zandy, n.d.) or
Dynamite (Iskra et al., 2000). Its added value is the use of a translator, which
improves its sc. Clearly sa is limited to a single class of fault-tolerance
provisions. No adaptivity is foreseen in Porch, so a is set to insufficient.
Next section describes an application-level approach to fault-tolerance
employing translators. The approach is based on so-called Reflective and
refractive variables. Available as a rough prototype, a system supporting this
approach is currently being developed by the author of this book.
Figure 1: A simple example of the use of reflective and refractive variables.
3 AN EXAMPLE: REFLECTIVE AND
REFRACTIVE VARIABLES
The idea behind reflective and refractive variables is to use memory access as
an abstraction to perform concealed tasks. Reflective and refractive variables
are volatile variables whose identifier links them with an external device, such
as a sensor, or an RFID, or an actuator. In reflective variables, memory cells
get asynchronously updated by service threads that interface those external
devices. The well-known concept of reflection is used, because those variables
“reflect” the values measured by those devices. In refractive variables, on the
contrary, write requests trigger a request to update an external parameter,
such as the data rate of the local TCP protocol entity or the amount of
redundancy to be used in transmissions. We use to say that write accesses
“refract” (that is, get redirected (Institute for Telecommunication Sciences,
n.d.)) onto corresponding external devices.
The reflective and refractive variables model does not require any special
language: Figure1 is an example in the C language. The portrayed program
declares two variables: “cpu”, a reflective integer, which reports the current
percentage of usage of the local CPU as an integer number between 0 and 100,
and “tcpTxRate”, a reflective and refractive integer, which reports and sets
the send rate parameter of the TCP layer. The code periodically queries the
CPU usage and, when that reaches a value greater than 90%, it requests to
change the TCP send rate. Note that the only non standard C construct used
in the example is attribute “Ref t”, which specifies that a corresponding
declaration is reflective or refractive or both. Through a translation process,
discussed in detail in Sect. 3, this code is instrumented so as to include the
logics required to interface the cpu and the TCP external devices. Figure3
shows this simple code in action on our development platform—a Pentium-M
laptop running Windows XP and the Cygwin tools.
One can observe that through the reflective and refractive variable model the
design complexity is partitioned into two well defined and separated
Figure 2: An excerpt from the execution of the code in Fig. 2.
components: The code to interface external devices is specified “elsewhere”
(Sect. describes where and how) while the functional code is specified in a
familiar way, in this case as a C code reading and writing integer variables.
The result is a structured model to express tasks such as cross-layered
optimization, adaptive or fault-tolerant computing in an elegant, non
intrusive, and cost-effective way. Such model is characterized by strong
separation of design concerns (that is, excellent sc), for the functional
strategies are not to be specified aside with the layer functions. Only
instrumentation is required, and this can be done once and for all. This
prevents spaghetti-like coding for both the functional and the non-functional
aspects, and translates in improved maintainability and enhanced efficiency.
The reflective and refractive variable model provides the designer also with
another attribute: a variable, be it a reflective / refractive variables or a
“common” one, can be tagged as being “redundant”. Redundant variables are
variables whose contents get replicated several times so as to protect them
from memory faults. Writing to a redundant variable means writing to a
number of replicas, either located strategically2 on the same processing node,
or on remote nodes—when available and the extra overhead be allowed.
Reading from a redundant variable actually translates in reading from each of
its cells and performing majority voting (through an approach such as the one
described in Chapter 3). The result of this process is monitored by a special
device, called Redundance. Redundance measures the amount of votes that
differ from the majority vote, and uses this as a measure of the disturbance in
the surrounding environment. Under normal situation, Redundance triplicates
the memory cells of redundant variables. This corresponds to tolerating up to
one memory fault in the cells associated to a redundant variable. Under more
critical situations, the amount of redundancy should change. This is indeed
what actually happens: The component that manages redundant variables
Figure 3: General structure of feedback loops.
Figure 4: Redundant variables.
declares the integer reflective variable “ref t int redundance”. The latter is set
asynchronously by the Redundance device, which adjusts the corresponding
memory cells3 with a number representing the ideal degree of redundancy with
respect to the current degree of disturbances.
The reflective and refractive variables model can also be used in contexts such
as cross-layer optimization. In general, it provides an application-level
construct to manage feedback loops.
Feedback loops (see Fig. 2)—a well known concept from system theory—are
ideal forms to shape our systems so as to be
adaptive-and-dependable (Van Roy, 2006). As we have mentioned already in
Chapter 2, such property is an important pre-requisite for the welfare of our
computer-dominated societies and economies: In the cited paper Van Roy
explains their relevance to future software design. Reflective and refractive
variables provide a straightforward syntactical structure and software
architecture for the expression of feedback loops. This structure is used, e.g.,
to implement redundant variables. The main advantage in this case is that,
instead of taking a design decision once and for all, one lets a system
parameter change as needed, zeroing in on the optimum. The use of reflective
and refractive variables simplifies the design of our solution, which also
enhances maintainability. But probably the most important consequence of
that design choice is that our solution does not assume a fixed, immutable
fault model, but lets it change with the actual faults being experienced—which
is precisely the property pointed out in Chapter 2 as a key requirement for
modern dependable software.
Figure4 shows how simple it is to use a redundant variable: No syntactic
differences can be noticed. The required logic is “hidden” in the translation
process. More detail about redundant variables is provided in Sect. 4.
3.1 Implementation
The core of the reflective and refractive variables architecture is a LEX
analyzer4 that translates the input source code into two source files, one with
an augmented version of the original code and one server-side to monitor and
drive the external devices. This process is considered in Fig. 5, an excerpt
from the translation of the code in Fig. 4. Let us review the resulting code in
more detail (please note that item x in the following list refer to lines tagged
as “// x” in the code):
1. First the translator removes the occurrences of attributes “ref t” and
“redundant”.
2. Then it performs a few calls to function “aopen”. This is to open the
associative arrays “reflex” and “rtype”. As well known, an associative
array generalizes the concept of array so as to allow addressing items by
non-integer indexes. The arguments to “aopen” are functions similar to
“strcmp”, from the C standard library, which are used to compare index
objects. The idea is that these data structures create links between the
name of variables and some useful information (see below).
3. There follow a number of “awrites”, i.e., associations are created between
variables identifiers and two numbers: The corresponding variables’
address and an internal code representing its type and attributes.
4. Then “Server”, the thread responsible to interface the external devices,
is spawned.
5. Besides a write access into refractive variable tcpTxRate, the translator
places a call to function “CalltcpTxRate”. In general, after a call to
refractive variable v, the call “Callv(&v)” is produced.
6. Similarly, a write access to redundant variable w, of type t, is followed by
a call to “RedundantAssign t(&w)”.
7. Finally, reading from redundant variable w, of type t, is translated into a
call to function “RedundantRead t(&w)”.
It is the responsibility of the designer to make sure that proper code for
functions “Callv(&v)” is produced. Functions “RedundantAssign t(&w)” and
“RedundantRead t(&w)” are automatically generated through a template-like
approach—the former performs a redundant write, the latter a redundant read
plus majority voting. For voting, an approach similar to that in Chapter 3 has
been followed (that is, voting farms).
As already mentioned, the “Server” thread is the code responsible to monitor
and interface the external devices. Its algorithm is quite simple (see Fig. 6):
Figure 5: Abridged version of the main function of the translated code.
the code continuously waits for a sensor update (lines tagged with “// 1”),
then retrieves the address and type of the corresponding reflective variable (in
“// 2”) and finally updates that variable (“// 3”).
The complexity to interface external devices is charged to function “getValue”,
an excerpt of which is shown in Fig. 7. The core of “getValue” is function
“cpu”, which returns the amount of CPU currently being used.
3.2 Other Uses of Reflective and Refractive Variables
As mentioned at the beginning, our research on this topic has begun only
recently. We are in the process of making use of our approach in several
real-life applications—most likely the subject of future publications. In what
follows a few contexts where our variables could provide effective and low-cost
solutions are discussed.
3.2.1 Management of Concurrency
As cleverly explained e.g. by Gates in (Gates, 2007), a well known
challenge in robotics is concurrency, defined in the cited paper as
“how to simultaneously handle all the data coming in from
multiple sensors and send the appropriate commands to the robot’s
motors”. The conventional approach, i.e., making use of a long
loop that first reads all the data from the sensors, then processes
the input and finally controls the robot is not adequate enough.
Because of this, the robot control could be using stale values,
which could bring to disastrous consequences. As Gates mentions
in the cited paper, this is a scenario that applies not only to
Figure 6: The Server code.
Figure 7: Function getValue interfaces all the external devices that are con-
nected to reflective and refractive variables.
Figure 8: RR var to localize objects with RFID tags on them.
robotics but also to all those fields such as distributed, parallel and
resilient computing where data and control often need to be
effectively orchestrated under strict real-time constraints and
despite the occurrence of faults. “To fully exploit the power of
processors working in parallel, the new software must deal with the
problem of concurrency”, Gate says. It is our belief that an
approach such as the one offered by reflective and refractive
variables could result in an effective syntactic structure for that: A
control loop using reflective variables, for instance, would not need
to specify a reading order for the input variables, which are
updated asynchronously, as new values need to replace old ones.
Within that loop one could attach e.g. the asynchronous
management of failures.
3.2.2 Localizing Hidden Assets
Extending our translator it can be possible to allow writing programs such as
the one in Fig. 8.
At first sight the program may sound meaningless, as it only declares a
function and a reflective variable, “rfid”, and does not seem to perform any
useful action. “Behind the lines”—a nice feature offered by translators—what
happens is that surrounding RFID tags reflect their content onto variable
“rfid”. Data stored into that variable is compared with the initialization value
(in this case, an ISBN number). In case of a match, function “beep” is called.
Now imagine running this code onto your PDA while walking through the
lanes of a large library such as the Vatican Library in search for a “lost” or
misplaced book. When in reach of the searched item, the PDA starts
beeping5. Or imagine that, thanks to international regulations, all
“companies” building antipersonnel mines be obliged by law to embed RFID
tags into their “products”. When activated, these tags and a program as
simple as the one in Fig. 8 could easily prevent dreadful events that
continuously devastate the lives of too many a human being. Changing
context, the same approach could be used to speed up the localizing of people
trapped in the ruins of a fallen building after an earthquake, and so forth.
This could be sensible in a highly seismic region.
Conclusions. This section introduced a translation system that allows
making use of reflection in a standard programming language such as C. The
same translator supports “refraction”, that is the control of external devices
through simple memory write accesses. These two features are used to realize
redundant data structures. As well known, redundancy is a key property in
fault-tolerance. The Shannon theorem teaches us that through any unreliable
channel it is possible to send data reliably by using a proper degree of
redundancy. This famous result can be read out in a different way: For each
degree of unreliability, there is a minimum level of redundancy that can be
used to tolerate any fault. Our approach uses reflective and refractive
variables to attune the degree of redundancy required to ensure data integrity
to the actual faults being experienced by the system. This provides an
example of adaptive fault-tolerant software.
Reflective and refractive variables can be used to express problems in
cross-layer optimization, but also in contexts where concurrency calls for
expressive software structures, e.g. robotics. Localization problems could also
be solved through a very simple scheme. Other fields where our tool is being
exercised include personalized healthcare (De Florio, Vaerenbergh, & Blondia,
2007) and global adaptation frameworks to enhance the quality of experience
of mobile services (Sun, De Florio, Ning, & Blondia, 2007).
By construction, reflective and refractive variables exhibit a good amount of
transparency, which translates in good sc. sa is limited to those
fault-tolerance techniques that can be expressed in terms of the variables;
some variables could be used e.g. to express processing and communication
entities, and allow them to migrate transparently; other variables could change
their state to represent the detection of faults, and so forth. As authors we are
convinced of their merits, but we must be objective and state that no such
provisions exist so far—with the exception of the ones described in next
section. So a fair assessment for sa could be “limited/potentially good”. The
hidden implementation of reflective and refractive variables allows to achieve a
good a with an approach such as the one described in the next section.
4 ADAPTIVE DATA INTEGRITY
THROUGH DYNAMICALLY
REDUNDANT DATA STRUCTURES
Changes, they use to say, are the only constant in life. Everything changes
rapidly around us, and more and more key to survival is the ability to rapidly
adapt to changes. This consideration applies to many aspects of our lives.
Strangely enough, this nearly self-evident truth is not always considered in
computer science with the seriousness that it calls for: The assumptions that
are drawn for our systems often do not take into due account that e.g., the
run-time environments, the operational conditions, or the available resources
will vary. Software is especially vulnerable to this threat, and with today’s
software-dominated systems controlling crucial services in nuclear plants,
airborne equipments, health care systems and so forth, it becomes clear how
this situation may potentially lead to catastrophes.
Let us consider in particular the viewpoint of the software fault-tolerance
engineer and the design goal of enhanced data integrity: It is clear that
protecting data against memory faults requires the definition of a fault model
stating the possible fault scenarios that our software is going to experience.
The current practice is to take this as a static choice, which means that our
data integrity provisions (DIP) have a fixed range of admissible events to
address and tolerate. This translates into two risks:
1. overshooting, i.e., over-dimensioning the DIP with respect to the actual
threat being experienced, and
2. undershooting, namely underestimating the threat in view of an
economy of resources.
Note how those two risks turn into a crucial dilemma to the designer: Wrong
choices here can lead to either unpractical, too costly designs or cheap but
vulnerable provisions.
A sensible example of the problem just stated is given by redundant data
structures (RDS). Here redundancy and voting are used to protect memory
from possible transient or permanent corruptions. The common choice would
be that of adopting a static fault model assumption, such as e.g. “during any
mission, up to 3 faults shall affect the replicas”, which translates into using a
7-redundant cell to address the worst possible scenario. This is precisely a case
of the above stated dilemma.
Our starting point in the research reported herein was the question “Is this the
right approach?,” or “Does it make sense in the first place to fix, once and for
all, a set of possible conditions affecting memory modules?” We don’t think so.
First of all, memory technology (like all technologies) changes, which means
that while yesterday our software was running atop CMOS chips, today the
common choice e.g. for airborne applications is SDRAMs because of speed,
cost, weight, power and simplicity of design (Ladbury, 2002). But CMOS
memories for airborne applications mostly experience single bit errors (Oey &
Teitelbaum, 1981), while SDRAMS are known to be subject to several classes
of faults, including so-called “single-event effects”, i.e. single faults affecting
whole chips6 (Ladbury, 2002). Furthermore the cited paper remarks how even
from lot to lot error/failure rates vary more than one order of magnitude. A
static choice of the fault model cannot take all this into proper account.
A second argument is that run-time environments change, often because the
application is mobile but sometimes also because of external events affecting
e.g. temperature, radiation, electro-magnetic interference, or cosmic rays
(think of a wireless sensor network to assist a fire brigade, or of a spaceborne
application circulating around the sun). Also in these cases a static choice
would be unpractical, as the nature of faults may change during a same
mission.
Figure 9: A simple example of use of redundant variables.
Our conjecture is that the solution to this problem should come by considering
the nature of faults as a dynamic system, i.e., a system evolving in time, and
by modeling faults as a function F (t). Consequently, any fault-tolerance
provision that be able to solve effectively the problem of over-dimensioning
and under-dimensioning should function as an adaptation feedback
loop (Van Roy, 2006) in which the resources are allocated after the estimated
values of F (t), derived by monitoring sensible environmental variables. This
section reports on the design of a tool compliant to that model.
Our tool allows designers to make use of adaptively redundant data structures
with commodity programming languages such as C or Java. Designers using
such tool can define redundant data structures where the degree of
redundancy changes dynamically with respect to the disturbances experienced
at run-time. Our approach attunes the degree of redundancy required to
ensure data integrity to the actual faults being experienced by the system and
provides an example of adaptive fault-tolerance software provision.
In what follows a description of our tool and design issues are given.
4.1 Dynamically Redundant Data Structures
Our tool is a translator that loosely parses a source code performing some
transformations as reported in the rest of this section. A translator was
developed in the C programming language together with the Lex lexical
analyzer generator and the YACC syntactic analyzers generator (Levine,
Mason, & Brown, 1992). The reported version supports the C syntax though
the same principles can be easily applied to any other language. Our
translator performs a simple task—it allows the programmer to tag variables
with a keyword, “redundant,” and then instruments the memory accesses to
tagged variables. Figure 9 shows how this is done in practice with a very
simple example whose translation is provided in Fig. 10. Let us review the
resulting code in more detail (please note that item x in the following list refer
to lines tagged as “// x” in the code):
1. First the translator removes the occurrences of attribute “redundant”.
2. Then it performs a few calls to function “aopen”. This is to open the
associative arrays “redun” and “rtype”. As well known, an associative
Figure 10: An excerpt from the translation of the code in Fig. 9. Variable
“ Redundance” represents the current amount of redundancy, initially set to
“REDUNDANCE” (that is, 3).
array generalizes the concept of array so as to allow addressing items by
non-integer indexes. The arguments to “aopen” are functions similar to
“strcmp”, from the C standard library, which are used to compare index
objects. The idea is that these data structures create links between the
name of variables and some useful information (see below).
3. There follow a number of “awrites”, i.e., associations are created between
variables’ identifiers and two numbers: the corresponding variables’
address and an internal code representing its type and attributes (code
64 means “redundant int”).
4. Then the “Server” thread, responsible to allocate replicas and to monitor
and adapt to external changes, is spawned.
5. A write access to redundant variable w, of type t, is followed by a call to
“RedundantAssign t(&w)”.
6. Finally, reading from redundant variable w, of type t, is translated into a
call to function “RedundantRead t(&w)”.
The strategy to allocate replicas is a research topic on its own. Solutions range
from na¨ıve simple strategies such as allocating replicas into contiguous
cells—which makes them vulnerable to burst faults—to more sophisticated
strategies where replicas get allocated e.g. in different memory banks, or
different memory chips, or even on different processors. Clearly each choice
represents a trade-off between robustness and performance penalty. In our
current version replicas are separated by strides of variable length.
The core of our tool is given by functions “RedundantAssign t(&w)” and
“RedundantRead t(&w)”, which are automatically generated for each type t
through a template-like approach. The former function performs a redundant
write, the latter a redundant read plus majority voting. For voting, an
approach similar to that in (De Florio, Deconinck, & Lauwereins, 1998) is
followed.
What differs our tool from classical libraries for redundant data structures
such as the one in (Taylor et al., 1980) is the fact that in our system the
amount of replicas of our data structures changes dynamically with respect to
the observed disturbances. A monitoring tool is assumed to be available to
assess the probability of memory corruptions of the current environment. An
example of such monitoring tool, which estimates that probability by
measuring for each call to “RedundantRead t” the risk of failure r, is
provided. Quantity r may be defined for instance as follows: If our current
redundancy is 2n+ 1, and if the maximum set of agreeing replicas after a
“RedundantRead t” is m (0 < m < 2n+ 2), then
(1)
For instance if redundancy is 7 and m = 6, that is if only one replica differs,
then r = 1/3. Clearly the above choice of r lets risk increase linearly with the
number of replicas not in agreement with the majority. Other formulations for
r and for the monitoring tool7 are possible and likely to be more effective than
the ones taken here—also a matter for future research.
Our strategy to adjust redundancy is also quite simple: If r > 0.5, redundancy
is increased by 2; if r = 0 for 1000 consecutive calls to “RedundantRead t”,
redundancy is decreased by 2. Lower bound and upper bound for redundancy
have been set to 3 and 11 respectively.
Each request for changing redundancy is reflected by the “Server” thread into
variable “ Redundance” through the scheme introduced in (De Florio &
Blondia, 2007).
In Chapter 10 it is described how our tool behaves when memory faults are
injected. It us shown how, despite the above na¨ıve design choices, our tool
already depicts valuable results.
4.2 Conclusions
As already pointed out, redundancy is a key asset to achieve fault-tolerance.
The Shannon theorem teaches us that through any unreliable channel it is
possible to send data reliably by using a proper degree of redundancy. This
famous result can be read out in a different way: For each degree of
unreliability characterizing a run-time environment there is a minimum level of
redundancy that can be used to tolerate any fault. Unfortunately
environments change, e.g. because of external events, or because assets
dissipate, or because the service is mobile. Hence, there is no static allocation
of redundancy that can accommodate for any possible scenario: A highly
redundant system will withstand no more faults than those considered at
design time, and will allocate a large amount of resources even when no faults
are threatening the service.
Denying this truth is not a wise choice: As Einstein said, the rule should be
“Make everything as simple as possible, but not simpler”. Likewise, hiding
complexity is good, but hiding too much can lead to disasters—history of
computing is paved with dreadful examples unfortunately. The main lesson
learned by carrying out our research is that this problem must be addressed,
and that this complexity must not be neglected, but isolated into architectural
components. This section introduced a translation-based approach that has
precisely these design goals—addressing the problem of complex fault
behaviors and providing an architectural solution that make it as simple as
possible for the designer to concentrate on their functional design goals.
Our tool provides programmers of commodity languages such as C or Java
with adaptively redundant data structures. Designers using our tool can define
redundant data structures in which the degree of replication is not fixed once
and for all at design time, but changes dynamically with respect to the
disturbances experienced during the run time. In Chapter 10 the performance
of our tool is reported. Such analysis is carried out through a fault injector
called scrambler, which is also briefly introduced.
Redundant variables are a recent research project of our group at the
University of Antwerp. Future work will be devoted to further developing and
enhancing both those tools, e.g. by experimenting with other adaptation
strategies, other replica allocation strategies, and introducing more complex
fault injection scenarios such as single event effects. The global effect of
adaptive dependable provisions on power consumption shall also be
investigated in the near future.
5 CONCLUSIONS
Focus of this chapter has been approaches that reach fault-tolerance by means
of compilers and translators. Such tools are not only used to bring “syntactic
sugar” and possibly enhance sa and sc: It was shown how compilers can
become another important “place” where one may place application-level
fault-tolerant protocols that operate at the level of the programming language
through so-called meta-object protocols. The reader is also provided of what
we consider to be a glimpse into the future of our discipline: As cleverly stated
by Torres-Pomales,
“we use computer languages to try to capture the essence of
software, but the concepts are so intricate that they generally defy
attempts to completely visualize them in a practical manner and
require the use of techniques to simplify relationships and enable
communication among designers.” (Torres-Pomales, 2000)
This is exactly the starting point of the approaches based on introspection. It
is our belief that such approaches, combined with knowledge management,
semantic processing, and service orientation, may provide us with an
important tool to deal effectively with software complexity.
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FAULT-TOLERANT PROTOCOLS USING
FAULT-TOLERANCE PROGRAMMING
LANGUAGES
1 INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES
The programming language itself is the focus of this chapter: Fault-tolerance
is not embedded in the program (as it is the case e.g. for single-version
fault-tolerance), nor around the language (through compilers or translators);
on the contrary, fault-tolerance is provided through the syntactical structures
and the run-time executives of fault-tolerance programming languages. Also in
this case a significant part of the complexity of dependability enforcement is
moved from each single code to the architecture, in this case the programming
language.
Many cases exist of fault-tolerance programming languages; this chapter
proposes a few of them, considering three cases: Object-oriented languages,
functional languages, and hybrid languages. In particular it is discussed the
case of Oz, a multi-paradigm programming language that achieves both
transparent distribution and translucent failure handling.
2 FAULT-TOLERANT PROTOCOLS USING
CUSTOM PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES
Another approach is given by working at language level enhancing a
pre-existing programming language or developing an ad hoc distributed
programming language so that it hosts specific fault-tolerance provisions. The
following two sections cover these topics.
2.1 Object-oriented approaches
2.1.1 The Arjuna Distributed Programming System
Arjuna (Arjuna Technologies, ltd.) is an object-oriented system for portable
distributed programming in C++ (Shrivastava, 1995). It can be considered as
a clever blending of useful and widespread tools, techniques, and ideas—as
such, it is a good example of the evolutionary approach towards
application-level software fault-tolerance. It exploits remote procedure
calls (Birrell & Nelson, 1984) and UNIX daemons (Haviland & Salama, 1987).
On each node of the system an object server connects client objects to objects
supplying services. The object server also takes care of spawning objects when
they are not yet running (in this case they are referred to as “passive
objects”). Arjuna also exploits a “naming service”, by means of which client
objects request a service “by name”. This transparency effectively supports
object migration and replication. Arjuna offers the programmer means for
dealing with atomic actions (via the two-phase commit protocol) and
persistent objects. Unfortunately, it requires the programmers to explicitly
deal with tools to save and restore the state, to manage locks, and to declare
in their applications instances of the class for managing atomic actions. As its
authors state, in many respects Arjuna asks the programmer to be aware of
several complexities—as such, it is prejudicial to transparency and separation
of design concerns (insufficient sc). On the other hand, its good design choices
result in an effective, portable environment.
Arjuna provides the programmer with “a computation model in which
application programs manipulate persistent objects under the control of
atomic actions” (Shrivastava, 1995). This concise definition reflects the
opinions of many fault-tolerance language designers, that is, that coupling the
object and atomic action model with object persistency provides a good
solution to designing fault-tolerant systems. In Arjuna a failure appears to the
programmer as a persistent object becoming unavailable. Actual reasons for
this event may be e.g. a crash of the object repository, or a network
partitioning. Accordingly, avoiding failures in Arjuna is achieved by any
method directed to increasing the availability of its objects. The main
approach used for this in Arjuna is object replication. Like in any replication
scheme, clearly this calls for consistency protocols among the replicas.
As mentioned above, Arjuna uses an object server to turn passive objects into
active ones, when a reference to any such object is detected in the system.
Binding is the name of the operation that creates a local instance of any valid
Arjuna object and creates one such reference. The object server then attaches
the latest (committed) state of the named object to the local instance.
An example (from the cited reference) follows:
{ /* scope of o1,o2 and act is between the C++ block ("automatic variables") */
MyArjunaObject o1(Name-A); /* o1 is bound to object whose global name is "A" */
MySecondArjunaObject o2(Name-B); /* o2 to "B" */
AtomicAction act; /* o1 and o2 will be used in atomic action act */
act.Begin(); /* act starts */
o1.method1(...);
o2.method1(...); /* invocations, possibly changing state of o1 and o2 */
o2.method2(...);
.......
act.End(); /* act commits: if successful, "A" and "B" get updated
} /* o1 and o2 are deallocated, which breaks bindings to A and B */
As it is often the case for ALFT based on programming languages, Arjuna
builds on top of a few design axioms that determine its effectiveness but also
limit its general usability. Hence sa is assessed as “average”. No support for
adaptivity exists, though transparency replication could have been exploited
to reach a better a (limited/potentially good).
2.1.2 Programming languages based on Compositional Filters
Composition Filters (CF) are a concept developed and explored at the
University of Twente, The Netherlands. Originally CF were embedded into a
custom programming language called Sina. Later the concept was enucleated
from Sina and made available as extensions to existing languages such as
C++ (Glandrup, 1995) or Java (Wichman, 1999). The latter reference
provides a very nice and clear metaphor explaining what CF are. In what
follows the main reference is (Wichman, 1999) and the Java implementation of
composition filters, ComposeJ. Composition filters allow extending the object
oriented model with the possibility to model concerns such as coordinated
behavior, dynamic inheritance, delegation and multiple interfaces/views in a
reusable, extensible and adaptable way. The main idea is that of introducing
input and output filters, i.e. components that intercept and manipulate
message transmission and reception. An input filter set filters incoming
messages and an output filter set filters outgoing messages. Filters in a filter
set orderly evaluate and possibly manipulate the messages before passing them
to the target object. All messages sent to the object have to pass its input
filter set. All messages sent by the object have to pass its output filter set. A
special object (the filter object) provides the filters as its methods, which are
not publicly available to the filtered object. Filter set are like a block of
selection statements: An ordered cascade of conditions, each of which checks
whether the incoming message belongs or not to some category. If so, the
message is intercepted (”accepted”, in the CF lingo) and processed. As a
consequence of this processing, the message may change. Then the message is
passed to the next filter in the set and this goes on until the last filter in the
set is encountered. A message that is not accepted by the last filter raises an
exception. Clearly this procedure can be added to any hosting language, as it
is a procedural addition that has no impact on the language grammar.
The input and output filter set are declared within a class through the
inputfilters and outputfilters keywords, for instance,
inputfilters filter1 : Error = ..(will be explained shortly) filter2 : Dispatch
=(will be explained shortly)
The general structure of a filter element is
FilterName : FilterType = Conditions ConclusionOperator MatchingPattern
Parameters
“Conditions” is a Boolean that rejects the message when false. If true, the
second and the third sections come into play: if “ConclusionOperator” is an
inclusion, represented by ‘=>’, then one accepts all messages that verify the
matching pattern; if it is an exclusion, represented by ‘~>’, then one accepts all
message that did not verify a previous inclusion operator. “Parameters” is an
optional section that depends on the filter being used. If a message is
accepted, the filter’s accept handler is executed, otherwise the next filter
element is evaluated. If there are no more elements left in the current filter,
the filter’s reject handler is executed.
Filters belong to different types:
• Dispatch: any accepted message is delegated to one or more objects;
rejected messages go to the next filter in the set.
• Error: any accepted message does to next filter; rejected ones raise an
exception.
• Substitution: the accepted message is substituted with another one as
specified in section “Parameters”; rejected messages go to the next filter.
• Send: accepted messages are passed to any object; rejected messages go
to the next filter.
• Meta: any accepted message is reified and delegated to a “meta-object”
(that is, an object describing and monitoring the behavior of another
object); rejected messages go to the next filter.
• Wait: accepted messages go to the next filter, while rejected ones are
blocked until a certain condition is met—which is clearly useful for
concurrency control and synchronization.
For the sake of brevity these filters shall not be discussed in detail, but it is
clear that they have the potential to compose powerful fault-tolerance
mechanisms based, e.g., on replication and reflection. As an example, a
Dispatch input filter could be used to redirect an input message to several
replicas, while a Substitution or a Meta filter could be used to do voting
among the output objects produced by the replicas; a Wait filter could make
sure that all replicas synchronize, and so forth.
Composition Filters and Aspect Oriented Programming (described in
Chapter 7) have many points in common, as they represent two paths towards
reaching similar goals, e.g., separation of concerns. The main difference
between the two approaches is in the fact that Composition Filters work on a
per object basis, while AOP languages provide a system-wide
(application-wide) specification which is integrated with the class hierarchies
by means of a pre-processor (the aspect weaver, see Chapter 7).
Composition Filters provide “by construction”, so to say, excellent sc. As it is
often the case in this category of fault-tolerance provisions, sa is limited to
those fault-tolerance techniques that can be expressed in terms of composition
filters (average sa). All CF implementations we are aware of work at
compile-time, which impacts negatively on a.
2.1.3 FT-SR
FT-SR (Schlichting & Thomas, 1995) is basically an attempt to augment the
SR (Andrews & Olsson, 1993) distributed programming language with
mechanisms to facilitate fault-tolerance. FT-SR is based on the concept of
fail-stop modules (FSM). A FSM is defined as an abstract unit of
encapsulation. It consists of a number of threads that export a number of
operations to other FSMs. The execution of operations is atomic. FSM can be
composed so to give rise to complex FSMs. For instance it is possible to
replicate a module n > 1 times and set up a complex FSM that can survive to
n− 1 failures. Whenever a failure exhausts the redundancy of a FSM, be that
a simple or complex FSM, a failure notification is automatically sent to a
number of other FSMs so to trigger proper recovery actions. This feature
explains the name of FSM: as in fail-stop processors, either the system is
correct or a notification is sent and the system stops its functions. This means
that the computing model of FT-SR guarantees, to some extent, that in the
absence of explicit failure notification, commands can be assumed to have been
processed correctly. This greatly simplifies program development because it
masks the occurrence of faults, offers guarantees that no erroneous results are
produced, and encourages the design of complex, possibly dynamic failure
semantics (see Chapter 1) based on failure notifications. Of course this
strategy is fully effective only under the hypothesis of perfect failure detection
coverage—an assumption that sometimes may be found to be false.
FT-SR exloits much of the expressive power of SR to offer fault-tolerance to
the programmer; the only additions added by FT-SR are:
• Automatic generation of failure notifications, when a resource is
destroyed due to failure or explicit termination, and
• so-called higher-level fail-stop atomic objects.
Automatic generation of failure notifications. In FT-SR a failure is
detected by the language runtime system. The focus herein is on the ways the
application programmer instructs a notification.
FT-SR offers so-called synchronous and asynchronous failure notifications:
• Synchronous notification is one that is attached to a method’s invocation
and specifies a backup method to be executed as soon as the primary has
been detected as failed. This is done very simply from the point of view
of the programmer: He or she has just to add the identifier of the backup
method, as in
call { task1.primary, task2.backup }.
• Asynchronous failure notifications are used when one wants to make sure
that, whenever a certain condition takes place during a certain time
interval, a given “alarm” or reactive measure will be instructed. This is
specified by issuing the monitor statement, as in
monitor task1 send task2(arguments),
after which the FT-SR run-time executive starts monitoring task1 with
task2(arguments) as reactive measure. This mean that, in case task1
fails during monitoring, method task2(arguments) is implicitly invoked
with the current value of its arguments.
Higher-level fail-stop atomic objects.
FT-SR makes use of replication and error recovery techniques to
build more complex fault-tolerance mechanisms (Schlichting &
Thomas, 1992). Replication is used to create a group of replicated
resources that appear to the user as a single, more resilient or more
performant resource. A similar concept has been adopted in Ariel
for tasks (see Chapter 6). Replication is available to the FT-SR
programmer through the create statement—an augmented version
of the SR statement with the same name. As an example,
task1_cap := create (i := 1 to N) task2() on remote_node_caps[i]
creates a replicated task consisting of N replicas of task2, with
replica i to be executed on the processing node specified in
remote_node_caps[i].
Once the replicated task is created, all operations to that task are
managed accordingly: Sending messages becomes a multicast and
the same applies for invoking methods. The system guarantees
consistent total order, but the programmer can choose otherwise.
Sending is managed through atomic broadcast. When performing a
call to a method in a replicated task,it is the run-time system that
makes sure that only a single result is returned to the caller. No
voting is done by the run-time system in this case: the failure
semantic assumptions of fail-silent processes allows the system to
just return the first result becoming available.
Another important feature offered by FT-SR is restartability—the ability to
instruct the automatic restart of a failed entity in a healthier location of the
system’s. The syntax for doing so is very simple:
restart entity on somewhere_else.
The entity may be replicated, in which case the programmer can make use of a
syntax similar to that of create:
restart (i := 1 to N) task2() on remote_node_caps[i].
Restarted FT-SR entities are not. . . restarted from scratch: they retain their
state—a useful property which is not available, e.g., with the RESTART
recovery code of Ariel (again, see Chapter 6 for more details on Ariel).
Finally, FT-SR offers persistency (also called “implicit restart” by its authors):
any entity tagged with the persistent attribute when declared is
automatically restarted on any of a certain number of backup nodes (“backup
virtual machines” in FT-SR lingo). This allows to compose easily a stable
storage resource, which in turn is an important requirement to build even
more complex and advanced fault-tolerance protocols.
FT-SR places fault-tolerance in the foreground of system design, which
translates in bad sc. It offers several constructs, with sufficient sa. No
support for a is part of the language.
2.1.4 ARGUS
Argus (Liskov, 1988) is a distributed object-oriented programming language
and operating system. Argus was designed to support application programs
like banking systems. To capture the object-oriented nature of such programs,
it provides a special kind of objects, called guardians, which perform
user-definable actions in response to remote requests. To solve the problems of
concurrency and failures, Argus allows computations to run as atomic
transactions. Argus’ target application domain is clearly the one of
transaction processing.
Like in Arjuna, Argus builds on top of a few fault-tolerance design axioms,
which limits Argus’ sa. Explicit, non-transparent support translates in
insufficient sc. No support for adaptivity has been foreseen in Argus.
2.1.5 The Correlate Language
The Correlate object-oriented language (Robben, 1999) adopts the concept of
active object, defined as an object that has control over the synchronization of
incoming requests from other objects. Objects are active in the sense that they
do not process immediately their requests—they may decide to delay a request
until it is accepted, i.e., until a given precondition (a guard) is met—for
instance, a mailbox object may refuse a new message in its buffer until an
entry becomes available in it. The precondition is a function of the state of the
object and the invocation parameters—it does not imply interaction with
other objects and has no side effects. If a request cannot be served according
to an object’s precondition, it is saved into a buffer until it becomes servable,
or until the object is destroyed. Conditions like an overflow in the request
buffer are not dealt with in (Robben, 1999). If more than a single request
becomes servable by an object, the choice is made non-deterministically.
Correlate uses a communication model called “pattern-based group
communication”—communication goes from an “advertising object” to those
objects that declare their “interest” in the advertised subject. This is similar
to Linda’s model of generative communication, introduced in Chapter 4.
Objects in Correlate are autonomous, in the sense that they may not only
react to external stimuli but also give rise to autonomous operations motivated
by an internal “goal”. When invoking a method, the programmer can choose
to block until the method is fully executed (this is called synchronous
interaction), or to execute it “in the background” (asynchronous interaction).
Correlate supports meta-object protocols. It has been effectively used to offer
transparent support for transaction, replication, and checkpoint-and-rollback.
The first implementation of Correlate consists of a translator to plain Java
plus an execution environment, also written in Java.
Correlate bears several similarities with Composition Filters and reaches the
same values of the structural attributes.
2.1.6 Fragmented Objects
Fragmented Objects (FO) are an extension of objects for distributed
environments (Makpangou, Gourhant, Narzul, & Shapiro, 1994). FO do not
reside integrally in one processing node, but are decomposed into chunks called
“fragments”, consisting of data and methods, which may reside on different
nodes. The logics for the distribution of fragments is part of the objects
themselves. The client of a FO must have access to at least one fragment.
FO offer an abstract view and a concrete view: In the abstract view they
appear as a single, shared object. In the concrete view, the designer can
decompose the objects into fragments and can deploy them on different
machines. He or she may also control the communications among fragments.
All these aspects are specified through a custom programming language, FOG
(an extension of C++), a toolbox, and a compiler also responsible for object
serialization.
The key aspect of FO with respect to dependability is the full transparency
that they provide their users with: In particular there is no way to distinguish
between a local object and a local fragment. This paves the way to the
transparent adoption of dependability methods based on replication and
reconfiguration (Reiser, Kapitza, Domaschka, & Hauck, 2006). In particular
the amount of redundancy used could be made adaptively tracking the current
disturbances—with an approach similar to the redundant variables described
in Chapter 4. This translates in potentially good a. Also sc is good in FO,
due to the ingenious separation between abstract and concrete views. sa
appears to be somewhat limited due to specifics of the approach.
The interest around FO has never abated—examples include the adaptive
fragmented objects of FORMI (Kapitza, Domaschka, Hauck, Reiser, &
Schmidt, 2006).
2.2 Functional Languages
2.2.1 Fault-Tolerance Attribute Grammars
The system models for application-level software fault-tolerance encountered
so far all have their basis in an imperative language. A different research trend
exists, which is based on the use of functional languages. This choice
translates in a program structure that allows a straightforward inclusion of
fault-tolerance means, with high degrees of transparency and flexibility.
Functional models that appear particularly interesting as system structures for
software fault-tolerance are those based on the concept of attribute
grammars (Paakki, 1995). This paragraph briefly introduces the model known
as FTAG (fault-tolerant attribute grammars) (Suzuki, Katayama, &
Schlichting, 1996), which offers the designer a large set of fault-tolerance
mechanisms. A noteworthy aspect of FTAG is that its authors explicitly
address the problem of providing a syntactical model for the widest possible
set of fault-tolerance provisions and paradigms, developing coherent
abstractions of those mechanisms while maintaining the linguistic integrity of
the adopted notation. This means that optimizing the value of attribute sa is
one of the design goals of FTAG.
FTAG regards a computation as a collection of pure mathematical functions
known as modules. Each module has a set of input values, called inherited
attributes, and of output variables, called synthesized attributes. Modules may
refer to other modules. When modules do not refer any other module, they can
be performed immediately. Such modules are called primitive modules. On the
other hand, non-primitive modules require other modules to be performed
first—as a consequence, an FTAG program is executed by decomposing a
“root” module into its basic submodules and then applying recursively this
decomposition process to each of the submodules. This process goes on until
all primitive modules are encountered and executed. The execution graph is
clearly a tree called computation tree. This scheme presents many benefits,
e.g., as the order in which modules are decomposed is exclusively determined
by attribute dependencies among submodules, a computation tree can be
mapped onto a parallel processing means straightforwardly.
The linguistic structure of FTAG allows the integration of a number of useful
fault-tolerance features that address the whole range of faults—design,
physical, and interaction faults. One of these features is called redoing.
Redoing replaces a portion of the computation tree with a new computation.
This is useful for instance to eliminate the effects of a portion of the
computation tree that has generated an incorrect result, or whose executor has
crashed. It can be used to implement easily “retry blocks” and recovery blocks
by adding ancillary modules that test whether the original module behaved
consistently with its specification and, if not, give rise to a “redoing”, a
recursive call to the original module.
Another relevant feature of FTAG is its support for replication, a concept that
in FTAG translates into a decomposition of a module into N identical
submodules implementing the function to replicate. The scheme is known as
replicated decomposition, while involved submodules are called replicas.
Replicas are executed according to the usual rules of decomposition, though
only one of the generated results is used as the output of the original module.
Depending on the chosen fault-tolerance strategy, this output can be, e.g., the
first valid output or the output of a demultiplexing function, e.g., a voter. It is
worth remarking that no syntactical changes are needed, only a subtle
extension of the interpretation so to allow the involved submodules to have the
same set of inherited attributes and to generate a collated set of synthesized
attributes.
FTAG stores its attributes in a stable object base or in primary memory
depending on their criticality—critical attributes can then be transparently
retrieved from the stable object base after a failure. Object versioning is also
used, a concept that facilitates the development of checkpoint-and-rollback
strategies.
FTAG provides a unified linguistic structure that effectively supports the
development of fault-tolerant software. Conscious of the importance of
supporting the widest possible set of fault-tolerance means, its authors report
in the cited paper how they are investigating the inclusion of other
fault-tolerance features and trying to synthesize new expressive syntactical
structures for FTAG—thus further improving attribute sa.
FTAG also exhibits “by construction” a good separation of concerns (sc). No
support for a is known to exist for FTAG.
Unfortunately, the widespread adoption of this valuable tool is conditioned by
the limited acceptance and spread of the functional programming paradigm
outside the academia.
2.3 A Hybrid Case: Oz
Oz is defined by its authors as “a multiparadigm programming language”. The
main reasons for that is that Oz offers, by construction, several features
common to programming paradigms such as logic, functional, imperative, and
object-oriented programming. Another important feature of Oz is that it
provides the programmer with a network-transparent distributed programming
model that facilitates considerably the development of distributed
fault-tolerant applications. The Oz programming system, called Mozart, was
designed by the so-called Mozart Consortium.
Thanks to its rich model, Oz allows to solve, to some extent, the transparency
conundrum of distributed computing: Indeed distributed computing
approaches either choose to mask all complexity providing an illusion of a fully
synchronous system where all failures and disruptions are masked, or go for a
fully translucent system where everything is made known and reflected onto
the system controller. Oz solves this and shows that “network transparency is
not incompatible with entity failure reflection” (Collet & Mej´ıas, 2007). The
idea is that the language gives the illusion of a single memory space shared by
distributed processing nodes called sites. Full transparency is achieved for this:
It is simply not possible to tell whether a method or an entity is local or
distributed. But this is not true for all aspects of distribution—in particular,
site crashes and partial failures are made translucent and reflected in the
language. The mechanism offered by Oz to handle partial failures is
asynchronous failure detectors, managed through failure listeners: All entities
produce streams of events that reflect the sequential occurrence of their fault
states. Any Oz task can become a failure listener, that is, it can hook to such
streams and be informed of all the faults experienced by any other tasks. This
means that fault detection is intrinsically managed by Oz and Mozart. Error
recovery can then be managed by guarded actions, a little like in ariel, the
error recovery language described in next chapter. This facilitates considerably
the development of asynchronous failure detectors with one of the algorithms
described in Chapter 8.
The trade off between transparency and translucency in Oz leads to a
satisfactory sc. Its multiparadigmic nature should translate in a good score
for sa, though no concrete evidence to this appears to exist. Oz has been used
to express adaptive control loops (Van Roy, 2006) for self-management, so it
proved to exhibit good a.
3 CONCLUSION
Several examples of fault-tolerance protocols embedded in custom
programming languages have been shown. This class of methods can achieve
satisfactory degrees of sc. The language designer has the widest syntactic
freedom which is necessary to achieve good values of sa, but often, as a result
of the design choices, the programmer is confined to a limited amount of
possibilities. Attribute a depends on specific characteristics of the language,
e.g. being able to select dynamically the error recovery strategy when the
environment and its faults change.
Most of the programming languages discussed so far is not being supported
anymore, a noteworthy exception being Oz, whose most widespread platform,
Mozart, is a strategic research path at the University of Louvain-la-neuve,
Belgium.
Next chapter is devoted to a special case of a fault-tolerance programming
language: The ariel error recovery language.
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THE RECOVERY LANGUAGE APPROACH
1 INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES
After having discussed the general approach of fault-tolerance languages and
their main features, the focus is now set on one particular case: The ariel1
recovery language. It is also described an approach towards resilient computing
based on ariel and therefore dubbed the “recovery language approach” (RεL).
In this chapter first the main elements of RεL are introduced in general terms,
coupling each concept to the technical foundations behind it. After this a
quite extensive description of ariel and of a compliant architecture are
provided. Target applications for such architecture are distributed codes,
characterized by non-strict real-time requirements, written in a procedural
language such as C, to be executed on distributed or parallel computers
consisting of a predefined (fixed) set of processing nodes.
Reason for giving special emphasis to ariel and its approach is not in their
special qualities but more on the fact that, due to the first-hand experience of
the author, who conceived, designed and implemented ariel in the course of
his studies, it was possible for him to provide the reader with what may be
considered as a sort of practical exercise in system and fault modeling and in
application-level fault-tolerance design, recalling and applying several of the
concepts introduced in previous chapters.
2 THE ARIEL RECOVERY LANGUAGE
This section casts the basis of a general approach in abstract terms, while a
particular instance of the herein presented concepts is described in Section 3
as a prototypic distributed architecture supporting a fault-tolerance linguistic
structure for application-level fault-tolerance. System and fault models are
drawn. The approach is also reviewed with respect to the structural attributes
(sc, sa and a) and to the approaches presented in Chapter 3, 5, and 6.
The structure of this section is as follows:
• Models are introduced in Sect. 2.1.
• Key ideas, concepts, and technical foundations are described in Sect. 2.2.
• Section 2.4 shows the workflow corresponding to using RεL.
• Sect. 2.5 summarizes the positive values of the structural attributes sa,
sc, and a for RεL.
2.1 System and Fault Models
This section introduces the system and fault models that will be assumed in
the rest of this chapter.
2.1.1 System Assumptions
In the following, the target system is assumed to be a distributed or parallel
system. Basic components are nodes, tasks, and the network.
• A node can be, e.g., a workstation in a networked cluster or a processor
in a MIMD parallel computer.
• Tasks are independent threads of execution running on the nodes.
• The network system allows tasks on different nodes to communicate with
each other.
Nodes can be commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware components with no
special provisions for hardware fault-tolerance. It is not mandatory to have
memory management units and secondary storage devices.
A general-purpose operating system is required on each node. No special
purpose, distributed, or fault-tolerant operating system is required.
The number N of nodes is assumed to be known at compile time. Nodes are
addressable by the integers in {0, . . . , N − 1}. For any integer m > 0 let us call
the set of integers {0, . . . ,m− 1} as Im. Let us furthermore refer to the node
addressed by integer i as ni, i in IN .
Tasks are pre-defined at compile-time: in particular for each i in IN , it is
known that node ni is to run ti tasks, up to a given node-specific limit. No
special constraints are posed on the task scheduling policy.
On each node, say node i, tasks are identified by user-defined unique local
labels—integers greater than or equal to zero. Let us call Ini the set of labels
for tasks to be run on node ni, i in IN . The task with local label j on node i
will be also referred to as ni[j].
The system obeys the timed asynchronous distributed system model (Cristian
& Fetzer, 1999) already introduced in Chapter 2. As already mentioned, such
model allows a straightforward modeling of system partitioning—as a
consequence of sufficiently many omission or performance communication
failures, correct nodes may be temporarily disconnected from the rest of the
system during so-called “periods of instability” (Cristian & Fetzer, 1999).
Moreover it is assumed that, at reset, tasks or nodes restart from a
well-defined, initial state—partial-amnesia crashes (defined in Chapter 1) are
not considered.
A message passing library is assumed to be available, built on the datagram
service. Such library offers asynchronous, non-blocking multicast primitives.
The adoption of a library like ISIS (see Chapter 3) is suggested, in order to
inherit the benefits of its reliable multicast primitives.
As clearly explained in (Cristian & Fetzer, 1999), the above hypotheses match
well to nowadays distributed systems based on networked workstations—as
such, they represent a general model with no practical restriction.
The following assumptions characterize the user application:
1. (When N > 1 nodes are available): the target application is distributed
on the system nodes.
2. It is written or is to be written in a procedural language such as, e.g., C
or C++.
3. The service specification includes non-safety-critical dependability
goals—safety-critical systems may also be addressed, but in this case the
crash failure semantics assumption must be supported with a very high
coverage (Mortensen, 2000) This would require:
• Extensive self-checking (by means of, e.g., signature checking,
arithmetic coding, control flow monitoring, or dual processors).
• Statistical estimation of the achieved coverage, by means of proper
fault injection.
4. Inter-process communication takes place by means of the functions in the
above mentioned message passing library. Higher-level communication
services, if available, must be built atop that message passing library too.
The reason behind the third assumption is that, forcing communication
through a single virtual provision, namely the functions for sending and for
receiving messages, allows a straightforward implementation of mechanisms for
task isolation. This concept is explained in more detail in Sect. 3.2.9.
2.1.2 Fault Model
As suggested in Chapter 2, any effective design including dependability goals
requires provisions, located at all levels, to avoid, remove, or tolerate faults.
Hence, as an application-level structure, RεL is complementary to other
approaches addressing fault-tolerance at system level, i.e., hardware-level and
OS-level fault-tolerance. In particular, a system-level architecture such as
GUARDS (Powell et al., 1999), that is based on redundancy and hardware
and operating system provisions for systematic management of consensus,
appears to be particularly appropriate for being coupled with RεL, which
offers application-level provisions for NVP and replication (see later on).
The main classes of faults addressed by RεL are those of accidental, permanent
or temporary design faults, and temporary, external, physical faults. Both
value and timing failures are considered. The architecture addresses one fault
at a time: The system is ready to deal with new faults only after having
recovered from the present one.
2.2 Key Ideas and Technical Foundations
The design of RεL tries to capture, by construction, some of the positive
aspects of most of the approaches so far surveyed.
Some of the key design choices of RεL are:
• The adoption of a fault-tolerance toolset.
• The separation of the configuration of the toolset from the specification
of the functional service.
• The separation of the system structure for the specification of the
functional service from that for error recovery and reconfiguration.
These concepts and their technical foundations are illustrated in the rest of
this section.
2.3 Adoption of a Fault-Tolerance Toolset
A requirement of RεL is the availability of a fault-tolerance toolset, to be
interpreted herein as the conjoint adoption of:
• A set of fault-tolerance tools addressing error detection, localisation,
containment and recovery, such as the ones in SwIFT (Huang, Kintala,
Bernstein, & Wang, 1996) or EFTOS (Deconinck, De Florio, Lauwereins,
& Varvarigou, 1997; Deconinck, Varvarigou, et al., 1997). As seen in
detail in Chapter 3, fault-tolerance services provided by the toolset
include, e.g., watchdog timers and voting. Such tools are called basic
tools (BT) in what follows.
• A “basic services library” (BSL) is assumed to be present, providing
functions for:
– intra-node and remote communication;
– task management;
– access to the local clock;
– application-level assertions;
– functions to reboot or shut down a node.
This library is required to be available in source code so that it can be
instrumented, e.g., with code to forward information transparently to
some collector (described in what follows). Information may include, for
instance, the notification of a successful task creation or any failure of
this kind. This allows to create fault streams as in Oz (Chapter 5). If
supported, meta-object protocols (see Chapter 4) may also be used to
implement the library and its instrumentation. It is also suggested that
the functions for sending messages work with opaque objects that
reference either single tasks or groups of tasks. In the first case, the
function would perform a plain “send”, while in the second case it would
perform a multicast. This would increase the degree of transparency.
• A distributed component serving as a sort of backbone controlling and
monitoring the toolset and the user application. Let us call this
application “the Backbone”. It is assumed that the Backbone has a
component on each node of the system and that, through some software
(and, possibly, hardware) fault-tolerance provisions, it can tolerate crash
failures of up to all but one node or component. An application such as
the EFTOS DIR net discussed in Chapter 3 may be used for this.
Notifications from the BSL and from the BT are assumed to be collected
and maintained by the Backbone into a data structure called “the
database” (DB). The DB therefore holds data related to the current
structure and state of the system, the user application, and the
Backbone. A special section of the DB is devoted to keeping track of
error notifications, such as, for instance, “divide-by-zero exception
caught while executing task 11” sent by a trap handling tool like the one
discussed in Chapter 3. If possible, error detection support at hardware
or kernel level may be also instrumented in order to provide the
Backbone with similar notifications. The DB is assumed to be stored in
a reliable storage device, e.g., a stable storage device, or replicated and
protected against corruption or other unwanted modifications.
• Following the hypothesis of the timed asynchronous distributed system
model (Cristian & Fetzer, 1999), a time-out management system is also
assumed to be available. This allows an application to define time-outs,
namely, to schedule an event to be generated a given amount of “clock
ticks” in the future (Cristian & Schmuck, 1995). Let us call this
component the “time-out manager” (tom).
A prototype of a RεL-compliant toolset has been developed within the
European ESPRIT project “TIRAN”. Section 3.2 describes its main
components.
2.3.1 Configuration Support Tool
The second key component of RεL is a tool to support fault-tolerance
configuration, defined herein as the deployment of customized instances of
fault-tolerance tools and strategies. RεL envisages a translator to help the
user configure the toolset and his / her application. The translator has to
support a custom configuration language especially conceived to facilitate
configuration and therefore to reduce the probability of fault-tolerance design
faults—the main cause of failure for fault-tolerant software systems (Laprie,
1998; Lyu, 1998).
As an output, the translator could issue, e.g., C or C++ header files defining
configured objects and symbolic constants to refer easily to the configured
objects. Recompilation of the target application is therefore required after
each execution of the translator.
Configuration can group a number of activities, including:
• Configuration of system and application entities,
• configuration of the basic tools,
• configuration of replicated tasks,
• configuration for retry blocks,
• configuration for multiple-version software fault-tolerance.
The above configuration activities are now briefly described.
2.3.2 Configuration of System and Application Entities
One of the tasks of a configuration language is to declare the key entities of
the system and to define a global naming scheme in order to refer to them.
Key entities are nodes, tasks, and groups of tasks.
For each node ni, 0 <= i < N and for each task ni[j], 0 <= j < Ini , a unique,
global-scope identifier must be defined by the user. Let us call this identifier
the task’s unique-id. This can be done by editing a configuration script with
rules of the form
taskt = ni[j], (1)
which assigns unique-id t to ni[j], that is, task number j on node i. Similarly
one could define groups of task with rules of the form
groupg = {u}, (2)
where u is a list of comma-separated integers representing unique-ids. Such
rule defines then a group named g and made of the tasks corresponding to the
mentioned unique-ids. The translator would then turn a configuration script
containing rules of this kind into a header file to be compiled with the target
application and, if necessary, in configuration files expected by the toolset.
2.3.3 Configuration of the Fault-Tolerance Tools in the Toolset
Specific instances of the tools in the toolset can be statically configured by
means of the translator. For instance, in the case of a watchdog timer,
configuration can specify:
• The unique-id of the watching task as well as that of the watched task.
• The initial expected frequency of “heartbeats” to be sent from the
watched task to the watchdog.
• The actions to be taken when an expected heartbeat is not received in
time,
and so forth. As an example, a watchdog timer may be configured in high level
terms as follows:
WATCHDOG TASK 10 WATCHES TASK 14
HEARTBEATS EVERY 100 MS
ON ERROR WARN TASK 18
END WATCHDOG
Ideally, the output of the translator should be a configuration file for the BSL
to associate transparently the creation of the configured instance of the
watchdog to the creation of the watched task. Doing like this, the only
non-functional code to be intruded in the watched task can be the function
call corresponding to sending the heartbeat to the watchdog. A generic
“HEARTBEAT” method, with no arguments, can be used. This can be a
symbolic name properly defined in a header file written by the translator and
automatically included when compiling the user application. Even when
instrumenting is not possible, the watched task can start the watchdog by
means of a symbolic name properly defined in the above mentioned header file.
This kind of translations can be applied to most of the tools of a library such
as SwIFT or EFTOS that have been described in Chapter 3. Note how the
minimal or absent code intrusion provides an optimal sc. The adoption of a
custom, ad hoc language for the expression of the configuration concerns can
be used to reach high values for sa and compile-time a.
Configuration of Replicated Tasks. The translator and the BSL may be
used to implement replicated tasks, i.e., multiple instances of the same task
that perform like a more dependable entity. The goal of the translator is to
mask this choice and any other fault-tolerance technicalities, including, in this
specific case, replication. This can be obtained, e.g., by solving separately the
following sub-problems, both at syntactical and at semantic level:
1. Replication and forwarding of the input value.
2. Execution support of a fault-tolerance strategy.
3. Output management.
Problem 1 can be solved by defining a group-of-tasks object that, once passed
to the BSL function for sending messages, triggers a multicast of the same
message to the whole group, as suggested in Sect. 2.3.2.
Problem 2 can be solved in various ways—for instance, through a temporal
redundancy scheme, executing the involved tasks one after the other, on the
same node, or via spatial redundancy, executing tasks in parallel. Increased
dependability may be obtained via a number of software techniques,
implementing schemes such as active replication or primary-backup
replication (Guerraoui & Schiper, 1997). As noticed in the cited paper, each
scheme has both positive and negative aspects and requires solving specific
problems. All these problems are low-level design issues that can be made
transparent to the user of an RεL system. Other choices and options, e.g.,
which type and degree of replication and which redundancy scheme to adopt,
that would result in non-functional code intrusion, can be also made
transparent to the user by means of the translator (see Sect. 2.3.3), hence
increasing configurability.
Problem 3, depending on the adopted scheme, can be as simple as sending a
message (when in primary-backups mode) or could require special processing.
For instance, in the case of active replication, two sub-problems would call for
specific treatment:
3.1. Routing the outputs produced by the base tasks.
3.2. De-multiplexing, i.e., production of a unique output value from the
values routed in sub-problem 3.1.
Sub-problem 3.1 can be solved, e.g., by a proper combination of pipelining and
redirection. Other approaches may be used when the OS does not support the
above tools. De-multiplexing, i.e., solution of sub-problem 3.2, can be for
instance the result of a voting procedure performed among the outputs
produced by the base tasks. Also in this case, the availability of a translator
and an appropriate syntax rule could guarantee an almost complete separation
of design concerns. The configuration of a replicated task requires the
specification of:
• The unique-id of a task globally representing a set of replicas.
• The unique-ids of the replicas.
• The replication method and its parameters.
• The actions to be taken when an output is produced by the replicated
task.
• The actions to be taken when an error occurs.
In the case of replicated tasks, the translator is also responsible for the set up
of a proper run-time executive. The latter would then be responsible, at
run-time, for the orchestration of the services required by the replicated
tasks—task management, distributed voting, and so forth. Proper calls to the
BSL and to instances of the basic tools may be used for this. A voting tool
such as the EFTOS voting farm, described in Chapter 3, appears to be a
natural choice, as it addresses many of the required issues.
It is worth noting how, also in this case, full transparency is reached: A client
of a replicated task would have no way to tell whether its server be simple or
replicated—possibly apart from some performance penalty and a higher
quality of service. This translates into optimal sc. The same applies to sa and
a for the reasons mentioned in Sect. 2.3.3.
Configuration for Retry Blocks. Transparent support for redoing (see
e.g. language FTAG in Chapter 5)—another important fault-tolerance
provisions—can be provided via “retry blocks”. Again, a proper run-time
executive is to be produced by the translator. The problems to be solved at
this level include
1. reversibility of a failed task and
2. input replication.
The first problem can be solved by implementing some “recovery cache” (as in
the recovery block technique described in Chapter 3): That is a mechanism to
checkpoint the state of the calling task before entering the retry block and to
roll it back to its original value in case the acceptance test fails. This may be
done transparently or with the intervention of the user. In the latter case, one
restricts the size of the recovery cache and reduces the corresponding
overheads, at the same time increasing the code intrusion.
The second problem could be solved via an “input cache”, i.e., a mechanism
that:
• Intercepts the original input message.
• Stores the original message into some stable means.
• And forwards the saved original message to each new retry instance.
Transparent adoption of an input cache can also be realized, e.g., by means of
pipelining and redirection (when the OS supports these).
The configuration of a retry block requires the specification of:
• The unique-id of a task to be retried in case of errors.
• An acceptance test, in the form of the name of a function returning a
Boolean value or of a task that, upon termination, returns a Boolean
value2.
• A threshold r representing the maximum number of retries.
• The actions to be taken when the base task fails for r times in a row.
Configuration for Multiple-Version Software Fault-Tolerance.
Compile-time support towards multiple-version software fault-tolerance can be
provided by the translator through syntax rules and techniques similar to
those described for task replication.
The configuration of a provision for MV requires the specification of:
• The unique-id of a task representing the provision.
• The unique-id’s of the tasks running the versions.
• A set of thresholds representing time-outs on the execution of the version
tasks3.
• The name of the user-specified function to be executed by each version
task.
• A method to de-multiplex the multiple outputs produced by the versions
into a single output value.
• Possible arguments to the de-multiplexing method.
• The unique-id of a task to be notified each time an execution cycle is
successfully completed.
• The unique-id of a task to be notified each time an execution cycle fails.
Support towards consensus recovery blocks (Scott, Gault, & McAllister, 1985)
may be provided in a similar way. Acceptance tests should be specified as
described in Sect. 2.3.3.
An Example Scenario and Some Conclusions. A possible compile-time
and run-time scenario is now described for the case of the configuration of
multiple-version software fault-tolerance. This is done in order to provide the
reader with a more concrete view of the kind of support supplied by a
configuration language.
It is assumed that the OS supports pipelining and stream redirection. It is
also assumed that, by agreement, the user tasks that are going to be used as
NVP versions forward a single output value onto the standard output stream.
Finally, user tasks are assumed to be side effect-free.
Once fed with a configuration script, the translator writes a number of source
files for the tasks corresponding to the employed versions. Each of these source
files, set up from some template file, specify how to:
• Set up a configured instance of a distributed voting tool (such as the
EFTOS voting farm).
• Redirect standard output streams.
• Execute one of the version tasks.
During the execution, when a client needs to access a service supplied by the
provisions, it simply sends a request message to the corresponding task. The
client does not need to know that the latter is actually an “NVP task”, that is,
a group. Through the BSL, this sending turns into a multicast to the version
tasks. These tasks, which in the meanwhile have transparently set up a
distributing voting tool,
• get their input,
• compute some user-specified function,
• produce an output,
• and (by the above agreement) write that output into their standard
output stream.
This output, which was already redirected through a piped stream to the
template task, is fed into the voting system. The latter eventually produces an
output that, in case of success, is sent to some output task with the
notification of successful completion of a processing cycle.
Note that the client task of such an “NVP task” is completely unaware of the
context in which it is running, with full transparency and separation of design
concern. One can conclude that the adoption of a configuration strategy like
the one just sketched can lead to an optimal sc. The variety of fault-tolerance
provisions that can be supported by configuration and the adoption of a
linguistic environment separated from the functional application layer can be
exploited by programming language designers in order to attain optimal values
for sa and a as well.
2.3.4 Recovery Languages
Two of the three key concepts of RεL have been described, namely the
adoption of a fault-tolerance toolset and that of a configuration language. This
section now introduces the third component of RεL. This component supports
two application layers, namely:
• The functional application layer, i.e., the one devoted to the fulfillment
of the functional requirements and to the specification of an intended
user service, supported by the run-time modules of conventional
programming languages such as, e.g., C or C++.
• An ancillary application layer, specifically devoted to error processing
and fault identification, to be switched in either asynchronously, when
errors are detected in the system, or when the user synchronously signals
particular run-time conditions, such as a failed assertion, or when the
control flow runs into user-defined breakpoints.
In the following the service language is the language constituting the front
layer and recovery language the one related to error processing.
Note how a recovery language can be specified in a separate script. The latter
can then be translated into pseudo-code to be interpreted at run-time, or, e.g.,
into plain C to be compiled with the user application. In the first case, the
functional code and the recovery code are fully separated, also at run-time,
which can be exploited to reach optimal a and to extend or reduce the set of
faults to be tolerated. This feature could be used to realize the vision of a
fault model structured as a dynamic system, F (t), as described in Chapter 2.
The second case eliminates the overhead of interpreting the pseudo-code. The
same translator used for fault-tolerance configuration may be used to
generate the pseudo-code or the C source code.
The general strategy is as follows:
• During the lifetime of the application, in the absence of errors, the front
layer controls the progress of the service supply while the Backbone
collects and maintains in the DB the data concerning the state of each
component of the application, the state of each node of the system, the
state and progress of public and private resources, and so forth.
• As soon as an error is detected by a basic tool, such as a watchdog
timer, the latter transparently forwards a notification of this event to the
Backbone, which awakes the ancillary layer by enabling a module to
interpret or execute the recovery code. Let us call this module RINT,
for recovery interpreter.
A possible syntactical structure for the recovery language is that of a list of
guarded actions, i.e., statements in the form
g : a,
where g is a guard, i.e., a Boolean expression on the contents of the DB, and
a is one or more actions (to be specified later on). Hence, adequate
paradigms for the recovery language could be that of procedural or logic
programming languages. The following two paragraphs describe guards and
actions in more detail.
Guards represent conditions that require recovery. As just said, they are
Boolean expressions made of basic queries called atoms. Possible atoms may
express conditions such as:
• Task t has been detected as faulty.
• Task t has been detected as faulty by error detection tool d.
• For m times in a row, task t has been detected as faulty.
• A time-out concerning task t has expired.
• An N -version task has signaled that no full consensus has been reached,
or in more detail:
– For m times in a row, the same version, say task t′, has been found
in minority with respect to the other versions;
– for m times in a row, version t′ did not produce any output within
its deadline;
– and so forth.
• Node n is down, or, in more detail:
– Node n has crashed;
– Node n is unreachable;
– No sign of life from node n in the last s seconds, as measured by the
local clock;
– and so forth.
• Task t could not be restarted;
• Some of the tasks in group g are faulty.
and so forth. Most of the atoms in a Boolean clause will require a DB query or
proper actions on DB fields—for instance, conditions such as “task t is affected
by a transient fault” require the adoption, within the DB, of a thresholding
statistical technique such as α-count (Powell et al., 1999; Bondavalli,
Chiaradonna, Di Giandomenico, & Grandoni, 1997), which is capable of
distinguishing between transient and permanent/intermittent faults. In
particular, α-count (described in Sect. 3.2.4) can be straightforwardly “wired”
into the DB management system within the Backbone, because that
mechanism is based on adjusting some counters according to the contents in a
stream of error messages forwarded by a set of error detectors.
Actions are local or remote commands to be executed when their guard is
evaluated as true. Actions can specify, for instance, recovery or reconfiguration
services. A special case of action can be also another guarded action—this
allows to have nested guarded actions that can be represented as a tree. The
execution of an inner guard is, again, its evaluation. When a parent guard is
evaluated as false, all its actions are skipped, including its child guards.
Actions can include, for instance:
• Switching tasks in and out of a fault-tolerance structure such as, e.g., an
“NVP task” (see Sect. 2.3.3).
• Synchronizing groups of tasks.
• Isolating4 groups of tasks.
• Instructions to roll the execution of a task or a group of tasks back to a
previously saved checkpoint,
and so forth. Actions have a system-wide scope and are executed on any
processing node of the system where a non-faulty component of the Backbone
is running. They may include commands to send control signals to specific
components of the Backbone or to user tasks. Basic tools such as a distributed
voting tool like the EFTOS voting farm (discussed in Chapter 3) can be
instructed so that they respond to that signal supplying transparent support
towards graceful degradation, task switching, and task migration, as described
for instance in (De Florio, Deconinck, & Lauwereins, 1998). Furthermore, the
ability to distinguish between transient and permanent/intermittent faults can
be exploited, in order to avoid unnecessary reconfigurations or other costly or
redundancy-consuming actions, attaching different strategies to these two
cases.
Figure 1: A workflow diagram for RεL. Labels refer to usage steps and are
described in Sect. 2.4.
2.4 Workflow
This section describes the workflow corresponding to the adoption of the RεL
approach.
Figure 1 summarizes the workflow. The following basic steps have been
foreseen:
• In the first steps (labels 1 and 2 in the cited figure), the designer
describes the key application and system entities, such as tasks, groups
of tasks, and nodes. The main tool for this phase is the configuration
language.
• Next (step 3), the designer configures the basic tools and the
fault-tolerance provisions he / she has decided to use. The configuration
language is used for this. The output of steps 1–3 is the configuration
code.
• Next (step 4), the designer defines what conditions need to be caught,
and what actions should follow each caught condition. The resulting list
is coded as a number of guarded actions via a recovery language.
• The configuration code and the recovery code are then converted via the
translator into a set of C header files, C fragments, and system-specific
configuration files (steps 5 and 6). These files represent: configured
instances of the basic tools, of the system and of the application;
initialization files for the communication management functions; user
preferences for the backbone; and the recovery pseudo-code.
• On steps 7–9, the application source code and the configured basic tool
instances are compiled in order to produce the executable code of the
application.
• Next, the backbone is compiled on steps 10–12.
• Finally, on step 13, the communication management services of the BSL
are configured in order to allow the proper management of multicasting
and other communication services.
2.5 Conclusions
In this section an approach to application-level software fault-tolerance has
been introduced. Such an approach provides its users with a linguistic
structure to express application-level error recovery concerns and to configure
a number of fault-tolerance provisions outside the functional application layer.
The latter can be provided by any procedural language.
The RεL approach addresses dependability goals for distributed or parallel
applications written in any procedural language. Its target hardware platforms
include distributed and parallel computers consisting of a set of processing
nodes known at compile time. Within this application and system domain, the
novel approach can be qualitatively assessed as reaching optimal values of the
structural attributes. In particular, with respect to the application-level
software fault-tolerance approaches reviewed in Chapter 3, 4, and 5:
• Error recovery is expressed in a separate programming context—thus
good sc can be obtained.
• The executable code is separable—that is, at run-time, the portion of the
executable code devoted to the fault-tolerance aspects is clearly distinct
from the functional code.
• Run-time adaptability to diverse environmental conditions may be
obtained without requiring the entire executable code to be recompiled.
This and previous items bring to a good a.
• A large number of well-known fault-tolerance strategies are supported in
a straightforward way (i.e. good sa).
• The RεL approach addresses a wide class of applications: That of
distributed applications, with non-strict real-time requirements, written
in a procedural language, to be executed on distributed or parallel
computers consisting of a set of processing nodes known at compile time.
• Our approach reaches both the benefits of the evolutionary approaches,
which base themselves on standards, and those of “revolutionary”
approaches, exploiting ad-hoc, non-standard solutions.
• It can host other provisions and approaches.
• As shown in Chapter 9, in same cases RεL can be adopted with minimal
programming effort and minimal adaptation of a pre-existing, non
fault-tolerant application.
Finally, one can note that the language-based approaches such as those in
Chapter 5 differ considerably from RεL. Despite their many positive
characteristics, their very axioms—using a custom syntax for both the
functional and the fault-tolerance concerns—may restrict significantly their
usability. The lack of standards is further detrimental to their diffusion. On
the contrary, the choice to support a standard language for the functional
aspects and an ad-hoc syntactical structure for the fault-tolerance aspects
allows reach optimal sa with no impact on the usability.
Next chapter describes a prototype architecture based on the RεL approach.
3 A DISTRIBUTED ARCHITECTURE
BASED ON THE RECOVERY
LANGUAGE APPROACH
This section describes a prototypic architecture based on RεL that has been
designed in the context of the European ESPRIT project TIRAN.
The structure of the section is as follows: first, project TIRAN is described in
Sect. 3.1. The main components of the TIRAN architecture are covered in
Sect. 3.2. Section 3.2.6 describes the TIRAN configuration and recovery
language. Section 5 closes this part and draws a few conclusions.
3.1 The ESPRIT Project TIRAN
TIRAN is the name of the European ESPRIT project 28620. Its name loosely
derives from “Tailorable fault-tolerance frameworks for embedded
applications” (Botti et al., 1999). The main objective of TIRAN was to
develop a software framework5 providing fault-tolerant capabilities to
automation systems. Application-level support to fault-tolerance was included
by means of a RεL architecture, which is described in the rest of this chapter.
The framework provides a library of software fault-tolerance provisions that
are parametric and support an easy configuration process. TIRAN builds on
top of EFTOS, inheriting several of the concepts and tools developed in that
project and described in Chapter 3.
Using the TIRAN framework, application developers are allowed to select,
configure and integrate provisions for fault masking, error detection, isolation
and recovery among those offered by the library. Goal of the TIRAN project
was to provide a tool that significantly reduced the development times and
costs for dependable systems. TIRAN’s target market segment was that of
non-safety-critical6 distributed real-time embedded systems (Botti et al.,
2000).
TIRAN explicitly adopted formal techniques to support requirement
specification and predictive evaluation. This, together with the intensive
testing on pilot applications, was exploited in order to:
• Guarantee the correctness of the framework.
• Quantify the fulfillment of real-time, dependability and cost
requirements.
• Provide guidelines to the configuration process of the users.
Most of the TIRAN framework was designed for being platform independent.
A single version of the framework has been written in the C programming
language making use of a BSL designed by the TIRAN consortium and
initially developed by one of the partners for the development platform
(Microsoft Windows NT). Within TIRAN, a number of target platforms and
systems compliant to the model sketched in Sect. 2.1 have been selected.
Porting the TIRAN code to these platforms was mainly obtained through the
porting of the BSL. As mentioned already, this does not automatically
translate in porting the service expected by the BSL; the latter was obtained
by proper verification and validation of its properties on the target platforms.
Such platforms included:
• A set of Mosaic0207 boards running the Virtuoso
microkernel (Systems, 1998; Mosaic020, 1998).
• A set of VME boards based on PowerPC processors and
running the VxWorks operating system (VxWorks, 1999). An
MMU is available on these boards, which translates in special
hardware support for memory protection.
• A set of DEC Alpha boards running the TEX kernel. These
boards have no MMU and address spaces of tasks are not
protected. Proper protection is guaranteed by TEX, which
does not allow any dynamic memory allocation. All addresses
are therefore known at compile time, so a preprocessing tool
could be used in principle to prevent memory contamination.
• Clusters of Windows-CE personal computers (PCs).
The final version of the TIRAN framework, running on all the
above systems, was demonstrated in November 2000 at the final
TIRAN review meeting and at the TIRAN workshop (Thielemans,
2000).
Some elements of the TIRAN framework (namely those derived from EFTOS)
are also available on Parsytec CC and Parsytec Xplorer systems based on the
PowerPC processor and the EPX kernels (Parsytec, 1996a, 1996b) and on a
proprietary hardware board based on the DEC Alpha chip and running the
TEX kernel.
The main components of the TIRAN framework are:
1. The TIRAN toolset, the components of which are discussed in Sect. 3.2.
2. The TIRAN configuration and recovery language ariel, described in
Sect. 3.2.6. In particular:
• Its translator is dealt with in Sect. 3.2.9.
• The run-time executive of ariel, which is sketched in Sect. 3.2.9.
As mentioned already TIRAN was built on top of ESPRIT project
EFTOS—described in full detail in Chapter 3. In particular TIRAN adopted
and improved the EFTOS voting farm (De Florio et al., 1998), also described
in the mentioned chapter, so as to function as the distributed voting system of
the TIRAN framework.
Figure 2 draws the TIRAN architecture and locates its main components into
it. Two types of edges are used in the picture:
• The thinner, directed edge represents relation “<Sends>”: If such an
edge goes from entity a to entity b then it means that a sends a data
message to b or requests a service provided by b through a control
message or a method invocation.
• The thicker edge is only used between the RINT and ariel entities and
means that the former implements the latter through the process of
interpreting a pseudo-code called “r-codes” (detailed information about
this is available in Sect. 3.2.9).
The central, whiter layers represent the TIRAN framework. In particular:
• The level 0 hosts the TIRAN BSL, which gives system-independent
access to the services provided by the underlying run-time system (see
Sect. 2.3). The user application, the BT, the Backbone, the Time-out
Manager, and the dependable mechanisms (DMs, see Sect. 3.2.3), all
make use of the BSL, e.g., to create tasks or to send messages through
mailboxes.
• Level 1 services are provided by the BT for error detection and fault
masking (level 1.1) and by the BT addressing error isolation, recovery
and reconfiguration (level 1.2). Both services are supplied by node-local
(simplex) provisions. Section 3.2.1 describes in more detail the BT. The
edge from BT to Backbone represents the sending of error detection or
diagnostic messages. The edge from Backbone to BT represents control
messages, such as, for instance, a request to modify a parameter of a
watchdog, or a request to reboot the local node (see Fig. 4).
Figure 2: A representation of the TIRAN elements. The central, whiter layers
constitute the TIRAN framework. This same structure is replicated on each
processing node of the system.
• Level 2 hosts the TIRAN Backbone, including the Time-out Manager
component, the DB management functions, and the recovery interpreter,
RINT. In Fig. 2, the thicker edge connecting RINT to ariel means that
RINT actually implements (executes) the ariel programs. Note the
control and data messages that flow from Backbone to Time-out
Manager, DB, and RINT. RINT also sends control messages to the
isolation and recovery BT. Data messages flow also from Backbone to
the monitoring tool.
• Dependable mechanisms, i.e., high-level, distributed fault-tolerance tools
exploiting the services of the Backbone and of the BT, are located at
level 3. These tools include the distributed voting tool, the distributed
synchronization tool, the stable memory tool, and the distributed
memory tool, described in Sect. 3.2.3. Dependable Mechanisms receive
notifications from RINT in order to execute reconfigurations such as
introducing a spare task to take over the role of a failed task (see
Table 5).
The layers around the TIRAN framework in Fig. 2 represent (from the layer at
the bottom and proceeding clockwise):
• The run-time system.
• A provision to inject software faults at all levels of the framework and in
the run-time system.
• The monitoring tool, for hypermedia rendering of the current state of the
system within the windows of an Internet browser.
• The functional application layer and the recovery language application
layer (the latter is represented as the box labeled ariel).
Figure 3 pictures the key elements of the TIRAN architecture within the
workflow diagram in Fig. 1.
The following sections describe some of the TIRAN components in more detail.
3.2 Some Components of the TIRAN Framework
This section describes some key components of the TIRAN framework, namely:
The TIRAN toolset, i.e., the BT, the BSL, the Backbone, and the Time-out
Manager service. It also briefly enumerates the TIRAN level-3 mechanisms.
3.2.1 The TIRAN Basic Tools
The TIRAN Basic Tools represent a layer of node-local services for error
detection, fault masking, error recovery, and isolation. The TIRAN BT
include:
1. A watchdog timer.
Figure 3: The main components of the RεL architecture developed in TIRAN
are located within the workflow diagram of Fig. 1. A so-called “SocketServer”
has been also depicted, i.e., a BSL component managing message transmission
and dispatching.
2. A node-local voting system.
3. An input replicator, to be used with the voting system.
4. An output collector, to be used with the voting system.
5. A tool responsible for node shutdowns.
6. A tool responsible for node reboots.
7. A tool responsible for isolating a task.
Some of the BT (such as the level 1.1 BT with numbers 1–4) are
application-level software tools, others (for instance, the level-1.2 BT number
5–7) provide hooks to lower-level services. Most of these tools have been
designed and developed by the TIRAN partners and have been especially
conceived in order to meet hard real-time requirements. A deeper description
of some of these tools can be found in (Deconinck, Botti, Cassinari, De Florio,
& Lauwereins, 1998; Deconinck et al., 1999). As a side effect of using these
tools, the TIRAN Backbone (see Sect. 3.2.4) is transparently notified of a
number of events related to fault-tolerance.
Notifications generally describe the state of a given component and
have the form of a 4-tuple of integers
(c, t, u, p),
in which c identifies a specific condition, t is a label that identifies a
class of BT, u is the unique-id of either a task, or a group of tasks,
or a node, and p is a possibly empty list of optional arguments.
Unlike in Mozart (Chapter 5), where an entity can register to a fault stream
and be notified of all faults affecting any entity, within TIRAN an entity must
explicitly set up such fault stream by calling function RaiseEvent. Such
function forwards notifications to the Backbone. It has the following
prototype:
int RaiseEvent(int condition, int actor, TIRAN TASK ID uniqueId,
int nargs, ...).
3.2.2 The TIRAN Basic Services Library
The TIRAN Basic Services Library offers specific services such as
communication, task creation and management, access to the local hardware
clock, management of semaphores, and so forth. It supports multicasting:
Messages are sent to so-called “logicals,” i.e., groups of tasks. It was designed
by the TIRAN Consortium and developed by various partners for the different
target platforms and operating systems. Specific adaptation layers may be
designed for mapping existing communication libraries, such as MPI2, to the
TIRAN BSL.
As a side effect of using some of the BSL functions, the TIRAN Backbone (see
Sect. 3.2.4) can be transparently notified of events such as a successful
spawning of a task, or the failure state of a communication primitive. BSL
notifications are similar to BT notifications—4-tuples of integers
(c, t, u, p),
where c and p are as in Sect. 3.2.1, while in this context t is a label that
specifies the class of BSL services and u is the unique-id of the task that
experienced condition c.
A full description of the TIRAN BSL can be found in (Calella et al., 1999).
3.2.3 The TIRAN Dependable Mechanisms
As already mentioned, the TIRAN Dependable Mechanisms are distributed,
high-level fault-tolerance provisions that can be used to facilitate the
development of dependable services. The TIRAN Dependable Mechanisms
include:
• A tool to enhance data integrity by means of a stabilizing procedure
(data is only allowed to pass through the system boundaries when it is
confirmed a user-defined number of times). This is known as Stable
Memory Tool and is described in detail in Chapter 3.
• A Distributed Synchronization Tool, i.e., a software tool for
synchronizing a set of tasks. A description of this tool can be found
in (Calella et al., 1999).
• A so-called Distributed Memory Tool that creates and manages
distributed replicas of memory cells. Several features of this tool have
been described in Chapter 3.
• A “Redundant Watchdog”, i.e., a distributed system exploiting multiple
instances of the watchdog basic tool in order to enhance various
dependability properties (see Chapter 9).
• The TIRAN distributed voting tool (DV), an adaptation of the EFTOS
voting farm described in Chapter 3.
3.2.4 The TIRAN Backbone
The TIRAN Backbone is the core component of the fault-tolerance distributed
architecture described in this chapter. The main objectives of the TIRAN
Backbone include:
1. Gathering and maintaining error detection information produced by
TIRAN BT and BSL.
2. Using this information at error recovery time.
In particular, as described in Sect. 3.2.1, the TIRAN BT focusing on error
detection and fault masking forward their deductions to the Backbone. The
Backbone maintains these data in the TIRAN DB, replicated on multiple
nodes of the system. Incoming data are also fed into an α-count (Powell et al.,
1999) filter (see Sect. 3.2.4). This mechanism allows identifying statistically
the nature of faults—whether a given fault is transient or whether it is
permanent or intermittent. A set of private functions to query the current
state of the DB is available within the Backbone. Other private functions
request remote services such as, for instance, rebooting a node or spawning a
certain task on a given node.
When the underlying architecture is built around a host computer controlling
a number of target boards by means of a custom OS, the latter may execute
remote commands on the boards. On the contrary, when the OS is
general-purpose and node-local, remote services can be executed on any node
of the system by sending command messages from one component to the other
of the Backbone—for instance, a “reboot” message may be sent from the
component of the Backbone on node 0 to the component on node 2. On
receipt, the latter may execute the reboot command by forwarding a local
request to a BT addressing error isolation or recovery, e.g., the tool managing
the reboot service. Figure 4 represents this scheme. The above remote services
can be the basis for more complex, system-wide recovery and reconfiguration
actions.
Figure 4: On each processing node exactly one component of the Backbone is
located. This component is the intermediary of the Backbone on that node. In
particular, it gathers information from error detection and fault containment
BT (grey circles) and forwards requests to error containment and recovery BT
(light grey circles). These latter execute recovery actions and possibly, at test
time, fault injection requests.
The TIRAN Backbone consists of two core components. In the absence of
system partitioning, within the system there is exactly one manager, holding
the main copy of the DB and with recovery management responsibilities. On
other nodes, Backbone components called assistants deal with DB replicas,
forward local deductions to the manager and can take over the role of the
manager should the latter or its node fail.
A key point in the effectiveness of this approach is guaranteeing that the
Backbone itself tolerates internal and external faults. A custom distributed
algorithm has been designed to detect the failures of up to all but one of the
components of the Backbone or the nodes of the system. The same algorithm
also tolerates system partitioning during the “periods of instability” (see the
timed-asynchronous distributed system model (Cristian & Fetzer, 1999),
briefly described in Chapter 2). This procedure has been called the “algorithm
of mutual suspicion” (AMS) since each component of the Backbone
continuously questions the correctness of all the other valid components. It is
described in detail in Chapter 7.
The α-Count Fault Identification Mechanism. It is a well known fact
that reconfiguration is a costly activity, in the sense that it always results in
redundancy consumption. This translates in a possibly graceful, though actual
degradation of the quality of service of a system. This may have drastic
consequences, especially in systems where service degradations are static and
irreversible. For instance, in satellites and space probes, rapid exhaustion of
redundancy may severely affect the duration of the useful mission hours and
hence reliability (Inquiry, 1996). Two important issues towards solving the
problem just stated are:
1. Understanding the nature of faults, and in particular identifying faults as
permanent (and thus actually requiring reconfiguration) with respect to
transient ones.
2. Tolerating transient faults with less redundancy consuming techniques,
possibly not based on reconfiguration.
Issue 1 means that the adopted fault-tolerance mechanism is required not only
to locate a component subject to an error, but also to assess the nature of the
originating fault. This implies processing additional information and
unfortunately translates also in a larger delay in fault diagnosis. Despite this
larger delay, in same cases the benefits of techniques based on the above issues
may be greater than its penalties in performance and latency (Bondavalli et
al., 1997).
A number of techniques have been devised to assess the character of
faults—some of them are based on tracking the occurrences and the frequency
of faults and adopting thresholds of the kind “a device is diagnosed as affected
by a permanent fault when four failures occurs within 24 hours”. This and
other similar heuristics are described in (Lin & Siewiorek, 1990). A fault
identification mechanism, called α-count, has been described in (Powell et al.,
1999) and generalized in (Bondavalli, Chiaradonna, Di Giandomenico, &
Grandoni, 2000). α-count is also based on thresholds. The basic idea is that
each system component to be assessed is to be “guarded” by an error
detection device. This device should forward its deductions, in the form of a
binary digit, to a device called α-count filter. For each incoming judgement,
the filter would then perform the α-count technique and issue an assessment
about the nature of the fault leading to the detected error.
More formally, given n “guarded” components ui, 0 <= i < n, the
authors of the strategy call J(i, L) the L-th judgement on ui.
Judgement 0 means success (ui is “healthy”), 1 means failure (ui is
faulty). A score vector, α(i), 0 <= i < n, is initially set to zero and
updated, for each judgement L > 1, as follows:
α(i, L) = α(i, (L− 1))KifJ(i, L) = 0
α(i, L) = α(i, (L− 1)) + 1ifJ(i, L) = 1, (3)
being 0 <= K <= 1. When α(i, L) becomes greater than a certain
threshold αT , ui is diagnosed as affected by a permanent or
intermittent fault. This event may be signaled to a reconfigurator
or another fault passivation mechanism. The authors of α-count
show that their mechanism is asymptotically able to identify all
components affected by permanent or intermittent faults—if the
threshold αT is set to any finite positive integer A, and if the
Figure 5: The picture shows how an α-count filter, α(1, L), is updated when it
receives 14 error detection notifications (0 <= L <= 13) from the Backbone.
Notifications are in this case chosen randomly. Note that, on the last notification
(L = 13), a threshold (in this case, 5.5) is reached and the corresponding fault
is assessed as permanent or intermittent.
component is indeed affected by a permanent or intermittent fault,
they prove that α(i, L) will eventually become greater than or equal
to A (Bondavalli et al., 1997). The authors also prove that similar
results can be reached with some variants of formula (3). Figure 5
shows how that counter evolves when random-valued notifications
(either positive or negative assessments) are sent to the Backbone.
It is worth noting how the mechanism described above requires an approach
slightly similar to the one of the RεL toolset: in both cases, a fault stream has
to flow from a periphery of detection tools to a collector. This collector is the
α-count filter in the one case and the TIRAN Backbone and its DB in the
other one. This makes it straightforward adopting α-count in TIRAN: The
filter can simply be fed with data coming from the detection BT just before
this data in inserted into the DB. The added value of this approach is that it
is possible to set up a function that returns the current estimation of the
nature of a fault (see Sect. 3.2.9). Clearly, a requirement of this technique is
that each detection tool not only forward notifications of erroneous activity,
but also confirmations of normal behavior. This may have negative
consequences on the performance of the approach, as it may result in many
communication requests. In the prototype version developed by the author,
Figure 6: An assistant running on a node of a cluster of PCs. The upper window
hosts the assistant, the lower one its SocketServer (see Fig. 3). In the former
one, note how the α-counter detects that task 2 is affected by a permanent or
intermittent fault.
each notification from any detection tool to the backbone is tagged with an
integer label starting at 0 and incremented by 1 at each new deduction. This
way, only negative assessments can be sent—in fact, if, for instance, the
backbone receives from the same detection tool two consecutive negative
assessments labeled respectively, e.g., 24 and 28, then this implicitly means
that there have been three positive assessments in between, and the α-counter
can be updated accordingly—though possibly with some delay. This strategy
has been conceived by the author of this book.
Figure 6 shows the α-counter in action—a task has reached its threshold and
has been declared as affected by a permanent or intermittent fault.
Clearly a system like Mozart (Chapter 5) may also easily adopt a tool like
α-count.
3.2.5 The TIRAN Time-Out Manager
As already mentioned, the main assumption of RεL is the adoption of the
timed asynchronous distributed system model (Cristian & Fetzer, 1999), the
promising model for solving problems such as dynamic membership (Cristian
& Schmuck, 1995) in distributed systems that has been introduced in
Chapter 2. The availability of a class of functions for managing time-outs is an
important requirement for that model. The TIRAN Time-out
Manager (De Florio, Deconinck, & Lauwereins, 2000) fulfils this need—it is
basically a mechanism for managing lists of time-outs, that is objects that
postpone a function call for a certain number of local clock units. Time-outs
are ordered by clock-units-to-expiration, and time-out lists are managed in
such a way that only the head of the list needs to be checked for expiration.
When the specified amount of time elapses for the head of the list, its
function—let us call it “alarm”—is executed and the object is either thrown
out of the list or renewed (in this second case, a time-out is said to be
“cyclic”). A special thread monitors and manages one or more of such lists,
checking for the expiration of the entries in the time-out list.
Within the strategy of the TIRAN Backbone, a Time-out Manager task is
available on each node of the system, spawned at initialization time by the
local Backbone component. Time-out Manager is used in this context to
translate time-related clauses, such as, “pa seconds have elapsed”, into
message arrivals. In other words, each Time-out Manager instance of the
Backbone may be represented as a function a from C to M such that, for any
time-related clause c in C:
a(c) = message “clause c has elapsed” is in M.
This homomorphism is useful because it allows deal with the entire set of
possible events—both messages and time-related events—as the arrival of a
homogeneous set of messages. Hence, a single multiple-selection statement
such as the C language switch can be used to manage all cases, which
translates into a simpler and more straightforward implementation for error
detection protocols such as the AMS.
The Time-out Manager uses a well-known algorithm for managing its
time-outs (Tanenbaum, 1996). Once the first time-out is entered, the manager
creates a linked-list of time-outs and polls the top of the list. For each new
time-out to be inserted, a proper position in the list is found and the list is
modified accordingly, as described in Fig. 7. If the top entry expires, a
user-defined alarm function is invoked. This is a general mechanism that
allows associate any event with the expiring of a time-out. In the case of the
backbone, the Time-out Manager component on node k sends a message to
Backbone component on the same node—the same result may also be achieved
by sending that component a UNIX signal (Haviland & Salama, 1987). Special
time-outs are defined as “cyclic”, i.e., they are automatically renewed at each
new expiration, after invoking their alarm function. A special function renews
a time-out, i.e., it deletes and re-enters that entry. It is also possible to
temporarily suspend8 a time-out and re-enable it afterwards.
Time-out Manager exploits multiple alarm execution threads in order to
reduce the congestion that is due to concurrent execution of alarms and the
consequent run-time violations. A description of this strategy can be found
in (De Florio et al., 2000).
Figure 7: How the alarm manager works: in 1., a 330ms alarm called X is
inserted in the list. In 2., after 100ms, X has been reduced to 230ms and a
400ms alarm, called Y, is inserted (its value is 170, i.e., 400-230). Another 70ms
have passed in 3., so X has been reduced to 160ms. At that point, a 510ms
alarm, Z is inserted–it goes at the third position. In 4., after 160ms, alarm X
occurs–Y becomes then the top of the list; its decrement starts. In 5. another
20ms have passed and Y is at 150ms–at that point a 230ms alarm, called W is
inserted. Its position is in between Y and Z, therefore the latter is adjusted. In
6., after 150ms, Y expires and W goes on top.
The TIRAN Time-out Manager is a fundamental building block for the
TIRAN dependability strategies, but it is a useful tool also for other
approaches: Chapter 7 describes one of them, that is failure detection
protocols.
3.2.6 The Ariel Configuration and Recovery Language
ARIEL My master through his art foresees the danger
That you, his friend, are in; and sends me forth—
For else his project dies—to keep them living.
(Shakespeare, The Tempest, Act II, Scene I)
Within TIRAN, a single syntactical structure—provided by the ariel
language (De Florio, Deconinck, & Lauwereins, 2001; Deconinck, De Florio, &
Botti, 2001)—has been devised by the author of this book as both a
configuration and a recovery language. This chapter describes this language
and its compile-time and run-time tools. The structure of the section is as
follows:
• The general characteristics of ariel are described in Sect. 3.2.7.
• ariel as a configuration language is introduced in Sect. 3.2.8.
• Section 3.2.9 is on ariel as a recovery language.
ariel bears its name after the character with the same name of
Shakespeare’s last Comedy, The Tempest. In fact, in the Tempest,
spirit Ariel is a magic creature, the invisible assistant of Prospero,
the Duke of Milano. While Prospero plays his role in the
foreground of the Comedy—orchestrating a strategy to regain
possession of his dukedom, which had been usurped by Prospero’s
brother Antonio—Ariel faithfully serves Prospero performing his
magic in the background, exploiting his powers to execute
Prospero’s commands when his “Master through his art foresees the
danger” (see above quote). In a sense, the role of the ariel
language is somewhat similar to the one of Prospero’s ally. Its
run-time support is given by the agent that is sent forth when the
Backbone, through its nervous terminals—the error detection basic
tools—senses a potentially dangerous condition. The author of this
book thinks that the name Ariel captures well this similarity. This
is also the reason that led to the choice of “RεL” as an abbreviation
for “Recovery Language”: indeed, the spelling of that word is
“ [a:*]-[i:]-[el]”.
3.2.7 General Characteristics of ariel
ariel is a declarative language with a simple syntax somewhat similar to that
of a UNIX shell. One instruction per line is allowed. Comments are like in the
C shell (“#” starts a comment which ends at next new line or at end-of-file).
Names are not case-sensitive. ariel deals with five basic types: “nodes”,
“tasks”, “logicals”, integers, and real numbers. A node is a uniquely
identifiable processing node of the system, e.g., a processor of a MIMD
supercomputer. A task is a uniquely identifiable process or thread in the
system. A logical is a uniquely identifiable collection of tasks, possibly running
on different nodes. Nodes, tasks, and logicals are generically called entities.
Entities are uniquely identified via non-negative integers; for instance, NODE3
or N3 refer to processing node currently configured as node number 3.
Integer symbolic constants can be “imported” from C language header files
through the statement INCLUDE. For instance, if the C language header file
"vf.h" contains a define statement such as:
#define PROC NUM 4,
then it is possible to use that symbolic constant wherever an integer is
expected in the language. To de-reference a symbolic constant imported via
INCLUDEs a “brace-operator” has been defined—for instance, under the above
assumptions the following valid ariel statement:
NPROCS = {PROC_NUM}
(described later on) is equivalent to
NPROCS = 4.
An ariel script basically consists of two parts:
• A part dealing with configuration. This is described in Sect. 3.2.8.
• A part containing the guarded actions which constitute the user-defined
error recovery strategy. They are described in Sect. 3.2.9.
3.2.8 ariel as a Configuration Language
Special linguistic support has been designed by the author of this book while
taking part in the TIRAN project. Aim of this linguistic support is to
facilitate the configuration of the instances of the framework elements, of the
system and application parameters, and of the fault-tolerance provisions. Let
us call these elements a framework instance.
Once the user has configured a framework instance with ariel, the TIRAN
ariel translator “art” must be used to translate these high level
specifications into the actual C language calls that set up configured tasks
such as, for instance, user-configured watchdogs. The output of the translator
is a set of C files that need to be compiled with the user application.
A subset of the fault-tolerance provisions described in Chapter 6 is supported
by the version of ariel described in this book. The rest of this section
describes the process of configuring a framework instance with ariel.
System and Application Parameters. The ariel configuration language
can be used to define and configure the target system and application entities,
e.g., nodes, tasks, and group of tasks. The rules defined in Sect. 2.3.2 are
coded as follows:
• Rule (1), as for instance in
task3 = n0[8],
is coded as
TASK 3 = "TMR.EXE" IS NODE 0, TASKID 8.
In other words, the above statement declares that task 8, local to node 0,
is to be globally referred to as “task 3”. String “TMR.EXE” may also be
used to refer symbolically9 to task3. More complex rules are
possible—for instance,
TASK [1,3] = "Triple" IS NODE 0, TASKID [6,8]
is equivalent to
TASK 1 = "Triple1" IS NODE 0, TASKID 6,
TASK 2 = "Triple2" IS NODE 0, TASKID 7,
TASK 3 = "Triple3" IS NODE 0, TASKID 8.
• Rule (2), as in
group10 = {5, 6, 7},
is coded as
LOGICAL 10 = "TMR" IS TASK 5, TASK 6, TASK 7 END LOGICAL.
(String “TMR” may also be used to refer symbolically to group10). The
example defines a logical to be globally referred to as “logical 10”,
symbolically known as TMR, and corresponding to the three tasks whose
unique-id are 5, 6, and 7.
Let us assume the following lines have been written in a file called
“test.ariel”:
TASK 5 = "TMR_LEADER" IS NODE 0, TASKID 8
TASK 6 = "TMR2" IS NODE 1, TASKID 8
TASK 7 = "TMR3" IS NODE 2, TASKID 8
LOGICAL 10 = "TMR" IS TASK 5, TASK 6, TASK 7 END LOGICAL
File test.ariel can be translated by executing program art as follows:
bash-2.02$ art -i test.ariel
Ariel translator, v2.0g 03-Aug-2000, (c) K.U.Leuven 1999,
2000.
Parsing file test.ariel...
...done (4 lines in 0.01 CPU secs, or 400 lines per CPU sec.)
Output written in file .rcode.
Logicals written in file LogicalTable.csv.
Tasks written in file TaskTable.csv.
Alpha-count parameters written in file alphacount.h.
The bold typefaced string is the command line. What follows is the output
printed to the user screen. The italics-highlighted strings are the names of two
configuration files that are written by art on successful execution. These two
files declare tasks and logicals in the format expected by the BSL and by other
ancillary components (e.g., on the version for Windows NT, these tables are
also used by a “SocketServer10”).
The user can also define a number of other parameters of the TIRAN world
like, for instance:
• N , i.e., the total number of processing nodes in the system.
• ti, i.e., the number of tasks running on node ni.
• Task-specific parameters of the α-count fault identification mechanism
supported by the TIRAN Backbone.
As an example, the following lines declare a system consisting of two nodes,
each of which has to host 10 user tasks, and define the α-count parameters of
task 5:
NPROCS = 2
NUMTASKS 1 = 10
NUMTASKS 2 = 10
ALPHA-COUNT 2 IS threshold = 3.0, factor = 0.4 END ALPHA-COUNT.
The output produced by the art translator is given in this case by a number
of header files:
bash-2.02$ art -i test.ariel -s
Ariel translator, v2.0g 03-Aug-2000, (c) K.U.Leuven 1999,
2000.
Parsing file test.ariel...
...done (8 lines in 0.01 CPU secs, or 800 lines per CPU sec.)
Output written in file .rcode.
Logicals written in file LogicalTable.csv.
Tasks written in file TaskTable.csv.
static version
Preloaded r-codes written in file trl.h.
Time-outs written in file timeouts.h.
Identifiers written in file identifiers.h.
Alpha-count parameters written in file alphacount.h.
Again, the command has been given in bold typeface and relevant lines have
been highlighted using the italics typeface. The “-s” option, for “static”,
requests the writing of a number of header files. The produced header files
contain definitions like the following one, from file “timeouts.h”:
/* Number of available nodes
*/
#define MAX_PROCS 2
These are the first few lines of the output file ”alphacount.h”:
/********************************************************************
* *
* Header file alphacount.h *
* *
* This file contains the parameters of the alphacount filter *
* (factor and threshold) *
* Written by art (v2.0g 03-Aug-2000) on Wed Aug 16 15:46:40 2000 *
* (c) Katholieke Universiteit Leuven / ESAT / ACCA - 2000. *
* *
*******************************************************************/ 10
#ifndef ALPHA COUNT
#define ALPHA COUNT
#include "DB.h"
alphacount t alphas[ ] = {
{ 0.000000, 0.000000, 0 }, /* entry 0 */
{ 0.000000, 0.000000, 0 }, /* entry 1 */
{ 0.400000, 3.000000, 1 }, /* entry 2 */ 20
{ 0.000000, 0.000000, 0 }, /* entry 3 */
(Note how, at entry 2, the threshold and factor of the α-count related to task
2 have been entered in an array. The latter will then be used by the TIRAN
backbone when updating the α-count filters—see Sect. 3.2.4).
Backbone Parameters. ariel can be used to configure the Backbone. In
particular, the initial role of each Backbone component must be specified
through the DEFINE statement. For instance, the following two lines configure
a system consisting of four nodes and place the Backbone manager on node 0
and three assistants on the other nodes:
DEFINE 0 = MANAGER
DEFINE 1-3 = ASSISTANTS
A number of backbone-specific parameters can also be specified via the ariel
configuration language. These parameters include, for instance, the frequency
of setting and checking the <I’m Alive> flag of the backbone. Values are
specified in microseconds. A complete example can be seen in Table 1. Again,
the art translator changes the above specifications into the appropriate C
language settings as expected by the TIRAN Backbone.
# Specification of a strategy in the recovery language Ariel
# Include files
1 INCLUDE "phases.h"
2 INCLUDE "vf.h"
# Definitions
# After keyword ’DEFINE’, the user can specify
# an integer, an interval, or a list, followed by
# the equal sign and a backbone role, that may be
# ASSISTANT(s) or MANAGER
3 NPROCS = 4
4 Define 0 = MANAGER
5 Define 1-3 = ASSISTANTS
# Time-out values for the Backbone and the <I’m Alive> mechanism
6 MIA SEND TIMEOUT = 800000 # Manager Is Alive -- manager side
7 TAIA RECV TIMEOUT = 1500000 # This Assistant Is Alive -- manager side
8 MIA RECV TIMEOUT = 1500000 # Manager Is Alive -- backup side
9 TAIA SEND TIMEOUT = 1000000 # This Assistant Is Alive -- backup side
10 TEIF TIMEOUT = 1800000 # After this time a suspected node is assumed
# to have crashed.
11 I’M ALIVE CLEAR TIMEOUT = 900000 # <I’m Alive> timeout -- clear IA flag
12 I’M ALIVE SET TIMEOUT = 1400000 # <I’m Alive> timeout -- set IA flag
# Number of tasks
13 NUMTASKS 0 = 11 # node 0 is to be loaded with 11 tasks
14 NUMTASKS 1 = 10
15 NUMTASKS 2 = 10
16 NUMTASKS 3 = 10
17 TASK [0,10] IS NODE 0, TASKID [0,10]
18 TASK [11,20] IS NODE 1, TASKID [1,10]
19 TASK [21,30] IS NODE 2, TASKID [1,10]
20 TASK [31,40] IS NODE 3, TASKID [1,10]
21 LOGICAL 1 IS TASK 1, TASK 2, TASK 3 END LOGICAL
Table 1: An excerpt from an ariel script: configuration part. Line numbers
have been added for the sake of clarity.
Basic Tools. ariel can be used to configure statically the TIRAN tools.
The current prototypic version can configure only one tool, the TIRAN
watchdog. The following syntax is recognized by art to configure it:
WATCHDOG 10 WATCHES TASK 14
HEARTBEATS EVERY 100 MS
ON ERROR WARN TASK 18
END WATCHDOG.
The output in this case is a C file that corresponds to a configured instance of
a watchdog. The application developer needs only to send heartbeats to that
instance, which can be done as follows:
HEARTBEAT 10.
Configuring Multiple-Version Software Fault-Tolerance. As described
in Sect. 2.3.3, it is possible to design syntax rules to support the configuration
of the software fault-tolerance provisions described in Chapter 3. This section
describes the solution provided by ariel in order to support N -version
programming (Aviz˘ienis, 1985), and a possible syntax to support consensus
recovery blocks (Scott et al., 1985) and retry blocks (Huang & Kintala, 1993).
The following is an example that shows how it is possible to define an
“N -version task” with ariel:
#include "my_nvp.h"
N-VERSION LOGICAL {NVP_LOGICAL}
VERSION 1 IS TASK{VERSION1} TIMEOUT {VERSION_TIMEOUT}
VERSION 2 IS TASK{VERSION2} TIMEOUT {VERSION_TIMEOUT}
VERSION 3 IS TASK{VERSION3} TIMEOUT {VERSION_TIMEOUT}
METRIC "nvp_comp"
ON SUCCESS TASK{NVP_OUTPUT}
ON ERROR TASK{NVP_ERROR} {NVP_LOGICAL}
VOTING ALGORITHM IS MAJORITY
END N-VERSION
The art translator, once fed with the above lines, produces three source files
for tasks the unique-id of which is {VERSION1}, {VERSION2} and {VERSION3}.
These source files consist of code that
• sets up the TIRAN distributed voting tool (described in Sect. 3.2.3)
using metric function
int nvp_comp(const void*, const void*), setting the voting
algorithm to majority voting, and so forth;
• redirects standard output streams;
• executes a user task, e.g., task {VERSION3}.
By agreement, each user task (i.e., each version) has to write its output onto
the standard output stream.
During run-time, when the user needs to access a service supplied by an NVP
logical, it simply sends a message to entity {NVP_LOGICAL}. This translates
into a multicast to tasks {VERSION1}, {VERSION2} and {VERSION3}. These
tasks, which in the meanwhile have transparently set up a distributing voting
tool,
• get their input,
• compute a generic function,
• produce an output
• and (by the above stated agreement) they write the output onto their
standard output stream.
The latter, which had been already redirected through a piped stream to the
template task, is fed into the voting system. Such system eventually produces
an output that goes to task {NVP_OUTPUT}.
A time-out can also be set up so to produce an error notification when no
output is sent by a version within a certain deadline.
Table 2 shows one of the three files produced by the ariel translator when it
parses the script of Sect. 3.2.8. Note how this file basically configures an
instance of the TIRAN DV tool described in Sect. 3.2.3. Note also how all
technicalities concerning:
• The API of the tool,
• input replication,
• the adopted voting strategy,
• output communication,
and so forth are fully made transparent to the designer, who needs only be
concerned with the functional service. This allows the fault-tolerance designer
to modify all the above mentioned technicalities with no negative relapses on
the tasks of the application designer, and even to deploy different strategies
depending on the particular target platform. This can be exploited in order to
pursue performance design goals.
Support towards consensus recovery block may be provided in a similar way,
e.g., as follows:
#include "my_crb.h"
CONSENSUS RECOVERY BLOCK LOGICAL {CRB_LOGICAL}
VARIANT 1 IS TASK{VARIANT1} TIMEOUT {VARIANT_TIMEOUT}
ACCEPTANCE TEST TASK{ACCEPT1}
VARIANT 2 IS TASK{VARIANT2} TIMEOUT {VARIANT_TIMEOUT}
ACCEPTANCE TEST TASK{ACCEPT2}
#include "TIRAN.h"
/* Task 101 of NVersion Task 20
Version 1 / 3
*/
int TIRAN task 101(void)
{
TIRAN Voting *dv; size t size;
double task20 cmp(const void*, const void*);
dv = TIRAN VotingOpen(task20 cmp); 10
if (dv == NULL)
{
RaiseEvent(TIRAN ERROR VOTING CANTOPEN,TIRAN DV,101,0);
TIRAN exit(TIRAN ERROR VOTING CANTOPEN);
}
/* voting task description: which tasks and which versions */
/* constitute the n-version task */
TIRAN VotingDescribe(dv, 101, 1, 1);
TIRAN VotingDescribe(dv, 102, 2, 0); 20
TIRAN VotingDescribe(dv, 103, 3, 0);
TIRAN VotingRun(dv);
/* output should be sent to task 40 */
TIRAN VotingOutput(dv, 40);
TIRAN VotingOption(dv, TIRAN VOTING IS MAJORITY);
/* redirect stdout into a pipe input stream */
TIRAN pipework(); 30
/* execute the version */
task 101();
size = read(0, buff, MAX BUFF);
if (size > 0)
{
/* forward the input buffer to the local voter of this version */
TIRAN VotingInput(dv, buff, size);
} 40
else
{
/* signal there’s no input */
TIRAN VotingInput(dv, NULL, 0);
RaiseEvent(TIRAN ERROR VOTING NOINPUT,TIRAN DV,101,0);
TIRAN NotifyTask(60, TIRAN ERROR VOTING NOINPUT);
}
}
50
/* EOF file TIRAN task 101.c */
Table 2: Translation of the N-Version Task defined in Sect. 3.2.8.
1 REPLICATED TASK 10 IS TASK 101, 102, 103
2 METHOD IS MODULAR REDUNDANCY
3 VOTING ALGORITHM IS MAJORITY
4 METRIC "int_cmp"
5 END METHOD
6 ON SUCCESS TASK 20
7 ON ERROR TASK 30
8 END REPLICATED
Table 3: A possible syntax rule for compile-time management of replicated tasks.
VARIANT 3 IS TASK{VARIANT3} TIMEOUT {VARIANT_TIMEOUT}
ACCEPTANCE TEST TASK{ACCEPT3}
METRIC "crb_comp"
ON SUCCESS TASK{CRB_OUTPUT}
ON ERROR TASK{CRB_ERROR} {CRB_LOGICAL}
VOTING ALGORITHM IS MAJORITY
END CRB
This is syntactically similar to the previous example, but the user is asked to
supply tasks for the execution of acceptance tests. Other possibilities might
also be considered, e.g., supplying a function name corresponding to the
acceptance test, in order to avoid the overhead of spawning a task for that
purpose.
As described in Sect. 2.3.3, it is possible to design syntax rules to support the
configuration of replicated tasks. Table 3 shows the syntax recognized by
ariel for this. Lines have been numbered to ease the discussion. Line 1
specifies which tasks constitute the replicated task. Line 2 defines the method
of replication (NMR in this case). Sub-options of the chosen method, at lines 3
and 4, specify the type of voting to perform when de-multiplexing the multiple
outputs of the base modules of the replicated task (here, majority voting11).
Line 6 specifies the task the output of the replicated task is to be sent to. Line
7 specifies which task to notify in case of failure, e.g., when no majority can be
found.
ariel supports redoing as described in Table 4. Note how, in that table, task
10 has to complete within a user-defined deadline (line 2) fulfilling an
acceptance test (executed by task 20 at line 3). This allows regard run-time
violations as actual faults. Note also that both the latter task and task 10
could be also transparently replicated by means of the technique depicted in
Sect. 2.3.3. An upper bound on the number of retries is set at line 4: should
task 10 fail three times in a row, task 30 would be notified of this event and
could execute some error recovery scheme.
1 RETRY TASK 10
2 TIMEOUT 100ms
3 ACCEPTANCE TEST TASK 20
4 RETRIES 3
5 ON ERROR TASK 30
6 END RETRY
Table 4: A possible syntax rule for compile-time management of retry blocks.
3.2.9 ariel as a Recovery Language
The same linguistic structure that realizes the TIRAN configuration language
is used also to host the structure in which the user defines his or her error
recovery strategies. Recovery strategies are collections of sections with the
following syntax12:
section : if elif else fi ;
if : IF ’[’ guard ’]’ THEN actions ;
elif :
| ELIF ’[’ guard ’]’
THEN actions elif ;
else :
| ELSE actions ;
fi : FI ;
where non-terminals guard and actions are the syntactical terms defined
respectively in Sect. 2.3.4 and Sect. 2.3.4.
Ariel’s guards. An excerpt of the context-free grammar rules for guards
follows:
status :FAULTY | RUNNING | REBOOTED | STARTED | ISOLATED
| RESTARTED | TRANSIENT ;
entity :GROUP | NODE | TASK ;
expr :status entity
|’(’ expr ’)’
|expr AND expr
|expr OR expr
|NOT expr
|ERRN ’(’ entity ’)’ comp NUMBER
|PHASE ’(’ entity ’)’ comp NUMBER ;
comp :EQ | NEQ | GT | GE | LT | LE ;
The following conditions and values have been foreseen:
Faulty. This is true when an error notification related to a processing node, a
group of tasks, or a single task, can be found in the TIRAN DB.
Running. True when the corresponding entity is active and no error has been
detected that regards it.
Rebooted (only applicable to nodes). This means that a node has been
rebooted at least once during the run-time of the application.
Started (not applicable to nodes). This checks whether a waiting task or
group of task has been started.
Isolated. This clause is true when its argument has been isolated from the
rest of the application through a deliberate action.
Phase (only applicable to tasks). It returns the current value of an attribute
set by any task via the public function RaiseEvent. This value is
forwarded to the Backbone to represent its current “phase” or state
(e.g., an identifier referring to its current algorithmic step, or the
outcome of a test or of an assertion). For instance, a voting task could
inform the Backbone that it has completed a given algorithmic step by
setting a given integer value after each step (this approach is
transparently adopted in the EFTOS voting tool and is described in
more detail in (De Florio et al., 1998)). Recovery block tests can take
advantage of this facility to switch back and try an alternate task when a
primary one sets a “failure” phase or when a guarding watchdog expires
because a watched task sent it no signs of life. This condition returns an
integer symbol that can be compared via C-like arithmetic operators.
Restarted (not applicable to nodes). This returns the number of times a
given task or group has been restarted. It implies started.
Transient is true when an entity has been detected as faulty and the current
assessment of the α-count fault identification mechanism (see Sect. 3.2.4)
is “transient”. It implies faulty.
Furthermore, it is possible to query the number of errors that have been
detected and pertain to a given entity. Complex guards can be built via the
standard logic connectives and parentheses. As an example, the following
guard:
FAULTY TASK{MASTER} AND ERRN(TASK{MASTER}) > 10 AND
RESTARTED TASK{MASTER}
checks whether the three conditions:
• the task, the unique-id of which is the value of the symbolic constant
MASTER, has been detected as faulty;
• more than 10 errors have been associated to that task;
• that task has been restarted,
are all true.
Ariel’s actions. “Actions” can be attached to the THEN or ELSE parts of a
section. In the current implementation of the language, these actions allow to
start, isolate, restart, terminate a task or a group of tasks, to isolate or reboot
a node, to invoke a local function. Moreover, it is possible to multicast
messages to groups of tasks and to purge events from the DB.
A section of the context-free grammar for Ariel’s actions follows:
actions :
| actions action ;
action :
| section
| recovery action ;
recovery action
: STOP entity
| ISOLATE entity
| START entity
| REBOOT entity
| RESTART entity
| ENABLE entity
| SEND NUMBER TASK
| SEND NUMBER GROUP
| WARN entity ( condition )
| REMOVE PHASE entity FROM ERRORLIST
| REMOVE ANY entity FROM ERRORLIST ;
| CALL NUMBER
| CALL NUMBER ’(’ list ’)’
condition : ERR NUMBER entity ;
As suggested in Sect. 2.3.4, a special case of action is a section, i.e., another
guarded action. This allows specify hierarchies (trees) of sections. During the
run-time evaluation of the recovery strategies, a branch shall only be visited
when its parent clause has been evaluated as true.
The following actions are supported:
Stop terminates a task or a group of tasks, or initiates the shutdown
procedure of a node13.
Isolate prevents an entity to communicate with the rest of the system14.
Reboot reboots a node (via the TIRAN Reboot Node basic tool).
IF [ FAULTY (GROUP{My Group}) AND NOT TRANSIENT (GROUP{My Group}) ]
THEN
STOP TASK@
SEND {DEGRADE} TASK∼
FI
Table 5: This section queries the state of group {My Group} and, if any of its
tasks have been detected as affected by a permanent or intermittent fault, it
stops those tasks and sends a control message to those considered as being
correct so that they reconfigure themselves gracefully degrading their overall
service.
Start spawns (or, in static environments, awakes) a task or a group.
Restart is reverting a task or group of tasks to their initial state or, if no
other means are available, stopping that entity and spawning a clone of
it.
Enable awakes a task or group, or boots a node.
Send multicasts (or sends) signals to groups of tasks (or single tasks).
Warn informs a task or group of tasks that an error regarding an entity has
been detected. Action “WARN x” is equivalent to action “SEND {WARN} x”
Remove purges records from the section of the DB collecting the errors or
the phases of a given entity.
Custom actions and conditions may be easily added to the grammar of
ariel15.
When actions are specified, it is possible to use meta-characters to refer
implicitly to a subset of the entities involved in the query. For instance, when
the first atom specifies a group of tasks, STOP TASK@1 means “terminate those
tasks, belonging to the group mentioned in the first atom of the guard, which
fulfill that condition”, while WARN TASK∼2 means “warn those tasks, belonging
to the group mentioned in the second atom of the guard, that do not fulfil the
second condition”. If one does not specify any number, as in STOP TASK@, then
the involved group of tasks is the one that fulfils the whole clause. Table 5
shows an example of usage of this feature. Metacharacter “star” (*) can be
used to refer to any task, group, or processing node in the system. Actions like
STOP TASK* or STOP GROUP* are trapped by the translator and are not
allowed. Metacharacter “dollar” ($) can be used to refer in a section to an
entity mentioned in an atom. For instance, STOP GROUP$2 means “stop the
group mentioned in the second atom of the clause”.
A larger excerpt of ariel’s grammar has been given in Chapter 4.
Compile-time Support for Error-Recovery. Once fed with a recovery
script, the art translator produces a binary pseudo-code, called the r-code.
In the current version, this r-code is written in a binary file and in a C header
file as a statically defined C array, as in Table 6. As can be seen in that table,
the r-code is made of a set of “triplets” of integers, given by an opcode and
two operands. These are called “r-codes”.
This header file needs to be compiled with the application. Run-time error
recovery is carried out by the RINT module, which basically is an r-code
interpreter. This module and its recovery algorithm are described in the
following section. The rest of this section describes how to translate an ariel
script into the r-code. Within this section and the following one the simple
script of Table 7 will be used as an example.
The following scenario is assumed: a triple modular redundancy (TMR)
system consisting of three voting tasks, identified by integers {VOTER1},
{VOTER2}, and {VOTER3} is operating. A fourth task, identified as T{SPARE},
is available and waiting. It is ready to take over one of the voting tasks should
the latter fail. The failed voter signals its state to the backbone by entering
phase HAS_FAILED through some self-diagnostic module (e.g., assertions or
control-flow monitoring). The spare is enabled when it receives a {WAKEUP}
message and it requires the identity of the voter it has to take over. Finally, it
is assumed that once a voter receives a control message with the identity of
the spare, it has to initiate a reconfiguration of the TMR such that the failed
voter is switched out of and the spare is switched in the system.
Table 7 shows a recovery section that specifies what to do when task {VOTER1}
fails. The user needs to supply a section like the one in lines 8–12 for each
voting task.
Once the specification has been completed, the user can translate it, by means
of the art program, into a pseudo-code whose basic blocks are the r-codes (see
Table 8). A textual representation of the r-codes is also produced (see
Table 9).
Other than syntax errors, art catches a number of semantic inconsistencies
which are reported to the user—as an example, a non-sense request, such as
asking the phase of a node, gives rise to the following response:
bash-2.02$ art -i .ariel -s
Ariel translator, v2.0f 25-Jul-2000, (c) K.U.Leuven 1999, 2000.
Parsing file .ariel...
Line 76: semantic error: Can only use PHASE with tasks
if-then-else: ok
...done (85 lines.)
1 error detected --- output rejected.
The ariel Recovery Interpreter. This section briefly describes the ariel
recovery interpreter, RINT. Basically RINT is a virtual machine executing
r-codes. Its algorithm is straightforward: Each time a new error or burst of
errors is detected,
• it executes the r-codes one triplet at a time;
/*************************************************************
* *
* Header file trl.h *
* *
* Hardwired set of r-codes for Ariel file ariel *
* Written by art (v2.0g 03-Aug-2000) on Fri Aug 18 2000 *
* (c) Katholieke Universiteit Leuven 1999, 2000. *
* *
*************************************************************/
#ifndef T R L H 10
#define T R L H
#include "rcode.h"
#define RCODE CARD 15 /* total number of r-codes */
rcode t rcodes[ ] = {
/*line#*/ /* opcode */ /* operand 1 */ /* operand 2 */
/*0*/ { R INC NEST, −1, −1 },
/*1*/ { R STRPHASE, 0, −1 },
/*2*/ { R COMPARE, 1, 9999 }, 20
/*3*/ { R FALSE, 10, −1 },
/*4*/ { R STOP, 18, 0 },
/*5*/ { R PUSH, 18, −1 },
/*6*/ { R SEND, 18, 3 },
/*7*/ { R PUSH, 0, −1 },
/*8*/ { R SEND, 18, 3 },
/*9*/ { R PUSH, 3, −1 },
/*10*/ { R SEND, 18, 1 },
/*11*/ { R PUSH, 3, −1 },
/*12*/ { R SEND, 18, 2 }, 30
/*13*/ { R DEC NEST, −1, −1 },
/*14*/ { R OANEW, 1, −1 },
/*15*/ { R STOP, −1, −1 },
};
Table 6: The beginning of header file trl.h, produced by art specifying option
“-s”. Array rcodes is statically initialized with the r-code translation of the
recovery strategy in the ariel script.
1 INCLUDE "my definitions.h"
2 TASK {VOTER1} IS NODE {NODE1}, TASKID {VOTER1}
3 TASK {VOTER2} IS NODE {NODE2}, TASKID {VOTER2}
4 TASK {VOTER3} IS NODE {NODE3}, TASKID {VOTER3}
5 TASK {SPARE} IS NODE {NODE4}, TASKID {SPARE}
6 IF [ PHASE (T{VOTER1}) == {HAS FAILED} ]
7 THEN
8 STOP T{VOTER1}
9 SEND {WAKEUP} T{SPARE}
10 SEND {VOTER1} T{SPARE}
11 SEND {SPARE} T{VOTER2}
12 SEND {SPARE} T{VOTER3}
13 FI
Table 7: Another excerpt from a recovery script: after the declarative part, a
number of “sections” like the one portrayed in here can be supplied by the user.
• if the current r-code requires accessing the DB, a query is executed and
the state of the entities mentioned in the arguments of the r-code is
checked;
• if the current r-codes requires executing actions, a request for execution
is sent to the Backbone.
RINT plays an important role within the RεL architecture—its
main objective is establishing and managing a causal connection
between the entities of the Ariel language (identifiers of nodes,
tasks, and groups of tasks) and the corresponding components of
the system and of the target application. This causal connection is
supported by the Backbone and its DB. In particular, each atom
regarding one or more entities is translated at run-time into one or
more DB queries. Under the hypothesis that the DB reflects—with
a small delay—the actual state of the system, the truth value of
the clauses on the entities of the language will have a large
probability to tally with the truth value of the assertions on the
corresponding components of the system. Furthermore, by means
of RINT, symbolic actions on the entities are translated into actual
commands on the components. These commands are then managed
by the Backbone as described in Fig. 4.
The RINT task is available and disabled on each Backbone assistant while it is
enabled on the Backbone manager. Only one execution process is allowed.
RINT has the architecture of a stack-based machine—a run-time stack is used
bash-2.02$ art -i ariel -v -s
Ariel translator, v2.0g 03-Aug-2000, (c) K.U.Leuven 1999, 2000.
Parsing file ariel...
[ Including file ‘my_definitions.h’ ...9 associations stored. ]
substituting {VOTER1} with 0
substituting {NODE1} with 1
substituting {VOTER2} with 1
substituting {NODE2} with 2
substituting {VOTER3} with 2
substituting {NODE3} with 3
substituting {SPARE} with 3
substituting {NODE4} with 4
substituting T{VOTER1} with T0
substituting {HAS_FAILED} with 9999
substituting {WAKEUP} with 18
substituting T{SPARE} with T3
substituting T{VOTER2} with T1
substituting T{VOTER3} with T2
if-then-else: ok
...done (17 lines in 0.02 CPU secs, or 850.000 lines per CPU sec.)
Output written in file .rcode.
Tasks written in file TaskTable.csv.
Preloaded r-codes written in file trl.h.
Time-outs written in file timeouts.h.
Identifiers written in file identifiers.h.
Table 8: The art program translates the section mentioned in Table 7 into
r-codes. The “-i” option is used to specify the input filename, “-v” sets the
verbose mode, while “-s” allows create three header files containing, among
other things, an array of pre-loaded r-codes (see Table 6).
Art translated Ariel strategy file: .... ariel
into rcode object file : ............... .rcode
line rcode opn1 opn2
----------------------------------------------
00000 SET_ROLE 0 Manager
00001 SET_ROLE 1 Assistant
00002 SET_ROLE 2 Assistant
00003 SET_ROLE 3 Assistant
00004 IF
00005 STORE_PHASE... Thread 0
00006 ...COMPARE == 9999
00007 FALSE 10
00008 STOP Thread 0
00009 PUSH... 18
00010 ...SEND Thread 3
00011 PUSH... 0
00012 ...SEND Thread 3
00013 PUSH... 3
00014 ...SEND Thread 1
00015 PUSH... 3
00016 ...SEND Thread 2
00017 FI
00018 ANEW_OA_OBJECTS 1
00019 STOP
Table 9: A textual representation of the r-code produced when translating the
recovery section in Table 7.
during the evaluation of clauses. In a future release of RINT, the run-time
stack shall also be used as a means for communicating information between
actions. For any r-code being executed, a message will be broadcast to the
non-faulty assistants. Next r-code will only be executed when all the
non-faulty assistants acknowledge the receipt of this message and update their
stack accordingly. This allows maintain a consistent copy of the current status
of the run-time stack on each assistant. Should the manager fail while
executing recovery, the new manager would then be able to continue recovery
seamlessly, starting from the last r-code executed by the previous manager.
4 INTEGRATING RECOVERY
STRATEGIES INTO A PRIMARY
SUBSTATION AUTOMATION SYSTEM
The DepAuDE architecture provides an approach to integrate fault tolerance
support into distributed embedded automation applications. It allows error
recovery to be expressed in terms of recovery strategies, i.e., the lightweight
code fragments described in Chapter 6. At run time, the middleware
orchestrates their execution. This section reports on the integration of diferent
recovery scripts into a distributed run-time environment applied to the
embedded automation system of a primary substation. An instrumented
automata-based design environment allows the application to be deployed on a
heterogeneous platform with several real-time operating systems. While the
middleware detects the errors and selects the correct recovery scripts to be
executed, the application functionality is maintained through system
reconfiguration or graceful degradation. The added value comes from the
flexibility to modify recovery strategies without requiring major modifications
to the application, while tolerating the same physical faults as in the dedicated
hardware solutions.
4.1 Introduction
Industrial distributed embedded systems such as those used in the control and
automation of electrical energy infrastructures rely on off-the-shelf components
and protocols to ensure cost-efficient exploitation (Caird, 1997; Dy-Liacco,
2002). As a particular application can be deployed on a variety of hardware
targets (with different sets of sensors and actuators attached) and within
different environments (e.g. with different levels of electro-magnetic
interference), flexibility is needed both to instantiate the application functions
appropriately and to react adequately to disturbances to the information and
communication infrastructure on which the application is running. For
instance, system reconfiguration and recovery may be different, depending on
which I/O devices are connected to the different parts of the distributed
controllers. More generally, adaptability is required to modify fault tolerance
strategies depending on the environment. The DepAuDE architecture deploys
a set of middleware modules to provide fault tolerance by exploiting the
embedded systems distributed hardware and by separating functional behavior
from the recovery strategy, i.e., the set of actions to be executed when an error
is detected.
This architecture has been integrated in an innovative demonstrator of a
Primary Substation Automation System, i.e. the embedded hardware and
software in a substation for electricity distribution, connecting high voltage
lines (HV) to medium voltage (MV) lines over transformers. The Primary
Substation Automation System requires protection, control, monitoring and
supervision capabilities. It is representative of many applications with
dependability requirements in the energy field (Gargiuli, Mirandola, & et al.,
1981). As mentioned already in Chapter 4, the major source of faults in the
system is electro-magnetic interference caused by the process itself (opening
and closing of HV/MV switchgear) in spite of the attention paid to designing
for electromagnetic compatibility. Software and hardware faults in the
automation system have to be considered as well. These cause errors in
communication, execution and memory subsystems.
In the ongoing renewal of electric infrastructures in Europe, utility companies
are replacing their dedicated hardware-based fault tolerance solutions by
commercial, interconnected platforms. This trend is motivated by the growing
need for more functionality: Development of new, dedicated (hardware-based)
solutions is considered too expensive and not flexible enough to keep up with
the evolving requirements of the liberalized electricity market. The required
dependability is reached by exploiting hardware redundancy in the distributed
platform, combined with software-implemented fault tolerance solutions at the
application and at the middleware level. Although software-based fault
tolerance may have less coverage than hardware-based solutions, this was not
considered inhibitive, because the physical (electrical, non-programmable)
protection in the plant continues to act, as a last resort, as a safeguard for
non-covered faults16. Besides, high-quality software engineering and extensive
on-site testing remain important to avoid the introduction of design faults that
could hamper mission-critical services. This section presents the experience of
integrating this DepAuDE software architecture into an application developed
with the ASFA distributed run-time environment, a prototypic embedded
control system for a primary substation. According to the approach proposed
here, support for allocation of tasks to components, for reactions to detected
errors and for maintainability of the fault tolerance strategy is accomplished
by using the configuration-and-recovery language ariel introduced in Chapter
6, which was developed in the framework of project TIRAN and later became
is a key component of the DepAuDE architecture. In what follows we describe
in Sect. 4.2 the DepAuDE assumptions and models, in Sect. 4.3 the Primary
Substation Automation System application and in Sect. 4.3 the instantiation
of the DepAuDE architecture therein. Section 4.4 concludes with a qualitative
evaluation of the experience.
4.2 Assumptions and Models
DepAuDE relies on the following assumptions:
• Fault model and failure semantics: A single physical fault affects
execution or communication entities (tasks, nodes, links). Experiments
confirm that EMI affects only the entity to which the responsible I/O
element is connected (Gargiuli et al., 1981). Depending on the
underlying hardware and RTOS (for instance, whether a memory
management unit is available or not), a fault containment region is a
task or node. Crash failure semantics (fail-silent behavior) is assumed for
the fault containment region.
• System model: A synchronous system model is assumed (i.e. known
and bounded processing delays, communication delays, clock differences
and clock drifts, as explained in more detail in Chapter 2). As mentioned
already, this is realistic for the set of targeted real-time automation
applications, because of their implementation on dedicated systems.
• Communication, provided by a Basic Services Library similar to the one
designed in the project TIRAN, is assumed to be perfect (no lost
messages, no duplicates, keeping message order). In order to increase the
coverage for this assumption, a set of mechanisms such as the EFTOS
Fault Tolerant Communication tasks described in Chapter 3 can be
employed or developed in a similar way.
• The communication mechanism targets groups of tasks, that is, a
multicast service is prescribed to be available, whose behavior is assumed
to be atomic: When a message is sent to a group of tasks, the either all
the non-crashed processes receive it or none of them. If this assumption
coverage is too low, dedicated atomic multicast support and group
membership functions can be added.
The DepAuDE middleware supports the reintegration of the basic services
library and of the DepAuDE fault tolerance mechanisms (a concept also
derived from the TIRAN project). Furthermore it can reload application tasks.
The application in itself is responsible for reintegrating these restarted tasks
into the ongoing execution, as no checkpoint/restore mechanisms are included.
4.3 Case Study
The Local Control Level module is a Primary Substation Automation System
component providing control and protection functions for the primary
substation, as well as an interface to the operator and—over the inter-site
network—to remote control systems and remote operators. The Local Control
Level controls the switches to the two HV/MV transformers, the switch
connecting the Red MV bar (on the left) to the Green MV bar (on the right),
as well as switches local to the MV lines (Figure 8). The pilot application
implements two functions from the Local Control Level module: automatic
power resumption (function1) and parallel transformers (function2).
Function1 allows automatic power resumption when a HV/MV transformer
goes down, e.g. triggered by internal protection (temperature too high, oil
alarm, . . . ). It disconnects the MV lines connected to the busbar of the
transformer, computes the load carried by the transformer just before the
event happened, and if possible, causes the remaining transformer to take the
entire load, as e.g. in the following scenario:
• (Initially) Red transformer carries 32 MVA (8 lines of 4 MVA) and
Green transformer 24 MVA (8 x 3 MVA); the switches connecting the
Red and Green bars to the transformers are closed; the switch
connecting the Green MV bar to the Red MV bar is open.
• (Anomaly) An internal protection mechanism shuts down the Green
transformer, and its power drops from 24 MVA to zero. The switch
connecting the Green bar to the Green transformer opens. (The switch
connecting the Red bar to the Red transformer remains closed and the
switch connecting the two bars remains open.)
• (Reaction) The switch connecting the Green bar to the Red bar receives
the command to close. It closes 1 execution cycle (100 ms) later and the
load carried by the Red transformer rises to 56 MVA.
Function2 (parallel transformers) consists of a series of automatic actions,
assisting remote operators. As an example, an operator can request to switch
on a transformer and function2 translates this request into a specific sequence
of commands. Such a re-insertion scenario may be applied some time after
transformer exclusion.
System Setup The Primary Substation Automation System application has
been developed using a proprietary, automata-based, design environment
based on the specification technique ASFA. Application development consists
of several steps:
• Function1 and function2 are extracted from the Primary Substation
Automation System application and specified through the ASFA
Graphical Editor, obtaining a tabular description of the pilot application.
• These ASFA tables are processed by the ASFA-C Translator, producing
a target-independent C-code version of the application, and by the ASFA
Partitioner, allowing an application to be mapped to a single task or
decomposed into a set of tasks (Ciapessoni & Maestri, 2001). The single
task version has been used for the functional test of the application on a
single host node, while a four-task version was selected for testing on a
distributed system.
Figure 8: Electric circuit (grey lines) and control architecture (black lines) of
the Primary Substation.
Table 10: Allocation of middleware tasks to nodes. PU stands for “Peripheral
Unit”.
• At run time, the Distributed Execution Support Module, composed of
Basic Software (BSW) and Executive, enforces cyclic execution, typical
for PLC-based automation systems (PLC=Programmable Logic
Controller). Robust execution is ensured by cyclically refreshing the I/O
image and the non-protected memory areas, while the applications state
is safeguarded by hardware or software mechanisms [5]. The Basic
Software takes care of synchronization and exception handling, while the
Executive supplies the RTOS interface and a set of ASFA-specific library
functions.
A peculiarity of the ASFA environment is that the application code is
automatically obtained by translating the automata-based specification.
Besides reducing the probability of introducing coding errors, this approach
provides portability to all platforms supported by the Distributed Execution
Support Module.
As shown in Figure 9, this pilot application was deployed on a distributed
system consisting of three dedicated heterogeneous (“target”) processors for
the automation functions and two standard PCs for support functions,
interconnected by an Ethernet switch:
• N1 and N2: two industrial PCs (VMIC and INOVA), with VxWorks as
RTOS;
• N3: A Siemens SIMATIC M7, that is, an extended PLC with I/O
modules, with RMOS32 as real-time operating system;
• N4: A number of Linux-based standard PCs, hosting the DepAuDE
Backbone (an enhanced version of the EFTOS DIR net and of the
TIRAN Backbone described in previous chapters);
• N5: A Windows-NT PC with Operator Console functions.
For inter-site connections (not considered here), an additional node hosts the
gateway software.
Figure 9: Primary Substation Automation System hardware architecture.
The pilot application runs on this heterogeneous hardware equipment; input
and output from/to the field is simulated. Synchronization signals, for cyclic
application execution, are generated by the internal clock of one of the nodes
(in a real set-up, they are obtained from an independent, external device).
The following assumptions are made for the target nodes:
• All three target nodes (N1, N2 and N3 in Table 10) are attached to I/O
components on the field (the PU boxes in Fig. 8, that is, peripheral
units).
• The target node N3 handles the synchronization signal. In order to
provide a backup solution in case of faults on N3, synchronization
interrupts are also available at N1 and N3.
Instantiating the DepAuDE Mechanisms on the Primary Substation
Automation System.
The run-time components of the DepAuDE framework are integrated into the
Primary Substation Automation System pilot application (see Table 10). The
fault containment region is a node.
• An RMOS32 and a VxWorks implementation of the Basic Services
Library tasks run on the target nodes (N1, N2, N3); a Linux and WinNT
version runs on the host nodes (N4, N5).
• A LAN Monitor—that is, a fault-tolerant mechanism used for detecting
crashed or isolated nodes—is present on all nodes.
• The DepAuDE Backbone task, responsible for the execution of the
recovery strategies as described in Chapter 6, is allocated to N4.
• Each of the three target nodes hosts an instance of the ASFA
Distributed Execution Support Module, composed of Basic Software and
Executive. Each instance of the Basic Software is able to act as master
(BSW M, on the master node) or slave (BSW S, on the slave nodes).
The role is chosen depending on the specific system configuration. All
BSW S entities make up the BSW SLAVE GROUP. The configuration
with highest performance (see below) requires BSW M to be allocated to
N3 and the BSW S processes to run on N1 and N2. Executive process
instances are identical on each processing node and they compose the
EXECUTIVE GROUP.
The allocation of the application tasks depends on the partitioning of the two
Local Control Level functions (function1 and function2), among which there is
no communication. Function2 consists of a single task, PARALLEL TRS,
function1 (automatic power resumption) consists of three tasks: two tasks
(BUSBAR1 and BUSBAR2) handle low-level, I/O dependent, computations
relative to the MV lines attached to each busbar; one task, STRAT,
coordinates the whole function and performs no field I/O. There is no
communication between the two BUSBAR tasks, while both communicate
with STRAT. The basic constraint for allocating tasks to nodes is that a task
that controls a specific plant component should be allocated to a processor
attached to that plant component (due to I/O paths). As both functions of
the pilot application control the same set of field components (same
transformers and switches), all target nodes are assumed to be connected to
that portion of the field. We assume that target node N2 provides better
computing performance than N1.
The start-up configuration is the optimal distribution of application tasks onto
the heterogeneous hardware. The most performant configuration, Config 0 in
Table 2, does not require off-node communication among the application tasks:
• no application task is allocated to N3, whose Basic Software acts as
master and handles communication with the remote control center;
• PARALLEL TRS runs on N1;
• BUSBAR1, BUSBAR2, and STRAT are allocated to N2.
Table 11: Different configurations to allocate active Primary Substation Au-
tomation System application tasks to target nodes.
• Each application task has at least one standby replica task Ri on a
different target node Ni (i=1 . . . 3).
4.3.1 Recovery Strategy of the Primary Substation Automation
System
In order to cope with temporary and permanent physical faults affecting the
information and communication infrastructure of the Primary Substation
Automation System, an appropriate recovery strategy has been designed and
coded as a set of Ariel recovery scripts. Such strategy combines different kinds
of error detection mechanisms, error recovery and system reconfiguration.
Reconfiguration is statically associated to the crash of a single node. If two
nodes crash simultaneously no reconfiguration is possible. The following
scripts are examples of recovery actions.
Example 1. If a slave node (e.g., N1) crashes, the LAN Monitor detects this
event and notifies the Backbone executing the following Ariel code:
IF
[FAULTY NODE{N1} AND RUNNING NODE{N2} AND RUNNING NODE{N3} AND
PHASE(TASK{BSW_M}) == {NEW_CYCLE_PH}]
THEN
ISOLATE NODE{N1}
SEND {CONFIG_1} TASK{BSW_MSG_M}
SEND {CONFIG_1} GROUP{BSW_SLAVE_GROUP}
RESTART GROUP{EXECUTIVE_GROUP}
RESTART TASK{PARALLEL_TRS_R2}
FI
If the guard of the above script is fulfilled, application tasks are reconfigured
as of CONFIG 1 from Table 11. CONFIG 1 maintains the full Primary
Substation Automation System functionality by transferring Parallel TRS to
N2, actually activating its spare replica. This node is able to cope with the
whole computational load, as it does not need to perform communication
requested by the BSW M’s functions. To avoid undesired interference by the
Backbone during critical phases of BSW M activity, a condition on the current
execution phase (PHASE (TASK{BSW_M} ) == {NEW_CYCLE_PH}) must be
satisfied in conjunction with the crash test. The ISOLATE NODE action
corresponds to informing other nodes that they may not accept any message
from the isolated peer—even if it comes back to life—until the isolation is
undone.
Example 2. If a target node (e.g. N2) crashes during a different execution
phase of the master Basic Software, then this error is notified by the BSW M
to the Backbone (through function RaiseEvent (RE_BSW_error)) , causing
the execution of the following ARIEL code:
IF [EVENT {RE_BSW_error}]
THEN
IF [FAULTY NODE{N2} AND RUNNING NODE{N3}] THEN
ISOLATE NODE{N2}
SEND {CONFIG_2} TASK{BSW_MSG_M}
SEND {CONFIG_2} TASK{BSW_MSG_S1}
RESTART GROUP{EXECUTIVE_GROUP}
RESTART TASK{BUSBAR1_R3}, TASK{BUSBAR2_R3}, TASK{STRAT_R3}
RESTART TASK{PARALLEL_TRS_R1}
FI
FI
Hence the system is reconfigured as in Config 2: The spare replicas of
BUSBAR1, BUSBAR2 and STRAT are activated on N3.
Example 3. In case of a fault on target node N3 (where BSW M is
running), the following ARIEL code is executed, triggered by error detection
by the LAN Monitor and subsequent notification to the Backbone:
IF
[FAULTY NODE{N3} AND RUNNING NODE{N1} AND RUNNING NODE{N2}]
THEN
ISOLATE NODE{N3}
SEND {CONFIG_3} GROUP{BSW_SLAVE_GROUP}
SEND {BACKUP_MASTER} TASK{BSW_MSG_S2}
RESTART GROUP{EXECUTIVE_GROUP}
STOP TASK{PARALLEL_TRS}
RESTART TASK{STRAT_R1}, TASK{BUSBAR1_R1}, TASK{BUSBAR2_R1}
FI
Figure 10: User interface for application supervision and active task allocation.
As a consequence, the function of master node is transferred to N2 and the
application tasks of N2 are moved to N1. As N1 cannot support both
application functions simultaneously, PARALLEL TRS is disabled, thus
proceeding to a graceful degradation of the automation system (config 3).
Evaluation. Other recovery strategies, such as restarting all tasks on a node
after a transient fault, or shutting down the system when reconfiguration is
not possible, have also been coded in ARIEL and implemented. We did not
provide recovery strategies associated with a crash of N4 or N5, because as
they are not target nodes, they are not concerned with the automation control
function itself; so even if they crash, the application is not endangered. In a
real deployment they could be replicated or could backup each other.
Figure 10 shows the user interface of the pilot application demonstrator.
4.4 Summary and Lessons Learned
The lack of flexibility that is inherent to dedicated hardware-based fault
tolerance solutions makes their adoption not cost-effective in cases where
similar functionality has to be deployed in several sites, each characterized by
a slightly different environment. This section presented the integration of a
fault-tolerance architecture based on the recovery language approach into the
distributed automation system of a primary substation. The deployment of
this fault tolerance middleware allows different recovery strategies to be
integrated on a heterogeneous platform. Given the generality of the methods
and techniques used the designed solution is applicable to a wide class of
process automation systems.
The following points summarize the lessons learned:
• The ASFA design environment with automatic code generation provides
several advantages: less development time, absence of coding errors,
portable application code and possibilities for application partitioning. It
is straightforward to interface it to IEC 61850-compliant Intelligent
Electronic Devices (IED).
• The implementation effort required to integrate the DepAuDE Basic
Services Library into an ASFA application was limited (about 2400 lines
of code for the RMOS and VxWorks targets). The communication
mechanism supplied by the DepAuDE Basic Services Library provided
transparent inter-process communication among ASFA application tasks.
The grouping of tasks revealed itself as a useful tool when implementing
the standby replicas. Inter-processor communication among application
tasks strongly influences application performance and reconfiguration
time in case of faults. Therefore inter-processor data flow should be
avoided if possible, or at least minimized.
• The deployment of the DepAuDE architecture allowed integrating
several recovery strategies on a heterogeneous platform. The separation
between functional and error recovery programs provides flexibility to
modify recovery strategies without requiring major modifications to the
application, while tolerating the same physical faults as in the dedicated
hardware solutions.
5 CONCLUSION
The recovery language approach and ariel, a configuration-and-recovery
language, have been discussed. First the concepts have been treated in general
terms; then, a particular context has been chosen and the concepts in that
context have been deployed in the form of a prototypic architecture developed
in the framework of a European project, TIRAN. Finally, a real-life example
from the domain of electrical automation system has been discussed. ariel
and its run-time system provide the user with a fault-tolerance linguistic
structure that appears to the user as a sort of second application-level
especially conceived and devoted to address the error recovery concerns.
Designed by the author of this book while taking part to several European
research projects, ariel is currently being used as a linguistic structure to
express adaptive feedback loops.
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Notes
1To be pronounced as “[a:*]-[i:]-[el].”
2For instance, via the exit function call from the C standard libraries.
3Note how, according to the hypothesis of adherence to the timed-asynchronous distributed
system model, such thresholds are known because all services are timed.
4“Virtual” isolation of a task can be obtained, when the task obeys the fourth application
assumption at page 164, “disactivating” the corresponding BSL communication descriptors.
5To be intended herein as a set of software libraries, distributed components, and formal
techniques.
6Safety-critical systems, i.e., computer, electronic or electromechanical systems whose fail-
ure may cause injury or death to human beings, such as an aircraft or nuclear power station
control system (FOLDOC, 2000), were not covered within TIRAN. This allowed the crash
failure semantics assumption (see Sect. 2.1.1) to be satisfied with less strict coverage, which
translates into lower development costs for the framework.
7 Mosaic020 boards have been developed in the framework of the ESPRIT project Dipsap
II (Dipsap-II, 1997) by DASA/DSS and Eonic Systems. They are based on the Analog Devices
ADSP-21020 DSP and the SMCS communication chip. The SMCS chip complies with the
IEEE 1355 standard (IEEE, 1995) and has hardware support for detecting transmission and
connection errors and for higher level system protocols such as reset-at-runtime.
8A time-out is said to be suspended when, on expiration, no alarm is executed. The
corresponding entry stays in the time-out list and obeys its rules—in particular, if the time-
out was cyclic, on expiration the entry is renewed.
9An associative array (see, for instance, (De Florio, 1996)) may then be used to de-reference
an entity through its symbolic name.
10In TIRAN lingo, a SocketServer is a task run on each node of the system, which is used
by the TIRAN BSL for managing off node communication (via UDP sockets) and for local
dispatching of remote messages. This is a well-known technical solution which is used, e.g., in
PVM, where a single component, pvmd (PVM daemon), is launched on each node of a PVM
cluster to manage global tasks (Geist et al., 1994).
11A number of voting techniques have been generalized in (Lorczak, Caglayan, & Eckhardt,
1989) to “arbitrary N -version systems with arbitrary output types using a metric space frame-
work”. To use these algorithms, a metric function can be supplied by the user so to compare
any two votes. Such a function is called a “metric” and has a fixed prototype, the one of
function strcmp of the C standard library function—in the example, a function called int cmp
is selected. The object code of this function must be available and addressable when compiling
the target application. See Chapter 3 for more details on this.
12Here and in the following, context-free grammars are used in order to describe syntax
rules. The syntax used for describing those rules is that of the YACC (Johnson, 1975) parser
generator. Appendix A to Chapter 11 describes YACC in detail. Terminal symbols such as
GT are in capital letters. They are considered as intuitive and their definition (in this case,
string “>”) in general will not be supplied.
13These services are obtained via specific function calls to the level-1.2 BT (see the edge
from RINT to those BT in Fig. 2). Such BT, in turn, can either execute, through the BSL, a
kernel-level function for stopping processes—if available—or send a termination signal to the
involved processes. The actual choice is taken transparently, and RINT only calls one or more
times either a TIRAN Stop Task or a TIRAN Stop Node function.
14This service is obtained as described in the previous footnote. Depending on the char-
acteristics of the adopted platform, isolation can be reached either through support at the
communication driver or kernel level, or as follows: when a task opens a connection, a ref-
erence to a given object describing the connection is returned to both the user code and the
local component of the Backbone. Action ISOLATE simply substitutes this object with an-
other one, the methods of which prevent that task to communicate. This explains the third
application-specific assumption of Sect. 2.1.1.
15For instance, condition “DEADLOCKED” and action “CALL” (see the Appendix of Chapter 11)
were added to test the inclusion in ariel, respectively, of a provision for checking whether two
tasks are in a deadlock (see (Efthivoulidis et al., 1998) for a description of this provision) and
of a hook to the function call invocation method. These two provisions were easily introduced
in the grammar of ariel.
16As we have seen in the case of the Therac-25 linear accelerator in Chapter 2, it is often a
good design choice not to remove hardware safeguards. . .
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FAULT-TOLERANT PROTOCOLS USING
ASPECT ORIENTATION
1 INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES
This chapter resumes our survey of application-level fault-tolerance protocols
considering approaches based on aspect-oriented programming.
Aspect-compliant programming languages allow to treat a source code as a
pliable web that the designer can weave so as to specialize or optimize towards
a certain goal without having to recode it. This useful property allows
separate concerns, bound complexity and enhance maintainability. Aspect
programs may be used for different objectives, including non-functional
properties such as dependability. To date it is not known whether
aspect-orientation will actually provide satisfactory solutions for
fault-tolerance in the application layer. Some researchers believe this is not the
case (Kienzle & Guerraou, 2002)—at least for some fault-tolerance paradigm.
Some preliminary studies have been carried out (for instance in (Lippert &
Videira Lopes, 2000)), but no definitive word has been said on the matter. It
is our belief that, at least for some paradigms, aspects may reveal themselves
as invaluable tools to engineer the application-level of fault-tolerance services.
For this reason their approach is described in this chapter.
2 FAULT-TOLERANT PROTOCOLS
THROUGH ASPECT ORIENTATION
2.1 General Ideas
Aspect-oriented programming (AOP) (Kiczales et al., 1997) is a programming
methodology and a structuring technique that explicitly addresses, at
application level, the problem of the best code structure to express different,
possibly conflicting design goals such as high performance, optimal memory
usage, and dependability.
Indeed, when coding a non-functional service within an application—for
instance an application-level error handling protocol—using either a
procedural or an object-oriented programming language, one is required to
decompose the original goal, in this case a certain degree of dependability, into
a multiplicity of fragments scattered among a number of procedures or objects.
This happens because those programming languages only provide abstraction
and composition mechanisms to cleanly support the functional concerns. In
other words, specific non-functional goals, such as high performance, cannot be
easily captured into a single unit of functionality among those offered by a
procedural or object-oriented language, and must be fragmented and intruded
into the available units of functionality. As already observed, this code
intrusion is detrimental to maintainability and portability of both functional
and non-functional services (the latter called “aspects” in aspect-oriented
terminology). Such aspects tend to crosscut the system’s class and module
structure rather than staying, well localized, within one of these unit of
functionality, e.g., a class. This increases the complexity of the resulting
systems.
The main idea of aspect-oriented programming is to use:
1. A “conventional” programming language (that is, a procedural,
object-oriented, or functional programming language) to code the basic
functionality. The resulting program is called a component program. The
basic functional units of the component program are called components.
2. A so-called aspect-oriented language to implement given aspects by
defining specific interconnections (“aspect programs” in aspect-oriented
lingo) among the components in order to address various systemic
concerns.
3. An aspect weaver, that takes as input both the aspect and the
component programs and produces with those (“weaves”) an output
program (“tangled code”) that addresses specific aspects.
The weaver first generates a data flow graph from the component program. In
this graph, nodes represent components, and edges represent data flowing from
one component to another. Next, it executes the aspect programs. These
programs edit the graph according to specific goals, collapsing nodes together
and adjusting the corresponding code accordingly. Finally, a code generator
takes the graph resulting from the previous step as its input and translates it
into an actual software package written, e.g., for a procedural language such as
Java. This package is only meant to be compiled and produce the ultimate
executable code fulfilling a specific aspect like, e.g., higher dependability.
In a sense, aspect-oriented programming systematically automatizes and
supports the process to adapt an existing code so that it fulfils specific
aspects. Aspect-oriented programming may be defined as a software
engineering methodology supporting those adaptations in such a way as to
guarantee that they do not destroy the original design and do not increase
complexity. The original idea of aspect-oriented programming is a clever
blending and generalization of the ideas that are at the basis, for instance, of
optimizing compilers, program transformation systems, meta-object protocols,
and even literate programming (Knuth, 1984).
2.2 AspectJ and Aspectwerkz
2.2.1 AspectJ
AspectJ is the first and probably most wide-spread aspect-oriented
language (Kiczales, 2000; Lippert & Videira Lopes, 2000). Developed as a
Xerox PARC project, AspectJ can be defined as an aspect-oriented extension
to the Java programming language. AspectJ provides the programmer with
the following constructs:
• Join points, i.e. points in a program where additional behavior (logging
for example) can be attached. They represent relevant points in a
program’s dynamic call graph. Join points mark the code regions that
can be manipulated later one by an aspect weaver (see above). In
AspectJ, these points can be
– method executions,
– constructor calls,
– constructor executions,
– field accesses, and
– exception handlers.
Join points can be expressed through pointcuts (see below).
• Pointcuts are a way to express join points in a program. Let us suppose
for example one would need to achieve transparent logging of all the
methods whose names start with string “do” . In AspectJ this can be
expressed as pointcut
doMethod(): execution(* do*(*) );
• An advice is the additional code (the actual logging, for instance) that
has to be executed at the join point. In the logging example it can be
implemented as follows:
after() returning:doMethod() //log something .
• Inter-type declarations provide a mechanism to change the structure of
existing classes. It is possible to add methods, fields and even interfaces
to existing classes without changing the class itself. For instance if one
needs to log how many times a method is executed, it is possible to add
a counter field to the class.
AspectJ is in a sense an extension to Java and in this regard it has two
important properties. The first property is that all valid Java programs are
valid AspectJ programs and the second is that after transformation of the
AspectJ program, it becomes a valid Java program that can be run in the Java
Virtual Machine (jvm). In order for AOP to work, AspectJ has an
AspectJ-compiler (ajc) that weaves the aspects into the code. This weaving
can happen at three different times:
• Compile-time: ajc will compile the classes from source and produce the
woven classes as output. This is the simplest approach and only
necessary if the aspects are required for the code to compile (which
would not be a good approach).
• Post-compile-time: ajc will weave existing class- and jar-files with the
aspects. Post-compiletime weaving allows great flexibility as it enables
us to add aspects after the original code has been compiled.
• Load-time: The weaving only happens when the class loader loads the
class in the environment. This requires the support from a weaving class
loader and weaving agent by adding aspectjweaver.jar to the classpath.
Load-time weaving allows the most flexibility as the aspects to be woven
need only be known at runtime.
Another extension to Java is AspectJ’s support of the Design by Contract
methodology (Meyer, 1997), where contracts (Hoare, 1969) define a set of
pre-conditions, post-conditions, and invariants, that determine how to use and
what to expect from a computational entity.
A study has been carried out on the capability of AspectJ as an
aspect-oriented programming language supporting exception detection and
handling (Lippert & Videira Lopes, 2000). It has been shown how AspectJ can
be used to develop so-called “plug-and-play” exception handlers: libraries of
exception handlers that can be plugged into many different applications. This
translates into better support for managing different configurations at
compile-time. This addresses one of the aspects of attribute a defined in
Chapter 2.
2.2.2 Dynamic weaving of aspects
As mentioned in (Hiltunen, Ta¨ıani, & Schlichting, 2006), dynamic behavior
through run-time weaving is being recognized more and more as a key
property in modern aspect-oriented architectures. While early versions of
AspectJ could only define joinpoints as static source code locations it is now
possible to define joinpoints on the occurrence of run-time conditions. This
allows activate or deactivate aspects dynamically. Many researchers believe
that through this powerful syntactical framework it will be possible to tackle
effectively dynamic adaptation and self-configuration.
An interesting example of this trend is AspectWerkz (Bone´r & Vasseur, 2004;
Vasseur, 2004), defined by its authors as “a dynamic, lightweight and
high-performant AOP framework for Java” (Bone´r, 2004). AspectWerkz
utilizes bytecode modification to weave classes at project build-time, class load
time or runtime. This capability means that the actual semantics of an
AspectWerkz code may vary dynamically over time, e.g., as a response to
environmental changes. This translates in a useful structure to create
dependable service whose fault model changes over time, as discussed in
Chapter 2, hence characterized by an excellent a.
Recently the AspectJ and AspectWerkz projects have agreed to work together
as one team to produce a single aspect-oriented programming platform
building on their complementary strengths and expertise.
2.3 Variations on the Main Theme: AspectC++ and
GluonJ
A recent project, AspectC++ (AspectCpp, n.d.), proposes an aspect-oriented
implementation of C++ which appears to achieve most of the positive
properties of the other Java-based approaches and adds to this efficiency and
good performance.
AspectJ and Aspectwerkz are not the only aspect-oriented languages focusing
on Java: Another example is GluonJ (GluonJ, n.d.; Chiba & Ishikawa, 2005),
whose primary design goal is simplicity—a fundamental property for truly
dependable systems. Quoting his author, GluonJ “provides simple but
powerful AOP constructs by using annotations in regular Java. Developers can
use GluonJ as a compile-time AOP system or a load-time AOP system”.
GluonJ in particular provides its programmer with a mechanism for extending
an existing class, called refinement. As mentioned in Chapter 4, GluonJ has
been written on top of Javassist, the Java Programming Assistant meta-library
briefly introduced in that chapter.
3 CONCLUSION
Figure 1 synthesizes the main characteristics of AOP: it allows decompose,
select, and assemble components according to different design goals. This has
been represented by drawing the components as pieces of a jigsaw puzzle
created by the aspect program and assembled by the weaver into the actual
source code. AOP addresses explicitly code re-engineering, which in principle
should allow to reduce considerably maintenance costs.
AOP is a relatively recent approach to software development. AOP can in
principle address any application domain and can use a procedural, functional
or object-oriented programming language as component language. The
isolation and coding of aspects requires extra work and expertise that may be
well paid back by the capability of addressing new aspects while keeping a
single unmodified and general design.
For the time being it is not yet possible to tell whether AOP will spread out as
a programming paradigm among academia and industry the way
object-oriented programming has done since the Eighties. The many qualities
of AOP are currently being quantitatively assessed, both with theoretical
Figure 1: A fault-tolerant program according to an AOP system.
studies and with practical experience, and results seem encouraging.
Furthermore, evidence of an increasing interest in AOP is given by the large
number of research papers and conferences devoted to this interesting subject.
From the point of view of the dependability aspect, one can observe that AOP
exhibits optimal sc (“by construction”, in a sense (Kiczales & Mezini, 2005)),
and that recent results show that attribute a can in principle reach good
values when making use of run-time weaving (Vasseur, 2004), often realized by
dynamic bytecode manipulation. This work by Ostermann (Ostermann, 1999)
is an interesting survey on this subject.
The adequacy at fulfilling attribute sa is indeed debatable also because, to
date, no fault-tolerance aspect languages have been devised1—which may
possibly be an interesting research domain. Positive values for sa have been
questioned, at least in the case of fault-tolerance paradigms such as
transactions, which appear to be difficult to be “aspectized” (Kienzle &
Guerraou, 2002) especially because of the “very syntactic-only nature” of the
manipulations supported by the approach. Possibly an evolution of aspects
allowing semantic processing, a little like in Introspector (Chapter 4), could
provide us with the ultimate tool to master the application-level complexity of
fault-tolerance expression.
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FAILURE DETECTION PROTOCOLS IN THE
APPLICATION LAYER
1 INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES
Failure detection is a fundamental building block to develop fault-tolerant
distributed systems. Accurate failure detection in asynchronous systems
(Chapter 2) is notoriously difficult, as it is impossible to tell whether a process
has actually failed or it is just slow. Because of this, several impossibility
results have been derived—see for instance the well known paper (Fischer,
Lynch, & Paterson, 1985). As a consequence of these pessimistic results, many
researchers have devoted their time and abilities to understanding how to
reformulate the concept of system model in a fine-grained alternative way.
Their goal was being able to tackle problems such as distributed consensus
with the minimal requirements on the system environment. This brought to
the theory of unreliable failure detectors for reliable systems, pioneered by the
works of Chandra and Toueg (Chandra & Toueg, 1996). This chapter
introduces these concepts and the formulation of failure detection protocols in
the application layer. In particular a linguistic framework is proposed for the
expression of those protocols. As a case study it is described the algorithm for
failure detection used in the EFTOS DIR net and in the TIRAN
Backbone—that is, the fault-tolerance managers introduced respectively in
Chapter 3 and Chapter 6.
2 FAILURE DETECTION PROTOCOLS IN
THE APPLICATION LAYER
In Chapter 2 the concept of system model was briefly introduced together with
the main features of the classical asynchronous and synchronous system
models. The former model, also known as “time-free” system model, is the one
that is implicitly used by most non real-time services: For such systems there
is no bound for the time required to execute any computation or
communication step, which means that there is no way to tell whether a
certain part of the system is slow or if it has failed. How to distinguish
between these two cases? The answer found by researchers is failure detectors.
As cleverly expressed by Michel Raynal, failure detectors may be considered as
a sort of distributed oracle for failure detection. This oracle observes the
system and draws its conclusions about failures, informing those who query it.
It could be regarded as a sort of middleware service for failure detection.
Failure detectors are characterized by two properties:
• Completeness, which is the actual detection of failures, and
• Accuracy, which tells how reliable a failure detector can be in its
assessments.
In a sense, completeness and accuracy represent two coordinates by means of
which the spectrum of all possible failure detectors can be drawn. This
spectrum represents also a two-dimensional set of possible system models, a
set which is much more detailed and fine-grained than the linear one hitherto
available to researchers:
In other words, before failure detectors, the researchers had a sort
of interval defined by its two extremes, the asynchronous model (“I
ask nothing, so I get nothing”) and the synchronous model (“I ask
too much, so I can’t get it”). Partial synchronous systems are
points vaguely identified within that interval. With failure
detectors everything changes and one can talk of system model
(c, a), where (c, a) are the completeness and accuracy of the
minimal failure detector FD(c,a) that can be implemented in a
system obeying that model. This view has revolutionized the
research on dependable distributed systems.
Several and very important have been the consequences of the introduction of
failure detectors. Among them the following ones are highlighted herein:
• Famous impossibility results such as the impossibility to solve consensus
in a fully asynchronous system (Fischer et al., 1985), which had puzzled
the research community for years, have been now understood and tamed.
The correct way to solve it is to ask which is the weakest of failure
detectors the underlying asynchronous system has to be equipped with
in order for the consensus problem to be solved. This in turns means to
be able to identify which minimal set of additional mechanisms must be
available in an asynchronous system in order implement that failure
detector, thus making it able to support consensus. The same reasoning
can be applied to any other distributed computing problem. Clearly this
is a powerful conceptual and practical tool to reason about reliable
systems.
• Another important consequence of introducing a theory of failure
detectors is that a failure detector also reveals what are the minimal
requirements necessary for a service to migrate from a system to another
while keeping the desired quality of service. One of the key messages of
this book is that it is important to distinguish between porting a code
Construct NFD-E ϕ FD GMFD D ∈ ♦P HB HB-pt
Repeat no no yes no yes yes yes
periodically
Upon t = yes no yes yes no no no
current time
Upon receive yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
message
Concurrency yes yes no no yes yes yes
management
Table 1: Syntactical constructs used in several failure detector protocols. ϕ is
the accrual failure detector discussed in (Hayashibara, 2004; Hayashibara et al.,
2004). D is the eventually perfect failure detector of (Chandra & Toueg, 1996).
HB is the Heartbeat detector of (Aguilera et al., 1999). HB-pt is the partition-
tolerant version of the Heartbeat detector. By “Concurrency management” it
is meant co-routines, threading or forking.
and porting the service that that code is meant to offer, and that the
history of the relations between human beings and computers is paved of
cases where erroneous software reuse has led to dreadful disasters.
Failure detectors provide the designers with powerful “lens” through
which the differences among systems and the consequences of migrations
are put in the foreground. It is a pity that the awareness of the role of
failure detectors in dependable software development has not been fully
recognized and exploited yet in the ICT community at large.
• Finally, from a theoretical point of view, failure detectors create a partial
ordering among problems, which is also very important to better
understand and compare the threats of dependability.
Failure detection protocols are often described by their authors making use of
informal pseudo-codes of their conception. Often these pseudo-codes use
syntactical constructs such as repeat periodically (Chandra & Toueg,
1996)(Aguilera, Chen, & Toueg, 1999)(Bertier, Marin, & Sens, 2002), at time t
send heartbeat (Chen, Toueg, & Aguilera, 2002; Bertier et al., 2002), at time t
check whether message has arrived (Chen et al., 2002), or upon receive (Aguilera
et al., 1999), together with several variants (see Table 1). Such syntactical
constructs are not often found in COTS programming languages such as C or
C++, which leads us to the problem of translating the protocol specifications
into running software prototypes using one such standard language.
Furthermore the lack of a formal, well-defined, and standard form to express
failure detection protocols often leads their authors to insufficiently detailed
descriptions. Those informal descriptions in turn complicate the reading
process and exacerbate the work of the implementors, which becomes
time-consuming, error-prone and at times frustrating.
Several researchers and practitioners are currently arguing that failure
detection should be made available as a network service (Hayashibara et al.,
2004; Renesse, Minsky, & Hayden, 1998). No such service exists to date.
Lacking such tool, it is important to devise methods to express in the
application layer of our software even the most complex failure detection
protocols in a simple and natural way.
In the following one such method is introduced, which is based on the class of
time-outs (i.e., objects that postpone a certain function call by a given amount
of time) that has been introduced in Chapter 6. As mentioned already, this
feature allows convert time-based events into non time-based events such as
message arrivals. It also allows easily express the constructs in Table 1 in
standard C1. In some cases, our class allows get rid of concurrency
management requirements such as co-routines or thread management libraries.
The formal character of our method allows rapid-prototype the algorithms
with minimal effort. This is proved through a Literate Programming (Knuth,
1984) framework that produces from a same source file both the description
meant for publication and a software skeleton to be compiled in standard C or
C++.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.1 introduces our
tool. In Sect. 2.1.2 our tool is put to work and used to express three classical
failure detectors. Section 2.2 is a case study describing a software system built
with our tool. Our conclusions are drawn in Sect. 2.3.
2.1 TOM: A Time-outs Management System
This section briefly describes the architecture of our time-out management
system (TOM). The TOM class appears to the user as a couple of new types
and a library of functions. Table 2 provides an idea of the client-side protocol
of our tool.
To declare a time-out manager, the user needs to define a pointer to a TOM
object and then call function tom init. Argument to this function is an
alarm, i.e., the function to be called when a time-out expires:
int alarm(TOM *); tom = tom init( alarm );
The first time function tom init is called a custom thread is spawned. That
thread is the actual time-out manager.
At this point the user is allowed to define his or her time-outs. This is done
via type timeout t and function tom declare; an example follows:
timeout t t; tom declare(&t,TOM CYCLIC, TOM SET ENABLE, TID,
TSUBID, DEADLINE).
In what above, time-out t is declared as:
• A cyclic time-out (renewed on expiration; as opposed to
TOM NON CYCLIC, which means “removed on expiration”),
1. /* declarations */
TOM *tom;
timeout t t1, t2, t3;
int my alarm(TOM*), another alarm(TOM*);
2. /* definitions */
tom ← tom init(my alarm);
tom declare(&t1, TOM CYCLIC, TOM SET ENABLE, TIMEOUT1, SUBID1, DEADLINE1);
tom declare(&t2, TOM NON CYCLIC, TOM SET ENABLE, TIMEOUT2, SUBID2, DEADLINE2);
tom declare(&t3, TOM CYCLIC, TOM SET DISABLE, TIMEOUT3, SUBID3, DEADLINE3);
tom set action(&t3, another alarm);
3. /* insertion */
tom insert(tom, &t1), tom insert(tom, &t2), tom insert(tom, &t3);
4. /* control */
tom enable(tom, &t3);
tom set deadline(&t2, NEW DEADLINE2);
tom renew(tom, &t2);
tom delete(tom, &t1);
5. /* deactivation */
tom close(tom);
Table 2: An example of usage of the TOM class. In 1. a time-out list pointer
and three time-out objects are declared, together with two alarm functions. In
2. the time-out list and the time-outs are initialized, and an alarm differing from
the default one is attached to time-out t3. Insertion is carried out at point 3.
At 4., some control operations are performed on the list, namely, time-out t3 is
enabled, a new deadline value is specified for time-out t2 which is then renewed
to activate the changing, and time-out t1 is deleted. The whole list is finally
deactivated in 5.
• enabled (only enabled time-outs “fire”, i.e., call their alarm on
expiration; an alarm is disabled with TOM SET DISABLE),
• with a deadline of DEADLINE local clock ticks before expiration.
A time-out t is identified as a couple of integers, in the above example TID and
TSUBID. This is done because in our experience it is often useful to distinguish
instances of classes of time-outs. TID is used for the class identifier and TSUBID
for the particular instance. A practical example of this is given in Sect. 2.2.
Once defined, a time-out can be submitted to the time-out manager for
insertion in its running list of time-outs—see (De Florio & Blondia, 2006) for
further details on this. From the user point of view, this is managed by calling
function
tom insert( TOM *, timeout t * ).
Note that a time-out might be submitted to more than one time-out manager.
After successful insertion an enabled time-out will trigger the call of the
default alarm function after the specified deadline. If that time-out is declared
as TOM CYCLIC the time-out would then be re-inserted.
Other control functions are available: a time-out can be temporarily
suspended while in the time-out list via function
tom disable( TOM *, timeout t * )
and (re-)enabled via function
tom enable( TOM *, timeout t * ).
Furthermore, the user is allowed to specify a new alarm function via
tom set action) and a new deadline via tom set deadline; he or she can
delete a time-out from the list via
tom delete( TOM *, timeout t * ),
and renew2 it via
tom renew( TOM *, timeout t * ).
Finally, when the time-out management service is no longer needed, the user
should call function
tom close( TOM * ),
which possibly halts the time-out manager thread should no other client be
still active.
2.1.1 Requirements
A fundamental requirement of our model is that processes must have access to
some local physical clock giving them the ability to measure time. The
availability of means to control the priorities of processes is also an important
factor to reducing the chances of late alarm execution. Another assumption is
that the alarm functions are small grained both in CPU and I/O usage so as
to not interfere “too much” with the tasks of the TOM. Finally, asynchronous,
non-blocking primitives to send and receive messages are assumed to be
available.
2.1.2 Discussion
In this section it is shown that the syntactical constructs in Table 1 can be
expressed in terms of our class of time-outs. This is done by considering three
classical failure detectors and providing their time-out based specifications in
the cweb Literate Programming framework (Knuth, 1984).
Let us consider the classical formulation of eventually perfect failure detector
D (Chandra & Toueg, 1996). The main idea of the protocol is to require each
task to send a “heartbeat” to its fellows and maintain a list of tasks suspected
to have failed. A task identifier q enters the list of task p if no heartbeat is
received by p during a certain amount of time, ∆p(q), initially set to a default
value. This value is increased when late heartbeats are received.
The basic structure of D is that of a co-routine with three concurrent
processes, two of which execute a task periodically while the third one is
triggered by the arrival of a message:
The repeat periodically in Task 1 is called a “multiplicity 1” repeat,
because indeed a single action (sending a “p-is-alive” message) has to be
tracked, while the one in Task 2 is called a “multiplicity q” repeat, which
requires to check q events.
Our reformulation of the above code is as follows:
where tasks and actions are defined as follows:
The following observations can be drawn:
• Our syntax is less abstract than the one adopted in the classical
formulation. Indeed it was deliberately chosen a syntax very similar to
that of programming languages like C and its derivatives. Behind the
lines, a similar semantics is also assumed.
• Our syntax is more strongly typed: We have deliberately chosen to
define (most of) the objects our code deals with.
• Set-wise operations such as union, complement or membership have been
systematically avoided by transforming sets into arrays as, e.g., in
outputp ← outputpU{q},
which was changed into
outputp[q] = PRESENT.
• The abstract constructs repeat periodically have been systematically
rewritten as one or more time-outs (depending on their multiplicity).
Each of these time-out has an associated action that sends one message
to the client process, p. This means that
1. time-related event “it’s time to send p-is-alive to all” becomes event
“message REPEAT TASK1 has arrived.”
2. time-related events “it’s time to check whether q-is-alive has
arrived” becomes event “message (REPEAT TASK2, id=q) has
arrived.”
• Due to the now homogeneous nature of the possible events (message
arrivals) a single process may manage those events through a multiple
selection statement (a switch). The requirement for a co-routine has
been removed.
Through the Literate Programming approach and a compliant tool such as
cweb (Knuth & Levy, 1993; Knuth, 1984) it is possible to further improve our
reformulation. As well known, the cweb tool allows have a single source code
to produce a pretty printable TEX documentation and a C file ready for
compilation and testing. In our experience this link between these two
contexts can be very beneficial: testing or even simply using the code provides
feedback on the specification of the algorithm, while the improved specification
may reduce the probability of design faults and in general increase the quality
of the code.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 respectively show a reformulation for the HB failure
detector for partitionable networks (Aguilera et al., 1999) and for the group
membership failure detector (Raynal & Tronel, 1999) produced with cweb. A
full description of these protocols is out of the scope of this book—for that the
reader is referred to the above cited articles. The focus here is mainly on the
syntactical constructs used in them and our reformulations, which include
simple translations for the syntactical constructs in Table 1 in terms of our
time-out API. A case worth noting is that of the group membership failure
detector: Here the authors mimic the availability of a cyclic time-out service
but intrude its management in their formulation—which could be avoided
using our approach.
2.2 A Development Experience: The DIR net
As mentioned in Chapter 3 and Chapter 6, at the core of the software fault
tolerance strategies of several European projects (Deconinck, De Florio,
Varvarigou, Verentziotis, & Botti, 2002; Botti et al., 2000; Deconinck,
De Florio, Dondossola, & Szanto, 2003) there is a distributed application
Figure 1: Reformulation of the HB failure detector for partitionable net-
works.Special symbols such as τ and Dp are caught by cweb and translated
into legal C tokens via its “@f” construct.The expression m.path[q] ≤PRESENT
means “q appears at most once in path”.
Figure 2: Reformulation of the group membership failure detector.
called “DIR net” (De Florio, 1998) or “Backbone”. In this section that
application is described (let us call it just as the DIR net) and it is reported
on how it was designed and developed by means of the TOM system.
The DIR net has been described as a fault-tolerant network of failure detectors
connected to other peripheral error detectors (called Dtools in what follows).
Objective of the DIR net is to ensure consistent fault tolerance strategies
throughout the system and play the role of a backbone handling information
to and from the Dtools (De Florio, Deconinck, & Lauwereins, 2000).
The DIR net consists of four classes of components. Each processing node in
the system runs an instance of a so-called I-am-alive Task (IAT) plus an
instance of either a DIR Manager (DIR-M), or a DIR Agent (DIR-A), or a DIR
Backup Agent (DIR-B). A DIR-A gathers all error detection messages
produced by the Dtools on the current processing node and forwards them to
the DIR-M and the DIR-B’s. A DIR-B is a DIR-A which also maintains its
messages into a database located in central memory. It is connected to DIR-M
and to the other DIR-B’s and is eligible for election as a DIR-M. A DIR-M is a
special case of DIR-B. Unique within the system, the DIR-M is the one
component responsible for running error recovery strategies—see (De Florio,
2000; De Florio & Deconinck, 2002) for a description of the latter. Let us use
DIR-x to mean “the DIR-M or a DIR-B or a DIR-A.”
An important design goal of the DIR net is that of being fault-tolerant. This
is accomplished also through a failure detection protocol that will be described
Time-out Caller Action Cyclic?
tIA SET DIR-x On TimeNow + dIA SET do send mIA SET ALARM to Caller Yes
tIA CLR IAT On TimeNow + dIA CLR do send mIA CLR ALARM to IAT Yes
Table 3: Description of time-outs tIA SET and tIA CLR.
Message Receiver Explanation Action
mIA SET ALARM DIR-x Time to set IAF IAF ← TRUE
mIA CLR ALARM IAT k Time to check IAF if (IAF ≡ FALSE) SendAll(mTEIF, k)
else IAF ← FALSE,
Table 4: Description of messages mIA SET ALARM and mIA CLR ALARM.
in the rest of this section.
2.2.1 The DIR net failure detection protocol
Our protocol consists of a local part and a distributed part. Each of them is
realized through our TOM class.
DIR net protocol: local component. As already mentioned, each
processing node hosts a DIR-x and an IAT. These two components run a
simple algorithm: they share a local Boolean variable, the I’m Alive Flag
(IAF). The DIR-x has to set periodically the IAF to TRUE while the IAT
periodically has to check that this has indeed occurred and reverts IAF to
FALSE. If the IAT finds the IAF set to FALSE it broadcasts message mTEIF
(“this entity is faulty”).
The just mentioned cyclic tasks can be easily modeled via two time-outs,
tIA SET and tIA CLR, described in Table 3 and Table 4 (TimeNow being the
system function returning the current value of the clock register).
Note that the time-outs’ alarm functions do not clear/set the flag—doing so a
hung DIR-x would go undetected. On the contrary, these functions trigger the
transmission of messages that once received by healthy components trigger the
execution of the meant actions.
The following is a pseudo-code for the IAT algorithm:
The IAT k executes as follows :
timeout t tIA CLR;
msg t activationMessage, m;
tom declare(❀tIA CLR, TOM CYCLIC,
TOM SET ENABLE, IAT CLEAR TIMEOUT, 0, dIA CLR);
tom set action(❀tIA CLR, actionSendmIA CLR ALARM);
tom insert(❀tIA CLR);
Receive(activationMessage );
forever {
Receive(m);
if (m.type ≡ mIA CLR ALARM)
if (IAF ≡ TRUE) IAF ← FALSE;
else SendAll(mTEIF, k); delete timeout(❀tIA CLR);
}
actionSendmIA CLR ALARM() { Send(mIA CLR ALARM, IAT k); }
The time-out formulation of the DIR-x is given in next section.
2.2.2 DIR net protocol: distributed component
The resilience of the DIR net to crash faults comes from the DIR-M and the
DIR-B’s running a distributed algorithm of failure detection.
Algorithm DIR-M. Let us call mid the node hosting the DIR-M and b the
number of processing nodes that host a DIR-B. The DIR-M has to send
cyclically a mMIA (“Manager-Is-Alive”) message to all the DIR-B’s each time
time-out tMIA A expires—this is shown in the right side of Fig. 3. Obviously this
is a multiplicity b “repeat” construct, which can be easily managed through a
cyclic time-out with an action that signals that a new cycle has begun. In this
case the action is “send a message of type mMIA A ALARM to the DIR-M.”
The manager also expects periodically a (mTAIA, i) message
(“This-Agent-Is-Alive”) from each node where a DIR-B is expected to be
running. This is easily accomplished through a vector of (tTAIA A,~ı) time-outs.
The left part of Fig. 3 shows this for node i. When time-out (tTAIA A, p) expires
it means that no (mTAIA, p) message has been received within the current
period. In this case the DIR-M enters a so called “suspicion period”. During
such period the manager has to try to tell a late DIR-B from a crashed one.
This is done by inserting a non-cyclic time-out, namely (tTEIF A, p).
During the suspicion period only one out of the following three events may
take place:
1. A late (mTAIA, p) is received.
2. A (mTEIF, p) from IAT at node p is received.
3. Nothing comes in and the time-out expires.
In case 1, one gets out of the suspicion period, concludes that DIR-B at node p
was simply late and goes back waiting for the next (mTAIA, p). A wrong
deduction at this point is possible and will be detected in one of next cycles.
Adjustments of the deadlines are possible but not dealt with here for the sake
of simplicity of description.
Figure 3: The algorithm of the DIR-M.
If 2 is the case the remote component is assumed to have crashed though its
node is still working properly, as the IAT on that node still gives signs of life.
Therefore an error recovery step is initiated. This includes sending a “WAKEUP”
message to the remote IAT so that it spawns another DIR-B on that node.
In case 3 the entire node is assumed to have crashed and node recovery is
initiated.
Underlying assumption of our algorithm is that the IAT is so simple that if it
fails then the whole node can be safely assumed to have failed.
Algorithm DIR-B. This algorithm is also divided into two concurrent
tasks. In the first one DIR-B on node i has to cyclically send (mTAIA, i)
messages to the manager, either in piggybacking or on expiring of time-out
tTAIA B. This is represented in the right side of Fig. 4.
The DIR-B’s in turn periodically expect a mMIA message from the DIR-M. As
evident when comparing Fig. 3 with Fig. 4, the DIR-B algorithm is very
similar to the one of the manager: also DIR-B enters a suspicion period when
its manager does not appear to respond quickly enough—this period is
managed via time-out tTEIF B, the same way as in DIR-M. Also in this case one
can get out of this state in one out of three possible ways: either
1. a late (mMIA B ALARM,mid) is received, or
2. a (mTEIF,mid) sent by the IAT at node mid is received, or
3. nothing comes in and the time-out expires.
In case 1 one gets out of the suspicion period, concludes that manager was
simply late, goes back to normal state and starts waiting for the next
(mMIA,mid) message. Also in this case, a wrong deduction shall be detected in
next cycles. If 2, one concludes that the manager has crashed though its node
is still working properly, as its IAT acted as expected. Therefore a manager
recovery phase is initiated similarly to the DIR-B recovery step described in
Sect. 2.2.2. In case 3 the node of the manager is assumed to have crashed,
elect a new manager among the DIR-B’s, and perform a node recovery phase.
Table 5 summarizes the DIR-M and DIR-B algorithms.
Time-out Caller Action Cyclic?
tMIA A DIR-M Every dMIA A do send mMIA A ALARM to DIR-M Yes
tTAIA A[i] DIR-M Every dTAIA A do send (mTAIA A ALARM, i) to DIR-M Yes
tTEIF A[i] DIR-M On TimeNow + dTEIF A do send (mTEIF A ALARM, i) to DIR-M No
tTAIA B DIR-B j Every dTAIA B do send mTAIA B ALARM to DIR-B j Yes
tMIA B DIR-B j Every dMIA B do send mMIA B ALARM to DIR-B j Yes
tTEIF B DIR-B j On TimeNow + dTEIF B do send mTEIF B ALARM to DIR-B j No
Message Receiver Explanation Action
(mTAIA, i) DIR-M DIR-B i is OK (Re-)Insert or renew tTAIA A[i]
mMIA A ALARM DIR-M A new heartbeat is required Send mMIA to all DIR-B’s
mTAIA A ALARM DIR-M Possibly DIR-B i is not OK Delete tTAIA A[i], insert tTEIF A[i]
(mTEIF, i) DIR-M DIR-B i crashed Declare DIR-B i crashed
(mTEIF A ALARM, i) DIR-M Node i crashed Declare node i crashed
mMIA DIR-B j DIR-M is OK Renew tMIA B
mTAIA B ALARM DIR-B j A new heartbeat is required Send (mTAIA, j) to DIR-M
mMIA B ALARM DIR-B j Possibly DIR-M is not OK Delete tMIA B, insert tTEIF B
mTEIF DIR-B j DIR-M crashed Declare DIR-M crashed
mTEIF B ALARM DIR-B j DIR-M’s node crashed Declare DIR-M’s node crashed
Table 5: Time-outs and messages of DIR-M and DIR-B.
Figure 4: Algorithm DIR-B.
The DIR net was developed using the Windows TIRAN libraries (Botti et al.,
2000) and the cweb system of structured documentation. Figures 5–8 show the
DIR net at work in a system consisting of just a DIR-M and a DIR-B. Two
ancillary processes called SocketServers are used to manage UDP
communication.
2.2.3 Special services
Configuration. The management of a large number of time-outs may be an
error prone task. To simplify it, the configuration language of Chapter 6 was
used. Figure 9 shows an example of configuration script to specify the
structure of the DIR net (in this case, a four node system with three DIR-B’s
deployed on nodes 1–3 and the DIR-M on node 0) and of its time-outs. A
translator produces the C header files to properly initialize an instance of the
DIR net.
Figure 5: A DIR net consisting of a DIR-B (top left picture) and a DIR-M
(bottom left). Pictures on the right portray the “SocketServers”, i.e. ancillary
processes managing communication.
Figure 6: Time-out tTAIA A expires, meaning that expected message mTAIA has
not been received within the corresponding deadline dTAIA A. As a result, tTEIF A
is inserted. This corresponds to action “At time TimeNow + dTEIF A check
whether mTEIF has arrived”.
Figure 7: A DIR-B is stopped. Time-out tTEIF A expires and as a result, the
assistant is tagged as “faulty”.
Figure 8: The DIR-B is restarted. As a result, it begins sending mTAIA messages.
Upon receiving, the manager tags the assistant as “OK.”
Figure 9: An excerpt from the configuration script of the DIR net.
2.2.4 Fault injection
Time-outs may also be used to specify fault injection actions with fixed or
pseudo-random deadlines. In the DIR net this is done as follows. First the
time-out is defined:
#ifdef INJECT
tom_declare(&inject, TOM_NON_CYCLIC, TOM_SET_ENABLE,
INJECT_FAULT_TIMEOUT, i, INJECT_FAULT_DEADLINE);
tom_insert(tom, &inject);
#endif
The alarm of this time-out sends the local DIR-x a message of type
“INJECT FAULT TIMEOUT”. Figure 10 shows an excerpt from the actual main
loop of the DIR-M in which this message is dealt with.
Fault tolerance. A service such as TOM is indeed a single-point-of-failure
in that a failed TOM brings the local DIR net components to the impossibility
to perform their failure detection protocols. Such a case would be
indistinguishable from that of a crashed node by the other DIR net
components. As well known from, e.g., (Inquiry, 1996), a single design fault in
TOM’s implementation could bring the system to a global failure.
Nevertheless, the isolation of a service for time-out management may pave the
Figure 10: An excerpt from the cweb source of the DIR net: the beginning of
Code Section 18 (loop of the DIR-M).
way for a cost-effective adoption of multiple-version software fault tolerance
techniques (Lyu, 1998) such as the well known recovery block (Randell & Xu,
1995) or N -version programming (Aviz˘ienis, 1995). No such technique has
been adopted in the current implementation of TOM.
2.3 Conclusions
A tentative lingua franca for the expression of failure detection protocols was
introduced. TOM encloses the advantages of being simple, elegant and not
ambiguous. Obvious are the many positive relapses that would come from the
adoption of a standard, semi-formal representation with respect to the current
Babel of informal descriptions—easier acquisition of insight, faster verification,
and greater ability to rapid-prototype software systems.
Given the current lack of a network service for failure detection, the
availability of standard methods to express failure detectors in the application
layer is an important asset: a tool like the one described in this chapter isolates
and crystallizes a part of the complexity required to express failure detection
protocols. This complexity becomes transparent of the designer—which saves
development times and costs—and eligible for cost-effective optimizations.
Separation of design concerns is not among the design goals of our tool, which
provides the programmer with a library. Hence, our tool is characterized by
bad . is not applicable, as TOM only targets one fault-tolerance provisions,
i.e. failure detectors. No is considered, but in principle the server side of our
system could be designed with adaptivity in mind, e.g., masking the actual
number of failure detectors being used. Similar considerations apply to the
DIR net.
As a final remark it is noteworthy to remark how, at the core of our design
choices, is the selection of C and literate programming, which proved to be
invaluable tools to reach our design goals. Nevertheless these choices may turn
into intrinsic limitations for the expressiveness of the resulting language. In
particular, they enforce a syntactical and semantic structure, that of the C
programming language, which may be regarded as a limitation by those
researchers who are not accustomed to that language. At the same time we
would like to remark also that those very choices allow us a straightforward
translation of our constructs into a language like Promela (Holzmann, 1991),
which resembles very much a C language augmented with Hoare’s
CSP (Hoare, 1978). Accordingly, our future work in this framework shall
include the adoption of the Promela extension of Prof. Bosˇnacˇki, which allows
for the verification of concurrent systems that depend on timing
parameters (Bosˇnacˇki & Dams, 1998). Interestingly enough, this version of
Promela includes new objects, called discrete time countdown timers, which
are basically equivalent to our non-cyclic time-outs. Our goal is to come up
with a tool that generates from the same literate programming source (1) a
pretty printout in TEX, (2) C code ready to be compiled and run, and (3)
Promela code to verify some properties of the protocol.
3 CONCLUSION
The role of failure detection in dependable computing has been explained.
Several examples of failure detection protocols have been described in a
uniform way based on the time-out management system used in TIRAN to
realize the algorithm used by the Backbone to detect and tolerate crash
failures of nodes and Backbone components. That algorithm has been also
described with time-outs as a case study.
Failure detectors are being studied intensively by many research groups
throughout the world. Future work in our group at the University of Antwerp
will focus on the expression of failure detection services for service-oriented
architectures.
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HYBRID APPROACHES
1 INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES
This chapter describes some hybrid approaches for application-level software
fault-tolerance. All the approaches reported in the rest of this chapter exploit the
recovery language approach introduced in Chapter 6 and couple it with other tools and
paradigms described in other parts of this book. Objective of this chapter is to
demonstrate howRεL can serve as a tool to further enhance some of the
application-level fault-tolerance paradigms introduced in previous chapters.
But why hybrid approaches in the first place? The main reason is that joining two or
more concepts and their “system structures” (Randell, 1975), that is, the conceptual
and syntactical axioms used in disparate application-level software fault-tolerance
provisions, one comes up with a tool with better Syntactical Adequacy (the SA
attribute introduced in Chapter 2). As already mentioned, a wider syntactical structure
can facilitate the expression of our codes, while on the contrary awkward structures
often lead to clumsy, buggy applications. Hybrid approaches are often more versatile
and may also inspire brand new designs. A drawback of hybrid approaches is that they
are modifications of existing designs. The extra design complexity must be carefully
added to prevent the introduction if design faults in the architecture.
Which approaches to make use of is an important design choice. In some cases this
may be under the control of the programmer: An example could be for instance, using
a fault-tolerance library such as EFTOS to create a library of fault-tolerance
meta-objects with OpenC++. Section 3 and Sect. 3 are other examples of this case.
More ambitious goals would definitely require the design of new frameworks or
architectures, such as it is the case for the model described in next section and the
system in Sect. 5.
The first case is that ofRεLinda, a model couplingRεL with generative
communication, introduced in Sect. 2. Section 3 then shows how to useRεL to
enhance the resiliency of N-modular redundant systems by using spare components.
A similar method is used in Sect. 4 to come up with flexible and dependable watchdog
timers. Finally, Cactus is introduced—a system coupling a sort of recovery language
with single-version software fault-tolerance mechanisms.
2 A DEPENDABLE PARALLEL PROCESSING
MODEL BASED ON GENERATIVE
COMMUNICATION AND RECOVERY
LANGUAGES
As already remarked, redundancy is an important ingredient at the basis of both
parallel computing and dependable computing. In other words, the availability of
redundancy and a proper management of the available redundancy can be exploited to
reach both functional objectives, such as high performance, and non-functional goals
such as the ones at the core of this book, for instance high availability and data
integrity.
Indeed, the truly extended use of parallel computing technologies asks for effective
software engineering techniques to design, develop and maintain dependable parallel
software—that is, it requires expressive programming models capable to make
effective use of the available redundancy for capturing both the above classes of goals.
This happens because any computing service based on parallel computing
technologies must be designed in such a way as (1) to face and counterbalance the
inherently lower level of dependability that characterizes any parallel hardware, due to
the considerably higher probability for events such as a node’s permanent or
temporary failure in any such highly redundant system; and (2) to match the involved
algorithms to the target hardware platform, so as to exploit optimally the available
redundancy and reach, e.g., the expected performance.
One can conclude that, in order to be able to set up parallel computing services
actually capable to provide their users with the expected high quality of service, it is
important that the designers have at their disposal effective structuring techniques and
software engineering methodologies for developing and maintaining dependable
parallel services: lacking these techniques, the complexity pertaining to the
management of the purely functional aspects, i.e., the service, the aspects related to
the performance, i.e., the parallelism, and those related to fault tolerance, would
jeopardize the design of the service increasing both its development times and costs
and the probability of introducing design faults. Considering all the above and the
main lessons learned exposed in this book, one can conclude that a simple and
coherent structuring technique for dependable and parallel services, providing
straightforward and effective means to control their complexity, would be a key factor
for the wide-spreading of parallel computing technologies.
This chapter describes a novel software engineering methodology and structuring
technique,RεLinda, whose main goals include separation of design concerns,
dynamic adaptability of the service to varying environmental conditions, and
expressiveness. Such technique provides a parallel programming model that couples
the recovery language approach described in Chapter 5 and generative
communication (Gelernter, 1985) i.e., the well-known model of communication of
systems such as, for instance, Linda (Carriero & Gelernter, 1989) or
JavaSpaces (Oaks & Wong, 2000) briefly introduced in Chapter 4. RεLinda provides
its users with a single model for both parallel and dependable programming, and it is
our conjecture that this single software framework provides both the elegance of
generative communication and the effectiveness of recovery languages and, as such, is
a valuable design tool for the composition of parallel, and dependable, services.
A prototypic implementation of some components of aRεLinda architecture took
place in the framework of the ESPRIT project TIRAN, also introduced in Chapter 5.
The key characteristic of the reported technique is that it allows structure the target
application into three distinct components, respectively responsible for (1) the
functional service, including its performance aspects, (2) the management of the
fault-tolerance provisions, and (3) the adaptation to the current environmental
conditions. As such it provides another solution to the problem of an optimal
expression of fault-tolerance protocol whose fault model is not fixed once and for all
but changes with the actual faults being experienced.
In what follows theRεLinda approach, its models and elements are described.
2.1 TheRεLinda Approach
This section describes theRεLinda approach. It is structured into two parts. First, the
system and application models are provided in Sect. 2.1.1. After that, in Sect. 2.1.2,
the basic ideas behindRεLinda are exposed. A key component is then described in
§2.1.3, which also points out the key relation between the recovery language approach
andRεLinda.
2.1.1 System and Application Models
The target system forRεLinda is assumed to be a distributed or parallel system. Basic
components of this system are the nodes, the tasks, and the communication network.
In particular,
• a node can be, e.g., a workstation in a networked cluster or a processor in a
MIMD parallel computer. The number of available nodes is n, n > 0. Nodes
can be commercial-off-the-shelf hardware components with no special
provisions for hardware fault-tolerance.
• Tasks are independent threads of execution running on the nodes.
• The network system allows tasks on different nodes to communicate with each
other with the same properties described in Chapter 5 for the TIRAN
architecture.
A general-purpose operating system (OS) is required on each node. No special
purpose, distributed, or fault-tolerant OS is assumed to be required. The system is
assumed to obey the timed asynchronous distributed system model (Cristian & Fetzer,
1999) (see Chapter 2).
The following assumptions characterize the user application:
• the service is supplied by a parallel application;
• it is written or is to be written in a procedural or object-oriented language such
as, e.g., C or Java;
• the service specification includes non-safety-critical dependability goals;
• the target application is characterized by soft real-time requirements. In
particular, performance failures (Cristian, 1991) may occasionally show up
during error recovery;
• communication is based on the GC model. User tasks communicate exclusively
through functions with the semantics of the Linda primitives—in(), out(), rd(),
and their non-blocking versions, inp() and rdp().
• task management and, in particular, task creation and termination, is done
respectively via a function with the semantics of the Linda primitive eval() and
via function lave(), which terminates the matching active tuples.
2.1.2 RεLinda
Herein the elements of theRεLinda approach and some key components of its
architecture are described.
To the performance-oriented designer,RεLinda appears as a standard Linda-like
system. In addition to standard tuples, created by the user via function out(),RεLinda
supports a special class of tuples, called error notifications (ENs). Error notifications
are special, read-only tuples1 that represent error detections such as, for instance
“divide-by-zero exception caught while executing task 11,” sent by a trap handling
tool, and have the following structure:
(“ERROR”,m, t, e, v[1 . . . e]),
wherem is an integer that identifies an error detector (see later on), t is an integer that
identifies a task found in error bym, e is an integer, e ≥ 0, and v is a vector of e
integers describing the current error detection. By agreement, neither function out()
nor function eval() are allowed specify tuples with the same structure as the error
notifications. This means that the programmer has no direct way to emit an error
notification2. Indeed, error notifications can only be produced by:
• A set of tools addressing error detection and fault masking, collectively called
“error detectors” (EDs). EDs are tools similar to those of SwIFT (see
Chapter 3) or the TIRAN Dtools (see Chapter 5), and provide services such as,
e.g., watchdog timers and software voting (a system like the EFTOS Voting
Farm could be used for that, see Chapter 3 (De Florio, Deconinck, &
Lauwereins, 1998)3;
• a failing eval();
• or a failing assert(), the latter being a function with the semantics of the C
standard library function with the same name (Kernighan & Ritchie, 1988).
On the other hand, each user task has free read-only access to the error notifications,
and hence can query the current status of any task t—according to its error detectors.
This can be used to unblock potentially dangerous deadlock conditions, such as two
Table 1: Scheme of execution of TS when it processes request r.
1 Begin request (r) : 7 update α-count (r)
2 if tuple type (r) 6= EN then 8 insert EN tuple (r)
3 insert plain tuple (r) 9 awake recovery interpreter (r)
4 return SUCCESS 10 return SUCCESS
5 endif 11 endif
6 if sender = ED then 12 return FAILURE
tasks where each of them is waiting for the other to become available for
processing—by simply specifying, as an unblocking condition, the availability of the
error notification describing that the other task is being found in error.
As it is for “plain” Linda systems, also theRεLinda architecture foresees a tuple space
manager (TS). The latter is a distributed application, constituted of c components,
where 1 ≤ c ≤ n, each of which is located on a different node of the system. As a
whole, the TS executes the algorithm of mutual suspicion, that is, the fault tolerance
distributed algorithm described in Chapter 5 which allows tolerate up to c− 1 crash
failures affecting either its components or the nodes hosting them.
Tuples are stored by the tuple space manager into a database that is replicated on each
of its c components. Each time a new request for insertion of either an error
notification or a “plain” tuple reaches the tuple space manager, it is processed
according to the following scheme, also summarized in Table 1:
• If the request pertains to a “plain” tuple, the latter is inserted in the tuple space.
This implies updating the remote copies of the database.
• Otherwise, if the ES was sent by an error detector,
– first, a field of the database, called α-counter is updated (see below for
more details on this);
– then the error notification is inserted as a plain tuple; and
– (3) a RINT recovery interpreter is started (see Chapter 5 for a description
of RINT).
Field α-counter is a task-specific variable that is processed according to the
threshold-based statistical technique known as α-count and described in Chapter 5.
As explained there, this technique is capable of assessing whether a task is affected by
a transient vs. a permanent or intermittent fault; as such, it allows express fault-aware
error recovery strategies.
Apart from managing tuples and error notifications, the tuple space manager also
keeps track of the current structure and state of the system, the user application, and
itself. These data are used at error recovery time as described in the following text.
2.1.3 RεLinda Error Recovery Component
The execution of the recovery actions is done via a fixed (i.e., special-purpose)
scheme, portrayed in the sequence diagram of Fig. 1: as soon as an error is detected, a
Figure 1: Scheme of execution of a RεLinda-compliant distributed application: to-
gether with the application, two special-purpose tasks are running—a distributed tuple
space manager, which stores both the error notifications sent by the error detectors and
the “plain” tuples requested via out() or eval(), and a “recovery application”, i.e., a
task responsible for the execution of a set of recovery actions. The shown sequence
diagram describes the execution of the user-specified recovery actions.
notification describing that event is sent to a distributed entity responsible for the
collection and the management of these notifications. Clearly, inRεLinda this entity is
the TS and the above mentioned notifications are the ENs.
Immediately after storing each notification, the guards of the recovery actions are
evaluated. Guards evaluation is done by querying the database of the TS. When a
guard is found to be true, its corresponding actions are executed, otherwise they are
skipped.
As a conclusive remarkRεLinda may be described as a specialization (in
object-oriented terminology) of the general abstract classRεL addressing parallel
programming.
2.2 Conclusions
This section has exposed the key ideas behind a novel approach calledRεLinda,
coupling Generative Communication with the theRεL approach introduced in
Chapter 6. As such,RεLinda is an attempt to explicitly address both the dependability
and the performance aspects making use of a single design framework. RεLinda offers
a high degree of separation of design concerns, such that the functional and the FT
aspects do not conflict with each other. Its dynamic adaptability to varying
environmental conditions, which may obtained as described in (De Florio, 2000)
through dynamic linking of the r-code, is another important feature ofRεLinda. SA in
RεLinda is limited to those fault-tolerance provisions that better match its model; in
particular, the strong link with parallel computing makes it especially in line with
methods such as MVSFT (see Chapter 3).
Several other important topics related toRεLinda’s components could be investigated
in the future. Such topics include, for instance, the inclusion in the TS of the concept
of so-called “book-kept tuples,” i.e., tuples that are distributed to requesters by means
of the algorithm of RAFTNET for dependable farmer worker applications described
in Chapter 3. This strategy translates into effective and elegant support to highly
performing and highly dependable data-parallel applications. Another research path is
the extension of these schemes towards persistent object stores (Oaks & Wong,
2000) and CORBA-compliant or service-oriented middleware. Other strategies to
further increase the dependability ofRεLinda applications are, e.g., the possibility to
combine multiple tuple space operations into atomic transactions (Bakken &
Schlichting, 1995; Anderson & Shasha, 1991; Cannon & Dunn, 1992). Other
techniques that could be investigated to further enhance the dependability of the tuple
space could be e.g., tuple space checkpoint-and-rollback (Kambhatla, 1991).
3 ENHANCING A TIRAN DEPENDABLE
MECHANISM
As observed by the designers of GUARDS (Powell et al., 1999), many embedded
systems may benefit from an hardware architecture based on redundancy and
consensus in order to fulfill their dependability requirements. As pointed out in
Chapter 2, such a hardware architecture needs to be coupled with some
application-level strategy or mechanism in order to guarantee end-to-end tolerance of
faults4. The software architecture described in this book may support in many ways
the class of applications eligible for being embedded in a GUARDS system instance.
The main tool for this is the TIRAN Distributed Voting mechanism (derived from the
EFTOS Voting Farm described in Chapter 3). This section describes how it is possible
to further increase the dependability of the TIRAN Distributed Voting mechanism by
using ARIEL as both a configuration and a recovery language and making use of the
TIRAN framework. An assessment of these enhancements is reported in Chapter 10.
The system realizes a sophisticated N -version programming executive that
implements the software equivalent of an NMR system. Because of this assumption,
the user is required to supply four versions of the same software, designed and
developed according to the N -version approach (Aviz˘ienis, 1985). This requirement
can be avoided if it is possible to assume safely that no design faults resulting in
correlate failures affect the software.
To simplify the case study it is assumed that the service provided by any of the
versions or instances is stateless. When this is not the case, the management of the
spare would also call for a forward recovery mechanism—e.g., the spare would need
to acquire the current state of one of the non-faulty tasks. Furthermore, when using
pipelines of N-version tasks under strict real-time requirements, further techniques
(currently not part of the prototype presented in this work) would be required in order
to restore the state of the spare with no repercussion on the real-time goals
(see (Bondavalli, Di Giandomenico, Grandoni, Powell, & Rabe´jac, 1998) for an
example of these techniques).
The enhanced TIRAN Distributed Voting mechanism described in what follows is
representative of the class of applications that are best eligible for being addressed via
an application-level fault-tolerance structure such as NVP. This section describes how
RεL provides to those applications two additional features, namely, support of spares
and support of fault-specific reconfiguration, which are not part of plain NVP systems.
A system of four nodes is assumed. Nodes are identified by the symbolic constants
NODE1, . . ., NODE4, defined in the header file nodes.h. Header file
my_definitions.h contains a number of user definitions, including the unique-id
of each version task (VERSION1, . . ., VERSION4) and the local identifier of each
version task (in this case, on each node the same identifier is used, namely
VERSION). In the same file also the time-outs of each version are defined
(TIMEOUT_VERSION1, . . ., TIMEOUT_VERSION4).
Let us consider the following ARIEL script:
INCLUDE "nodes.h"
INCLUDE "my definitions.h"
TASK {VERSION1} IS NODE {NODE1}, TASKID {VERSION}
TASK {VERSION2} IS NODE {NODE2}, TASKID {VERSION}
TASK {VERSION3} IS NODE {NODE3}, TASKID {VERSION}
TASK {VERSION4} IS NODE {NODE4}, TASKID {VERSION}
N-VERSION TASK {TMR PLUS ONE SPARE}
VERSION 1 IS TASK {VERSION1} TIMEOUT {TIMEOUT VERSION1}ms
VERSION 2 IS TASK {VERSION2} TIMEOUT {TIMEOUT VERSION2}ms
VERSION 3 IS TASK {VERSION3} TIMEOUT {TIMEOUT VERSION3}ms
VERSION 4 IS SPARE TASK {VERSION4} TIMEOUT {TIMEOUT VERSION4}ms
VOTING ALGORITHM IS MAJORITY
METRIC "tmr cmp"
ON SUCCESS TASK 20
ON ERROR TASK 30
END N-VERSION
IF [ PHASE (T{VERSION1}) == {HAS FAILED} || FAULTY T{VERSION1} ]
THEN
STOP T{VERSION1}
SEND {WAKEUP} T{VERSION4}
SEND {VERSION1} T{VERSION4}
SEND {VERSION4} T{VERSION2}
SEND {VERSION4} T{VERSION3}
FI
IF [ PHASE (T{VERSION2}) == {HAS FAILED} || FAULTY T{VERSION2} ]
THEN
STOP T{VERSION2}
SEND {WAKEUP} T{VERSION4}
SEND {VERSION2} T{VERSION4}
SEND {VERSION4} T{VERSION1}
SEND {VERSION4} T{VERSION3}
FI
IF [ PHASE (T{VERSION3}) == {HAS FAILED} || FAULTY T{VERSION3} ]
THEN
STOP T{VERSION3}
SEND {WAKEUP} T{VERSION4}
SEND {VERSION3} T{VERSION4}
SEND {VERSION4} T{VERSION2}
SEND {VERSION4} T{VERSION1}
FI
The above script consists of two parts—one for managing the configuration of tasks
and tools, the other for describing a recovery strategy. The following two subsections
describe the two parts.
3.1 Configuration
The configuration section of the script just shown defines four tasks, each running on
a different node of the system. This decision has been taken to reduce the probability
of a common source for multiple failures, in case of a crash of a node. It is worth
noting that this design decision—the physical location of the tasks—is made outside
the application code and can be changed with no repercussion on it, thus allowing
location transparency and high SC.
Three of the four tasks are then configured as versions of a TIRAN Distributed Voting
mechanism (derived from the EFTOS Voting Farm described in Chapter 3). The
fourth task (VERSION4) is configured as a spare. This means that, when task
TMR PLUS ONE SPARE is launched, the first three tasks arrange themselves as
components of a TIRAN Distributed Voting mechanism, with each task assisted by a
local voter as described in the aforementioned section. On the contrary, the fourth task
is blocked waiting for the arrival of a special “wakeup” signal.
Feeding the ARIEL translator with the configuration script as described in Chapter 6, a
number of source codes are produced, including:
• The basic user tasks of a TIRAN Distributed Voting mechanism consisting of
three modules, an example of which can be seen in Chapter 6 when configuring
multiple-version software fault-tolerance.
• The spare user task, initially waiting for the arrival of a wakeup message.
• Task TMR PLUS ONE SPARE. This task is in charge of the:
1. Transparent set up of the TIRAN Distributed Voting mechanism via the
TIRAN CreateTask function of the TIRAN Basic Services Library.
2. Management of the replication of the input value.
3. Declaration and insertion in the TIRAN TOM of the set of time-outs that
represent an upper limit to the duration of the base tasks. This upper limit
is set by the user and known by one of the hypotheses of the
timed-asynchronous distributed system model introduced in Chapter 2 (all
services are timed).
4. De-multiplexing and delivering the output value.
In the absence of faults, task TMR PLUS ONE SPARE would appear to the user as yet
another version providing the same service supplied by tasks
VERSION1,. . . ,VERSION4. The only difference would be in terms of a higher
reliability (see Chapter 10) and a larger execution time, mainly due to the voting
overhead.
Location transparency in this case is supported by ARIEL, while replication
transparency is supported by the TIRAN Distributed Voting mechanism. The degree
of code intrusion in the application source code is reduced to the one instruction to
spawn task TMR PLUS ONE SPARE. No support for the automatic generation of
makefiles is provided in the current version of the ARIEL translator, so the user needs
to properly instruct the compilation of the source files written by the translator.
3.2 Recovery
The recovery section of the ARIEL script on p. 267 defines a recovery strategy for task
TMR PLUS ONE SPARE. When any error is detected in the system and forwarded to
the backbone, the backbone replies to this stimulus as follows:
1. It stores the error notification in its local copy of the DB.
2. It updates the α-count variable related to the entity found in error.
3. If the notification is local, i.e., related to a local task, then the local component
of the BB forwards the notification to the other components.
4. If the local BB entity plays the role of coordinator, it initiates error recovery by
sending a “wakeup” message to the recovery interpreter.
This latter orderly reads and executes the r-codes. Table 2 shows a trace of the
execution of some of the r-codes produced when translating a simplified version of the
ARIEL script on p. 267. As already mentioned, RINT implements a virtual machine
with a stack architecture. Line 5 starts the scanning of a guard. Line 6 stores on
RINT’s run-time stack the current value of the phase of task 0 (the value of symbolic
constant VERSION1). Line 7 compares the top of the run-time stack with integer
HAS FAILED. The result, 0 (false) is stored on top of the stack. Line 8 checks the top
of the stack for being 0. The condition is fulfilled, so a jump is made to line 18 of the
r-code list. That line corresponds to the end of the current IF statement—the guard has
been found as false, therefore the corresponding recovery actions have been skipped.
Then, on line 19, some internal variables are reset. Line 20 starts the evaluation of the
clause of the second IF of the recovery script. The scenario is similar to the one just
described, though (on line 22) the phase of task 1 (that is, VERSION2) is found to be
equal to HAS FAILED. The following conditional jump is therefore skipped, and a
stream of recovery actions is then executed: task VERSION2 is terminated on line 24,
then value 10 (WAKEUP) is sent to task VERSION4 by means of r-code SEND (which
sends a task the top of the run-time stack), and so forth, until line 33, which closes the
current IF. A third guard is then evaluated and found as false. Clearing some internal
structures closes the execution of RINT, which again “goes to sleep” waiting for a
new “wakeup” message to arrive.
Figure 2, 3, and 4 show three different views to a TMR-and-one-spare system at work,
as displayed by the TIRAN monitoring tool in a Netscape client (De Florio,
Deconinck, Truyens, Rosseel, & Lauwereins, 1998). The first picture renders the
current state and shape of the overall target application. Figure 3 summarizes the
framework-level events related to processing node 0. In particular, a value domain
failure is injected on the voter on node 2. This triggers the execution of a recovery
script which reconfigures the TMR isolating the voter on node 2 and switching in the
spare voter on node 3. The execution trace of the r-codes in this script is displayed in
Fig. 4.
It is worth noting how, modifying the base recovery strategy of the ARIEL script on
p. 267 does not require any modification in the application source code—not even
recompiling the code, in case the r-codes are read from an external means (e.g., from a
file). The two design concerns—that of the fault-tolerance software engineer and that
of the application software engineer—are kept apart, with no repercussions on the
maintainability of the service overall. To prove this, let us consider the ARIEL excerpt
in Table 3. Such a strategy is again based on a TMR plus one spare, though now,
before switching off the faulty version and in the spare, the current value of the
α-count filter related to the current version is compared with a threshold supplied by
the user in the configuration section. If the value is below the threshold, it is not
possible to assess that the fault affecting {VERSION1} is permanent or intermittent.
In this case, the faulty task is restarted rather than substituted. In other words, another
chance is given to that version, while its “black list” (its α-counter) is updated. As
mentioned in Chapter 6, research studies have shown that, whatever the threshold, the
α-count is bound to exceed it when the fault is permanent or intermittent. In the latter
case, therefore, sooner or later the second strategy is to be executed, permanently
removing the faulty version. It is worth noting how the adoption of such a scheme,
which is no longer purely based on masking the occurrence of a fault, in general
implies an execution overhead that may violate the expected real-time
behavior—during error-recovery.
Further support towards graceful degradation when spares are exhausted could also be
foreseen.
5 IF statement.
6 STORE-PHASE: stored phase of task 0, i.e., 0.
7 COMPARING(9999 vs. 0): Storing 0.
8 Conditional GOTO, fulfilled, 18.
18 FI statement.
19 OA-RENEW.
20 IF statement.
21 STORE-PHASE: stored phase of task 1, i.e., 9999.
22 COMPARING(9999 vs. 9999): Storing 1.
23 Conditional GOTO, unfulfilled, 24.
24 KILLING TASK 1.
25 PUSH(10).
26 SEND MSG 10 to TASK 3.
27 PUSH(1).
28 SEND MSG 1 to TASK 3.
29 PUSH(3).
30 SEND MSG 3 to TASK 2.
31 PUSH(3).
32 SEND MSG 3 to TASK 0.
33 FI statement.
34 OA-RENEW.
35 IF statement.
36 STORE-PHASE: stored phase of task 2, i.e., 0.
37 COMPARING(9999 vs. 0): Storing 0.
38 Conditional GOTO, fulfilled, 48.
48 FI statement.
49 OA-RENEW.
Table 2: Trace of execution of the r-codes corresponding to the recovery section of the
ARIEL script on p. 267. Number 9999 is the value of constant HAS FAILED.
Figure 2: A global view of the state and shape of the target application, as rendered
by a monitoring CGI script. In this case a four processing node system is used. Node
0 hosts the main component of the backbone. The circular icons are hypermedia links
(see Fig. 5). The small icon on the bottom right links to the execution trace of the
ARIEL interpreter.
Figure 3: A view to the events tracked while monitoring processing node 0. This
view can be obtained by selecting the top circular icon of Fig. 2. Events are ordered
decreasingly with respect to their conclusion time. Times are expressed in seconds
and measured through the local clock. Going from bottom to top: on line 15 process
2 is detected as faulty. On 16, that process is terminated. On 17, a new process (a
spare voter) is awaken. On 18 and 20, respectively voter 0 and 1 acknowledge the
reconfiguration. This allows retry a global consensus that succeeds (see lines 21, 23,
and 24). Finally all voters acknowledge their termination.
Figure 4: As soon as an error is detected—in this case, a voter has been found in
minority—RINT starts executing the r-codes. This picture is the execution trace of the
r-codes in Table 6 and Table 9 of Chapter 6. Numbers refer to the code lines in those
tables. Note how, at line 37, the state information of task 2 is found to be equal to
“9999” (HAS FAILED). As a consequence, a number of actions are executed in lines
39–47. In particular, task 2 is terminated at line 39.
ALPHACOUNT {VERSION1} IS threshold = 3.0, factor = 0.4 END
IF [ PHASE (T{VERSION1}) == {HAS FAILED} || FAULTY T{VERSION1} ]
THEN
IF [ TRANSIENT T{VERSION1} ]
THEN
RESTART T{VERSION1}
SEND {VERSION1} T{VERSION2}
SEND {VERSION1} T{VERSION3}
ELSE
STOP T{VERSION1}
SEND {WAKEUP} T{VERSION4}
SEND {VERSION1} T{VERSION4}
SEND {VERSION4} T{VERSION2}
SEND {VERSION4} T{VERSION3}
FI
FI
Table 3: An ARIEL script for a TMR-plus-one-spare system that exploits the α-count
technique to avoid unnecessary reconfigurations.
3.3 Lessons learned
Enhancing the TIRAN Distributed Voting mechanism allowed include two special
services (spare support and fault-identification) into those offered by NVP systems.
For those applications that best match with the MV application-level fault-tolerance
approach, and with NVP in particular, those services allow further increase the
dependability without being detrimental to SC—i.e., without intruding code. Eligible
applications include coarse-grained, distributed or parallel applications, i.e., those
addressed byRεL. SA is clearly limited to the above class of provisions. A has not
been considered here, but the code separation of ARIEL could be used to achieve some
adaptability. Furthermore, safety-critical parallel or distributed airborne and
spaceborne applications appear to be well addressed by those services. It must be
remarked, though, that the safety-critical character of these applications calls for
specific framework-level and system-level support, such as the one provided by the
GUARDS architecture (Powell et al., 1999), a generic, parameterizable hardware and
OS architecture for real-time systems, which straightforwardly supports the NVP
scheme.
4 COMPOSING DEPENDABLE MECHANISMS:
THE REDUNDANTWATCHDOG
This section describes how it is possible to compose dependable mechanisms
addressing specific needs by means of theRεL architecture devised in TIRAN. The
case reported in the rest of this section originated by a requirement of one of the
TIRAN partners, ENEL SpA. In present day’s fault-tolerance systems at ENEL, a
hardware watchdog timer is available and integrated in several of their automation
applications. Such device is a custom (non-COTS) hardware component that is
capable of guaranteeing both high availability and high integrity. This allows its use in
contexts where safety is the main concern.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, ENEL has started an internal plan that aims at renewing
and enlarging their park of automation systems, also with the goal of improving their
efficiency and quality of service. Within this plan, ENEL is investigating the
possibility to substitute this hardware device with a software component, exploiting
the redundancy of COTS parallel or distributed architectures, in such a way as to
guarantee acceptable levels of safety and availability for their applications. While
taking part in TIRAN, CESI posed the above problems to the consortium. The TIRAN
consortium proposed the solution described in this section, based on theRεL
approach.
4.1 An Industrial Problem: The Redundant Watchdog
Requirements
Technicians of energy automation systems typically express requirements in textual
form, capturing the main dependability needs of the applications. Considering the
Primary Substation Automation System a list of dependability requirements has been
collected and addressed in the TIRAN project (Botti et al., 1999). In this section the
focus will be on two of those Application Requirements (referred as AR1 and AR2
below) that lead to the need of an enhanced watchdog mechanism. They are
formulated as follows:
AR1 : “If an erroneous situation can not be recovered according to required mode
and within given time constraints, then a mechanism for the auto-exclusion of
the system should be provided which, if not reset before the expiration of a
pre-fixed time-out, disconnects the system from the plant, leaving the plant in
an acceptable state, forcing the output to assume a pre-defined secure
configuration, providing appropriate signalling to the operator and to the remote
systems (as automation system failures should not affect the plant).”
AR2 : “The auto-exclusion should guarantee a high availability, integrity and security
— e.g. by a redundant and periodically tested mechanism, with
auto-diagnostics.”
The auto-exclusion functionality (as required by AR1 and AR2) has been traditionally
supported by the so-called plant’s watchdog (plantWD) mechanism, a dedicated
hardware device with high integrity and availability degrees. In most cases the
plantWD mechanism is used as an ultimate action of a fault tolerant strategy to detect
un-recovered processing errors and to avoid their propagation. Errors are typically
run-time violations occurring during the execution of an application process due to,
e.g., a process that has crashed or is slowed down.
The watchdog mechanism (WD) cyclically sets a timer requiring an application
process to explicitly reset it by sending an “I am alive” message before it reaches its
deadline. If, for any reason, the application process is not able to send the message,
the watchdog raises an error condition that has to be treated by some entity in some
way. Depending on the global fault tolerance strategy adopted our plantWD is set to
count either the double of or the same time of the basic application cycle.
In support of the migration to flexible software dependability services running on
COTS platforms, the goal of developing a robust, software-based WD mechanism has
been addressed by the TIRAN Project. A watchdog basic tool has been implemented
characterized by the following Watchdog Requirements (WR) and Properties (WP):
WR1 : “The WD has to survive at system reboot or reset, i.e. the memory it allocates
for its counter is not to be cleared.”
WR2 : “In a distributed software architecture the application node’s signals have to
be put in a logic AND to actually signal the WD, i.e. the WD effectively stops
to countdown only if on each node the execution has terminated correctly.”
WR3 : “The WD has to survive at node failures, i.e. whatever node faults the WD
mechanism should be not compromised.”
WR4 : In order to guarantee correct operation of the WD mechanism, it is mandatory
that the WD task is running at a higher priority than the tasks (that run on the
same node) it supervises. WD tasks supervising tasks on other nodes must have
appropriate priority to ensure proper operation. It is the responsibility of the
application writer to ensure correct partitioning and priority allocation.
WP1 : The watchdog task can be placed either on the same node where the
application tasks run on or on a different node.
WP2 : Placing the watchdog task on the same node where the application task runs
on minimizes overhead and detection latency.
WP3 : Placing the watchdog task on a different node with respect to the application
node lowers the probability of a common failure for both application and
watchdog task that would go undetected.
WP4 : Detection latency is under the control of the application writer. The higher the
frequency of sending “I’m alive” messages, the lower the detection latency.
WP5 : Overhead is under the control of the application writer. The lower is the
frequency of sending “I’m alive” messages, the lower is the overhead paid by
the application task and the communication system.
WP6 : WD is just one task which receives system clock ticks and application “I’m
alive” messages. Both types of messages are received through interprocess
communication and are asynchronous to WD task.
WP7 : Being the WD in a distributed software architecture it is able to receive
multiple signals and to apply a logical operation on them (i.e. in the case of the
logical operation AND required by WR1 the WD will fire if at least one node
does not produce its signal).
In Section 4 it will be shown how the requirement WR3 above may be fulfilled by
instantiating more WD mechanisms and by applying different voting mechanisms to
their firings. Such Redundant WatchDog (RWD) mechanism is characterized by the
following design properties:
RWP1 : Processing errors affecting WD replicas can be detected and recovered
transparently by the RWD
RWP2 : The number of WD replicas and the voting mechanism chosen determine a
different improvement of the RWD dependability: e.g. Nreplica=3, allows a
2-out-of-3 voting (which can correct up to 1 fault); the selection of the suitable
Nreplica and voting is a compromise among dependability and performance
overhead, left to the application writer’s experience.
RWP3 : WD replicas can be placed all on the same node. This minimizes overhead
and detection latency but does not increase the RWD dependability.
RWP4 : WD replicas can be placed on different nodes. This minimizes the chance of
a common failure affecting each WD replica.
4.2 The Strategy and Its Key Components
The strategy proposed within TIRAN exploits the following components:
• The Basic Services Library, and specifically its function TIRAN Send, which
multicasts a message to a logical, i.e., a group of tasks.
• The configuration support provided by ARIEL.
• The TIRAN BB and its DB.
• The recovery language ARIEL.
• The watchdog Basic Tool, i.e., a node-local software component in level 1.1 of
the TIRAN architecture (see Chapter 6 for a description of the TIRAN
architecture.)
The latter, which executes on a single processing node, can not guarantee the required
degree of availability when used as a substitute of the ENEL hardware watchdog. This
notwithstanding, the adoption of the above components allowed composing—rather
than programming—a new prototypic DM, the so-called Redundant Watchdog (RW).
This composition is made in terms of the above elements of the TIRAN framework,
with ARIEL playing the role of coordinator.
In order to introduce the strategy, the following scenario is assumed:
• A distributed system is available, consisting of three nodes, identified as N1, N2
and N3.
• On each node of this system, a number of application tasks and an instance of
the TIRAN watchdog are running.
The design goal to be reached is enhancing the dependability of this basic scheme by
means of a technique that does not overly increase, at the same time, the complexity
of the overall software tool.
The adopted strategy is now explained—each step has been tagged with a label
describing the mainRεL feature being exploited.
Configuration: Define and configure the three watchdogs by means of the provisions
described in Chapter 6. In particular,
• Assign them the unique-idsW1,W2, andW3.
• Specify that, on a missed deadline, a notification is to be sent to the
TIRAN BB.
• Deploy the watchdogs on different nodes.
Configuration: Define logical L, consisting of tasksW1,W2, andW3.
Recovery: Define in ARIEL an “AND-strategy”, that triggers an alarm when each and
every watchdog notifies the BB, an “OR-strategy”, in which the alarm is
executed when any of the three watchdog expires, and a “2-out-of-3 strategy”,
in which a majority of the watchdogs needs to notify the BB in order to trigger
the alarm. In the current prototype, the alarm is a notification to the task the
unique-id of which is A.
The configuration step is coded as in Table 4. Table 5 lists the recovery actions
corresponding to the AND-strategy.
When a watched task sends “watchdog L” its heartbeats, the Basic Services Library
relays these messages to the three watchdogs on the three nodes. In absence of faults,
the three watchdogs5 process these message in the same way—each of them in
particular resets the internal timer corresponding to the client task that sent the
heartbeat. When a heartbeat is missing, the three watchdogs expire and send a
notification to the BB, one at the time. The reply of the BB to these notifications is the
same: RINT is awoken and the r-codes are interpreted. The difference between the
three strategies is then straightforward:
• The OR-strategy triggers the alarm as soon as any of the watchdog expires. This
tolerates the case in which up to two watchdogs have crashed, or are faulty, or
are unreachable. This intuitively reduces the probability that a missing
heartbeat goes undetected, hence can be regarded as a “safety-first” strategy. At
INCLUDE "watchdogs.h"
TASK {W1} IS NODE {N1}, TASKID {W1}
TASK {W2} IS NODE {N2}, TASKID {W2}
TASK {W3} IS NODE {N3}, TASKID {W3}
WATCHDOG {W1}
HEARTBEATS EVERY {HEARTBEAT} MS
ON ERROR WARN BACKBONE
END WATCHDOG
WATCHDOG {W2}
HEARTBEATS EVERY {HEARTBEAT} MS
ON ERROR WARN BACKBONE
END WATCHDOG
WATCHDOG {W3}
HEARTBEATS EVERY {HEARTBEAT} MS
ON ERROR WARN BACKBONE
END WATCHDOG
LOGICAL {L} IS TASK {W1}, TASK {W2}, TASK {W3} END LOGICAL
Table 4: Configuration of the Redundant Watchdog.
IF [ PHASE (TASK{W1}) == {EXPIRE} AND
PHASE (TASK{W2}) == {EXPIRE} AND
PHASE (TASK{W3}) == {EXPIRE} ]
THEN
SEND {ALARM} TASK{A}
REMOVE PHASE LOGICAL {L} FROM ERRORLIST
FI
Table 5: The AND-strategy of the Redundant Watchdog. Action REMOVE resets the
phase corresponding to the tasks of logical L.
the same time, the probability of “false alarms” (mistakingly triggered alarms)
is increased. Such alarms possibly lead to temporary pauses of the overall
system service, and may imply costs.
• The AND-strategy, on the other hand, requires that all the watchdogs reach
consensus before triggering the system alarm. It decreases the probability of
false alarms but at the same time decreases the error detection coverage of the
watchdog Basic Tool. It may be regarded as an “availability-first” strategy.
• Strategy 2-out-of-3 requires that a majority of watchdogs expire before the
system alarm is executed. Intuitively, this corresponds to a trade-off between
the two above strategies.
More sophisticated strategies, corresponding to other design requirements, may also
be composed. Other schemes, such asmeta-watchdogs (watchdogs watching other
watchdogs) can also be straightforwardly set up.
5 Cactus
Cactus is a design framework and runtime system for implementing and executing
configurable services based on an event-driven execution model. As mentioned in
Chapter 2, configurable services such as configurable communication protocols, file
systems, database systems, and middleware are a useful approach to explicitate the
system and fault model requirements and a useful tool to reach truly portable services,
that is systems characterized by dynamic and adaptive system and fault models. One
such system is the Configurable Transport Protocol.
The Cactus programming model is a clever improvement on the classical layered
system design principle: Systems have a macroscopic structure, that is, the traditional
layers, called services in the Cactus terminology, and a microscopic structure, that is a
web of modules representing the atoms constituting the services and connected
non-hierarchically into a network of so-called “micro-protocols”. Non-hierarchically
means here that there is no communication restriction between modules, which can
exchange information and cooperate regardless their macroscopic position (that is,
even though the corresponding services are not contiguous to each other). This
structuring technique is said to provide the designer with a model coupling enhanced
flexibility with the required separation of design concerns.
In Cactus micro-protocols communicate through an even-driven execution model. In
the above mentioned Configurable Transport Protocol, for instance, all service
properties and functional components are implemented as micro-protocols, each of
which is a list of event handlers in the familiar form of guarded actions, i.e.,
statements structured like in
g : a,
where g is an event stating a significant change such as the arrival of a message and a
is one or more event handler assocuated to the guard g. When g occurs, a is executed.
This is clearly the same principle used in the recovery language Ariel discussed in
Chapter 6.
The Cactus designers did not choose to develop a custom event-based programming
language such as Ariel to specify its guarded actions—instead, they preferred to come
up with a set of conventions and a software library. This allowed produce Cactus
implementations in several languages, such as C and Java.
As explained in (Hiltunen, Taı¨ani, & Schlichting, 2006), Cactus has been used to build
services ranging from low-level communication protocols to group membership and
group remote procedure call. Application-level services such as a configurable
distributed system monitoring service have also been developed with Cactus.
The clever design choices of Cactus place it in between a system like Ariel and
library-based approaches; moreover, several similarities between Cactus and
aspect-oriented programming have been pointed out in (Hiltunen et al., 2006).
One concludes by assessing SC as bad (the system requires the explicit coding and
intertwining of the protocols), SA as limited (by Condor’s model and structure), and A
as potentially good (though dynamic trading of event handlers, e.g., appears not to be
part of Condor.)
6 CONCLUSIONS
The reported experiences demonstrate howRεL allows fast-prototype complex
strategies by composing a set of building blocks together out of those available in the
TIRAN framework, and by building system-wide, recovery-time coordination
strategies with ARIEL. This allows set up sophisticated fault-tolerance systems while
keeping the management of their complexity outside the user application. The
compact size of the ARIEL configuration scripts is one of the arguments that can be
used as evidence to this claim. Transparency of replication and transparency of
location are also reached in this case. No similar support is provided by the
application-level fault-tolerance approaches reviewed in Chapters 4–6.
As a final remark let us observe how SC is guaranteed here by a custom, separate
composition language (ARIEL), that SA is limited to the single class of addressed
provisions, and that the possibility to trade off strategies or compose new ones at
run-time brings to an excellent degree of A.
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1A read-only tuple is one that can only be read via either rd() or rdp().
2The rationale behind this decision is that, this way, the user cannot produce mock error notifications,
which would increase the risk of Byzantine failures (Lamport, Shostak, & Pease, 1982).
3If available, error detection support at driver or kernel level may be also instrumented so to emit ENs.
4This way, also software design faults would be addressed.
5In this case study, three instances of the same software component have been used. Clearly this does not
protect the system from design faults in the watchdog component itself. Using NVP when developing the
watchdogs may possibly guarantee statistical independence between failures.
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MEASURING AND ASSESSING TOOLS
1 INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES
As mentioned in Chapter 1, a service’s dependability must be justified in a
quantitative way and proved through extensive on-field testing and fault
injection, verification and validation techniques, simulation, source-code
instrumentation, monitoring, and debugging. An exhaustive treatment of all
these techniques falls outside the scope of this book, nevertheless the author
feels important to include in this text an analysis of the effect on dependability
of some of the methods that have been introduced in previous chapters.
2 RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF THE TIRAN
DISTRIBUTED VOTING MECHANISM
As mentioned in Chapter 9, a number of applications are structured in such a
way as to be straightforwardly embedded in a fault-tolerance architecture
based on redundancy and consensus. Applications belonging to this class are,
for instance, parallel airborne and spaceborne applications. The TIRAN
Distributed Voting mechanism provides application-level support to these
applications. This section analyses the effect on reliability of the
enhancements to the TIRAN Distributed Voting mechanism described in the
mentioned chapter, that is, management of spares, dealt with in Sect. 2.1, and
fault-specific recovery strategies supported by the α-count feature, analysed in
Sect. 2.2.
2.1 Using ariel to Manage Spares
This section analyses the influence of one of the features offered by ariel—its
ability to manage spare modules in N -modular redundant systems—that has
been introduced and discussed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 9.
Reliability can be greatly improved by this technique. Let us first consider the
following equation:
R(0)(t) = 3R(t)2 − 2R(t)3, (1)
i.e., the equation expressing the reliability of a TMR system with no spares,
R(t) being the reliability of a single, non-replicated (simplex) component.
Equation (1) can be derived for instance via Markovian reliability modeling
under the assumption of independence between the occurrence of
faults (Johnson, 1989).
With the same technique and under the same hypothesis it is possible to show
that, even in the case of non-perfect error detection coverage, this equation
can be considerably improved by adding one spare. This is the equation
resulting from the Markov model in Fig. 1, expressed as a function of error
recovery coverage (C, defined as the probability associated with the process of
identifying the failed module out of those available and being able to switch in
the spare (Johnson, 1989)) and time (t):
R(1)(C, t) = (−3C2 + 6C)× [R(t)(1−R(t))]2 +R(0)(t). (2)
Appendix A gives some mathematical details on Eq. (2).
Adding more spares obviously implies further improving reliability. In general,
for any N ≥ 3, it is possible to consider a class of monotonically increasing
reliability functions,
(R(M)(C, t))M>0, (3)
corresponding to systems adopting N +M replicas. Depending on both cost
and reliability requirements, the user can choose the most-suited values for M
and N .
Note how quantity (2) is always greater than quantity (1) as R(0)(t) and
(−3C2 + 6C) are always positive for 0 < C ≤ 1. Figure 2 compares Eq. (1)
and (2) in the general case while Fig. 3 covers the case of perfect coverage. In
the latter case, the reliability of a single, non-redundant (simplex) system is
also portrayed. Note furthermore how the crosspoint between the
three-and-one-spare system and the non-redundant system is considerably
lower than the crosspoint between the latter and the TMR
system—R(t) ≈ 0.2324 vs. R(t) = 0.5.
The reliability of the system can therefore be increased from the one of a pure
NMR system to that of N-and-M-spare systems (see Fig. 2 and Fig. 3).
2.2 Using the α-count Feature
As it has been already mentioned, the TRANSIENT clause of ariel, exploiting
the α-count fault identification mechanism introduced in Chapter 6, can be
adopted to associate different recovery or reconfiguration strategies:
• To the detection of a permanent or intermittent fault, in general
requiring reconfiguration and redundancy exhaustion,
• and to the detection of a transient fault, that could be tolerated with a
recovery technique such as resetting the faulty component.
This section describes a simple Markov reliability model of a TMR system
discriminating between these two cases. Figure 4 shows the model. T is the
probability that the current fault is a transient one and R is the probability of
Figure 1: Markov reliability model for a TMR-and-1-spare system. λ is the
failure rate, C is the error recovery coverage factor. A “fail safe” state is reached
when the system is no more able to correctly perform its function, though the
problem has been safely detected and handled properly. In ‘Fail unsafe,’ on the
contrary, the system is incorrect, though the problem has not been handled or
detected. Every other state is labeled with three digits, d1d2d3, such that d1 is
the number of non-faulty modules in the TMR system, d2 is the number of non-
faulty spares (in this case, 0 or 1), and d3 is the number of undetected, faulty
modules. The initial state, 310, has been highlighted. This model is solved by
Eq. (2).
Figure 2: Graphs of Eq. (1) and (2) as functions of C and of R. Note how the
graph of (2) is strictly above the other.
successful recovery for a component affected by a transient fault. To simplify
the model, recovery is assumed to be instantaneous. The system degrades only
when permanent faults occur. Solving the model brings to the following
equation:
Rαtmr(t) = 3 exp
−2(1−RT )λt−2 exp−3(1−RT )λt . (4)
Eq. 4 can be written as
Rαtmr(t) = 3R(t)
2(1−RT ) − 2R(t)3(1−RT ), (5)
with R(t) the reliability of the simplex system. Note how, in a sense, the
introduction of the α-count technique results in a modification of the
exponents of Eq. 1 by a factor equal to 1−RT .
In general, the resulting system shows a reliability that is larger than the one
of a TMR system. Figure 5 compares these reliabilities. As it is evident from
that image, the crosspoint between the reliability graphs of the simplex and
that of the TMR system extended with the α-count technique is in general
lower. Its exact value is given by the function
crosspoint(R, T ) = 0.51/(1−RT ),
which is drawn in Fig. 6.
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Figure 3: Graphs of Eq. (1) and (2) when C = 1 (perfect error detection cover-
age). The reliability of a single, non-redundant system is also portrayed.
3 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF
REDUNDANT VARIABLES
In Chapter 4 the concept of redundant variables was introduced: Data
structures in which the degree of replication is not fixed once and for all at
design time, but changes dynamically with respect to the disturbances
experienced during the run time. Here it is shown how the performance of our
approach was analyzed.
In order to analyze our system, a simulator, called “scrambler” was developed.
Our scrambler tool allows to simulate a memory, to protect it with redundant
variables, to inject memory faults (bit flips or “bursts” corrupting series of
contiguous cells), and to measure the amount of redundancy actually used.
Scrambler interprets a simple scripting language consisting of the following
commands:
SLEEP s , which suspends the execution of the scrambler for s seconds,
SCRAMBLE n, p , which repeats n times action “scramble a
pseudo-random memory cell with probability p”,
BURST n, p, l , which repeats n times action “scramble l contiguous cells
with probability p”,
Figure 4: The Markov reliability model of a TMR system that gracefully de-
grades in the presence of a permanent or intermittent fault and “cleans up”
(that is, rejuvenates) the components affected by transient faults.
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Figure 5: Reliability of a simplex system, of a TMR system, and of a modified
TMR system exploiting the α-count fault identification technique. In this case
T is 50% and R = 0.6.
Figure 6: The crosspoint between the graph of the reliability of the simplex
system and that of Rαtmr as a function of R and T .
END , which terminates the simulation.
The above commands can be used to compose a complex sequence of fault
injections. As an example, the following script, corresponds to the following
configuration: no faults for 1 second, then various disturbances occurring with
Gaussian distribution1, then no disturbances again for 5 seconds:
SLEEP 1 // sleep 1 sec
SCRAMBLE 2000, 0.1053992 // scramble 2000 random cells
// with probability f(-3)
SCRAMBLE 2000, 0.3678794 // scramble 2000 random cells
// with probability f(-2)
BURST 2000, 0.7788008, 10// execute 2000 bursts of 10
// contiguous cells
// with probability f(-1)
SCRAMBLE 2000, 1 // scramble 2000 random cells
BURST 2000, 0.7788008, 10// execute 2000 bursts of 10
// contiguous cells
// with probability f(1)
SCRAMBLE 2000, 0.3678794 // scramble 2000 random cells
// with probability f(2)
SCRAMBLE 2000, 0.1053992 // scramble 2000 random cells
// with probability f(3)
SLEEP 5 // sleep 5 secs
END // stop injecting faults
The idea behind these scripts is to be able to represent executions where a
program is subjected to environmental conditions that vary with time and
range from ideal to heavily perturbed. Scenarios like these ones are common,
e.g., in applications servicing primary substation automation
systems (Deconinck, De Florio, Dondossola, & Szanto, 2003) or spaceborne
applications (Oey & Teitelbaum, 1981).
In the following a few experiments are described, together with the results
obtained with scrambler.
All our experiments have been carried out with an array of 20000 redundant
4-byte cells and an allocation stride of 20 (that is, replicas of a same logical
cell are spaced by 20 physical cells). In all the reported experiments the
following script was run:
SLEEP 1
SCRAMBLE 10000, 0.9183156388887342
SCRAMBLE 10000, 0.9183156388887342
SLEEP 3
SCRAMBLE 10000, 0.9183156388887342
SCRAMBLE 10000, 0.9183156388887342
END
Concurrently with the execution of this script, 1500000 read accesses were
performed in round robin across the array. The experiments record the
number of scrambled cells and the number of read failures.
Scrambler makes use of standard C function “rand”, which depends on an
initial seed to generate each pseudo-random sequence. In the reported
experiments the same value has been kept for the seed, so as to produce
exactly the same sequences in each experiment.
3.1 Experiment 1: Fixed, low redundancy
In this first experiment scrambler was executed with fixed (non adaptive)
redundancy 3. Table 1 shows the setting of this experiment. The main
conclusion one can draw from this run is that a statically redundant data
structures provision in this case fails 193 times: In other words, for 193 times
it was not possible to find a majority of replicas in agreement, and the system
reported a read access failure. The total number of memory accesses is
proportional to 3× 1500000× k, where k > 0 depends on the complexity of the
redundant read operation.
3.2 Experiment 2: Fixed, higher redundancy
Also experiment 2 has fixed redundancy, this time equal to 5. Table 2 shows
the setting of this new experiment. Main conclusion is that the higher
redundancy is enough to guarantee data integrity in this case: No read access
failures are experienced. The total number of memory accesses is proportional
to 5× 1500000× k.
$ scrambler faults.in 3 scrub noadaptive
Scrambler::sleep(1)
run 1
run 50001
run 100001
run 150001
Scrambler::scramble(10000,0.918316)
Scrambler::scramble(10000,0.918316)
Scrambler::sleep(3)
run 200001
run 250001
. . . lines omitted. . .
run 650001
Scrambler::scramble(10000,0.918316)
Scrambler::scramble(10000,0.918316)
Scrambler::END
run 700001
run 750001
. . . lines omitted. . .
run 1500001
36734 scrambled cells, 193 failures, redundance == 3
redundance 3: 1500001 runs
redundance 5: 0 runs
redundance 7: 0 runs
redundance 9: 0 runs
redundance 11: 0 runs
Table 1: Experiment 1: Scrambler executes the script in file “faults.in”. Pa-
rameters set redundancy to 3, select memory scrubbing to repair corrupted data
when possible, and keep redundancy fixed.
$ scrambler faults.in 5 scrub noadaptive
Scrambler::sleep(1)
run 1
run 50001
run 100001
Scrambler::scramble(10000,0.918316)
Scrambler::scramble(10000,0.918316)
Scrambler::sleep(3)
run 150001
. . . lines omitted. . .
run 500001
Scrambler::scramble(10000,0.918316)
Scrambler::scramble(10000,0.918316)
Scrambler::END
run 550001
. . . lines omitted. . .
run 1500001
36734 scrambled cells, 0 failures, redundance == 5
redundance 3: 0 runs
redundance 5: 1500001 runs
redundance 7: 0 runs
redundance 9: 0 runs
redundance 11: 0 runs
Table 2: Experiment 2: Scrambler executes the same script as before; only,
redundancy is now set to 5. No failures are observed.
$ scrambler faults.in 5 scrub adaptive
run 1
Scrambler::sleep(1)
run 50001
run 100001
run 150001
run 200001
Scrambler::scramble(10000,0.918316)
Scrambler::scramble(10000,0.918316)
Scrambler::sleep(3)
run 250001
. . . lines omitted. . .
run 600001
Scrambler::scramble(10000,0.918316)
Scrambler::scramble(10000,0.918316)
Scrambler::END
run 650001
. . . lines omitted. . .
run 1500001
36734 scrambled cells, 1 failures, redundance == 3
redundance 3: 1455404 runs
redundance 5: 6054 runs
redundance 7: 28967 runs
redundance 9: 9576 runs
redundance 11: 0 runs
Table 3: Experiment 3: Scrambler executes the same script as before; only,
redundancy is now adaptive. No failures are observed, but the employed redun-
dancy is mostly of degree 3.
3.3 Experiment 3: Adaptive Redundancy
In this last experiment adaptive redundancy was enabled and initially set to 5.
Table 3 shows the resulting setting. Most worth noting is the fact that also in
this case no read access failures show up, but the actual amount of redundancy
required to reach this result is much lower. Consequently, also the total
number of memory accesses, proportional to
(3× 1455404 + 5× 6054 + 7× 28967 + 9× 9576)× k, is considerably lower.
Figure 7 shows how redundancy varies during the first 100000 read cycles.
During this time frame no fault injection takes place. This is captured by our
adaptation strategy, which decreases redundancy to 3 after 1000 cycles.
Figure 8 depicts an interval where several fault injections do take place. These
events are detected and trigger several adaptations.
3.4 Conclusions
The analysis of the performance of one of the application-level approaches
introduced in Chapter 4, namely redundant variables, was described. The
Figure 7: The first 100000 cycles of experiment 3 (Sect. 3.3). Note how redun-
dancy drops to its minimum after the first 1000 cycles.
Figure 8: A section of experiment 3 in which fault injection takes place. Note
how redundancy changes accordingly.
main focus here was on the methods and tools used to assess, in a quantitative
way, the properties of our tool.
4 A TOOL FOR MONITORING AND FAULT
INJECTION
To conclude this chapter a distributed, multimedia application for monitoring
and fault injection is described. Such application was developed in the
framework of Project EFTOS (Embedded Fault-Tolerant Supercomputing,
already introduced in Chapter 3). It dynamically sets up a hierarchy of HTML
pages reflecting the current status of an EFTOS-compliant dependable
application running on a Parsytec CC system. These pages are fed to a
WWW browser playing the role of hypermedia monitor. The adopted
approach allows the user to concentrate on the high-level aspects of his/her
application so as to quickly assess the validity of their dependability
assumptions. This view of the system lends itself well for being coupled with a
tool to interactively inject software faults in the user application.
4.1 Introduction
As systems get more and more complex, the need for a one-look snapshot of
their activity is indeed ever increasing. This need has been strongly felt by the
people involved in Project EFTOS (Deconinck, De Florio, Lauwereins, &
Varvarigou, 1997), whose aim was to set up a software framework for
integrating fault-tolerance into embedded distributed high-performance
applications in a flexible and easy way.
Through the adoption of the EFTOS framework, the target application
running on a parallel computer is plugged into a hierarchical, layered system
whose structure and basic components have been described in detail in
Chapter 3:
• at the lowest level, a set of parameterizable functions managing error
detection (Dtools) and error recovery (Rtools). EFTOS supplies a
number of these Dtools and Rtools, plus an API for incorporating
user-defined EFTOS-compliant tools;
• at the middle level, the DIR net (detection, isolation, and recovery
network) is available to coherently combine Dtools and Rtools, to ensure
consistent strategies throughout the whole system, and to play the role
of a backbone handling information to and from the fault-tolerance
elements. To fulfill these requirements, the DIR net makes use of
processes called Manager, Agents, and Backup Agents;
• at the highest level, these elements are combined into dependable
mechanisms e.g., methods to guarantee fault-tolerant communication,
voting methods and so on.
As explained in Chapter 3, during the lifetime of the application the EFTOS
framework guards the service from a series of possible deviations from the
expected behavior; this is done by executing detection, isolation, and
reconfiguration tasks. For instance, a memory access exception caught in a
thread by a trap handling Dtool may trigger a relocation of that thread
elsewhere in the system. As another example, if an error is detected which
affects a component of the DIR net itself, say a Manager, then the system will
isolate that component and elect another one (actually, one of the Backup
Agents) as the DIR Manager.
In order to allow the user to keep track of events such as those sketched above,
the DIR net continuously prints on the system console short textual
descriptions. Evidently such a linear, unstructured listing of events pertaining
to different aspects of different actions taking place in different points of the
user application, does not make up the best of mechanisms to gain insight in
the overall state of the fault-tolerant system. On the contrary, a hierarchical,
dynamic view of the structure and behavior of that system, including:
• Its current shape (on which node which components are running, and
their topology),
• the current state of its components (for instance, whether they are
regarded to be correct, faulty, or are being recovered),
• each component’s running history,
appeared much more attractive.
Two main advantages from the adoption of such a strategy were expected to
be:
• (At design and system validation time) the possibility to assist the user
assessing and/or validating his/her EFTOS-based fault-tolerance design,
• (at run time) the possibility to shorten the latency between the
occurrence of the event, its comprehension, and a proper reaction at user
level2.
This text describes the architectural solution that was successfully adopted
within EFTOS to easily and quickly develop a tool fulfilling the above stated
needs—a portable, highly customizable hypermedia monitor for the EFTOS
applications making use of cheap, ready available off-the-shelf software
components like e.g., an Internet Browser. It also shows how our monitor
supplies the user with the needed structured information, and how it proved
its usefulness within EFTOS. In particular an extension is described by means
of which our monitor can be turned into a versatile tool for fault-injection.
4.2 Design Requirements
In order to quickly deliver human-comprehensible information from the
gigantic data stream produced by an EFTOS application, two needs have been
assessed:
• Deriving a hierarchical representation of the data.
(Most of the produced data is available, but it has to be organized and
made browsable in “layers”:
– At the highest level, only the logical structure of the application
should be displayed: Which nodes are used, the EFTOS
components executed on each node, and their overall state;
– at a medium level, a concise description of the events pertaining to
each particular node should be made available;
– at the lowest level, a deeper description of each particular event
may also be supplied on user-demand),
• the use of multimedia.
“An image is worth a thousand words”, they say, and maybe even more
insight can be derived from the extensive use of colors, sounds,
video-clips and so on. For instance, re-coloring a green image to red may
lead the user into realizing that a previously fault-free state has turned
into a problem. The use of colors traditionally associated to meanings,
or whose meaning can be borrowed from well-known everyday situations
(e.g., those of traffic lights) further speeds up the delivery of the
information to the user.
Both aspects were already available in Internet browsers available at the time
of EFTOS, such as Netscape, which were able to render hierarchies of
dynamically produced HTML (Berners-Lee & Connolly, 1995) pages.
Therefore it was decided to develop a distributed application piloting an
Internet browser that in turn plays the role of a hypermedia renderer for the
EFTOS system activity. This product, called the EFTOS Monitor, is
described in the following sections.
4.3 The Architecture of the EFTOS Monitor
The EFTOS Monitor basically consists of three components (see Fig. 9):
1. A client module, to be run by the DIR net;
2. an “intermediate” module, to be run by a number of Common Gateway
Interface (Kim, 1996) (CGI) scripts;
3. the “renderer” i.e., an Internet browser.
• The client part, together with the DIR net and the user application, runs
on a Parsytec CC system (Parsytec, 1996b), a distributed-memory
MIMD supercomputer consisting of powerful processing nodes based on
PowerPC 604 at 133MHz, dedicated high-speed links, I/O modules and
Figure 9: The architecture of the EFTOS Monitor: the CGI scripts and the EFTOS
application share the same file system and communicate via a socket stream: Each
time a new event takes place, the DIR net updates a special database (1) and sends
a notification to the main CGI script (2). The latter reads the database (3) on the
arrival of the notification and converts it into a HTML hypertext, which is then fed
back (4) to a Netscape or another Internet browser for hypermedia rendering. The
client part of the Monitor is integrated in the DIR net Manager process.
routers. The system adopts the thread processing model; as mentioned
in Chapter 3, threads communicate via a proprietary message passing
library called EPX (Parsytec, 1996a) (Embedded Parallel extensions to
uniX ). The main tasks of the client module are the set up and
management of a database maintaining an up-to-date snapshot of the
system activity, including the current mapping of the DIR net’s
components onto the processing nodes and the state and current activity
of each component. This module also connects to the intermediate part
via TCP sockets (as described for instance in (Comer, 1993)) and sends
it signals at the very beginning and on each state transition.
• The intermediate module consists of a hierarchy of CGI scripts spawned
by an Apache HTTP (Berners-Lee, Fielding, & Frystyk, 1996; Fielding
et al., 1997) server, all running on the workstation hosting the CC
system. The root script of this hierarchy connects with the client module
and acts as a TCP server: for each new stimulus, the snapshot file is
read over and a HTML document is produced and fed to the renderer. A
connection is also started up with this latter so as to be able to interact
with it without the intervention of the HTTP daemon: Having done so,
one CGI script may stay alive and produce multiple HTML requests.
This special feature is known as “non-parsing header” (NPH)
mode (Kim, 1996). Logically speaking, one may say that the
intermediate module acts as a gateway between the CC system and the
hypermedia renderer. Like mythical Janus (the god of gates, doors and
doorways (Janus, n.d.); in Italian, Giano), one “face” of the system is
turned to the client module and gathers its requests, while a second one
is turned to the renderer and translates those requests in HTML.
Because of this its main component has been called cgiano.
• The third component, the renderer, is a browser playing the role of a
server able to display HTML data.
The application is started in two steps via a shell script whose first task is to
run the renderer (or to reconnect to a previously run renderer: This latter is
possible using e.g., remote control extensions (Zawinski, 1994) or an approach
based on the Common Client Interface mechanism. The renderer is run with a
uniform resource locator (URL) pointing to the root-level CGI script, which
connects to Netscape in NPH-mode and starts listening for a TCP connection.
As a second step, the shell script spawns the parallel application on the CC
system. Then the application launches the DIR net and the Monitor’s client
module. The latter initializes the snapshot files, connects to the CGI script
and sends it the first signal. The script reacts to that stimulus by translating
the main snapshot file in HTML and requesting the renderer to display it. The
top-left image in Fig. 10 shows a typical output of this phase: The EFTOS
application appears to the user as an HTML table depicting the processing
nodes in the user partition. The state of each module is illustrated by means
of colors (green is “OK”, red is “not OK”, yellow means that the module is
currently being recovered, and so on). In this way the user can immediately
perceive whether a node is ready or not and which actions are carried out on
it, as asked for in the requirements (Sect. 4.2.)
Information displayed in this HTML document only covers the logical
structure of the application. If the user “clicks” any icon on this page, a
high-level hypertextual description of the DIR net-events pertaining to that
specific node is displayed in a separate browser (see Fig. 10, Window
“Node-specific Information”). To keep this page up to date, an automatic
reload is periodically performed. This technique is explained e.g., in (Kim,
1996).
This secondary document is in turn a hypertext whose links point to in-depth
descriptions of each specific event (see Fig. 10, Window “Attached
Information.”)
4.4 Architecture Assessment
A number of observations may be drawn upon the above presented
architecture; in particular:
• Our architecture is based on unmodified, low-cost, off-the-shelf
hypermedia components.
• It is open, in the sense that the architecture is based on wide-spread
standards e.g., the use of uniform resource locators within a World-Wide
Web interconnection, the HTML language, TCP/IP sockets, the MIME
classification, and so on;
• It is distributed, and in particular the renderer may run on any
X11-compliant Display Server, including remote PCs running
Cygwin/X11.
A possible alternative was to develop a custom application to play as a tailored
monitoring tool. As an example, Scientific Computing Associates’ TupleScope
visual debugger is a custom X-based visualization and debugging tool for
parallel programs using the LINDA approach introduced in Chapter 4. This
may result in higher performance and possibly be more flexible but of course:
• It reasonably requires more time to develop even for a simple prototype;
• it requires custom design and development choices that may impact
portability and supported features e.g., which software development
environment and specifically which language and which libraries to use,
or whether to restrict the hypermedia rendering to images or to use
sounds as well—these choices may be simply skipped in our approach;
• distribution and hypermedia issues call for specific support which turn
into higher costs and longer times.
For instance, TupleScope runs with the user application by adding a special
linking option at compile time to the user application; this means it has been
developed on purpose as a custom X11 application. Though it perfectly
addresses its own goals, it has limited rendering capabilities (it only deals with
static images) and would certainly require non-negligible efforts to adapt it
towards other media. Moreover, TupleScope is available on a number of
platform, though the costs of this portability and consequent support are
certainly not negligible as well.
4.5 A Tool for Fault Injection
The same approach used to monitor the state of an EFTOS-compliant
application is also effective in order to actively interact with it. Considering
once again Fig. 9, a control path may be drawn starting from the user at
his/her browser, then crossing a CGI script, and eventually reaching the user
application. It is therefore fairly possible to add a layer to the hierarchy of
HTML pages dynamically created by the intermediate modules so that the
user may freely choose among a certain set of malicious actions to bring
against an EFTOS application, including for instance:
• An integer division-by-zero,
• a segmentation violation,
Figure 10: The three windows of the EFTOS Monitor. In window 1 (“Global view”),
the visual column contains graphical hyperlinks pointing to second-level informa-
tion about the corresponding processing node at the same row. Configuration
is the DIR net-role. Status may be one of the following values: OK, Faulty,
Isolated, Recovering, and Killed. Some minor information is also displayed
at the bottom of the page. The right-hand hypertext (window “Node-specific in-
formation”) is the result of “clicking” on the top circular icon and enumerates the
actions that have just taken place on node 0, fresher-to-older. The elapsed time
(in seconds) corresponding to each event is displayed. Underlined sentences may
be further expanded by clicking on them e.g., the bottom-left image reports about
action number 115 of the hypertext.
Figure 11: The recursive loop of fault injection and monitoring.
• a link failure,
• rebooting a processing node,
• killing a thread.
These requests would then reach a CGI script, be translated in appropriate
system- or application-level actions, which would then be executed or turned
into fault-injection requests to be fulfilled by the DIR Manager. As an
example of system-level action, the CGI script may directly execute a system
command to reboot one node in the CC system. As of application-level
actions, the Manager may for instance ask the trap handler tool (see
Chapter 3) to trigger a specific signal like SIGSEGV (segmentation violation) on
a certain thread; or it may request a watchdog timer tool (again, described in
Chapter 3) on a particular node to behave like if it had detected a time-out.
As a direct consequence of the injection of these faults, a number of detection,
isolation, and recovery actions take place on the system according to the
EFTOS-based fault-tolerance strategies adopted by the designer in his/her
application. These actions will then be reported in the snapshot files and
displayed by the Monitor. This process, summarized in Fig. 11, may be
modeled after a recursive loop like follows:
do {
Inject fault;
Observe feed-back;
Derive conclusions;
Correct the fault tolerance model;
} while (model is unsatisfying).
This procedure should result in a useful tool for rapidly assessing a design,
trying alternative fault-tolerance strategies, and overloading the system with
malicious attacks aiming at verifying its resilience, with a quick and
meaningful feed-back from the system.
4.6 Conclusions
A distributed application has been presented, for monitoring the fault
tolerance aspects of an embedded parallel application and for interactively
injecting faults into it. The overall system makes up an integrated
environment in which
• the application,
• a graphical rendering of the results, and
• real-time interactions
cyclically evolve. By doing so the researcher is made able to verify the
hypothesis he/she is formulating about the system.
The design choice to adopt low-cost, off-the-shelf components for hypermedia
rendering revealed to be cost-effective, speed up the development process,
match the design requirements, and pave the way towards more ambitious
capabilities and features. In particular, the use of an Internet browser as
hypermedia renderer allows inherit the benefits of the volcanic evolutions of
web services, HTML languages, HTTP protocol, multimedia capabilities of the
browsers, and so on.
The high degree of openness proven by this heterogeneous application basing
itself on uniform communication mechanisms and standardized access
interfaces guarantees portability and makes it also a good starting point
towards the development of similarly structured applications ranging from
remote equipment control to hypermedia multi-user environments.
The deeper insight gained from the EFTOS Monitor on the run-time aspects
of our dependable applications has turned it into an invaluable tool to speed
up the development of our application-level fault-tolerance provisions.
5 CONCLUSION
We have described three examples of approaches used to assess the
dependability of application-level provisions: Reliability analysis is used to
quantify the benefits of coupling an approach such as recovery languages to a
distributed voting mechanism (De Florio, Deconinck, & Lauwereins, 1998); a
custom tool is used to systematically inject faults onto the adaptively
redundant data structure discussed in Chapter 4 (De Florio & Blondia, 2008);
a hypermedia application to watch and control a dependable service is then
used for monitoring and fault-injection (De Florio, Deconinck, Truyens,
Rosseel, & Lauwereins, 1998).
A MATHEMATICAL DETAILS RELATED
TO EQ. 2
The basic steps leading to Eq. 2, i.e.,
are described in what follows.
The Markov reliability model of Fig. 1 brings to the following set of equations:
The above equations can be written as follows:
For any state s, let us now call Ls = L(ps(t)), where L is the Laplace
transform. Furthermore, as (310) is the initial state, it is reasonable to assume
that p310(0) = 1 and ∀s 6= (310) : ps(0) = 0. Then taking the limit of the
above equations as ∆t goes to zero and taking the Laplace transform brings to
Inverting the Laplace transform, the following probabilities can be found:
(only useful states have been computed).
Let us denote with R the reliability of the basic component of the system, i.e.,
exp−λt, and Rtmr as the reliability of the TMR system based on the same
component. The reliability of the three and one spare system, R(1)(C, t), is
given by the sum of the above probabilities:
which proves Eq. (2).
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CONCLUSIONS AND APPENDICES
1 AN INTRODUCTION AND SOME
CONCLUSIONS
We have reached the end of our discussion about application-level
fault-tolerance protocols, which were defined as the methods, architectures,
and tools that allow the expression of fault-tolerance in the application
software of our computers. Several “messages” have been given:
• First of all, fault-tolerance is a “pervasive” concern, spanning the whole
of the system layers. Neglecting one layer, for instance the application,
means leaving a backdoor open for problems.
• Next, fault-tolerance is not abstract: It is a function of the target
platform, the target environment, and the target quality of service. The
tools to deal with this are the system model and the fault model, plus
the awareness that 1) all assumptions have a coverage and 2) a coverage
means that, sooner or later, maybe quite later but “as sure as eggs is
eggs,” cases will show up where each coverage will fail.
• This means that there is a (even ethical) need to design our systems
thinking of the consequences of coverage failures at mission time,
especially considering safety critical missions. I coined a word for those
supposed fault-tolerant software engineers that do not take this need into
account: Endangeneers. Three well-known accidents have been presented
and interpreted in view of coverage failures in the fault and system
models.
• Next, the critical role of the system structure for the expression of
fault-tolerance in computer applications was put forth: From this
stemmed the three properties characterizing any application-level
fault-tolerance protocol: Separation of concerns, adequacy to host
different solutions, and support for adaptability. Those properties
address the following question: Given a certain fault-tolerance provision,
is it able to guarantee an adequate separation of the functional and
non-functional design concerns? Does it tolerate a fixed set of faulty
scenarios, or does it dynamically change that set? And, is it flexible
enough as to host a large number of different strategies?
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Figure 1: Application-level software fault-tolerance protocols according to the
three structural attributes sc, sa, and a.
• Then it has been shown that there exist a large number of techniques
and hence of system structures able to enhance the fault-tolerance of the
application. Each of these techniques has its pros and cons, which we
tried to point out as best as we could. We also attempted to qualify each
technique with respect to the above mentioned properties1. A summary
of the results of this process is depicted in Fig. 1.
• Another key message is that complexity is a threat to dependability, and
we must make sure that the extra complexity to manage fault-tolerance
does not become another source of potential failures. In other words,
simplicity must be a key ingredient of our fault-tolerance protocols, and
a faulty fault-tolerant software may produce the same consequence of a
faulty non fault-tolerant software—or maybe direr.
• Finally, we showed with some examples that adaptive behaviour is the
only way to match the ever mutating and unstable environments
characterizing mobile systems. As an example, static designs would
make bad use of the available redundancy.
As the reader will have noticed, this book also has different levels of
deepenings: Some approaches are sketched, some others are explained in deep
detail. As mentioned already this is due to the fact that this book represents
the author’s current vision and summa of personal experiences. This is
particularly true for ariel, the system described in Chapter 7. ariel is
described in large detail there, then used in Chapter 10 in two of the hybrid
cases described there. One of its component, the DIR net, is described in
detail in Chapter 9. Finally, in what follows, a view to the internals of the
ariel system is provided so as to give the reader an idea of how a
fault-tolerance architecture for the application layer was actually implemented.
I trust this to be particularly useful to young researchers in the initial phase of
a master or doctoral program in resilient computing.
Enjoy!
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Figure 1: Application-level software fault-tolerance protocols according to the
three structural attributes sc, sa, and a.
• Then we have shown that there exist a large number of techniques and
hence of system structures able to enhance the fault-tolerance of the
application. Each of these techniques has his pros and cons, which we
tried to point out as best as we could. We also attempted to qualify each
technique with respect to the above mentioned properties1. A summary
of the results of this process is depicted in Fig. 1.
• Another key message is that complexity is a threat to dependability, and
we must make sure that the extra complexity to manage fault-tolerance
does not become another source of potential failures. In other words,
simplicity must be a key ingredient of our fault-tolerance protocols, and
a faulty fault-tolerant software may produce the same consequence of a
faulty non fault-tolerant software—or maybe direr.
• Finally, we showed with some examples that adaptive behaviour is the
only way to match the ever mutating and unstable environments
characterizing mobile systems. As an example, static designs would
make bad use of the available redundancy.
As the reader will have noticed, this book also has different levels of
deepenings: Some approaches are sketched, some others are explained in deep
detail. As mentioned already this is due to the fact that this book represents
the author’s current vision and summa of personal experiences. This is
particularly true for ariel, the system described in Chapter 7. ariel is
described in large detail there, then used in Chapter 10 in two of the hybrid
cases described there. One of its component, the DIR net, is described in
detail in Chapter 9. Finally, in what follows, a view to the internals of the
ariel system is provided so as to give the reader an idea of how a
fault-tolerance architecture for the application layer was actually implemented.
I trust this to be particularly useful to young researchers in the initial phase of
a master or doctoral program in resilient computing.
We provide in what follows an introduction to Lex and YACC, two tools that
are often useful when dealing with linguistic structures for computers. The
provided information is not a full manual, which would be out of the scope of
this book, but more a summary of the minimal information required to fully
comprehend the next section, devoted to the ariel internals.
Enjoy!
A TOOLS FOR TRANSLATORS AND
COMPILERS: LEX AND YACC
This section describes two well-known tools for crafting efficient translators
and compilers: The LEX lexical analyzer and the YACC syntactical analyzer.
A.1 Introduction
The capability to compose valid sentences in a given language, as well as to
verify that a given string represents a valid sentence in a given language builds
upon two lower-level capabilities:
1. Classification, which is the ability to turn a stream of characters into a
stream of lexical entities (words, punctuation, delimiters), and
2. Verification, that is, the ability to recognize the syntactical correctness of
a sentence, starting from a stream of lexical entities.
The first capability is also known as lexical analysis, the second as syntactical
analysis.
Given, for instance, the mathematical expression:
sin(a+
√
(0.4)),
the first capability means translating the stream of characters representing the
above expression, i.e.
(’s’, ’i’, ’n’, ’ ’,’(’, ’a’, ...),
into a stream of tokens, or syntactical atoms:
("sin", ’(’, "a", ’+’, "sqrt", ...);
Syntactical analysis is indeed the tool that allows us to verify the syntactical
correctness of a sentence, given a certain set of rules, called “grammar”—in
the above example, the grammar of well-formed mathematical formulae.
The above mentioned capabilities are experienced by human beings as
inherent and natural abilities, of which one has not even full awareness. When
one has to set up, e.g., an interpreter of a computer language, or any other
software module that needs recognize a given structure in its input stream,
then it is useful to set up a hierarchical structure at the base of which there
are tools for lexical and syntactical analysis. Such tools are software systems
that ease the development of lexical and syntactical analyzers. Two well
known standard utilities for this are LEX and YACC (or their GNU
counterpart, Flex and Bison). LEX and YACC allow to speed up considerably
the development of parsers, translators, compilers, interpreter, conversion tools
and have been used for more than 20 years by the author of this book to craft
various tools, including those described in this chapter and in chapters 7, 10,
and 11. LEX and YACC have been especially designed for combined use and
for hosting user-defined C routines. Custom versions supporting C++ and
Java also exist. In what follows we strictly follow the following two
sources: (Levine, Mason, & Brown, 1992) and (Johnson, 1975).
A.2 The LEX Lexical Analyzer
LEX may be defined as a “tokenizator”: Given a stream of chars, LEX
performs a classification of groups of contiguous characters. These groups are
called tokens, i.e., words and symbols that are atomic from the viewpoint of
syntactical analysis.
For instance, LEX can translate string sin(a+ sqrt(0.4)) in a set of couples
“(token, token number)”, e.g., as follows:
• “sin”, FUNCTION
• “(”, ’(’
• and so forth.
The token number identifies the class the token belongs to.
LEX can be used
• either as a stand-alone tool, so to perform simple translations or
compute statistics on the lexical atoms,
• or in conjunction with a parser generator. YACC is the natural choice,
but it is always possible to choose another parser.
LEX writes a deterministic finite state automaton from a list of regular
expressions. Regardless the number of rules supplied by the user, and
regardless their complexity, the LEX finite state automaton breaks the input
stream into tokens in a time that is proportional to the length of the input
stream. The number of rules and their complexity only influence the size of
the output source code.
The general structure of a LEX program is as follows:
[ Definitions ]
%%
[ Rules ]
[ %%
User functions ]
Definitions and User functions can be missing. Hence, the minimum size LEX
program is the following one:
%%
LEX performs its classification via a list of regular expressions (regex) that the
user needs to supply through a standard language.
Regex describe patterns of characters to be located in the text. LEX reads
these regular expressions and produces a finite state machine that recognizes
those patterns. Finite state machines are indeed the simplest conceptual tool
with which to recognize words expressed by regex. LEX uses the same regular
expressions recognizer used by most of those UNIX tools that offer pattern
matching services: vi, sed, awk, find, grep, for instance, adopt a similar set
of agreement based on a similar set of “meta-characters”, including
" \ [ ] ^ - ? . * + | { } $ / ( ) % < >.
(Perl, archie, and others, adopt slightly different sets). In what follows we
provide a brief description of the most important among the meta-characters:
" the quotation mark operator is the simplest meta-character: all the
characters of a string between quotation marks are interpreted as plain
(non-meta) characters.
[ ...] Squared parentheses (pair []) specify classes of characters. For
instance, [xyz] means: “a single x, y or z char”
The hyphen sign between any two chars a and b means that all the chars
between ord(a) and ord(b) are specified. For instance, [A-Z] means “any
uppercase letter”, while [A-Za-z] means: “any letter”.
Furthermore, [\40-\176] for instance selects a range of characters, that
is, the one between octal(40) and octal(176).
[^ ...] Character “^” , within the squared parentheses, means
“complementary set”. For instance, [^0-9] means “any character but
the digits”.
\ (Backslash) has the same meaning it has, e.g., in the C language function
printf: It turns a meta-character into a plain character.
. (Dot) means “any character but ’\n’”.
? The question mark goes after optional strings of characters. For instance,
ab?c means: “either ’ac’ or ’abc’”.
* Postfix operator “star” means zero or more instances of a given class. As
an example, [^a-zA-Z]* means “zero or more instances of
non-alphabetic chars”.
+ Postfix operator “plus” means one or more instances of a given class. For
instance, [xyz]+ means “any non-empty string, of any size, consisting of
any of the characters ’x’, ’y’ and ’z’”, such as e.g. xyyyyyyzz.
Operators () and |. Parentheses group a set of characters into one object.
For instance, in (xyz)+, operator + is applied to string xyz. Within a
group, the OR between entities is specified via meta-character |. For
instance,
(ab|cd+)?(ef)*
means “zero or more instances of string "ef", possibly preceded either by
string ab or by cd+ (c followed by one or more instances of d)”.
^: This char, if not within square parentheses, means “at begin-of-file or
right after a newline.”
$: This means “at the end of a line” or “at end-of-file”, i.e., if the following
char is either ’\n’ or EOF. For instance, (riga|row)$ means “string
riga or string row followed either by \n or by EOF.
/: Infix operator slash checks whether an entity is followed by another one.
For instance, a/b means “character a, only when followed by character
b”. Note that ab/\n is equivalent to ab$.
{}: Curly brackets have two meanings:
• When grouping two comma-separated numbers, as in (xyz){1,5},
they represent a multiple instance. The above example means “from
one to five instances of string xyz”.
• When grouping letters, they represent the value of a regex alias (see
further on).
% Character % is reserved character, not a meta-character.
A LEX source file may include up to three sections; the first one is the one
including the LEX definitions. Definitions include a list of regular expressions:
letter [a-zA-Z]
letters {letter}+
This is, so to say, the grammar of the LEX definitions:
1. At column 1, an identifier is supplied,
2. then some blank or tab chars,
3. and finally a regular expression.
After its definition, the identifier becomes an alias for its regular expression.
To dereference an alias one has to put curly brackets around it.
The Rules section is mainly a list of associations in the form
r ⇒ a
where r is a regular expression and a is a list of actions, i.e., user defined C
language statements that are executed when the corresponding regular
expression is recognized. An example follows:
%%
begin printf("{");
end {
putchar(’}’);
}
When no rule is verified, a default rule is executed: ECHO, meaning “print the
current character”. For readers accustomed to thinking in C, this means that
the finite state automaton produced by LEX has a switch statement ending
with “default: ECHO;.”
Practical consequences of this include, e.g., that there is no need to supply
rules for the so called “literal tokens,” i.e., single characters whose token
number is equal to their ASCII code. Another consequence is that in order to
“sift out” some portion of text from the input stream, one needs recognize it
explicitly and to associate a null action to it. As an example, to remove
newline characters, one needs write this simple program:
%%
\n ;
Some simple transformations can be useful in order to facilitate the import of
a file. For instance some word processors, such as TEX, regard paragraphs as
multiple lines of text separated by two or more line feed characters, while
other programs such as Word regard paragraphs as a single line and separate
paragraphs with one or more line feed character. When one wants to import
some TEX text into Word the following simple script may be useful:
%%
\n\n ECHO;
\n putchar(’ ’);
It converts every single \n into a character space.
When a regular expression is recognized, the corresponding string (the token)
is copied in a string pointed by a char* called yytext. This is true also for
literal tokens.
The corresponding script is similar to the previous one:
%%
[^\n]\n[^\n] { putchar(yytext[0]);
putchar(’ ’);
putchar(yytext[2]);
}
It is sometimes interesting to take a look at the source code of the program
produced by LEX; for instance, on my system running cygwin and flex, action
ECHO turns out to actually be this simple macro:
#define ECHO puts(yytext)
Variable int yyleng is set by LEX to the number of characters of the string
that verifies the current rule; in other words,
yyleng == strlen(yytext).
The following excerpt shows an example of how to use yyleng:
%%
[0-9]+ dig += yyleng;
[a-zA-Z]+ alp += yyleng;
(.|\n) oth++;
Clearly the above excerpt is not a completely meaningful LEX program:
1. Variable dig etc. have not been declared.
2. No output message is provided at the end.
Nevertheless, this is not a buggy LEX program: The objective of LEX is to
produce a C program, not necessarily an error free one: No checks are done on
the syntactic correctness of the output program. Typical situations are that
some syntax errors slip in the actions (indeed, actions are simply copied as
strings into the output program). Later on we will describe how to introduce
C text into the output program so as to declare variables and produce output
messages at end of processing time.
A number of functions are available to the LEX user:
yymore() instructs LEX so that the next matched string is attached to the
current value of yytext. An example follows:
%%
\"[^"]* {
if (yytext[yyleng-1] == ’\\’)
yymore();
else
do_that(yytext);
}
yyless() “sends back” a given number of characters. This can be very useful
in some cases. For instance, in the early days of the C programming
language, a =- b had the same meaning of a -= b (that is, subtract b
from a). This is no more the case, so the first form could result in a
hidden bug when current compilers deal with “old dusty deck” software.
To detect possible problems one may use the following filter:
%%
=-[a-zA-Z] {
printf("Operator =- is ambiguous: ");
printf("not recognized.\n");
yyless(yyleng-2);
manage_assignment();
}
The form yyless(x) pushes back onto the input yyleng− x characters.
int input() reads the next input character. Character NULL (bitwise
equivalent to (int)0) is interpreted as the end-of-file condition).
void output(char c) writes c onto the output stream.
void unput(char c) “pushes back” c into the input stream.
The user can choose between a standard version of these functions or
make use of his or her own versions of those functions, which must have
the same name and prototype.
int yywrap(void)
This system (or user-) function is called when an EOF is encountered.
The system version of this function returns 1, which means “end of
processing.” The user can substitute this function with a new version
which, if it returns 0, lets the execution continue until a new EOF is
encountered. By doing so it is possible, e.g., to process more than one
input file during the same run. Another use of yywrap() is to allow the
user to specify end-of-job functions (for instance, printing the final
output), which is one of the requirement we highlighted for the code
fragment at page 319.
LEX adopts two steps to select which user rule to apply:
1. The rule that recognizes the largest string is always preferred.
2. If more than one rule recognizes largest strings, it is chosen the rule the
user has specified first in the LEX script.
Within a same rule, LEX returns the largest possible string:
%%
\’.*\’ { yytext[0] = ’[’;
yytext[yyleng-2] = ’]’;
printf("%s",yytext);
}
produces a program that, when reading an input string such as ’hi’ -he
said- ’how are you?’, writes the following string on the output: [hi’ -he
said- ’how are you?].
When LEX selects which rule to execute, it creates an ordered list of possible
candidates. The one to be executed is the one at the top of the list. When
that action includes macro
REJECT;
the following two actions take place:
1. The input string is sent back onto the input stream.
2. The rule is removed from the list. The rule that is selected is therefore
the new top one.
REJECT is useful, e.g., to count all the “digrams” (that is, all the couples of
contiguous alphabetic characters) in a given text:
%%
[A-Z][a-z] { digram[yytext[0]][yytext[1]]++;
REJECT;
}
(.|\n) ;
Each digram in the text is located by the first rule, as it returns a string of two
characters while the second one returns a string of just one character. REJECT
writes back the two characters of the digram onto the standard input stream
and rejects the first rule. The second one is then executed. As a result, a
character is removed from the input stream.
LEX allows to include in the output C source code any useful information
(header files, declaration of global variables and so forth). An example follows:
%%
[a-z][a-z] { extern int dig[26][26];
dig[yytext[0]-’a’][yytext[1]-’a’]++;
REJECT; }
(.|\n) ;
%%
int dig[26][26];
int yywrap() { int i, j;
for (i=0; i<26; i++)
for (j=0; j<26; j++)
if (dig[i][j])
printf("digram [%c%c] = %d\n",
’a’+i,’a’+j, dig[i][j]);
return 1;
}
Inclusion can be done in three “zones” of the output source file:
1. At the end of the file (as it is done in the above example).
2. At the beginning of the file, that is, before any of the functions.
3. At the beginning of function yylex().
The three zones in the output source code correspond to the following zones of
the LEX script:
1. In User Functions.
2. In Definitions,
3. On top of Rules, i.e., right after the first %%;
Case 1 is trivial—one has just to write the required C code, as shown in the
above example. For 2 and 3, we need to distinguish the text to be processed
by LEX from the text that needs be copied verbatim in the output file. To do
so, one can follow any of these ways:
• [
t]+.* (at least a blank space or tab character at column zero, then the
data to be flushed onto the output file.)
• Anything between %{ and %}.
In most UNIX environments, in order to process a LEX source code available
in file source.l, one needs execute the following commands:
1. lex source.l (that is we use LEX to translate source.l into the C
program lex.yy.c; the same syntax is used with GNU flex.)
2. cc -o output lex.yy.c -ll (that is we use the C compiler to read the
C program produced by LEX and compile it with the assistance of the
LEX library, producing an executable file called output .)
3. ./output (that is, we execute the output file.)
File lex.yy.c includes function yylex() i.e., the actual scanner. Compiling
lex.yy.c with the system library libl.a (or libfl.a in the case of FLEX) a
main() function is automatically supplied, which calls function yylex().
The user can substitute this default main() with one of his or her own design.
Doing this, one can choose between either automatically generating an
executable or “pipelining” LEX output to other programs—for instance, a
syntactical analyzer such as YACC.
A.3 Syntactical Analysis with YACC
YACC, whose name stands for “Yet Another Compiler-Compiler,” has been
defined by its authors as a system for describing the input structure of a
program. Indeed, the YACC programmer is required to supply:
1. The syntactical structure of the input, and
2. C code to be executed when the syntax rules are recognized.
On the basis of the above input data, YACC produces a C program with a
parsing routine. The parsing routine calls a lower level routine, called
yylex(), in order to get the next lexical atoms in the input stream. It goes
without saying that LEX produces exactly one such routine.
YACC works with grammars of type LALR(1), plus rules to solve
ambiguities. As its names tell, YACC is just one of many “compiler
compilers”, and many new powerful syntactical analyzers have been designed,
a noteworthy example being ANTLR (Parr, 2007). Some of them are open
software and can be easily downloaded and compiled from the Internet. YACC
(or its GNU sibling, Bison) is likely to be available on any UNIX distribution,
so we decided to focus on its syntax. Another reason to go for YACC with
respect to other tools is that its syntax has been designed so as to make it
very easy to master its functions for someone who knows LEX already.
A.3.1 Structure of a YACC Script
The general structure of a YACC script strictly follows the one of a LEX
script:
[ Definitions ]
%%
Rules & Actions
[ %%
User functions ]
In particular, the structure of Rules & Actions is similar to the corresponding
section of a LEX script: It includes a set of grammar rules, plus actions that
are associated to each rule. Each time a rule is recognized, the corresponding
actions are executed. Actions may return values and use the values returned
by other actions.
YACC rules have the following structure:
lhs : rhs ;
where lhs is a non-terminal symbol and rhs is a sequence of zero or more
terminal or non-terminal symbols, “literals” (see below), and actions.
Identifiers for terminal and non-terminal symbols follow the rules of the C
language, with the addition that character ’.’ is considered as a letter.
A literal is a constant character defined as follows:
literal : QUOTE char QUOTE
| QUOTE BACKSLASH char QUOTE
| QUOTE BACKSLASH od od od QUOTE
;
where in this case QUOTE is character " and od is an octal digit. The pipe
character “|” is the YACC way to represent alternative definitions—it reads
out as “or”. It is used when more than one rule has the same lhs.
As with LEX, the parentheses %{ and %} allow to include in the output of
YACC any C source code. This code is global with respect to the parser
function and to the user functions.
YACC uses a number of identifiers starting with “yy” for internal purposes.
As a consequence it is a good idea to avoid that prefix: While the YACC
syntax is more or less standard, clearly its implementations may be completely
different from each other or from future ones. A variable starting with “yy”
may translate in a hidden design fault.
Lexical atoms (the tokens) must be explicitly declared in Definitions. This is
done, for instance, by writing one or more lines such as the following one:
%token name1 name2 . . .
All the symbols that have not declared as tokens are implicitly declared as
non-terminals (non-terminals). An important property that must be
guaranteed for any YACC source program is that each non-terminal must be
the lhs of at least one rule.
The declaration of the start symbol of the grammar may be done as follows:
%start name
in Declarations. If this specification is missing, it is assumed that the start
symbol is the lhs of the first grammar rule specified by the user.
A special token marks the end-of-input. This is called end-marker in YACC
lingo. If the tokens encountered between the start of processing and the
end-marker (not including the latter) verify the start symbol, then the parsers
successfully stops processing after having read the end-marker. Reading the
end-marker before the start symbol is verified leads to an error.
Within each rule, the programmer can specify some actions to be executed
each time that rule is recognized while analysing the input stream. Actions
may return values and use the values returned by other actions. Also the
tokens returned by yylex() may have values. Actions are a group of C
statements between curly brackets. Each action can return a value by setting
variable $$. For instance:
{ action(); $$=1; }
returns 1. Also the rules may return values. This value is either the value of
the first component or the value of variable $$. For instance:
A : B;
is equivalent to
A : B { $$ = $1; } ;
The following example shows how it is possible to use the values returned by
previous rules:
expr : ’(’ expr ’)’
{ $$ = $2; }
;
In other words, $i is the value returned by RHS[i]. An example follows: Let us
suppose we wanted to build a syntax analysis tree and for that we are using a
function node() that allocates a new syntax object and returns its address.
Then such functions could be called in rules such as the following one:
expr : expr infix_op expr
{ $$ = node( $2, $1, $3); }
;
Values returned by rules and actions are integers by default.
As we mentioned in previous section, function yylex() returns an
integer—the token number. This number is either a literal (when in [0, 255])
or a symbolic constant s > 256 that describes the lexical “class” the
recognized string belongs to. One such class could be, for instance, NUMBER,
identifying all numerical symbolic constants. Function yylex() also returns
the actual string that was found in the input. That string is kept in variable
extern X yylval;
where X is either int or can be defined by the user. An example follows:
%%
[0-9]+ { yylval=atoi(yytext); return NUMBER; }
The choice of which integers to use with tokens can be done
automatically by YACC, which associates the integers from 256 one by one to
the tokens that have been declared with the %token keyword; or
implicitly for literals, to which it is associated their ASCII code; or
explicitly by the YACC programmer, who can associate an integer greater
than 0 after the name of a token or a literal in section Declarations.
Token numbers must be different. When executing yacc with the -d option, a
header file is created, called y.tab.h, which contains all the token numbers.
This file can be included, e.g., in the LEX script, through a statement such as
the following one:
%{
#include "y.tab.h"
%}
Note that the C program produced by LEX can be either compiled separately
or even included in the YACC output program by specifying in User functions
the following statement:
#include "lex.yy.c"
A.3.2 Associativity rules
Some arithmetical operators have their own associativity rules, and by
agreement there are priorities between them. Therefore a method is required
in order to set a priority among operators and to choose beforehand the type
of associativity that is required.
The kind of associativity of an operator can be defined in YACC by the three
directives:
%left %right %nonassoc
Such directives also represent an alternative way to declare tokens and literals
with respect to %token. For instance,
%right ’=’
%left ’-’ ’+’
selects right association for the assignment operator (that is, a = b = c is
interpreted as a = (b = c)) and left association for ’+’ and ’-’.
Each row defines a priority level. The earlier the specification appears in the
source file, the lower its priority:
’=’ ≺ (’+’, ’-’) ≺ · · ·
For instance,
a = b = c ∗ d− e− f/g;
is interpreted as
a = (b = (((c ∗ d)− e)− (f/g)));
Keyword %nonassoc specifies that a certain operator must not be applied
more than once. For instance, in Fortran the following expression
A .LT. B .LT. C
is not valid. The %nonassoc tokens catch such conditions.
There are cases in which a same sign, for instance ’-’, has two different
meanings and priorities:
expr : expr ’=’ expr
| expr ’*’ expr
| expr ’-’ expr
| ’-’ expr
Unary “minus” has greater priority than that of diadic “minus”. In such cases
one can make use of a fictitious token and operator %prec:
%left ’+’ ’-’
%left ’*’ ’/’
%left UMINUS
%%
expr : expr ’-’ expr
| ....
| ’-’ expr %prec UMINUS /* same priority of UMINUS */
As we have seen already, the value stack of YACC is by default based on short
integers. The user can override that choice and choose any other type. In this
case the value stack is organized as a vector of union’s. The programmer can
declare such union and associate the name of its members with the tokens and
non-terminals that return a value. When the user does declare the union, the
following string is attached to any reference like $$ or $i:
.field-name
This is a possible example
%union {
char *String;
double Real;
int Integer;
}
An equivalent way to shape this union is by defining explicitly type YYSTYPE:
typedef union {
char *String;
double Real;
int Integer;
} YYSTYPE;
After that definition one can associate a field-name to a token like follows:
%left <Integer> ’+’ ’-’
%right <Real> ’=’
It is even possible to associate a field-name to a non-terminal:
%type <String> expr
%type <Real> number
Another possibility is to associate a field-name to an action:
expr : ’(’ strexp ’)’
{ $<Real>$ = atof( $<String>2 );
}
;
that is, “$<”, followed by a field-name, followed by “>$”
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B  The Ariel internals
In this section we would like to provide the reader with an (abridged) description of the internals of the
Ariel translator, art, so as to give a real-life example of the way tools such as Lex and YACC can be used to
craft application-level fault-tolerance provisions.
Art is built by compiling the Lex source code “Ariel.l” and the YACC source code “Ariel.y”, together with
several ancillary C source codes. Art takes as input an Ariel script and produces as output:
1. A number of configuration files describing a distributed application and an execution platform.
2. An error recovery specification, expressed in the form of a pseudo-code for the Ariel virtual
machine.
The configuration files are to be compiled with the sources of the distributed application, while the error
recovery specifications are compiled with the Ariel virtual machine, which then executes concurrently with
the distributed application. Each time a fault is detected in the system, the Ariel virtual machine executes
the error recovery specification interpreting the pseudo-code. This pseudo-code is called “r-code” (recovery
code) and represents the “virtual machine language” for a stack machine called RINT. More details on this
can be found in Chapter 7.
We begin with the Ariel’s scanner, “ariel.l”, then we provide an excerpt of some ancillary source code used
by Ariel’s parser, and we conclude with an abridged view to the latter.
Ariel’s scanner
Source code Ariel.l starts with a “%{” … “%}” section, within which a few comment lines introduce the
source code, its version and so forth. C header files are included and some global variables are declared. An
example is “lines”, an integer starting at 1 and counting the number of lines being processed:
%{
/**************************
**
**     File: ariel.l
**
**     Description: scanner
**
**     Language: lex
**
**     History:
**     Version 2.0d   08-Feb-2006
**      - added "Watchdog"
… lines omitted …
***************************
#include <string.h>
int lines=1;
%}
Ariel.l continues with its definitions.  These include:
? Ariel’s keywords, such as “IF” or “THEN”;
? generic lexical atoms such as “NUMBER” or “REAL”;
? atoms such as “THREAD” or “NODE”, defining the Ariel identifiers for Ariel’s “entities”, in this
case respectively processes or computers;
? atoms such as “AGENT” or “MANAGER”, defining the roles that are to be assigned to certain
processes:
IF      ([Ii][Ff])
FI      ([Ff][Ii])
ELSE    ([Ee][Ll][Ss][Ee])
THEN    ([Tt][Hh][Ee][Nn])
… lines omitted …
THREAD  ([Tt]([0-9]+)
GROUP   ([GgLl]([0-9]+)
NODE    ([Nn]([0-9]+)
DIGIT   [0-9]
NUMBER  ("-")?[0-9]+
REAL    ((({NUMBER})?{DOT})?{NUMBER})
AGENT           ([Aa][Gg][Ee][Nn][Tt][Ss]?)
BACKUPAGENT
(([Bb][Aa][Cc][Kk][Uu][Pp][Ss]?){AGENT}?)|([Aa][Ss][Ss][Ii][Ss][Tt][Aa][Nn][Tt][Ss]?)
MANAGER         ([Mm][Aa][Nn][Aa][Gg][Ee][Rr])
ROLE            ({AGENT}|{BACKUPAGENT}|{MANAGER})
Other definitions specify Ariel’s guards or pre-conditions. Such guards are to check whether a given entity
has been stopped or restarted, or detected as faulty, or isolated, and so forth:
KILLED          "-"?(([Kk]([Ii][Ll][Ll][Ee][Dd])?)|([Ss][Tt][Oo][Pp][Pp][Ee][Dd]))
RESTARTED       "-"?[Rr]([Ee][Ss][Tt][Aa][Rr][Tt][Ee][Dd])?
PRESENT         "-"?[Pp]([Rr][Ee][Ss][Ee][Nn][Tt])?
RUNNING         "-"?([Rr][Uu][Nn][Nn][Ii][Nn][Gg])
ISOLATED        "-"?[Ii]([Ss][Oo][Ll][Aa][Tt][Ee][Dd])?
FAULTY          "-"?[Ff]([Aa][Uu][Ll][Tt][Yy])?
There follow some definitions for the configuration of single version and multiple version fault-tolerance
provisions. As an example, these are the Lex definitions corresponding to a watchdog timer:
WATCHDOG        [Ww][Aa][Tt][Cc][Hh][Dd][Oo][Gg]
KEYW_AT         ([Aa][Tt])
WATCHES         [Ww][Aa][Tt][Cc][Hh][Ee][Ss]
HEARTBEATS      [Hh][Ee][Aa][Rr][Tt][Bb][Ee][Aa][Tt][Ss]
EVERY           [eE][vV][eE][Rr][Yy]
MS              [Mm][Ss]
US              [Uu][Ss]
REBOOT          [Rr][Ee][Bb][Oo][Oo][Tt]
EndWatchdog     ([Ee][Nn][Dd](([ ]+)?({WATCHDOG})))
Then the Ariel’s rules are listed. As an example, when art encounters the token “GID” (in Ariel, the
identifier of a group of tasks, e.g. “G42”), the corresponding actions set the return value, yylval, with the
group number (42) and with the role of the given entity (in this case, ID_NORMAL | ID_GROUP, which means
“a user-defined group of tasks”). Note how yylval is in this case is not a scalar value but a complex data
type defined by the YACC “%union” statement (see Section 3):
%%
{GID}           {
                yylval.id.role = ID_NORMAL | ID_GROUP;
                sscanf(yytext+1, "%d", &yylval.id.id);
                return GID;
                }
Another few examples of Ariel rules. Some of them set yylval (e.g. “NUMBER”, corresponding to an
integer input, or “REAL”, namely a real number); some others simply return a token number to the calling
parser (e.g., definition “WATCHDOG” returns the token number represented by the symbolic constant
having the same name). Token numbers are created automatically by YACC in this case. The last rule
catches unrecognized characters, which are printed on the output and ignored:
{NUMBER}        {
                        sscanf(yytext, "%d", &yylval.integer);
                        return NUMBER;
                }
{REAL}          {
                        sscanf(yytext, "%f", &yylval.real);
                        return REAL;
                }
{WATCHDOG}      return WATCHDOG;
{WATCHES}       return WATCHES;
{HEARTBEATS}    return HEARTBEATS;
{EVERY}         return EVERY;
{MS}            return MILLISEC;
{US}            return MICROSEC;
{REBOOT}        return REBOOT;
{EndWatchdog}   return KEYW_ENDWATCHDOG;
{THRESHOLD}     return THRESHOLD;
{ALPHACOUNT}    return ALPHACOUNT;
{FACTOR}        return FACTOR;
{EndAlpha}      return  KEYW_ENDALPHA;
.               fprintf(stderr, "Lex: unrecognized char: %s\n", yytext);
Ariel’s r-code
As we mentioned already, the output of the art translator include the translation of the Ariel script into r-
code. To explain in more detail how this is done, we provide here an excerpt of the header files and source
codes that create the r-code. Finally, we briefly describe the main loop of RINT, the run-time executive of
the r-code.
1. R-code.h
Header file “rcode.h” defines the opcode of the RINT virtual machine. These are organized as a series of
integer numbers between 0 and LAST_RCODE (in the current implementation, 56). The opcodes are
organized into classes, consisting of one or more opcode. The header file also defines a number of
predicates, such as isstoprcode or issetrcode, returning a non-zero value when the argument satisfies the
predicate. Rcode.h consists of a compile-time section, used when compiling the Ariel translator “art”, and a
run-time section, used when compiling  the r-code virtual machine RINT.
/* The R-opcodes */
#define R_STOP          000000
#define isstoprcode(x)     (! x)
#define R_SET_ROLE      1
#define R_SET_DEF_ACT   2
#define issetrcode(x)   (x>=R_SET_ROLE && x<=R_SET_DEF_ACT)
#define R_AND           3
#define R_OR            4
#define R_NOT           5
#define R_INC_NEST      6
#define R_DEC_NEST      7
#define R_STRVAL        8
#define R_STRPHASE      9
#define is1operandrcode(x)   (x>=R_AND && x<=R_STRPHASE)
#define R_FALSE         10
#define R_GOTO          11
#define R_PUSH          12
#define R_FUNCTION_CALL 13
#define R_OANEW         14
#define R_CLEAR         15
#define R_PAUSE         16
#define is2operandrcode(x)   (x>=R_FALSE && x<=R_PAUSE)
#define R_KILLED       17
#define R_RESTARTED    18
#define R_PRESENT      19
#define R_ISOLATED     20
#define R_FAULTY       21
#define R_FIRED        22
#define R_PAUSED       23
#define R_REINTEGRATED 24
#define R_STRERRN      25
#define R_STRERRT      26
#define R_COMPARE      27
#define isclause(x)   (x>=R_KILLED && x<=R_REINTEGRATED)
#define istestrcode(x)   (x>=R_KILLED && x<=R_COMPARE)
#define R_KILL         28
#define R_WARN         29
#define R_ANDWARN      30
#define R_START        31
#define R_RESTART      32
#define R_REBOOT       33
#define R_CHKERR       34
#define R_ENABLE       35
#define R_REMOVE       36
#define R_REMOVE_ALL   37
#define R_SEND         38
#define R_GET          39
#define R_SET          40
#define R_CONST        41
#define R_ADD          42
#define R_SUBTRACT     43
#define R_MULTIPLY     44
#define R_DIVIDE       45
#define R_COMPLEMENT   46
#define R_LOGS         47
#define R_LOGI         48
#define R_LOGC         49 // VdF, Oct 2002
#define R_LOGV         50 // VdF, Oct 2002
#define R_EVENT        51 // VdF, 30 Oct 2002
#define R_ISOLATET     52 // VdF, 30 Oct 2002
#define R_ISOLATEG     53 // VdF, 30 Oct 2002
#define R_ISOLATEN     54 // VdF, 30 Oct 2002
#define R_SETPHASE     55 // VdF, 13 Oct 2002
#define isactionrcode(x)   (x>=R_KILL && x<=R_REMOVE_ALL)
#define R_DEADLOCKED   56
#define LAST_RCODE     R_DEADLOCKED
There follow the definition of type rcode_t, which is a triplet of integers consisting of an opcode and two
arguments. The rcode translation of the Ariel script is stored into an array of rcode_t triplets, called
compile_time_rcode:
typedef int rcode_t[3];
#ifdef COMPILETIME
static rcode_t compile_time_rcode[RCODE_MAX_CARD];
#endif
The rcode.h header file then defines the data structures for the management of Ariel nested IF statements,
which need to be translated into their rcode equivalent by means of conditional and unconditional branch
instructions (R_FALSE and R_GOTO). Their meaning is explained in Sect. 2.
struct goto_t {
   int pc;              /* pc is the value of the RINT program counter */
   struct goto_t *next;
};
typedef struct {
        int pc;
        struct goto_t *gotos;
        } if_t;
static if_t ifs[RCODE_MAX_NEST], *iftop;
static int  ifp;
This concludes the compile-time section of header file rcode.h. There follow the declarations for the r-code
functions, i.e., the functions that are executed by RINT when interpreting the opcodes. All these functions
read the three integers corresponding to an r-code and return an integer exit value:
#ifndef COMPILETIME
int   R_Stop(int,int,int);
int   R_And(int,int,int);
int   R_Or(int,int,int);
int   R_Not(int,int,int);
int   R_OArenew(int,int,int);
int   R_Clear(int,int,int);
… lines omitted …
int   R_IsolateGroup(int,int,int);
int   R_IsolateNode(int,int,int);
int   R_Deadlocked(int,int,int);
An extra function called R_Nop (for “no operation”) is also declared. Such function corresponds to
outdated opcodes still to be reorganized. Finally, rfunc, an array of function pointers is defined statically
(that is, at compile time). Note that entry rfunc[i] corresponds to the i-th opcode:
int   R_Nop(int a,int b,int c); // { return 0; }
static int (*rfunc[])(int,int,int) =
 { R_Stop,              // 0
   R_Nop,               // 1
   R_Nop,               // 2
   R_And,               // 3
   R_Or,                // 4
   R_Not,               // 5
   R_NestIn,            // 6
   R_NestOut,           // 7
   R_StoreVal,          // 8
… lines omitted …
   R_IsolateGroup,      // 54
   R_IsolateNode,       // 55
   R_Deadlocked,        // 56
 };
2. R-code.c
Source file rcode.c defines, among others, the functions to generate the rcode-equivalent of an Ariel
recovery script. Some of these functions are very simple, such as rcode_stop:
/*****************************************************************************/
/*      generates the R_STOP R-code, which closes an R-code object file      */
/*****************************************************************************/
int rcode_stop()
{
  if (pc < RCODE_MAX_CARD)
  {
     compile_time_rcode[pc][0] = R_STOP;
     compile_time_rcode[pc][1] = -1;
     compile_time_rcode[pc][2] = -1;
     pc++;
     return pc;
  }
  return 0;
}
Some others are complex and intertwined, such as those corresponding to the IF THEN … ELSE / ELIF …
FI statements:
/*****************************************************************************/
/*      generates the R_FALSE R-code, corresponding to the beginning of      */
/*      `if/then/elif/else/fi' statements.                                   */
/*****************************************************************************/
int rcode_if()
{
  if (pc < RCODE_MAX_CARD)
  {
     if (iftop == NULL)        /* top-level if  */
     {
         iftop = &ifs[0];
         ifp = 0;
     }
     else                      /* non top-level if */
     {
         ifp++;
         iftop = &ifs[ifp];
     }
     iftop->gotos = NULL;
     iftop->pc = pc;
     compile_time_rcode[pc][0]     = R_FALSE;   /* new R_FALSE statement */
     compile_time_rcode[pc][DEST]  = 0;         /* goto value initially set to 0 */
     compile_time_rcode[pc][2]     = -1;        /* unused */
     pc++;
     return pc;
  }
  return 0;
}
/*****************************************************************************/
/*      generates the R_GOTO R-code (unconditioned branch). It is used to    */
/*      jump to the next `elif' or the `else' part of an `if' statement.     */
/*****************************************************************************/
int rcode_goto(int where)
{
  if (pc < RCODE_MAX_CARD)
  {
     compile_time_rcode[pc][0] = R_GOTO;
     compile_time_rcode[pc][1] = where;
     compile_time_rcode[pc][2] = -1;
     pc++;
     return pc;
  }
  return 0;
}
/*****************************************************************************/
/*   generates the R_GOTO R-code statement which closes the current section  */
/*   of an `if' statement, together with the R_FALSE R-code which starts a   */
/*   new `elif' section.                                                     */
/*****************************************************************************/
int rcode_elif(int goto_address)
{
/* when we encounter an `elif' statement, three things have to be managed:
   1. first, a goto_t block has to be allocated and linked to the list, and
      an incomplete goto statement has to be added to rcode list;
   2. secondly, compile_time_rcode[iftop->pc][3] i.e., the running value, has to
      be updated with the current value of the pc register;
   3. third, a new `false' statement has to added, and iftop->pc should be
      updated with the current value of the pc register.
 */
… lines omitted …
}
/*****************************************************************************/
/*      generates the R_GOTO R-code, corresponding to the beginning of       */
/*      an `else' section of an `if' statement. Ends the R_FALSE R-code      */
/*      R-code corresponding to previous section.                            */
/*****************************************************************************/
int rcode_else(int goto_address)
{
/* when we encounter an `else' statement, two things have to be managed:
   1. first, a goto_t block has to be allocated and linked to the list, and
      an incomplete goto statement has to be added to rcode list;
   2. secondly, compile_time_rcode[iftop->pc][3] i.e., the running value, has to
      be updated with the current value of the pc register;
   No new `false' statement has to be added, nor iftop->pc should be
   updated with the current value of the pc register, as it was the case
   with rcode_elif().
 */
… lines omitted …
}
/*****************************************************************************/
/*      ends the pending R_GOTO's, corresponding to all sections of the      */
/*      current `if'. Ends also the top R_FALSE.                             */
/*****************************************************************************/
int rcode_fi()
{
/* Once we encounter a `fi' it obviously means that a whole `if' statement
   is over; when this happens we still have to adjust the whole list of goto's
   so as to point to this statement.
   When everything is done for each and every goto, then it's time to pop
   the `if' statement off the stack. When we reach the bottom we also have
   to reset iftop to NULL.
 */
… lines omitted …
}
Rcode.c also defines rflush, the function that, at the end of processing time, flushes the contents of
compile_time_rcode into the output files. One such file is “trl.h”, an example of which is available in Table
6 of Chapter 7. Function rflush is called by the main function of the Ariel.y parser.
/*****************************************************************************/
/*    flushes the R-codes to the object file, resets counters accordingly    */
/*****************************************************************************/
int rflush()
{
   extern FILE *f;
   n = fwrite( (void*) &compile_time_rcode[0][0], sizeof(rcode_t), pc, f);
   fflush(f);
3. Rint.c
This section briefly sketches the source code of the RINT virtual machine, the interpreter of the r-code
generated by the art translator. Its main function is rather simple:
int main(void) /* RINT main module */
{
  rdump = fopen("rdump.txt", "w");       /* rdump logs all the executed rcodes */
  if( BSL_InitLibrary() == BSL_ERROR)  { /* connects to the BSL (re: Chap.7, Sect.3.2) */
                fprintf(stderr, "RINT: failed to initialise BSL\n");
                BSL_CloseLibrary();
                return -1;
        }
  dowhile();                             /* executes a loop in function “dowhile” */
  if( BSL_CloseLibrary() == BSL_ERROR) { /* and disconnects */
                fprintf(stderr,
                "RINT: failed to close BSL. Clean up the system manually!\n");
                return -1;
        }
  return 0;
}
Clearly the greater part of the complexity of RINT lies in its dowhile function, which just waits
continuously for a waking message after which it executes the rcodes one by one:
dowhile ()
{
        int line;
        extern int rcode_card;
        size = sizeof(message_t);
        while (1)
        {
                RINTGetMessage();                 /* “Wake up!” */
                printf("Recovery starts (%d r-codes).\n", rcode_card);
                BSL_ResetTimerBase();             /* Zero time counters */
                line = 0;                         /* line (program counter) is zeroed */
                while ( line < rcode_card ) {     /* while there are rcodes… */
                                                … lines omitted …
                                                  /* execute the function
                                                     corresponding to the current rcode
                                                  */
                    rfunc [ rcodes[line][0] ] (rcodes[line][1], rcodes[line][2], line);
                    line++;
        }
The execution of the rcodes implies the use of a run-time stack for the evaluation of arithmetical and
Boolean expressions.  Such stack is accessed through function R_Push and R_Pop, defined elsewhere.
After the execution of any arithmetical or Boolen operation, the result is pushed onto the stack. This is for
instance the execution of R_False,_the function corresponding to recovery opcode R_FALSE:
                  if (R_Pop() == FALSE)          // check the top of the stack
                  {
                        fprintf(rdump, "%d \tConditional GOTO, fulfilled, %d.\n",
                                        line, line + rcodes[line][1]);
                        line += rcodes[line][1]; // if FALSE, execute jmp
                        continue;
                  }
Another simple example is given by function R_Or (the run-time executive for opcode R_OR):
int R_Or(int op1, int dummy, int rline)
{
        /* RCODE: R_OR
           ARIEL:  part of the expressions within IF statements */
        int t = R_Pop();
        int s = R_Pop();
        R_Push( t || s );
        fprintf(rdump, "%d \tOR statement (popped %d and %d, pushed %d).\n",
                        rline, t, s, t || s);
        return  t || s;
}
After having described the Ariel scanner and Ariel’s compile-time and run-time components, we can now
focus our attention on the Ariel parser.
Ariel’s parser
The Ariel parser is the program that actually instructs the translation from the high-level Ariel source into
the lower-level rcodes and configuration header files. A thorough description of this section would be
inappropriate, so we concentrate on a few particularly meaningful fragments.
As already mentioned, the structure of a YACC parser closely resembles that of LEX scanners. For
instance, like Ariel.l, also Ariel.y begins with a “%{” … “%}” section. Among other things, in that section
we include header file “rcode.h”, described in previous section, and define the type of yylval through the
“%union” statement:
%{
… lines omitted …
#include "rcode.h"
typedef struct {
          unsigned
          int role;   /* a bit pattern with one or more of these
                         bit positions turned on:
                           ID_GROUP, ID_THREAD, ID_NODE, ID_ENTITY,
                           ID_NORMAL, ID_STAR, ID_DOLLAR */
          int id;     /* an integer identifying the entity */
        }             ident_t;
%union {
        float real;                // value of the just scanned real number
        int   integer;             // value of the just scanned integer number
        ident_t  id;               // role and id of an entity
        struct { char name[64];    // symbolic name of an rcode opcode
                 int  rcode;
        } string;
        char  quoted_string[64];   // value of a quoted string
        int   status;              // status info
}
Ariel also defines 26 integer variables, each for each letter of the English alphabet. The Definitions section
of YACC also makes room for them:
static int var[26];  /* Ariel’s 26 pre-defined and pre-initialised variables */
Several sections follow, which describe the data structures for the configuration of some of the “Basic
Tools” (see Chapter 7, Sect. 2.3 for more detail on this). One such tool is the watchdog timer, a Single-
version software fault-tolerance provision that would normally be configured in the functional source code
of the user application. Ariel allows configuring such tools in the Ariel (non-functional) source code. Here
is the YACC section of the watchdog:
… lines omitted …
/************************** watchdogs *****************************/
typedef struct {
                int watching, /* id of the watching task */
                    watched,  /* id of the watched task */
                    rate,
                    unit,
                    action,
                    target, running;
        }       watchdog_t;
#define    MAX_WDOGS    32
watchdog_t watchdog[MAX_WDOGS];
int        w_sp = 0;
#define    INCWATCH     ++w_sp;
#define    WATCHTOP     watchdog[w_sp]
#define    BADWATCH     (w_sp > MAX_WDOGS)
#define    MAX_WD_FNAME 80
#define    MAX_WD_NAME  40
int watchdog_flush(watchdog_t*, int); // creates the source codes for the watchdogs
/*********************** end watchdogs ****************************/
Another section defines a restoring organ (see Chapter 4, Section 3 on the EFTOS Voting Farm, the source
of which was used here). Note that this is a software fault-tolerance provision that would normally require a
non-negligible amount of code intrusion, which is considerably reduced in this case:
/************************* nversion ******************************/
typedef struct { int version,            // version id
                     task,               // task id
                     timeout,            // max duration of task
                     unit;               // millisecs or microsecs
        } version_t;
#define    MAX_VERS     7                // up to 7 versions (7-MR system)
typedef struct {
                int running,             // parsing flag
                    task;                // task id of the restoring organ
                version_t va[MAX_VERS];  // the versions
                int va_num;              // running number of encountered versions
                int voting;              // voting algorithm
                char *metric;            // name of the metric function
                int success, error;
                int versmin, versmax;    // versions can be given in any order
        }       nversion_t;
#define    MAX_NVERS    16               // up to 16 restoring organs
nversion_t nversion[MAX_NVERS];
int        nv_sp = 0;                    // stack pointer for nversion[]
#define    INCNVERS     ++nv_sp;
#define    NVERSTOP     nversion[nv_sp]
#define    BADNVERS     (nv_sp > MAX_NVERS)
#define    MAX_NV_FNAME 80
#define    MAX_NV_NAME  40
int nversion_flush(nversion_t*, int);   // creates the sources of the restoring organs
/*********************** end nversion ****************************/
Another section defines the tokens, (optionally) their type, and precedence/associativity rules:
%token <string> ROLE
%token <integer> NUMBER VAR
%token <real> REAL
%token <id> GID NID TID
%token IF ELSE ELIF FI THEN
%token KILL RESTART START ISOLATE
%token KEYW_TASK KEYW_TASKID KEYW_NODE KEYW_IS KEYW_ALIAS KEY
%token KEYW_LOGICAL KEYW_ENDLOGICAL
%token WATCHDOG WATCHES HEARTBEATS EVERY
%token REBOOT KEYW_ENDWATCHDOG
%token NVERSION KEYW_VERSION TIMEOUT VOTING
%token MAJORITY ALGORITHM
%token METRIC SUCCESS KEYW_ENDNVERSION
… lines omitted …
%token <integer> LET VAL
%token <integer> EQ NEQ GT GE LT LE
%token <integer> MILLISEC MICROSEC
%left AND OR
%left NOT
%token <status> KILLED RESTARTED PRESENT
%token <status> ISOLATED FAULTY DEADLOCKED
%token <status> REINTEGRATED FIRED PAUSED
%type <status> status
%type <id> id
%type <integer> compare
%type <integer> seconds
%type <integer> expression linexp
/* precedences/associativity */
%left '+' '-'
%left '*' '/'
%left UMINUS
We get then to the main YACC section, that of Rules & Actions. The start symbol is “rlstats”, which states
that an Ariel script consists of one or more “rlstat” or erroneous lines:
%%
rlstats:
        | rlstats rlstat
        | error '\n'
                {
                fprintf(stderr, "\tLine %d: syntax error.\n", lines);
                errors++;
                }
        ;
It is the definition of “rlstat” that lists all possible cases for a valid Ariel statement. Here it follows its
(abridged) specification:
rlstat:   '\n'
        | definition '\n'
                {
                        if (rec)
                        {
                        fprintf(stderr, "\tLine %d: semantical error: ", lines);
                        yyerror("Can't define roles in strategy section");
                        errors++;
                        }
                }
        | section '\n'
        | include '\n'
        | timeouts '\n'
        | definitions '\n'
        | identifiers '\n'
        | alphacounts '\n'
        | aliases '\n'
        | logicals '\n'
        | entrypoints '\n'
        | stacksizes '\n'
        | watchdog '\n'
        | nversiontask '\n'
        | injection '\n'
        ;
An exhaustive description not being appropriate here, we decided to focus our attention on some of the
above mentioned statements. We begin with an example of a configuration statement: this is the syntax of
statements for the configuration of watchdogs.
watchdog:       watchdog_start watchdog_args watchdog_end
        ;
watchdog_args:
        |       on_error watchdog_args
        |       heartbeats watchdog_args
        |       w_alphacount watchdog_args
        ;
watchdog_start:      WATCHDOG KEYW_TASK NUMBER WATCHES KEYW_TASK NUMBER '\n'
                {
                        WATCHTOP.running = 1; /* flag: we're within a watchdog */
                        WATCHTOP.watching = $3;
                        WATCHTOP.watched = $6;
                        taskram[$3].actor = RE_WD;
                }
        ;
w_alphacount:ALPHACOUNT KEYW_IS THRESHOLD '=' REAL ',' FACTOR '=' REAL KEYW_ENDALPHA '\n'
                {
                        alphas[WATCHTOP.watching].used = 1;
                        alphas[WATCHTOP.watching].threshold = $5;
                        alphas[WATCHTOP.watching].k = $9;
                }
        ;
seconds :       MILLISEC | MICROSEC
        ;
heartbeats:     HEARTBEATS EVERY NUMBER seconds '\n'
                {
                        if (WATCHTOP.running)
                        {
                                WATCHTOP.rate = $3;
                                WATCHTOP.unit = ($4 == MILLISEC)? 0:1;
                        }
                        else
                        {
                                fprintf(stderr, "\tLine %d: semantical error: ", lines);
                                yyerror("bad use of ON ERROR.");
                                errors++;
                        }
                }
        ;
on_error:       ON ERROR WARN KEYW_TASK NUMBER '\n'
                {
                        if (WATCHTOP.running)
                        {
                                WATCHTOP.action = 0;
                                WATCHTOP.target = $5;
                        }
                        else
                        {
                                fprintf(stderr, "\tLine %d: semantical error: ", lines);
                                yyerror("bad use of ON ERROR.");
                                errors++;
                        }
                }
        |       ON ERROR REBOOT '\n'
                {
                        if (WATCHTOP.running)
                                WATCHTOP.action = 1;
                        else
                        {
                                fprintf(stderr, "\tLine %d: semantical error: ", lines);
                                yyerror("bad use of ON ERROR.");
                                errors++;
                        }
                }
        |       ON ERROR RESTART '\n'
                {
                        if (WATCHTOP.running)
                                WATCHTOP.action = 2;
                        else
                        {
                                fprintf(stderr, "\tLine %d: semantical error: ", lines);
                                yyerror("bad use of ON ERROR.");
                                errors++;
                        }
                }
        ;
watchdog_end:   KEYW_ENDWATCHDOG '\n'
                {
                        WATCHTOP.running = 0;
                        INCWATCH;
                        if (BADWATCH)
                        {
                                fprintf(stderr, "\tLine %d: semantical error: ", lines);
                                yyerror("Too many watchdogs have been defined.");
                                errors++;
                        }
                }
        ;
Apart from converting configuration statements into configured header files and source code fragments, the
other important task of the Ariel translator is producing the rcode equivalent of the Ariel recovery script.
As an example, herein we describe how the IF THEN … ELSE … FI statements are dealt with:
section:        if elif else fi
        ;
if:     {
                /* each IF increments the IF nesting counter */
                rcode_single_op(R_INC_NEST);
                                  … lines omitted …
        }
        IF '[' expr  ']'     Sepp  /* Sepp is whitespaces */
        {
                 /* at first we issue an incomplete R_FALSE
                    statement that is meant to jump to the ELSE
                    clause or to the FI statement if the
                    expression will be evaluated as false
                  */
                 rcode_if();
                                    … lines omitted …
        }
        THEN Sepp actions
                        {
                                /* No maintenance is required by THEN */
                        }
        ;
else:   |        /* else may be missing */
                        {
                                /* at first, before ELSE, we issue an
                                   incomplete R_GOTO corresponding to the
                                   Beginning of the ELSE clause
                                   and we record where we are
                                 */
                                goto_pc = rcode_goto(0);
                        }
                ELSE
                        {
                                /* after ELSE, we complete the R_FALSE R-code
                                   issued at the closest IF statement.
                                 */
                                rcode_else(goto_pc);
                        }
                Sepp actions
                        {
                                /* there go the else actions… */
                        }
        ;
fi:             FI
                        {
                                rcode_fi();
                                /* each FI implies decrementing the nesting counter */
                                rcode_single_op(R_DEC_NEST);
                                                                        … lines omitted …
                        }
        ;
The possibility to have nested IF is expressed very simply:
actions:
        | actions action
        ;
action: '\n'
        |
        section            Sepp
        |
        recovery_action    Sepp
        ;
The actual error recovery actions are defined as follows:
recovery_action:  KILL    id
                {
                        /* This means “KILL *”, which is not likely to be
                           a sensible recovery action, hence is not allowed
                         */
                        if ($2.role & ID_STAR)
                        {
                                fprintf(stderr, "\tLine %d: semantical error: ", lines);
                                yyerror("Can't use `*' with KILL");
                                errors++;
                        }
                        /* GENERATE_RACTION is, in its simplest form, a
                           rcode_raction($1, $2.role, $2.id)
                         */
                        GENERATE_RACTION(R_KILL, $2);
                }
        |         RESTART TID
                {
                        GENERATE_RACTION(R_RESTART, $2);
                }
        |         RESTART GID
                {
                        GENERATE_RACTION(R_RESTART, $2);
                }
        |         RESTART NID
                {
                        GENERATE_RACTION(R_REBOOT, $2);
                }
        | CALL NUMBER
                {
                        /* CALL takes its argument from the stack;
                           first argument is arg counter, 0 in this case
                         */
                        rcode_twoargs(R_PUSH, 0);
                        /* the available function calls are
                           identified by integers */
                        rcode_twoargs(R_FUNCTION_CALL, $2);
                }
        | CALL NUMBER '(' list ')'
                {
                        for (i=card_list-1; i>=0; i--)
                        {
                                rcode_twoargs(R_PUSH, list[i]);
                        }
                        rcode_twoargs(R_PUSH, card_list);
                        rcode_twoargs(R_FUNCTION_CALL, $2);
                }
        | LET VAR '=' linexp
                {
                        rcode_twoargs(R_SET, $2);
                        /* linexp pushes its result on top of the evaluation stack; then
                           The code for R_Set is very simple:
                                      int R_Set(int index, int dummy1, int dummy2)
                                      { int t = R_Pop();
                                        return var[index] = t;
                                      }
                         */
                }
        | LOG NUMBER
                {
                        rcode_twoargs(R_LOGI, $2);
                }
        | LOG CLOCK
                {
                        rcode_single_op(R_LOGC);
                }
        | LOG VAR
                {
                        rcode_twoargs(R_LOGV, $2);
                }
;
… many lines omitted …
The last section of the YACC source code Ariel.y includes the whole scanner and defines the main
function:
%%
#include "lex.yy.c"
main(int argc, char *argv[])
After a long list of definitions, the management of the art’s command arguments, and the opening of the
input files, the main function executes yyparse, i.e., the actual parser. As a result – provided that the parsing
concluded successfully – several data structures are filled with configuration data and the actual output r-
code. The processing ends with a series of “flush” calls:
yyparse();
rflush();
if (w_sp > 0)
    {
            watchdog_flush(watchdog, w_sp);
            fprintf(stderr, "Watchdogs configured.\n");
    }
if (nv_sp > 0)
    {
            nversion_flush(nversion, nv_sp);
            fprintf(stderr, "N-version tasks configured.\n");
    }
… lines omitted …
}
